Knowledge Exchanges Between Portugal and Europe

Maritime Diplomacy, Espionage, and Nautical Science in the Early Modern World (15th-17th Centuries)
Knowledge Exchanges between Portugal and Europe
Maritime Humanities, 1400-1800

Early modern oceans not only provided temperate climates, resources, and opportunities for commercial exchange, they also played a central role in cultural life. Increased exploration, travel, and trade, marked this period of history, and early modern seascapes were cultural spaces and contact zones, where connections and circulations occurred outside established centres of control and the dictates of individual national histories. Likewise, coastlines, rivers, and ports were all key sites for commercial and cultural exchange. Interdisciplinary in its approach, Maritime Humanities, 1400–1800: Cultures of the Sea welcomes books from across the full range of humanities subjects, and invites submissions that conceptually engage with issues of globalization, post-colonialism, eco-criticism, environmentalism, and the histories of science and technology. The series puts maritime humanities at the centre of a transnational historiographical scholarship that seeks to transform traditional land-based histories of states and nations by focusing on the cultural meanings of the early modern ocean.

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Knowledge Exchanges between Portugal and Europe

*Maritime Diplomacy, Espionage, and Nautical Science in the Early Modern World (15th–17th Centuries)*

*Nuno Vila-Santa*

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Introduction: Maritime History and History of Knowledge for the 16th-Century European History

Abstract
This chapter links together recent historiographical trends in the fields of maritime history, the history of knowledge, and the history of science, to present the state of the art in the field of the book: Iberian maritime studies. The question of the secrecy policy of the Iberian monarchies (Portugal and Spain) is raised, as well as the need to study the specific case of the circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge among its competitors and the general impact thereof on both sides. Thus, it is explained that the book focuses on the circulation of maritime knowledge (pilots, sailors, cartographers, cosmographers, nautical rutters, nautical cartography, nautical treatises) through normal channels and through espionage attempts, using Portuguese, Spanish, French, English, and Dutch sources.

Keywords: history of knowledge, history of science, European history, maritime history, globalization, Iberian secrecy policies

The 16th century was characterized by a geographical revolution that had a meaningful impact on Europe. This revolution was triggered by the maritime explorations of the Portuguese and the Spanish in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans during the 15th and 16th centuries, as well as later expansion by the French, English, and Dutch in the same areas. To this day, scholars from various disciplines and backgrounds still debate the impact of European overseas expansion on the cultural, economic, social, political, and scientific development of Europe and the rest of the world. In these processes, the circulation of knowledge between European maritime players was of pivotal...
importance for the beginning of expansionist processes and also for the later creation of overseas empires. Historiographical debates on these topics have been enormous. They are recorded in two of this book's main areas: the history of knowledge and maritime history. As this book aims to study these processes for the Portuguese scenario, a brief overview, as well as an explanation of the reasons for this study, will be provided.

Recent debates on the history of science and the history of knowledge gave rise to historiographical claims on the importance of these fields and their differences. One of the many impacts of these debates has been on the renewal of historiography on the history of knowledge itself. In a well-known book, Benjamin Schmidt and Pamela A. Smith proposed an in-depth examination of the impact of knowledge circulation beyond studies of print culture, focusing on the social construction of knowledge and its agents. Other authors also recognized the importance of studying “knowledge agents,” meaning intermediaries and cross-cultural brokers. Alida C. Metcalf studied them in colonial areas such as Brazil in the 16th century, while later James Delbourgo, Kapil Raj, Lissa Roberts and Simon Schaffer also edited a book on the topic.

These appeals were considered when concrete steps for the creation of a coherent field on the history of knowledge were pursued by a group of historians from Scandinavia. This group published an important volume on the circulation of knowledge, providing a comprehensive historiographical background for the field. Afterwards, the creation of the Journal for the

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3 Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005).
History of Knowledge in 2020 also had important impact. In the journal's first issue, a group of experts, including Sven Dupré, Johan Östling, David Larsson Heidenblad, and Peter Burke, engaged in discussion on the new directions for research in the field. While all experts acknowledged the high expectations for the field, they provided diverse perspectives on its future. The significance of knowledge dissemination and its impact was emphasized as a crucial aspect, as well as determining the ultimate goal of the history of knowledge. In line with recent trends in global history, all authors concurred on the importance of expanding the scope of the field. Peter Burke proposed incorporating the formal approach of cultural historians and infiltrating other fields such as economic, social, and political history. While Burke did not mention maritime history, there are compelling reasons to consider its inclusion as such claims also affected recent works on the history of science.

In a volume on the origins of modern science, Ofer Gal has advanced a conceptualization of “global knowledge.” Gal posits that in order to comprehend how Europe transitioned from antiquity to the emergence of modern science, the process of knowledge becoming accessible to all was of paramount importance. According to Gal, knowledge became globalized in the early modern period through navigations, geographical discoveries, and global trade. Gal's argument, therefore, highlights the significance of maritime history in the processes of knowledge globalization. Along the same lines, Lauren Benton and Nathan Perl-Rosenthal argued for the importance of conducting new studies that adopt a global maritime history approach and that simultaneously enhance our understanding of the exchange of nautical knowledge through people, ideas, and practices. Both authors emphasized the necessity of examining peaceful and conflicting dynamics and contexts to comprehend the contribution of knowledge circulation to the emergence of modern science. It is precisely at this point that these

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6 For the whole debate see: https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/issue/view/497 [accessed on August 24, 2022].


debates intercept with studies on Iberian maritime history and, mainly, discussions on the importance of Iberian maritime knowledge circulation.

Some authors have recently stressed the need for connected histories of globalization, while others even posed the question of an Iberian origin of modern globalization. However, this last claim poses an historiographical problem: if the theory of an Iberian origin of globalization is credited, how should later European contributions be placed? Recent works that have highlighted the importance of global knowledge, regarded as another crucial “commodity” of the early modern period, provide an answer. These studies stressed that the circulation of knowledge needs to be studied in order to understand its impact on the emergence of new global webs of power. In these processes, it would be a mistake to consider that knowledge is not transformed by its circulation, as Kapil Raj argues. As knowledge circulates, it is altered by its carriers and by the contexts of its origin and destination.

The question of the Iberian origin of globalization is also linked to a longstanding debate that is relevant to this book: the contribution of the 16th-century to 17th-century science and the role played by the Iberians. In the 1970s, renowned Portuguese historian Avelino Teixeira da Mota challenged Harold L. Burstyn’s views, by emphasizing the importance of the Portuguese invention of astronomical navigation in the 15th century for the overall process of European overseas expansion and nautical science. Similarly, English navy officer David Waters authored an often-overlooked article entitled “Portuguese Nautical Science and the Origins of the Scientific

Revolution.” In it, Waters established the connection between Portuguese navigations in the 15th century and new mental horizons, linking this with the emergence of modern science in Europe. Quoting Waters’ words: “The genius of men such as Galileo was to develop this revolutionary attitude of mind into the scientific method whose application in the 17th century on a wide intellectual front effected the Scientific Revolution. But, the initial impetus for all this came, let me repeat, from the application of science to the art of navigation by Portuguese scholars of the 15th and early 16th centuries, and from the use of this nautical science by the seamen of Portugal who fearlessly risked their lives and put scientific theory and prediction into practice and proved them correct.” The author claimed the importance, as the later history of knowledge argued, of the processes of knowledge becoming accessible to wider audiences. Waters underscored the relevance of the first astronomical rules for navigation and of solar declination tables, which allowed for “science [to be brought] out of the secret recesses of scholar’s closet on the windswept decks of ships for daily use.” Waters finally remarked that for European history the “consequences were revolutionary, some might say, cataclysmic.”

The arguments put forward by David Waters were also developed by other authors, who also claimed the importance of the Portuguese contribution to the rise of modern science. However, the question of the Portuguese input

is related to a larger debate: the Iberian contribution to the rise of modern science (thus, including also Spain). Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra directly addressed this problem. In an article entitled “Iberian Science in the Renaissance: Ignored How Much Longer?,” the author discussed the main reasons for the Iberian absence from the main narratives of the modernization of European science. He claimed that the Iberians’ self-consciousness of scientific superiority during the 16th century was acknowledged by their maritime rivals. He noted how Richard Hakluyt (1553–1616), the prominent compiler and publisher of English maritime records of the century, recognized the superiority of Iberian nautical science as late as 1599. Cañizares-Esguerra concluded that the Iberian absence from historiographical debates was primarily a consequence of the negative image of the Spaniard in England, perceived as a threat, during the 16th and 17th centuries. This contributed to the omission of Spanish contributions to the debates on the emergence of modern science in Europe. He also recognized this was not only a Spanish challenge, but also a Portuguese problem.

The subsequent historiographical renewal on the Spanish contributions to the rise of modern science, slowly integrated the Portuguese case in those debates. The edited volume by Daniela Bleichmar, Kristin Huffine, Kevin Sheehan, and Paula de Vos, is a primary example. In this book, Henrique Leitão and Palmira Fontes Costa provided a contribution in which they summarized the main literature on the study of Portuguese imperial science, including developments in the maritime field. Francisco Contente


21 Palmira Fontes Costa and Henrique Leitão, “Portuguese Imperial Science: A Historiographical Review,” in Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, ed. Daniela Bleichmar, Kristin Huffine,
Domingues argued in a similar vein for the impact of Portuguese nautical science. Onésimo T. Almeida also stated that Portuguese sailors were at the forefront of the emergence of early modern science in Europe. The author claimed that the Portuguese contribution was less well-known than that of others mainly because Portuguese works were not translated into English and widely disseminated. He also called on historians, and historians of science in particular, to examine and study the connections between 17th-century scientific authors and their 16th-century predecessors. Quoting one of Francis Bacon’s (1561–1626) famous passages in which Bacon acknowledged that his work was a direct result of all the maritime voyages undertaken by Europeans and not just the English, Almeida suggested the importance of studying the exchange of knowledge between Portugal and its European maritime rivals and how these processes influenced their own overseas expansions. Several of Henrique Leitão’s and António Sánchez’s works have, more recently, argued for the relevance of the Portuguese maritime example and contribution to the modernization of early modern science.

Along similar lines, Anthony Pagden and Sanjay Subrahmanyam also wrote a related essay on the importance of the Iberian connection in the
rise of British overseas expansion. In their opinion: “The English, like the French, kept an ever-watchful eye on what both their Iberian rivals were doing from the moment that Columbus returned from his first voyage in 1492.” In this work, they documented how Britain learned from the Spanish experience in the Americas and the Portuguese experience in India. Concerning India, the authors stated clearly that from the beginning the English followed the example of the Portuguese.  

Still, even after this, some scholars continued to insist on the lack of recognition of Portugal’s contribution from the debates. It is precisely at this point that one should ask why the Portuguese contributions have been so neglected.

At the heart of the Portuguese absence in this debate is, as Onésimo T. Almeida has remarked, the lack of translations of the main Portuguese Renaissance authors in Anglophone literature. This scenario is also partially explained by the lack of studies on the dissemination of Portuguese maritime knowledge to its rivals. A notable exception is the seminal study by Banha de Andrade on the circulation of Portuguese geographical “novelties” to Europe from the 15th century until the end of King Manuel I’s reign (1495–1521). This study primarily focuses on the exchange of knowledge with Italy, Germany, and Spain. However, as the book’s chronology predates the emergence of France, England, and the Dutch Republic as important competitors to Portuguese overseas interests, they are not mentioned in many instances. Despite its valuable contributions, Banha de Andrade’s study has not been translated into English, rendering it invisible to most Anglophone readers. Additionally, the idea of a Portuguese secrecy policy, as advanced by historian Jaime Cortesão, has played a role in the lack of studies on the

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28 Jaime Cortesão, A política de sigilo nos Descobrimentos (Lisbon: INCN, 1997).
circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe during the 16th century. As Cortesão argued that the Portuguese had some success in this policy, ever since it has been assumed in Anglophone academic studies, that the Portuguese were relatively successful in those attempts almost until the political union with Spain in 1580. However, even by the time of Jaime Cortesão’s *opus*, several scholars contested this vision. Luís de Albuquerque, Avelino Teixeira da Mota and Armando Cortesão’s studies had already suggested the opposite. Albuquerque, like Banha de Andrade, has suggested that sensitive Portuguese geographical and nautical knowledge freely circulated to Italy ever since the early 16th century in the mailbags of ambassadors and spies stationed in Lisbon. Avelino Teixeira da Mota and Armando Cortesão have also shown very similar instances in their *Portugaliae Monumenta Cartographica* for France, England and the Dutch Republic. Concerning Portuguese pilots circulating among European maritime rivals, Francisco de Sousa Viterbo uncovered several cases already in the 19th century.

Therefore, the importance of studying the circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe and its impact on the overseas expansion of Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic, is evident in several of the quoted authors. Still, there is currently a lack of a coherent narrative on this topic. The aim of this book is to begin addressing this gap in academic studies and to draw attention to this important yet understudied subject. It is crucial to acknowledge that attempts by the Portuguese to maintain secrecy in the 16th century were destined to fail (as they did) and that Portugal’s western geographical location in Europe did not impede deep connections with the rest of Europe. Additionally, the belief that Portugal primarily focused on overseas expansion prior to the political union with Spain in 1580 has led to the neglect of studies on the circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe particularly after King Manuel’s reign (from 1521 onwards). However,

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29 In 1580, at the death of the Portuguese King Henry (1578–80) without direct succession, the Portuguese throne was occupied by King Philip II of Spain, who ruled in Portugal as King Philip I. Until the 1640 Portuguese revolt, the successors of King Philip II of Spain reigned in Portugal, forming the Portuguese Austria dynasty; the period is usually referred to as the Iberian Union of Crowns.


it was during this time that France, England, and the Dutch Republic began to challenge Portugal’s attempted maritime hegemony overseas. It is, thus, essential to examine the exchange of nautical knowledge, primarily produced by sailors, pilots, cartographers, and cosmographers, during this period in order to fully understand the Portuguese contribution to the overall European maritime expansion process and to early modern science.

This book aims to examine the interchange of maritime knowledge between Portugal and its main European maritime rivals. The main questions that it will address and attempt to answer include: Who were the primary transmitters of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe? How did they circulate this knowledge? What conditions facilitated this circulation? What impact did it have at the points of arrival? Did it influence maritime and overseas expansion processes in other parts of Europe and if so, how? In answering these questions, the book will take a stand in the historiographical debates about maritime history and the role played by Iberian maritime knowledge in the overall European expansionist process. It will argue the importance of this connection especially in the early stages of English, French and Dutch overseas expansionist processes in the 16th and 17th centuries and will contend that these knowledge exchanges should be mainly perceived as a consequence of globalization processes that deployed in the 16th century, and not as mere “national” histories unconnected with each other. One of the major problems revealed in the previous historiographical discussion is the lack of integration and dialogue between different historiographies (for instance Dutch and English) and the Iberian ones (particularly the Portuguese) when it comes to the study of maritime knowledge transmission between rivals in the early modern period. Taking into consideration these historiographical needs, this book will attempt to create a coherent connected maritime European history, and following history of knowledge approaches, study the circulation and impact of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe.

Despite the gaps in sources, this study will make use of Portuguese, Spanish, French, English, and Dutch sources and studies whenever possible. The reader will quickly realize that the history of the circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge to Europe is not a straightforward narrative to uncover. Portuguese sources regarding pilots are scarce and they rarely directly mention the circulation to Europe of sailors, cosmographers and cartographers, except when they were considered traitors to the Portuguese Crown. As will be argued, this mostly took place with the well-known and openly commented cases. In many cases, references can be found in Portuguese documents related to diplomacy and espionage. This is why
most of the book’s chapters will focus on 16th-century diplomatic and espionage dispatches of Portuguese, Spanish, French, and English origin, as they were privileged places for documenting this interchange. In such cases, using Spanish, French, and English records is an opportunity to shed light onto cases not documented in Portuguese sources, particularly the less mentioned and apparently less meaningful ones. However, not only diplomats or spies were intermediaries of the type of knowledge that this book aims to study. Merchants, sailors, and travelers also acted as intermediaries between Portugal and the rest of Europe and could carry important maritime knowledge with them, and they will also be studied. Overall, the resulting picture is one of a history of often silent but decisive interchange taking place between Portugal and Europe. Although sources do not always allow for full documentation, it is impossible to deny that these knowledge exchanges took place and that they had deep consequences for both sides. For these reasons, the book’s primary field can be perceived as being that of the European maritime history of knowledge. Still, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the historical events, political contexts will be included whenever necessary to contextualize important moments in the narrative.

The book is organized in five chapters that will cover each specific case in a chronological manner with a conclusion, discussing how all the previous histories of knowledge interchange (Spanish-Portuguese; Anglo-Iberian; Franco-Iberian and Dutch-Iberian) are all interconnected and demonstrating why there is no reason to seriously consider the existence of coherent Portuguese secrecy policies. Throughout the book, the term “maritime knowledge” is used to encompass the various forms of knowledge exchange that are studied, including the circulation of pilots, sailors, cartographers, cosmographers, and nautical documents such as rutters, cartography and treatises, as well as maritime information embodied in documents resulting from maritime espionage and counter-espionage operations. Throughout the book, the term Iberian refers, in most cases, to Portuguese and Spanish knowledge as a whole. However, there will be instances in which Portuguese or Spanish knowledge cases will be referred separately as being Iberian. Even when mentioning them as single cases, it is clear that they were mainly Iberian, especially when seen from the 16th-century perspective of the French, the English or the Dutch. The Portuguese and Spanish maritime self-consciousness of being above all Iberian will also become evident through the documental evidence presented in the book. As discussed previously, the intrinsically Iberian nature of this interchange with Europe will also be underscored several times in the book.
From the early 15th century, the Portuguese were the first to create the different types of maritime knowledge that were later appropriated by their rivals. It is, thus, important to refer to these types of maritime knowledge that will be mentioned throughout the book. They include oceanic nautical rutters, oceanic cartography and the birth of astronomical navigation, particularly as later developed in nautical treatises of the 15th and 16th centuries. As David Waters has argued, at the time of their inception in the 15th century, these different bodies of maritime knowledge were entirely new. This factor decisively explains why it was so crucial for the Spanish, the French, the English and the Dutch to acquire that knowledge to launch systematic overseas expansion. As will be shown for the Spanish, the English, the French and the Dutch cases, all these maritime players quickly understood that one of the main prerequisites for sustaining oceanic navigations and building overseas empires was mastery of maritime knowledge. This topic is linked with the importance of the processes of circulation of general maritime information and intelligence (for instance, details about rival fleet’s departures emanating from maritime espionage—according to each case’s sensitivity they can be labeled as information or intelligence), and its transformation into maritime knowledge (for instance editing and translating Portuguese maritime knowledge into other languages). In all these instances, rivalry and emulation went hand in hand in the processes of information circulation and its transformation into knowledge. Throughout the book’s chapters, the difference will become clear with concrete instances.

One of the book’s goals is to underscore the significance of this informal circulation of knowledge, which often took place in manuscript form and had important consequences for those involved. Additionally, this book aims to demonstrate how this type of knowledge exchange was largely uncontrollable by any single power, be it the Iberian, French or English Crowns, or the Dutch Republic. As will be argued, this a key characteristic of all European overseas expansionist processes. In sum, the chapters of this book will collectively demonstrate how, already in the 16th century and in a process that only accelerated in the 17th and 18th centuries, maritime knowledge was already a global commodity among maritime rivals. Although

other European areas, such as Italy and Germany, were also privileged places for Iberian maritime knowledge interchange, they are not included in this book. Even if they significantly participated in the process through the production of chief knowledge translations and editions, neither Italian nor German powers became serious maritime competitors of the Iberian overseas interests. Therefore, as it is impossible in a single book to address all the European actors of this exchange, a deliberate choice was made to focus only on the interchange with the direct maritime rivals of the Portuguese (Spain, France, England and the Dutch Republic).

The structure of the book is designed to provide a comprehensive examination of the interchange of maritime knowledge between various European powers. The first chapter focuses on the intra-Iberian nautical exchange between Portugal and Spain, beginning in the 15th century and ending in 1580 with the political union of Portugal and Spain. The chapter will demonstrate the intensity of the Portuguese-Spanish interchange and how Portuguese contributions to Spanish nautical science were crucial in several key moments during the 16th century. Additionally, the chapter will argue that Spanish contributions to Portuguese scientific and overseas developments were also meaningful, and that the process of interchange between Portugal and Spain also affected the rest of Europe.

The second chapter examines Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations, drawing on recently discovered original documents that detail one of the earliest episodes of interchange and rivalry between Portugal and England: the first systematic English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s. The chapter will analyze the diplomacy, espionage, and interchange of maritime knowledge between both sides and its role in the re-emergence of English overseas expansion. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how, already during the early 1550s, the pattern of rivalry, emulation, and interchange of nautical knowledge was present in Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations.

The third chapter uses the correspondences of Michel de Seure and Jean Nicot, the French ambassadors to Portugal during the 1550s and 1560s, to study French-Portuguese interchange of maritime knowledge during a pivotal period marked by official and unofficial confrontations in Brazil and West Africa. This chapter will demonstrate how French overseas imperial ambitions were closely linked to French espionage and the acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge in Lisbon, and how this connects to earlier French-Portuguese maritime rivalry.

In the fourth chapter, the book delves into the Portuguese strategies to counteract the French and English acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge during the critical period of the 1550s and 1560s. The study of
the correspondence of a Portuguese ambassador to France and England will be used to understand how Portugal attempted to prevent Portuguese maritime knowledge and expertise from entering French and English service. This chapter will focus on the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* and *Secret Science* policies, and will demonstrate the difference between these attempted policies and their actual results.

The fifth chapter examines the Dutch-Iberian relations, with a focus on the well-known case of Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the famous Dutch traveler to Portuguese Asia in the 1580s. The chapter will discuss the methods used by Van Linschoten to acquire Iberian (Portuguese and Spanish) maritime knowledge, and how his reshaping of the contents for the *Itinerario* publication in 1596 affected not only Dutch overseas expansion, but also English and French. Additionally, the chapter will demonstrate how, at the transition to the 17th century, Iberian maritime knowledge had become so globalized among its maritime rivals that it became impossible for the Iberian Crowns to successfully implement any secrecy policy.

The conclusion of the book will bring all the previous histories of knowledge together, highlighting the interconnectedness of these cases and emphasizing that they are merely examples of a much broader reality: the widespread circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge within Europe in the 16th century, despite all attempted secrecy policies. The conclusion will also discuss the reasons for the failure of these secrecy policies, while considering how the circulation of Portuguese maritime knowledge to its European rivals contributed to early modern science.

This book is based on research developed within the RUTTER project. Some of the chapters in this book use material previously published, but in all cases the book chapters develop and greatly extend the previously published versions. Thus, for instance, in chapter 2, more works, documents and bibliography were added to the version forthcoming in *English Historical Review* and the text was substantially re-written. Chapter 3 uses materials published in an article in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, but whole new sections were introduced, new topics added, many more documents discussed, etc. Chapter 4 is also a much enlarged version of an article in *Vegueta*, made possible by new research in archives and libraries in Spain, France and England. Chapters 1 and 5 do not use material published elsewhere. All chapters were written in order to give the book a streamlined and coherent flow.
1. The First Global Exchange and Dispute over the Globe: the Portuguese-Spanish Nautical Interchange (1415–1580)

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the intra-Iberian nautical exchange between Portugal and Spain, beginning in the 15th century and ending in 1580 with the political union between Portugal and Spain under the Iberian Union. It demonstrates the intensity of the Portuguese-Spanish interchange and shows how Portuguese contributions to Spanish nautical science were crucial at several key moments during the 16th century. Additionally, it argues that Spanish contributions to Portuguese scientific and overseas developments were meaningful, and that the process of interchange between Portugal and Spain also affected the rest of Europe.

Keywords: pilots, cosmographers, Charles V, Philip II, John III, secrecy policies

Introduction

The process of nautical exchange between Portugal and what would later become Spain,\(^1\) was of great significance for both sides starting in the 15th century.

\(^1\) Although this process started as Portuguese-Castilian rivalry in the 15th century, it evolved during the 16th century into a truly Portuguese-Spanish process owing to the political union between Castile and Aragon in 1469 by the dynastic marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon. This union was further strengthened when King Charles I assumed the crown of both realms in 1516. As such, it has been deemed appropriate in this chapter to refer to these processes as Portuguese-Spanish rather than simply Portuguese-Castilian, as the union between Castile and Aragon had a great impact on the strength of Spain’s claims vis-à-vis Portugal. This will become evident in this chapter’s section on diplomacy and espionage. This logic will be maintained in the following chapters too.


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century. As the first European powers to systematically embark on overseas expansion, Portugal and Spain were also the first to establish structures to support their empires and to engage in overseas rivalry. This Portuguese-Spanish rivalry, which initially took place in the Iberian Peninsula and the North Atlantic, soon expanded to encompass the geographies of both empires during the 16th century, as Portuguese and Spanish sailors reached new parts of the globe and established new imperial bases. As a consequence, Portuguese-Spanish nautical exchange also began to occur worldwide as the maritime rivalry intensified. While the importance of this exchange can be clearly observed and is best documented from the 1480s onwards, when Spain began to engage more systematically in overseas enterprises, it is also true that Portugal sometimes utilized this exchange for its own interests. The best-known example of this is Ferdinand Magellan’s (1480–1521) proposal to King Charles I of Spain (1516–56) for what became the first circumnavigation of the globe. However, there were also other meaningful cases prior to Magellan’s voyage, dating back to the beginning of Portuguese overseas expansion with the occupation of Ceuta in 1415. Both sides quickly understood the importance of controlling the flow of nautical information and knowledge to and from their rival, whether through simple circulation, diplomatic maneuvering, or espionage attempts. This process of exchange remained critical for both sides until the union of Portugal and Spain in 1580, and even after this period, collaboration and rivalry between the two sides did not subside.

The intense circulation of maritime knowledge played an important role in the history of Portuguese and Spanish overseas enterprises in the 15th and 16th centuries. It not only served the needs of both countries’ maritime imperial systems, but also embodied scientific knowledge exchanges that influenced what came to be known as Iberian maritime literature, embodied in the Spanish Manuals of Navigation. This interchange also had important consequences for the rest of Europe, as the Portuguese–Spanish exchange was the first of its kind chronologically and set a precedent for other 16th-century instances, such as the Anglo-Iberian, French-Iberian, Dutch-Iberian, Anglo-French, and Anglo-Dutch exchanges of nautical information. However, it is important to differentiate between the normal circulation of nautical experts (such as pilots, cartographers, and cosmographers) and diplomatic and espionage attempts aimed at preventing such circulation. Collaboration, emulation, and rivalry were key but conflicting concepts that affected this intra-Iberian interchange, but that still remained relevant for both sides.

This chapter will examine the exchanges of nautical knowledge between Portugal and Spain chronologically, although it will not aim to be exhaustive due to the vastness of the topic. Instead, it will focus on the main episodes
and their overall significance. The analysis will begin with the Spanish borrowing of Portuguese nautical expertise, starting with well-known episodes, and will then analyze the period after Magellan’s circumnavigation until the political union of Portugal and Spain in 1580. In the final sections, the Portuguese borrowing of Spanish nautical expertise and the diplomacy and espionage involved in attempts by both sides to disrupt the rival's maritime expeditions will be discussed. Throughout all sections, it will become apparent that, despite each side’s efforts to prevent the circulation of nautical knowledge, and independently of the reasons, most of the attempts failed. This pattern of Portuguese-Spanish nautical interchange will also be noticed in the following chapters.

1.1 Portuguese Nautical Knowledge at Spain’s Service (1481–1580)

1.1.1 The First Interchanges up to Ferdinand Magellan’s time (1481–1516)

One of the first and most consequential episodes of nautical knowledge interchange between Portugal and Spain took place with the inaugural voyage of Cristófer Columbus (1451–1506), in 1492. It is no secret that before coming to Spain, Columbus had proposed his plan to sail to the West to the Portuguese King John II (1481–95).² For this reason, Spanish chroniclers recognized the role that previous nautical knowledge exchanges with Portuguese pilots had for Columbus's ideas. In this context, the Spanish chronicler Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566) mentioned the information that Christopher Columbus gathered in conversations with Portuguese pilots such as Martim Vicente, Vicente Dias de Tavira, and Miguel Corte-Real,³ Antonio de Herrera (1549–1625), another Spanish official chronicler, emphasized the relevance of Vicente Dias de Tavira’s intelligence on the existence of islands to the West, which, he claims, were used by Columbus to convince the Catholic Kings (Elizabeth of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon) to sponsor his first voyage.⁴ Furthermore, Columbus had served in Portuguese voyages to West Africa for a decade, and on his inaugural expedition, he brought

² For a recent overview of Columbus’s career see the solidly documented new biography by: Luís Filipe Thomaz, Cristóvão Colombo o Genovês meu tio por afinidade (Lisbon: Portuguese Navy Academy, 2021).
⁴ Antonio de Herrera, Historia General de los hechos de los castellanos en las Islas i tierra firme del Mar oceano, I Decade (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1601), 6.
at least five Portuguese crew members with him. While this is what can be documented, there is a possibility that more Portuguese may have been onboard, providing valuable geographical insights.5

Columbus's case is paradigmatic of the nature of these exchanges between Portugal and Spain at the end of the 15th century, which decisively shaped the major pattern of maritime knowledge interchange between the two Iberian realms during the early 16th century. Even before formally becoming king of Portugal, in his quality as regent in 1480, Prince John issued a law forbidding Castilians and other foreigners from participating in Portuguese voyages to West Africa. If anyone was found in the region, the prince authorized Portuguese authorities to kill the interlopers without mercy or any need to consult Lisbon.6 This treatment of Castilians found in the area during those years was akin to the later approach towards the French and the English, as it was based on the Portuguese attempt to implement Mare Clausum policies.7 However, later and already as king, John II hired several foreigners for his geographical discoveries. Columbus's episode and the hiring of German cosmographer Martin Behaim (1459–1507) took place during his reign, showing how the Portuguese Crown, despite its awareness on the sensitivity of geographical knowledge, did not adopt a full secrecy policy with regard to it.8 Another instance similar to Behaim's employ is that of King John II's conversation with the German and Imperial ambassador Hieronymus Münzer (1437–1508) on recent Portuguese geographical discoveries.9 From this perspective, Columbus's case is illuminating and well-documented, as he was able to travel freely with critical information and knowledge between Portugal and Spain. However, this does not imply that Portugal fully accepted the free circulation of nautical experts to Spain.

5 Maria da Graça A. Mateus Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento e conquista da Hispano-América. Viagens e expedições (1492–1557) (Lisbon: Colibri Editions, 1999), 52.
9 Münzer visited Portugal and Spain during the 1480–90s. He dined at King John II's table and the Portuguese king confided to him that he was sending two Portuguese agents to Cairo to obtain knowledge about the Indian Ocean (Andrade, Mundos Novos, vol. I, 110). Although Münzer supported Columbus's idea to venture west to arrive to Asia whereas the Portuguese king did not patronize it, Münzer publicly praised the role of Portuguese navigations for European knowledge (Andrade, Mundos Novos, vol. I, 110 and 143).
Indeed, Portugal kept close vigilance and interfered in the circulation of its technical personnel. Again, Columbus’s story provides a striking episode. On the return of his first voyage, Columbus anchored firstly in Lisbon. At his arrival, Columbus had a fierce argument with a Portuguese captain. The discussion made him fear that war would soon break out between Portugal and Spain owing to the maritime discoveries he had made. The war was avoided because both realms started the negotiations that ended in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Shortly after, two other critical instances of documented geographical knowledge exchange took place. Before coming to Spain, the Italian Amerigo Vespucci (1454–1512) also served in Portugal and witnessed the making of Portuguese charts with information that was to be decisive for the Spanish to continue geographical discoveries after Columbus’s first voyages. As a consequence, he offered this intelligence to Spain. The Portuguese reaction was clear: the new Portuguese King Manuel I (1495–1521) hired Vespucci, for a time, for Portuguese maritime discoveries in South America. Still, due to unclear circumstances, the Portuguese king was unable to prevent his return to Spain, where he became the first pilot-major of the Sevillian Casa de la Contratación. The Casa had been created in 1503 by King Ferdinand of Aragon (1452–1516) and Queen Elizabeth of Castile (1451–1504) and followed the model of the Portuguese Casa da Índia. This serves as another proof of the importance of these intra–Iberian exchanges and of how Spain benefited from them in the early days of its overseas enterprises.

But if Columbus and Vespucci document instances of “foreign” nautical knowledge being disputed between Portugal and Spain, it was also at the end of the 15th century, that a Portuguese pilot entered Spanish service for good. The case had important repercussions, particularly as it preceded the 1517 migration of Ferdinand Magellan, and it initiated another phase in these nautical exchanges between Portugal and Spain. As this period coincided with the major Spanish attempts to launch systematically overseas

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expeditions, the Spanish nautical machine needed to recruit technical personnel with experience in long–distance oceanic voyages. At the time, Portuguese experts were at the head front and some were becoming increasingly interested in serving Spain mainly for the prospects of achieving better rewards than in Portugal. The career of Portuguese pilot João Dias de Solis (1470?–1516) soon became an example of how far a talented Portuguese sailor could rise in Spain’s service.

Although there has been some controversy over Solis’ nationality, Spanish and Portuguese documents prove his birth in Portugal. In October 1496, pressed by King Manuel I, the Catholic Kings signed an order to jail Solis, mentioned as a Portuguese pilot, as he had fled to Spain. At stake was the fact that Solis had privateered in French fleets against the Portuguese in West Africa.14 After serving for some time in Spain, Solis returned to Portugal. A Portuguese document related to captain Afonso de Albuquerque’s (1453–1515) departure for India in 1506 states that Albuquerque’s pilot was Solis. The departure was halted because Solis had escaped. This time, the reason was that he had murdered his wife. Some authors argued that Solis carried with him a manuscript version of the regiment of the astrolabe that was to be decisive in providing the Spanish with the techniques for astronomical navigation.15 When Solis arrived in Spain, he was promoted by King Ferdinand to the post of pilot of the Casa in 1507.16 Together with the Spaniard Vicente Yañes Pinzon (1462?–1514), Solis was named for a reconnaissance expedition to the Americas. While Pinzon would have the authority on land, Solis was to be the master in all nautical issues. Despite the important geographical discoveries made by both, upon their return to Spain, Solis was jailed for not obeying previous orders.17

Nevertheless, Solis’s detention did not last long. At Amerigo Vespucci’s death in 1512, King Ferdinand had already released Solis and named him as pilot-major of the Casa, bypassing other Spanish candidates such as the navigator-astronomer Andrés de San Martín.18 The king recognized the need

16 José Toribio Medina, Juan Díaz de Solís. Estudio histórico (Santiago de Chile: author’s edition, 1897), CXII.
17 Toribio Medina, Juan Díaz de Solís, CXI and CLXXVIII.
for the Portuguese pilot experience in training Spanish seamen. Nevertheless, Solis’s appointment was linked to the fulfilment of an important condition. In the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas it had been agreed that Portugal and Spain would send a joint expedition to settle the longitudinal line of demarcation in the Atlantic that divided the Portuguese and the Spanish hemispheres of influence. By 1512, this had not yet taken place. As the Portuguese had conquered Malacca and there were rumors that the antemeridian in Asia would pass close to Malacca, King Ferdinand decided to settle this issue. King Ferdinand’s interest in the matter was related to his and Queen Elizabeth of Castile’s desire, ever since the beginning of Spanish overseas plans, to find an alternative route to Asia without violating the Treaty of Tordesillas.

It was in this context that, using his previous experience in Portuguese service and Ptolemaic prescriptions, Solis argued that all the area from Malacca to the Pacific belonged to Spain as the antemeridian passed close to Malacca. King Ferdinand appointed Solis as pilot-major on the condition that he would organize an expedition to calculate the exact line of the Tordesillas meridian in the Americas and the antemeridian in Asia. King Ferdinand’s secret orders authorized Solis to navigate to Asia by the Cape of Good Hope, something that Spain was not allowed to do according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Tordesillas, as the route fell in the Portuguese hemisphere of influence. Solis was to go to Sri Lanka and Malacca to take measurements, and if he found that any of these areas really belonged to Spain, he was allowed to claim them for Spain. Considering Solis’s career between Portugal and Spain and particularly his previous reasons for migration, King Ferdinand worried with regard to his motivations. Accordingly, he ordered a close vigilance of Solis’s movements.  

In the meantime, Diogo Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain, discovered Solis’s plans. In August 1512, he confronted Solis, whom he identified as a Portuguese pilot serving Spain, and attempted to convince him to return to Portugal. Solis refused. The ambassador also mentioned that Solis had a brother and a goldsmith called João Henriques assisting him. Pending certain conditions, Henriques was willing to return to Portugal. As a man with no sea experience, the Portuguese ambassador reported these events to King Manuel I, warned him of the dangers and asked for the Portuguese king’s final position. By September 1512, understanding that he was unable to prevent Solis from sailing, the ambassador confronted King Ferdinand, arguing that this constituted a violation of the Treaty of
Tordesillas. King Ferdinand replied that Solis would not navigate to the Portuguese hemisphere in Asia but to the Spanish one in the Americas. Indeed, King Ferdinand by then was planning to send Solis to Central America to discover a nautical passage to Asia. In the official response to King Manuel I, King Ferdinand also asserted that Solis was an old man and that he would not have a leading role in the expedition. But, meanwhile, Henriques had also confessed that Solis would sail by the Cape of Good Hope, and as a result the Portuguese ambassador in Spain informed King Manuel I that he did not completely believe King Ferdinand’s words. The final outcome of this was a sibylline letter in menacing tones by King Manuel I to King Ferdinand, in which the insinuation was made of a new war between Portugal and Spain in case Solis sailed to Asia by the Cape route. The Portuguese king’s pressure prompted King Ferdinand to cancel Solis’s planned voyage to Asia. The conditions for such an expedition would only come with Ferdinand Magellan. Instead, Solis was ordered to direct the first Spanish expedition that sailed to the Plata River region, already in 1512. To prevent any potential issues or escape attempts, King Ferdinand offered substantial rewards to Solis.

This was one of the first significant attempts by the Portuguese to disrupt a Spanish overseas expedition. Later in this chapter, other examples will be detailed. However, when the tables were turned, Spain also exerted diplomatic pressure on Portugal to abort its overseas expeditions. These attempts, as in the case of Solis, often involved espionage efforts that, for the first time in maritime history, accompanied the discoveries, extending beyond Europe to the entire known globe. It is important to note that Solis’s story shares similar patterns with those of Columbus and Vespucci in that the dispute between Portugal and Spain over the nautical expertise of ocean captains was not solely political, but also a matter of preventing geographical knowledge from reaching the maritime rival.

The discovery of the Mar de Sur (Pacific Ocean) by Vasco Nunez de Balboa (1475–1519) also triggered an important geographical debate about the discoveries in this area. Solis participated in it and was commissioned by King Ferdinand to discover a route to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of South America, another instance demonstrating how Spain continued to search for a route to Asia on its own. Again, Solis’s personal experience and nautical skill were the key reason for his appointment.

21 Sánchez, La espada, la cruz, 103.
22 Toribio Medina, Juan Díaz de Solís, CXC–VI and CCXXIV.
King Ferdinand also allowed Solis's brother to replace him during the voyage should anything happen to Solis. Solis organized the second Spanish expedition to the Plata River, which was first called Solis River, but he died at the hands of indigenous people in 1516. Once more, Solis brought with him other Portuguese experts, such as Henrique Montes, Diogo Garcia, and Aleixo Garcia, who continued to assist later Spanish expeditions.

Solis’s migration to Spain thus presaged the well-known case of Ferdinand Magellan, an episode that had decisive consequences for the increasing migration of Portuguese sea experts to Spain. Edward Collins has pointed out that there is a period before and after the Treaty of Zaragoza of 1529 when this applied to the Portuguese contributions to Spanish navigation in the 16th century. It is therefore time to examine how this flow of expertise continued to increase until the Treaty of Zaragoza, by which King Charles I sold the Spanish rights over the Moluccas to Portugal. In a second moment, it will be analyzed whether or not the Treaty decreased the migration of Portuguese sailors to Spain.

1.1.2 Magellan’s Voyage and Its Consequences: From the Expedition to the Treaty of Zaragoza (1517–29)

Like Columbus and Vespucci, Ferdinand Magellan arrived in Spain with Portuguese geographical intelligence, asserting that the Moluccan Islands were on the Spanish side of the antemeridian of Tordesillas. As was recently argued, Magellan presented himself to King Charles I with the best cartographers and pilots, besides having behind him the best nautical science, updated and truthful cartographical knowledge. Aside from Portuguese pilots, it is highly probable that the renowned cartographer Diogo Ribeiro also came with Magellan. As it has also been argued that Ribeiro had a Spanish mother, this might have facilitated his coming to Spain with Magellan. What is certain, is that the Faleiro brothers (Rui and Francisco) came with Magellan, two important cosmographical advisors for...
the expedition. Although Rui Faleiro was named to depart with Magellan, his madness prevented that from happening. In 1521, when Rui and Francisco Faleiro were jailed in Portugal, they were only released by King Charles I’s intervention. The Spanish king’s interest in the brothers might also have been connected to the fact that both brought to Spain the idea (later published in Francisco Faleiro’s treatise in 1535 with King Charles I’s support) that there was an equivalence between measuring magnetic declination and finding longitude at sea. This idea was debated in the Portuguese maritime milieu in the early years of the 16th century and was already present in the seamanship book of João de Lisboa, a renowned Portuguese pilot. Despite the Faleiro brothers’ role in the planning of Magellan’s voyage, none of them sailed with Magellan. However, their knowledge was fundamental for King Charles I to such a degree that he had an interest in maintaining them in his service and avoid their return to Portugal. This fact not only justifies King Charles I’s intervention to have them released from a Portuguese prison, but also explains the later life of the Faleiro brothers in Spain.

Magellan himself went through several difficulties during the final preparations of his departure. In his fleet, with the exception of the Spaniard Juan Rodríguez de Mafra, the pilots Estêvão Gomes, João Lopes Carvalho, and João Serrão were all Portuguese. Carvalho had personal experience in a previous Portuguese expedition to the Plata River region, and Serrão was even appointed as the pilot-major for the journey. The Portuguese were one of the most numerous non-Spanish groups in the expedition and this fact explains why Spanish authorities tried to reduce Portuguese numbers, excluding at the last minute some Portuguese such as a brother of pilot Estêvão Gomes. Gomes had already been officially named pilot of the Casa with a salary in 1518. In 1519, another Portuguese pilot, Pedro Abreu, was appointed. A similar process happened with Diogo Ribeiro, but not with

30 Juan Gil, El exilio portugués en Sevilla. De los Braganza a Magallanes (Sevilla: Fundación Cajasol, 2009), 354–356.
32 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 106.
33 Laguarda Trías, “Pilotos portugueses,” 65.
35 Gil, El exilio portugués, 279 and 291.
the Portuguese cartographers Pedro and Jorge Reinel who helped the Spanish cartographer Nuno Garcia Toreño. Jorge and Pedro Reinel were in Seville temporarily to prepare maps for Magellan's expedition, but both returned to Portugal sometime later. Indeed, father Jorge Reinel came to Seville to bring his son Pedro Reinel back to Portugal. Compared to Solis's two expeditions, Magellan's voyage had the highest participation of Portuguese seamen who had ever set sail under a Spanish flag. Thus, it is no wonder, as shall be detailed below, that, as they did with Solis, Portuguese agents in Spain attempted to disrupt this expedition ever since its initial plans.

Still, after Magellan's death in the Philippines in 1521 and when Juan Sebastián Elcano (1476–1526) returned to Spain in September 1522, the Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in the Moluccan Islands came fully to the fore for both sides and for the rest of Europe. A scientific and diplomatic process was opened between Portugal and Spain to discuss where exactly the antemeridian passed and who was the rightful owner of the disputed islands that produced the so highly desired large quantities of clove and nutmeg. The purpose of this section is not to detail these affairs, which had several phases and led to the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza, but to document the exchanges of knowledge between Portugal and Spain that continued to take place while the negotiations were ongoing. Already before Elcano's return, King Charles I, who was worried by the news received from some deserters of Magellan's expedition, ordered Gil González de Ávila (1480–1526) in 1521 to sail to the Moluccas, but the Spanish captain ended in Central America.

Once Elcano returned, King Charles I issued two relevant orders. Firstly, he established a new house of trade for the Moluccan spices at the Galician port of La Coruna. The purpose was to capitalize on its location and the wealth of merchants in Northern Spanish ports to finance new expeditions to the Moluccas and North America. For this reason, Cristóbal de Haro (?–1541) was appointed head of the house, as he was an important Spanish merchant with businesses and connections in Portugal, Spain, and the rest of Europe. The Flemish entourage of King Charles I was also interested in

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exploiting the maritime commercial connections with the Netherlands and Northern Europe. The creation of the house was also connected to a 1511 charter given to Juan de Agramonte, which authorized him to establish a house at La Coruna for cod fishing in North American shores, but it seems that Agramonte’s project did not advance.\textsuperscript{41}

The second measure that King Charles I took was to accept in some cases and release in others Portuguese men with robust geographical knowledge that he knew Spain would need to successfully sustain its ambitions in the Moluccan Islands. As to the former, the Portuguese sailor and cosmographer Simão de Alcáçova, whose exact time of arrival in Spain is unknown but likely took place after Magellan’s arrival, was formally hired by King Charles I. Alcáçova accumulated experience in Portuguese India, China, and the Moluccas and had long before made proposals to King Charles I. But he was only accepted into Spanish service after Juan Sebástian Elcano’s return. As the latter, the Portuguese captain Álvaro de Mesquita was released after Elcano’s return and pardoned for his leaving of Magellan’s expedition.\textsuperscript{42}

Estêvão Gomes, one of the pilots who deserted Magellan’s expedition and who had been authorized in 1521 to hunt French privateers in Algarve waters under Spanish flag,\textsuperscript{43} was also given a new status. Gomes received authorization from King Charles I in March–April 1523 to launch a voyage to Japan and China by sailing to North American areas,\textsuperscript{44} where the pilot-major Sebastian Cabot (1476–1557) had already sailed. Gomes’s expedition had Cabot’s support and was an attempt to find a North American passage to Asia, also having a clear connection with the first voyage of the Italian Giovanni Verrazano (1485–1528) in French service in 1524. Though his expedition was in preparation at La Coruna since 1523, Gomes’s participation in the Spanish commission that negotiated with Portugal in 1524 delayed his departure until 1525.


\textsuperscript{42} Antonio de Herrera, Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las islas i tierra firme del mar oceano, En Madrid, En la imprenta real de Nicolas Rodiguez, 1726, 132.


\textsuperscript{44} Herrera, Historia General, III Decade, 143.
Owing to these negotiations with Portugal, King Charles I in 1524 sent only a warning ship to the Moluccas. On board was an unknown Portuguese, certainly to help guide the Spanish in the navigation in the South Atlantic. While noticing this in February 1525, António de Azevedo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain, also warned King John III (1521–57) that the Portuguese cartographer Diogo Ribeiro had made a significant invention to drain water on board and mentioned the long preparations for Loaísa’s fleet. García Lofo de Loíasa’s (1490–1526) large fleet was intended to sail to the Moluccas by the Strait of Magellan and was King Charles I’s attempt to rescue his Spanish subjects in the Moluccas. However, before Loaísa was able to set sail in 1525, other important events and knowledge exchanges occurred.

After intense diplomatic quarrelling in 1522–23, in 1524 a Spanish and a Portuguese commission met at the Spanish-Portuguese border, at Badajoz-Elvas. The goal was to discuss the antemeridian and the rights to possession of the Moluccas. For the meeting, commissions were arranged on both sides, each composed of three pilots, three astrologers, and three diplomatic agents. The Spanish commission included Portuguese members such as Simão de Alcâço and Estêvão Gomes. Portuguese protests soon were able to remove Alcâço from the Spanish commission, but not Gomes, who participated on the Spanish side as a pilot and consultant. Another Portuguese who helped the Spanish in the 1524 negotiations was the pilot André Pires, who proposed a method to count the distance in leagues between the meridian and the antemeridian. With the calculations made, Pires concluded that the antemeridian passed not along Malacca, but along the Ganges River, an argument that Spain had already used, using Ptolemaic geographical prescriptions. But Pires was not alone: beforehand, the Portuguese master Pedro Margalho, a professor at Salamanca University and by then a member of the Portuguese commission, had published a book in which he defended that the Moluccan Islands belonged to Spain. The Portuguese rejected these arguments and stated that the exact longitudinal position of the Moluccas could only be determined with certainty with astronomical measurements. As no agreement was reached in the meetings of Badajoz-Elvas in 1524, the dispute continued. However, it is important to note that the presence of Portuguese pilots, whether on the Spanish or Portuguese side, highlights the importance of practical experience and nautical knowledge in maritime debates that were suddenly transformed into matters of state.

During this period, Juan de Zuñiga, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, actively sought to gather intelligence and persuade prominent Portuguese figures to enter the service of King Charles I. Zuñiga’s 1524 letters prove his ongoing negotiations with Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, a member of the Portuguese commission, who had been the first Portuguese to command a Portuguese expedition to Malacca in 1509 and later became governor of Portuguese Asia between 1518 and 1521. Fearing imprisonment upon his return to Portugal, Sequeira anchored firstly in Spain and only entered Portugal when the Portuguese king provided him with a safe conduct. Displeased at the way the new Portuguese King John III treated him, Sequeira confessed to Zuñiga that he was willing to enter King Charles I’s service. He handed over information to Zuñiga about the remaining Spanish in the Moluccas, showed him a chart of the area proving that the region belonged to Spain and went so far as to promise him that he would defect to Spain with the renowned Portuguese astrologer Simão Fernandes (another member of the Portuguese commission). All these negotiations took place during the year of 1524, but Sequeira ended up not entering Spanish service. Still, he provided relevant geographical intelligence to Spain.\(^{47}\) There has been some controversy over Sequeira’s intentions in 1524 and it has been argued that he was not willing to betray Portugal but simply to spy and infiltrate the Spanish espionage network.\(^{48}\) Further research is needed to understand Sequeira’s intentions. However, it should be noted that Sequeira’s actions were not unique, as other Portuguese figures also sought to negotiate with the Spanish during this time.

Duarte Pacheco Pereira (1460–1533), the renowned author of the *Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis*, also approached Zuñiga due to his dissatisfaction with King John III, stemming from his deposition from the Mina fortress in 1522 and accusations of theft. Pereira, who was well-versed in nautical knowledge, proposed to Zuñiga that he should organize an expedition under the Spanish flag to the Eastern Indies. Zuñiga’s letter does not state clearly the destination, merely referring Eastern Indies,\(^{49}\) but it is likely that Pereira proposed the same as the contract that King Charles I signed with Portuguese pilot Estêvão Gomes in 1523: finding the northwestern passage to Japan and China. In the end, Pereira did not pass into Spanish service either. Finally, Zuñiga’s correspondence in 1523–24 demonstrates that an unnamed Spanish cosmographer working for King John III provided Zuñiga with updates on

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\(^{48}\) *Portugaliae*, vol. I, 50.
\(^{49}\) Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 367, nº 119, fl. iv.–2.
Portuguese cartography being produced for the diplomatic negotiations. He also used this contact to acquire the Portuguese *Padrão Real* (the Padron chart of navigation preserved at the Casa da Índia), which had been made by the Portuguese cartographer Lopo Homem, who was also a member of the Portuguese commission. But in 1524, Zuñiga regretted to inform King Charles I that it was hard to acquire charts by Homem, as he was only allowed to produce them for the Portuguese king. This was likely a consequence of the fact that in the meantime King John III issued new rewards to Lopo Homem. Yet in 1524, the Portuguese king confirmed Lopo Homem as his official cartographer, and in 1526, 1531 and 1532 he even increased his income. Still, throughout his life, Lopo Homem kept complaining that various promised rewards were delayed, forcing him to spend his own money in missions in the king’s service. Although this situation was not unusual, as several other Portuguese courtiers complained of the same, this came to have an important impact (upon which the next chapters will reflect) on the paths of Lopo Homem’s sons.

Nevertheless, what Zuñiga regretted not being able to access in Portugal, seems to have been much more easily obtained in Spain itself. Pedro Ruiz de Villegas, a member of the Spanish commission at Badajoz-Elvas in 1524, was able to lay hands on Portuguese nautical charts made by Portuguese sailors such as Estevão Gomes, Simão de Alcáçova, or lesser known characters such as Frei Tomás and Heitor de Coimbra. Villegas also acquired a globe, usually attributed to João Dias de Solis. Thus, allegedly “secret” Portuguese cartographical knowledge ended up in Spanish hands by the simple circulation of Portuguese nautical experts to Spain. This is not surprising, as it has been underscored how characters like Estevão Gomes and Simão de Alcáçova deliberately chose to serve Spain instead of Portugal. What is worth highlighting is how the Portuguese-Spanish dispute over the Moluccas soon evolved into a dispute over the whole globe, and how this justified all these events. Such maneuvers are not easily understood without bearing in mind the new geographical horizon of the earth that Magellan’s expedition opened. One of its most dramatic effects on Portuguese-Spanish relations was the increasingly global scale of the interchange process that became unstoppable.

The Andalusian Dominican Friar Juan de Caro was another key figure in the network that informed King Charles I after Juan Sebastián Elcano’s

52 Cortesão, *Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses*, vol. I, 175–76.
return. Caro had decided to serve in India with the Portuguese in hopes of receiving a prestigious religious grant from the Portuguese king, as well as acquiring knowledge of the Portuguese nautical routes, as he confessed in a letter addressed to King Charles I in 1525. He claimed that during his service to the Portuguese, he had gained extensive knowledge in cosmography, navigation, and astronomy, and he criticized the Spanish king for relying on so many Portuguese who did not possess the same level of expertise. He offered to teach navigation, cosmography, and astronomy at the Casa in Seville, but upon his return to Spain, he was jailed in Simancas for selling his "secrets". Later, the king of Portugal, recognizing Caro as a threat due to the knowledge he had acquired about Portuguese Asia and the Moluccas, managed to capture him and deport him to Sofala (in Eastern Africa), where he died. Caro’s aspirations were only made possible due to the ongoing Portuguese-Spanish dispute over the Moluccas. His story serves as a paradigm of espionage and counter-espionage attempts from both sides and highlights how, in the Iberian context of the 1520s and 1530s, nautical knowledge, even in the hands of someone without formal academic training, was perceived by both sides as a significant threat to imperial and overseas ambitions.

Returning to Garcia de Loaísa’s fleet, when it finally departed in 1525, it also raised anchor from La Coruna, as did Estêvão Gomes’ expedition to North America some months later. Loaísa’s choice for the head of the expedition was not without ulterior motives. In 1524, King Charles I had appointed him president of the Spanish Consejo de Indias, indicating that Loaísa had compiled a meaningful amount of geographical knowledge before the departure. This was fully justified by the dangers that repeating Magellan’s voyage would entail. Loíasa died during the expedition, but the contribution of Portuguese sailors and knowledge remained important during the voyage, as a Spanish chronicler recorded. The maps for Loaísa’s expedition were also prepared by Portuguese cartographer Diogo Ribeiro at La Coruna, precisely as António de Azevedo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain, had reported. During 1524, Diogo Ribeiro might have also been occupied with translating Duarte Barbosa’s (1481–1521) book, as he worked on it with the Genovese ambassador in Spain. This book, one

54 Francisco Lopez Gomara, Historia General de las Indias, vol. II (Madrid: Calpe, 1922), 245.
55 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Historia General y Natural de las Indias, Islas Y Tierra-Firme del Mar Oceano, vol. II (Madrid: Imprenta de La Academia Real de la Historia, 1852), 34–35.
56 Portugaliae, vol. I, 94.
of the first works detailing the Portuguese domains in Asia, had originally been brought to Spain by Magellan. But it was not the first time that Spain received updated news on Portuguese Asia. The Spaniard Martín Fernández de Figueirora, who likely met Magellan in Asia during the first years of the 16th century, had also published a small book on the Portuguese conquests in Asia in Salamanca in 1512.\textsuperscript{57} The book’s publication, with all the details of the riches discovered by the Portuguese, contributed to further Spanish interest in acquiring a share of that wealth through discovering an alternative nautical route to Asia through the Spanish hemisphere. This interest existed since King Ferdinand and continued under King Charles I and Philip II.

Some months after Loíasa, but still in 1525, Estêvão Gomes set out on an expedition to North America. Although Gomes made new geographical discoveries, which is why Diogo Ribeiro’s famous 1529 mapa mundi even noted the “land of Esteban Gómez”, he did not find the northwestern passage to Asia. Upon his return, there was a commotion. A rumor circulated that he had brought cloves from India and the news reached the Spanish court. There was great disappointment when it was understood that Gomes had only brought back native Americans, who were mistaken for cloves.\textsuperscript{58} Despite the disillusion, Gomes remained in Spanish service. In 1527, he asked for a promotion as he had, in the meantime, sailed to the Caribbean with his countryman Simão de Alcáçova. In August 1533, Gomes proposed the building of a dry dock at Guadalquivir, a project that was accepted. As a reward, King Charles I knighted Gomes in 1534.\textsuperscript{59} This is noteworthy for the processes of social promotion and recognition that skilled pilots could achieve in the Iberian context of the early 16th century. His case was far from the only one, as other instances are found in the Portuguese and Spanish contexts of those days. As to Gomes’s death, all data indicates that he died in the area of the Plata River in 1536, after being the pilot-major for D. Pedro de Mendonza’s (1487–1537) expedition to the area.\textsuperscript{60}

Still, even before Mendonza’s expedition, in 1526, King Charles I ordered an expedition headed by Sebastian Cabot to sail to the Moluccas via the Magellan Strait. However, Cabot deviated from the original course and instead headed towards the Plata River, due to news about gold that was believed to have been discovered inland. This information was provided to Cabot by the

\textsuperscript{59} Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. II, 203.
\textsuperscript{60} Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 119–20.
Portuguese pilots Jorge Gomes and Rodrigo Álvares. Gomes had previously participated in a Portuguese expedition to the area under the command of Captain Cristóvão Jacques in 1521, while Álvares had taken part in the 1511 Portuguese discovery journey to the Plata River led by João de Lisboa and Estêvão Fróis.61 After his return to Europe, Rodrigo Álvares spent some time in Lisbon and Seville. His knowledge and expertise were highly sought after by both Portugal and Spain, and he also maintained close contacts with the Portuguese cartographer João Rodrigues.62 His contribution as an “explorer” is recorded in the *Islario* of the Spanish cosmographer Alonso de Santa Cruz (1505–67), who named some islands near the Plata River as the “isles of Rodrigo Álvares” in recognition of his role in the exploration and mapping of the area.63

Fernando de Ribeira and Gonçalo da Costa were two other Portuguese mariners that proved valuable for Sebastian Cabot, although Costa became more famous. Costa was originally in Brazil and started by assisting Cabot’s expedition. His career as a Portuguese pilot in Spanish service continued.64 Another Portuguese in Cabot’s expedition was Diogo Garcia. Garcia wrote a nautical rutter of the Plata River. Upon his return to Spain, he contested Cabot’s results, demanding a promotion. As this goal seems not to have been achieved, he returned to Portugal, where he was employed until his death in 1554 as pilot in the Portuguese India Run.65 Garcia’s case is noteworthy. It is an uncommon instance of a Portuguese pilot who went to Spain and then returned to Portugal, as opposed to the more common pattern of Portuguese pilots remaining in Spanish service.

Due to the difficulties in establishing a stable nautical route between the Strait of Magellan and the Moluccas and concerns about the fate of his Spanish subjects, King Charles I signed an order for Hernán Cortés (1485–1547), the viceroy of New Spain, to send a ship from New Spain to the Moluccas.66 Cortés sent this ship under the command of Álvaro de Saavedra (?–1529). Saavedra arrived at the Philippines in early 1528. Preparing some of the wood for Saavedra’s ship was another Portuguese, Diogo

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61 For more details on this expedition see Rolando Laguarda Trías, *El predescubrimiento del Río de la Plata por la expedición portuguesa de 1511–1512* (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1973).
64 For further details see: José Toribio Medina, *El portugués Gonzalo de Acosta al servicio de España* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1908).
65 Ventura, *Portugueses no descobrimento*, 124.
66 Cuesta Domingo, “La Casa de la Contratación,” 70 and 72.
Correia, who had helped the Spanish in nautical matters at least since the late 1510s. When Saavedra’s pilot died and it was decided to return to New Spain, Portuguese and Spanish sources diverge on what exactly happened. Portuguese chroniclers state that due to the lack of a skilled pilot, but profiting from some Portuguese desertions to the Spanish side in the Moluccas, Saavedra hired the Portuguese Simão de Brito Patalim as pilot. Bearing in mind that other Portuguese and Spanish sources also mention the Spaniard Mancías del Poyo as pilot, it is likely that del Poyo was only named after Brito committed treason to the Spanish Crown, for which he was executed. Any case, Patalim’s episode evidences how dependent the Spanish were in the 1520s on Portuguese pilots to attempt to sail the opposite route that Magellan had discovered.

When news of the failed attempts by Loiása and Saavedra to sail to the Moluccas reached Spain, Lope Hurtado de Mendonza, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal since 1528, strongly suggested to King Charles I the need to hire Portuguese pilots for future Spanish voyages to the Moluccas. This news also had a major impact on the final dealings that led to the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza, with King Charles I accepting to pledge his rights to Portugal in exchange for a large amount of money. Still, the treaty stipulated that if King Charles I repaid the money, he could regain his rights. As a result of the signing of the treaty, King Charles I revoked the authorization for Simão de Alcáçova’s planned voyage to the Moluccas. The existence of such authorization to Alcáçova is linked to the fact that the Portuguese became the overseer of the House of Trade of La Coruña that King Charles I created. The House of Trade of La Coruña had also been established due to its close geographical proximity to key Portuguese northern ports. Moreover, La Coruña had been the winning city over Seville in the debate to decide which city would host the House of Trade for spices. However, the Treaty

67 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 67.
68 João de Barros, Da Ásia, IV Decade (Lisbon: Real Oficina Typografica, 1778), 119–21; Herrera, Historia General, Decade III, 47–48; Martín Fernandez de Navarrete, Colleccion de los Viages y Descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los españoles desde fines del siglo XV, con varios documentos ineditos concernientes a la Historia de la Marina Castellana y de los establecimientos españoles en Indias, ol. V, (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional), 82, 86 and 124.
70 Mariño and Moran, Tratados Internacionales, CIV.
of Zaragoza would end the house’s activities, explaining that when Alcáçova died, it was on service in another geographical area: Patagonia.

Already in 1525, Spanish cosmographer Pedro Ruiz Villegas, who had assisted King Charles I since the beginning of negotiations with Portugal, expressed his opposition to the agreement to pledge the Moluccas to Portugal. Villegas even suggested that Spain should offer Portugal the “poor” region of Estremadura instead of the “rich” Moluccas. The Castilian courts also contested the agreement in 1529 and later even offered King Charles I the money to repay Portugal in 1548 so that new Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas could be launched. But King Charles I ordered them to close the matter, an answer that left many people surprised.72 Yet, in 1551, King Charles I ordered his ministers to re-examine his rights to the Moluccas, but nothing came of this,73 except that in 1553 it was Prince Philip who suggested to his father to pay back the money to Portugal to prepare expeditions to the area. King Charles I’s answer is unknown but it seems that he delayed the project due to his European priorities.74 Still, this does not mean that the Spanish use of Portuguese nautical expertise ended. If it is true that it started to decrease after 1529, the contributions of Portuguese experts remained relevant, as an analysis of nautical knowledge exchanges up until the Iberian Union will demonstrate.

1.1.3 Sailing to the Americas and the Pacific with Portuguese nautical experts (1530–80)

Even after the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza, the presence of Portuguese nautical experts serving Spain in its various overseas territories remained considerable. However, the number of such experts varied in different geographical areas.

From the early days of the Spanish presence in the Caribbean, Portuguese pilots were employed locally. When Vasco Nuñez de Balboa first sighted the Pacific Ocean, there were Portuguese sailors with him. Balboa also advised Spain that the first ships to sail in this new ocean should be built according to the designs used in Portugal and Andalusia,75 a testament to the prestige of Portuguese shipbuilding at the period. Thus, it is not surprising that in a 1514 expedition to Panama, several Portuguese ship builders were identified.76

73 Mariño and Moran, Tratados Internacionales, CI V.
74 Braga, “Península Ibérica,” 141.
76 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 57–58.
Although not all cases are easy to document, mainly because Portuguese pilots tended to disguise themselves as Galicians and easily changed their names to Spanish forms (to short-circuit the Casa’s rules limiting the number of Portuguese, as will be detailed below), already during the 1530s it was common for the correspondence from the Caribbean to Spain to be sent via Portugal using returning Portuguese ships. Portuguese sailors were at the helm of nearly every Portuguese ship that entered the Caribbean. This sometimes resulted in famous shipwrecks reported by Spanish chroniclers.

Nevertheless, in several cases, Spanish local authorities hired Portuguese pilots. This happened, for instance, in voyages to Cumana, where Portuguese sailors such as António Fernandes were contracted locally. For Francisco de Orellana’s (1511–46) inaugural voyage to the Amazon River in 1541, Portuguese pilots Fernando Gonçalves and António Fernandes were hired. Orellana was so satisfied with their services that he expressly advised the Consejo de Indias to use only Portuguese pilots, as they had all the knowledge of the area and were easier to hire than the Spanish. This was what Orellana did when he organized his 1544 expedition. Due to the Portuguese nautical expertise in an area that was assigned to the Spanish hemisphere, King Charles I even had a special concern. In 1556, when the Spaniard Jerónimo Aguayo was organizing another expedition to the region, he decided to flee to Portugal. King Charles I worried that this would fuel Portuguese ambitions in the area. Yet in 1559–60, Francisco Faleiro, the Portuguese cosmographer in the service of the Casa at Seville, also attempted to organize another journey, but the project failed. Once more it was a Portuguese organizing a Spanish expedition in the Spanish hemisphere. However, this situation was not only limited to this area, as this scenario also extended to other geographical regions.

A very similar case, continuing the precedent set by Portuguese sailors such as Estêvão Gomes, can be observed in Hernando de Souto’s (1497–1542) expedition to Florida in 1538. A whole group of Portuguese sailors from Elvas took part in the entire expedition, to the point that the Portuguese had their own captain and ship. Portuguese pilots serving in the Florida region remained present even when the French attempted to occupy the area in the 1560s. It was within this context that the case of Portuguese pilot

77 Braga, “Península Ibérica,” 343.
79 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 89.
80 Collins, “Interactions of Portuguese Artisanal Culture,” 207.
81 Gil, El exilio portugués, 394–96 and 406.
Bartolomeu Borges has recently been identified. Borges served the Spanish in the Caribbean in the 1550s, was kidnapped by the French and ended up piloting Jean Ribault’s (1520–65) voyage to Florida in 1562.\(^{82}\) The details and story of this Portuguese pilot are only fully understood considering his Portuguese predecessors that served in the area under Spanish flag.

On the opposite shore of the American continent, a similar process took place in relation to the exploration of California. In 1535, the Spaniard Hernando de Grijalva (?–1537) organized a voyage to the Californian coast, which was piloted by the Portuguese Martim da Costa. As a consequence, Martim da Costa wrote a nautical rutter of the region.\(^{83}\) In 1537, when Grijalva was killed by his crew for refusing to sail to the Moluccas due to the Treaty of Zaragoza, Martim da Costa guided the expedition to New Guinea, as a letter from a Portuguese captain of the Moluccas recorded.\(^{84}\) Another local reconnaissance of California which D. Antonio de Mendonza (1495–1552), viceroy of New Spain, instructed the Portuguese pilot João Rodrigues Cabrilho (1499–1543) to undertake in 1542, resulted in another relevant report of the expedition.\(^{85}\) Cabrilho had served the Spanish since the late 1510s in the Caribbean and New Spain.\(^{86}\) At Cabrilho’s death, viceroy Mendonza had another Portuguese pilot, Bartolomeu Fernandes, to guide the Spanish expedition.\(^{87}\)

In 1535, another Portuguese named João Pacheco proposed the Consejo de Indias to organize an expedition to collect spices from islands in the Pacific Ocean. His request was accepted in 1536 on the condition that he would pay for the expedition himself and could only bring with him twelve Portuguese. This answer was motivated by Pacheco’s previous petition to King Charles I in which he asked to be authorized to bring with him ten to twelve Portuguese pilots “because they are much better than any others for navigational purposes.”\(^{88}\) As a reward, Pacheco was promised a share in the gains if the expedition departed before 1538. There is no sign that Pacheco organized this venture, as he soon left for France (albeit his action


\(^{83}\) Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 109 and 214–21.

\(^{84}\) Sousa Viterbo, Trabalhos náuticos, 158.

\(^{85}\) Colección de diarios y relaciones para la historia de los viajes y descubrimientos, vol. I (Madrid: Instituto Histórico de Marina, 1943), 29–42.

\(^{86}\) Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 108–10.

\(^{87}\) Herrera, Historia General, Decade VII, 113.

there remains unclear). Still, Pacheco’s attempt bears a resemblance with Simão de Alcâçova’s aforementioned agreement with King Charles I signed in 1529. Both stories reveal how important Portuguese nautical knowledge was for the early Spanish attempts and plans to colonize the Pacific, even in clear defiance of the alleged Portuguese rights to the area. For sailors like Simão de Alcâçova, Estêvão Gomes, or João Pacheco, the 1494 division of the world between Portugal and Spain at Tordesillas meant nothing. For these seamen the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were free seas and what truly mattered was the opportunity to use nautical skill to make a fortune and to achieve better social status. In the following chapters, very similar instances will be detailed when observing the reasons behind Portuguese seafarers coming to England and France.

Thus, it is not surprising to find that the viceroy of New Spain, D. Antonio de Mendonza, recognized and fully rewarded Portuguese nautical expertise. After hiring João Rodrigues Cabrilho and Bartolomeu Fernandes for California, he appointed Gaspar Rico, a pilot from Algarve, to be the pilot-major in Ruy Lopez de Villalobos’s (1500–44) expedition in 1544. Villalobos’s expedition was another Spanish attempt to establish a regular connection between New Spain and Asia. However, owing to the stipulations of the Treaty of Zaragoza, Villalobos was forced to surrender to the Portuguese. He died at Malacca when attempting to return to Spain. In 1547, viceroy Mendonza considered organizing a new expedition but he dropped the idea, and it is difficult to know if he planned to hire another Portuguese pilot. Yet in 1550–51, Bernardo de La Torre, a participant in Villalobos’s journey, sailed to the Moluccas. Apparently, he did so without any Portuguese pilot. Only after a debate held in Madrid, King Philip II (1556–98) ordered D. Luiz de Velasco (1511–64), the viceroy of New Spain, to launch another expedition to colonize the Philippines and establish contacts with China and Japan.

The command was given to Miguel López de Legazpi (1502–72). As the friar Andrés de Urdanetta (1508–1568) participated in the journey and he had previously accumulated knowledge that would enable the Spanish to discover the route for the return voyage to New Spain, there was no need for Portuguese expertise. However, Legazpi’s expedition was not an exploratory expedition as the previous Spanish attempts were, but one of

89 Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. II, 205.
90 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 115–19.
conquest. The Spanish knew they would face Portuguese opposition. It is possible that a previous decision not to hire a Portuguese pilot was taken, so that no betrayals would happen, as had previously happened in the Moluccan scenario. Still, a recent investigation has suggested, based on a missive found in a Portuguese nautical compilation from the 1570s, that a Portuguese might have been onboard Legazpi’s voyage. This would explain how secret information for the Portuguese (the letter written by Legazpi to the viceroy of New Spain in 1565 and delivered to Urdanetta for the return voyage to Mexico) ended up in the compilation. However, even if the Portuguese pilots’ contributions in the Spanish Pacific decreased before 1580, it is important to stress that once more these knowledge exchanges took place in an area fully in the Spanish hemisphere. For the Plata River region, Portuguese nautical expertise retained a key role for a long period.

After Sebastian Cabot’s 1526 expedition to the Plata River, the Portuguese Simão de Alcáçova in 1534 also directed an important journey to Patagonia, although he died there. The next year, D. Pedro de Mendonza was sent to the region with the Portuguese pilot Estêvão Gomes as the pilot-major of the expedition. Accompanying Mendonza were thirty-seven Portuguese, several of them mariners. One of them, Jacome de Paiva, wrote another rutter for the navigation of the Plata River. In 1537, when the bishop of Plascencia sent an expedition to the area, the pilot-major was the Portuguese Gonçalo da Costa, who has already been mentioned in Cabot’s 1526 expedition. Costa had a long career in Spanish service, being the pilot-major for the expeditions of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca (1490–1557) in 1542 and the pilot for Bishop Hernando de La Torre’s voyage to the region during the 1550s. Owing to tempting promises from Portugal in case of his return, Costa was officially promoted at the Casa to the rank of pilot in 1537. Nevertheless, Costa’s nautical expertise was not, in Spanish eyes, as recognized and consensual as that of his countryman Jacome Luís.

Jacome Luís already had an important role in the 1538 expedition of Alonso de Cabrera. His knowledge of the area caused him to be promoted. In 1545, King Charles I formally appointed him pilot-major of the Plata River and wrote to his officers of the Casa in Seville: “Give him the hope that we

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93 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 128–29.

94 Ventura, Portugueses no descobrimento, 128–33.

will always remember him and make him happy in whatever way we can. And [...] do not let him leave that city [Seville] to go to Portugal in any way, for you can see the inconvenience that would follow.\textsuperscript{96} Aside from several other Spanish expeditions in which Jacome Luís participated, he was the first to be appointed pilot-major for the Plata River. After his death, he was succeeded by the Portuguese Pedro Dias, who received his office in 1581 also because of his experience and knowledge of the area. Dias’s services to the Spanish Captain Juan Ortiz de Zárate (1510–76), to Pedro Menendez de Avilés (1519–74) and to Diego Florés de Valdez (1530–95) were so important that they afforded him a better salary in 1586.\textsuperscript{97} Laguarda Trías has demonstrated that during the 16th century, out of fifty Spanish expeditions to the Plata River, thirty-nine were piloted by Portuguese.\textsuperscript{98} As late as 1620, the Spanish still recognized the need to hire Portuguese pilots to sail to the area.\textsuperscript{99} But why were the Portuguese so massively employed in this region, apparently more than in other areas of the Spanish overseas empire? The Plata River region had been originally discovered by a Portuguese expedition in 1511–12,\textsuperscript{100} financed by the Spanish merchant Cristóbal de Haro,\textsuperscript{101} at the service of the Portuguese King Manuel I. Soon afterwards, the Plata River nautical route became a natural continuation of the Portuguese Brazil Run, a route that the Portuguese sailed regularly and earlier than the Spanish. Furthermore, the Plata River and the South American region were not as attractive as the Caribbean or New Spain for the Spanish to sail to and conquer in the early 16th century. This, coupled with an earlier coastal settlement of the Portuguese in Brazil, led the Spanish to rely heavily on the local nautical expertise of the Portuguese for their expeditions in the region. This trend of hiring Portuguese pilots persisted well into the 1570s. The geography of the region and its growing geo-strategic importance from the 1580s onwards (after Francis Drake’s circumnavigation) can explain why in Pedro Dias’s time as pilot-major there was a separate exam for the pilots to this region. The post was abolished only at the beginning of the 17th century.


\textsuperscript{97} José de Veitia Lineage, \textit{Norte de la Contratación de las Indias Occidentales} (Seville, por Francisco de Blas 1672), 153–54.

\textsuperscript{98} Laguarda Trías, “Pilotos portugueses,” 83.


\textsuperscript{100} Laguarda Trías, \textit{El predescubrimiento del Río de la Plata}.

\textsuperscript{101} For more details on Haro see: Bénat-Tachor, “Cristóbal de Haro.”
The employment of Portuguese nautical experts in the Spanish overseas empire was a sensitive issue, particularly when it came to the rules for being accepted as a pilot of the Casa, which often included issues related to Portuguese nationality. In 1513, King Ferdinand issued a real cédula allowing the hiring of any Portuguese that appeared in Seville for the Spanish overseas expeditions. But, two years later, he revoked this order. While King Ferdinand’s original order should be framed within the early Spanish attempts to start to organize its maritime machine, the king’s second order was certainly caused by some of the Portuguese diplomatic pressure over Solís’s voyage in 1512 and the other events that will be mentioned below. The many conflicts on Magellan’s expedition owing to the participation of so many Portuguese were the target of new legislation for the Casa after the signing of the Treaty of Zaragoza. In 1527, a first order was issued to pilot-major Sebastián Cabot not to hire non-Castilians as pilots for the Casa, but it appears that this order was not fully implemented. In 1547, Cabot was once again ordered to comply with this rule, with reference to a similar order issued in 1534. New commands were also issued in 1551, 1562, and 1576.

Most of these orders established the rules for being considered a Castilian, which was a key requirement for being approved for the pilotage exam at the Casa. In order to prevent unqualified pilots from navigating Spanish ships, one of the documents required for each Spanish fleet departing from Seville stipulated that no pilot would be authorized to make any voyage to the Spanish Indies without first passing the pilotage exam. The document also mandated that pilots had a legal obligation to hand over their nautical charts every time they returned to Seville. This was also the basis for the prohibition of the Casa’s pilot-majors to leave Spain without royal authorization. The main goal of these regulations was to avoid the
dangers of having non-Spanish pilots and masters who could easily betray the Spanish Crown and share nautical and cartographical knowledge with maritime rivals. This would help to maintain a monopoly of the Spanish Crown over the navigation of the seas.

Nevertheless, the Spanish maritime machine’s needs frequently devoured its creatures, thus conflicting with these commands. In 1534, the nautical needs of Spain prompted King Charles I to authorize the hiring of foreign pilots, on the condition that they were not French or English. This fact explains why the number of foreigners in Spanish fleets remained high in the 1530s. A similar situation happened in the 1580s when the Casa relaxed the rules on the pilotage exams due to the shortage of Spanish experts. Conflicts arose in 1554 when the Consejo de Indias ordered the Casa to send a list of non-Castilian pilots at the Casa owing to several complaints regarding foreigners’ abuses as masters and pilots in the Spanish expeditions, also causing too many shipwrecks. In 1558, the Casa requested permission from the Consejo to hire six more foreign pilots, but the Consejo refused, demanding a new list of foreign pilots working at the Casa and even sending an inspector to check the situation. Some years later, in 1561, the Casa asked the Consejo if the Portuguese were to be included in the prohibition of foreigners. The answer was positive, but the order seems to have been ignored as another real cédula, dated 1576, stipulated that no Portuguese pilot or ship master should be hired. In 1579 there was even an order to investigate the Portuguese working at the Casa, precisely because of their overwhelming numbers. After the Iberian Union in 1580, the Portuguese remained the more numerous foreign community working in nautical matters at Seville. Some Portuguese cartographers are examples of this.

108 Maria da Graça A. Mateus Ventura, Por este mar adentro. Éxitos e fracassos de mareantes e emigrantes algarvios na América hispánica (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2021), 79.
111 AGI, Indiferente General, libro 12, fls. 156v.–57v.; Collins, “Portuguese Pilots,” 190.
112 Pulido Rubio, El piloto mayor, 182–84.
113 Veitia Lineage, Norte de la Contratación, 242.
During the 1520s, Portuguese cartographer Gaspar Rebelo endured tough moments due to Sebastian Cabot’s refusal to accept him as a member of the Casa. Rebelo was only able to join the institution when King Charles I intervened and compelled Cabot to hire him.115 Similarly, in 1563, Portuguese cartographer André Freire was prohibited by Spanish cosmographer Diego Gutierrez (1485–1574) from selling nautical instruments in Seville. The son of a cosmographer of the Portuguese king, Freire had been accused of copying the Spanish Padrón Real and sending it to Portugal.116 While there is limited information available about this alleged incident of Portuguese cartographical espionage in Seville during the 1560s, it is possible that it was connected to King Philip II’s competition over the Portuguese settlement at Macau, which had occurred in 1557. This Portuguese settlement in the Far East further consolidated Portuguese trade with China and Japan, and was considered by some Spanish cosmographers to fall within the Spanish hemisphere. As a result, new Spanish plans for a possible occupation of the Philippines began to be debated. In 1565–66, King Philip II summoned his cosmographers from the Casa to discuss the Philippines’ longitudinal position and Spanish rights.117

Similar tensions between Portuguese experts working in Seville and Spanish authorities persisted, as evidenced by the cases of the Portuguese instrument makers Manuel Peres and Pascoal Silvestre. Pilots who used Portuguese nautical instruments on Spanish expeditions were also rebuked, even when they argued that they were only able to acquire such instruments in Lisbon. This was the case with Portuguese pilot Afonso Dias, who recovered his confiscated Portuguese nautical instruments following protests to the Casa.118 Still, many Portuguese pilots had their exams rejected because of their nationality.

Despite the tensions between Portuguese experts and Spanish authorities, other notable Portuguese individuals were able to work for the Casa. In addition to the previously mentioned case of cartographer Diogo Ribeiro, who died serving Spain, there were the contributions of Francisco Faleiro. Faleiro had a longer, albeit less well-documented, career at the Casa. He wrote a nautical treatise in 1535 that decisively influenced 16th-century Spanish seamanship,119 namely Pedro de Medina’s (1493–1567) and Martín

117 Sánchez, La espada, la cruz, 282.
Cortés de Albacar’s (1510–82) nautical works. Both Spanish texts incorporated knowledge from Faleiro’s treatise and were translated into French, English, and Dutch, later providing the Iberian maritime rivals with critical knowledge when the time came for them to systematically launch maritime overseas enterprises. Furthermore, both Medina and Cortés’s treatises are considered to be the mature works on the 16th-century Spanish art of navigation. The incorporation of Faleiro’s works into these Spanish canon is a good example of how the Portuguese nautical information that the Faleiro brothers brought to Spain in 1517 was transformed and adapted into a coherent body of maritime knowledge for Spanish purposes. In the next chapters, similar cases will be observed for the English, the French, and the Dutch.

Nevertheless, going even further back in time, the influence of Portuguese nautical knowledge can be traced in the 1519 geographical book that Martín Fernández de Enciso (1469–1533) wrote, which was originally dedicated to King Charles I and is commonly considered to be the first navigation manual in Spain. The instructions provided by Enciso for the use of the nautical astrolabe and the calculation of latitude using measurements of the pole star and sun bear a strong resemblance to the Portuguese nautical guides from Munich and Évora printed in the 1510s. Enciso also used solar declination tables for the years 1497–1500 that were composed in Portugal. This kind of knowledge easily spread to Spain in the belongings of Portuguese pilots like João Dias de Solis, or with men that served both Portugal and Spain like Amerigo Vespucci, who also learned Portuguese nautical and cartographical techniques at the Portuguese Casa da Índia.

Thus, in the period after Ferdinand Magellan, while Diogo Ribeiro and Francisco Faleiro are the most prominent and longest lasting examples of nautical knowledge exchanges between Portuguese and Spanish experts at the Casa, it is important not to overlook the contributions of the other pilots and cartographers previously mentioned. With each Portuguese nautical...
expert working in and serving Spain, Portuguese geographical and maritime knowledge was exchanged. Nevertheless, it is also relevant to consider if a similar process occurred with Spanish nautical experts working for Portugal. This topic will now be addressed, as it also falls under the umbrella of intra-Iberian knowledge exchange encompassing the entirety of the globe.

1.2 Employing Spanish Nautical Knowledge for Portuguese Goals (1415–1580)

The examples provided in this section are a small sample, as they are not as well-documented as the cases of Portuguese experts working for Spain. Still, it is clear that for nautical purposes, the Portuguese use of Spanish experts was not as intense as its reverse.

A first important case took place when the Portuguese Prince Henry (1394–1460) hired Jacome de Majorca, the chart-maker, to work for him during the 1420s. At the time, Majorca worked for Aragon. Majorca's hiring was of special importance at the beginning of the Portuguese overseas enterprise, as the cartographical expert brought the Mediterranean cartographical school's knowledge and techniques with him to Portugal. Jacome came from a good, if not, the best European cartographical school of the time.\textsuperscript{126} This knowledge was adapted to fit the early Portuguese navigations and had a key role in the birth and development of Portuguese nautical and cartographical science.\textsuperscript{127} Still, Majorca's case was not the sole episode in Portuguese early overseas expeditions.

Turning to the voyages organized by Prince Henry to West Africa, a Galician, thus a native of Castile, served as pilot in one of Captain Antão Gonçalves's expeditions to West Africa in 1445.\textsuperscript{128} It is possible that other undocumented cases took place, as the Portuguese chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara (1410–74) also asserted that the prince hired a Dane who offered himself to sail to West Africa.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, two Italians, Francisco

\textsuperscript{126} Alfredo Pinheiro Marques, \textit{Origem e desenvolvimento da cartografia portuguesa na época dos Descobrimentos} (Lisbon: INCM, 1987), 72–73.
\textsuperscript{127} Sánchez, \textit{La espada, la cruz}, 53–54. For more details see: Rolando Laguarda Trías, \textit{La Aportación Científica de Mallorquines y Portugueses a la Cartografía Náutica en los Siglos XIV al XVI} (Madrid: Instituto Histórico de Marina, 1964).
de Usodimare and Alvise Cadamosto (1432–88) sailed to Guinea, with Cadamosto writing an important report.¹³⁰ Later King John II issued orders to kill any non-Portuguese found in West Africa, but he made exceptions for some Castilians.¹³¹ King John II recognized that he still needed to make exceptions and accept the service of foreigners, as Portugal always lacked manpower throughout its maritime enterprises. This is the reason why King John II answered Columbus in 1486–87 with a map depicting Bartolomeu Dias’s discoveries. The king also ordered his ambassador in Rome in 1492, as he did in 1485, to make a public presentation to the pope, in the presence of several other ambassadors. The goal was to inform the pope and the European powers on how close Portugal was to finding the nautical connection between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.¹³²

During the 15ᵗʰ century, Spanish academic knowledge played an important role in Portuguese overseas expansion. This is exemplified by the Portuguese use of the work of the Spanish Jewish scholar Abraham Zacut (1452–1515) and Diego Ortiz de Villegas (1447–1519). Zacut, who frequented the circles of Salamanca University,¹³³ became an important astrological and astronomical authority in the Iberian Peninsula, later serving King John II.¹³⁴ The astrological tables he designed with astronomical predictions for some years were widely utilized by Portuguese sailors, greatly enhancing navigational safety. Villegas came to Portugal in the entourage of the Castilian Princess Juana (1462–1530),¹³⁵ and was employed, amongst other matters, on geographical and maritime issues. Villegas had been an astrology teacher at Salamanca University. He counselled Kings John II and Manuel I on the answer to give to Columbus’s proposal and on Vasco da Gama’s fleet, respectively, and ended his days as a bishop in Portuguese service.¹³⁶ Thus, the examples of Zacut and Villegas point to the importance for Portugal, and of the academic knowledge interchange with Salamanca

¹³⁵ Princess Juana was exiled to Portugal at the end of the Portuguese-Castilian war according to the Treaty of Alcazovas-Toledo of 1480. Nicknamed *La Beltraneja* because she was regarded as being the daughter of the Castilian King Henry IV’s (1454–74) favorite minister, Princess Juana was defeated in the Castilian war of succession in 1474–79 by Queen Elizabeth of Castile.
¹³⁶ Waters, "Portuguese Nautical Science,” 181.
University. Indeed, it is also well-known that Salamanca was a traditional place chosen by Portuguese students.137

Still, it is relevant to underscore that this interchange remained important for Portugal in nautical matters during the 16th century, as shown by the career of the Portuguese master Pedro Margalho. Although Margalho studied in Paris, he later became a professor at Salamanca University. Before serving as a member of the Portuguese commission at Badajoz-Elvas in 1524, Margalho had published a book on philosophy in Salamanca in which he argued that the Moluccas belonged to Spain. As a result, he also came into contact with Ferdinand Columbus. King John III quickly recognized the danger of having a prominent Portuguese academic defending the Spanish claim. Thus, he appointed Margalho as preceptor to his brother Prince Afonso (1509–40) and his natural son Duarte (1521–43). To further ensure that Margalho would not leave for Spain, he was later employed at Coimbra University.138 Still, Margalho’s connection to Salamanca is undeniable, like that of the first Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes (1502–78) who also received part of his formation at Salamanca University and had unfulfilled ambitions of becoming a professor there.139 Additionally, a similar pattern of employing Spanish pilots by the Portuguese can also be observed.

In 1521, a Spanish pilot who had survived Solis’s expedition was hired to sail to the Plata River. When this pilot returned to Lisbon, the Spanish ambassador Juan de Zuñiga quickly obtained intelligence about his voyage. It is likely that Zuñiga attempted to send the pilot back to Spain, but the outcome is unknown.140 Magellan’s migration to Spain seems also to have influenced reverse processes: instances of Portuguese appropriation of Spanish nautical knowledge. A notable example took place when António de Brito, the Portuguese captain of the Moluccas, captured the Trinidad (one of the ships from Magellan’s expedition). On board, he got access to nautical charts drawn by Diogo Ribeiro and Nuno Garcia Toreño. He also imprisoned the pilot, captain, and master of the ship and counselled King John III to kill them, as their knowledge of the Pacific route was too dangerous. In the letter, Brito also mentioned that he was thinking of sending a

137 On this topic see the seminal work of Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, Portugueses no estudo de Salamanca, 1250–1550 (Coimbra: University of Coimbra Press, 1962).
140 Toribio Medina, Juan Díaz de Solís, CCCXVI.
Spanish pilot to Malacca using a faster nautical route by Borneo.\textsuperscript{141} Brito's successor in the Moluccas, the Captain D. Jorge de Meneses, indeed sent a fleet to Malacca by this route in 1527, using a Spanish pilot.\textsuperscript{142} It was not long before the Portuguese preferred this route to the longer one by the islands of Sumatra and Java. Therefore, the long skirmishes and embassies between the Portuguese and the Spanish in the Moluccas were also used by the Portuguese, and not only by the Spanish, to improve nautical knowledge of the area.

Meanwhile, in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal also closely monitored apparently minor events taking place at the Spanish court. In April 1525, António de Azevedo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain, informed King John III that King Charles I had ordered the confiscation of some nautical charts to a Galician pilot who had sailed in the Portuguese India Run and that had offered his services to Spain. This pilot was even summoned into King Charles I's presence.\textsuperscript{143} A Portuguese document from April 1524 also appears to refer to this same pilot, who was accompanying the Portuguese commission in diplomatic meetings.\textsuperscript{144} This suggests that Portugal used this Galician pilot to counter Spanish interests, in similar fashion to King Manuel I's employment of the Spanish Captain D. Luiz de Guzman in the Portuguese navy in response to the situation with Magellan.\textsuperscript{145} The message was clear: if King Charles I intended to use Portuguese, Portugal would also use Spanish, a situation that seems to have become increasingly common.

In 1534, in two letters, Tristão de Ataíde, a Portuguese captain of the Moluccas, recounted that he had spoken with a Spanish pilot who had shown him a nautical chart with the route followed by Garcia de Loaísa's fleet in 1525. This pilot had also presented him the nautical route from New Spain to the Moluccas and had provided him information about Viceroy Hernán Cortés's attempts. For this reason, Ataíde would not risk sending this valuable pilot to Malacca, as he feared his fresh escape.\textsuperscript{146} Another critical piece of evidence of how Portugal valued the knowledge of Spanish seamen is friar

\textsuperscript{142} Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do Descobrimento e Conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses, book VII (Lisbon: Typografíia Rollandiana, 1833), 133.
\textsuperscript{143} As Gavetas, vol. I, 918–20.
\textsuperscript{144} Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Corpo Cronolóxico 1–30–102.
\textsuperscript{145} Gil, El exílio portugués, 257.
Andrés de Urdaneta’s return to Lisbon in 1536. Throughout his forced stay in the Philippines and the Moluccas, this Spanish friar had accumulated vital reports, taken notes based on his observations, and compiled information from his fellow countrymen and the Portuguese. At Urdaneta’s arrival to Lisbon, all this intelligence, alongside nautical rutters and probably nautical cartography, were seized from him by Portuguese authorities. The Spanish pilot Mancías del Poyo who accompanied Urdaneta at his landing in Lisbon, was threatened with imprisonment. When Urdaneta went to Évora to complain to King John III, the Spanish ambassador Luiz Sarmiento de Mendonza told him to drop his complaint, and gave him a horse to flee to Spain before he too would be jailed. What was at stake in Mendonza’s action was his clear awareness that for the Portuguese any Spaniard that appeared in Lisbon, independently of his status, with knowledge connected to Magellan’s expedition was considered a threat. This was due to the fact that the Portuguese not only considered Magellan to be a traitor to Portugal, but mainly because they needed to acquire the knowledge associated with his expedition to monitor Spanish plans in the Moluccas.

The treatment of Urdaneta and del Poyo is similar to that of previous survivors of Magellan’s expedition when they landed in Lisbon. Among those who faced prison we could include the Genoese pilot Leone Pancaldo, as well as the Spanish pilot Ginés de Mafra and the captain of the Trinidad, Gomez de Espinoza. The Sevillian mariner Juan Rodríguez, el Sordo (the Deaf), who was the first to anchor in Lisbon, was jailed and released only after he delivered a written report of Magellan’s expedition to King John III. Furthermore, the Portuguese Pedro de Lourosa, a collaborator of the Spanish in the Moluccas that Urdaneta met in person and who had nautical knowledge of the Cape of Good Hope route, was promptly executed by Captain António de Brito for his treason. As has been underscored previously, the same António de Brito seized all the belongings of the Trinidad in 1521. Among the materials apprehended were two important technical documents: a regiment, signed by Portuguese cosmographer Rui Faleiro, to calculate the longitudinal position of the Moluccas, and the diary of the Spanish navigator-astronomer Andrés de San Martín with all the astronomical measurements taken during Magellan’s voyage. These materials went

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148 On Rui Faleiro’s regiment and the nautical details of Magellan’s voyage see: Avelino Teixeira da Mota, O regimento de altura de leste-oeste de Rui Faleiro. Subsídios para o estudo náutico e geográfico da viagem de Fernão de Magalhães (Lisbon: Edições Culturais da Marinha, 1986); Avelino Teixeira da Mota, A primeira viagem de circun-navegação. Estudo náutico e geográfico (Lisbon: Comissão Cultural de Marinha, 2019).
first to Duarte de Resende, the Portuguese overseer of the Moluccas, who used them to write an account of Magellan's voyage, and they later landed on the desk of the Portuguese chronicler of Asia, João de Barros (1496–1570), in Lisbon, who used them for his famous works about Asia.\textsuperscript{149}

Therefore, it is not surprising that King Charles I continued to express concern about Spanish nautical personnel working for Portugal. This is exemplified in 1540, when he wrote to Luiz Sarmiento de Mendonza, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal, regarding the Spaniard Pedro Alvin. In his letter, King Charles I stated: “You say that one of those who wants to go in that Armada [of Portugal] is called Pedro Alvin, a Castilian who has always sailed in our kingdoms and territories, and who has experience about such a discovery. If it were possible, bring him back, making him understand that once here, given his ability, we will send him to be favored and we will employ him in a trade where he can be exploited. And let it seem that this was not ordered from here.”\textsuperscript{150}

Alvin serves as an example of how knowledge possessed by pilots could become a source of dispute between Portugal and Spain, both in diplomatic and espionage terms. The Portuguese employment of Spanish nautical personnel was also part of a larger policy to disrupt Spanish maritime expeditions. Before concluding, it is important to examine this issue, as well as Spanish attempts to disrupt Portuguese maritime enterprises. In doing so, a chronological approach will be taken, highlighting once again how the dispute over pilots’ knowledge of the ocean was at the heart of many of these attempts.

\section*{1.3 Disrupting the Rival’s Expeditions: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Intra-Iberian Global Interchange over the Globe}

Portugal's early recognition of the dangers of having Portuguese pilots sharing their knowledge with Spain is exemplified in an incident from the 1480–90s. Upon learning that a Portuguese pilot and some mariners who had engaged in privateering in West Africa had fled to Spain, King John II dispatched secret agents to kidnap and bring them back to Portugal. These agents successfully captured the men and brought them back in the utmost secrecy. When they arrived in Évora, the king ordered their public execution, sending a clear message, as recorded by the king’s chronicler: it

\textsuperscript{149} Loureiro, “A malograda viagem,” 99–102.
\textsuperscript{150} Moreno Madrid, “Circulation and Contacts,” 9.
was safer for nautical experts to fear the Portuguese king's reaction than to risk their lives by venturing to Spain or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{151} This incident is connected to a famous Portuguese law that officially forbade Portuguese pilots from entering foreign service without royal permission, as it was considered royal treason and could result in a death sentence. King John II's policy was followed by all of his successors until 1580. Despite this law, Portuguese seafarers continually challenged it throughout the course of Portuguese-Spanish maritime relations. As will be shown in later chapters vis-à-vis England and France, this Portuguese law also justified complex counter-espionage operations in Europe that earned the Portuguese a reputation for fierce secrecy.

Thus, diplomacy and espionage became closely linked as tools to prevent the circulation of nautical knowledge between the two sides. Aside from the Portuguese diplomatic pressure on Spain, mentioned above in relation to Solis's expedition in 1512, Portugal also sent agents to disturb other Spanish preparations. In 1510, the Portuguese agent Afonso Álvares was sent to Seville on a mission to hire the Spanish pilot Juan Barbero. This was reportedly part of a Portuguese plan to launch an expedition that intended to sail to Urabá and Veragua, regions clearly within the Spanish hemisphere according to the Treaty of Tordesillas, in response to Pinzon and Solis's previous voyage. Afonso Álvares was imprisoned, failing to realize his goal.\textsuperscript{152} But he also likely intended to win over the Spanish pilot Juan Rodríguez de Mafra, who could provide a detailed account of the new Spanish geographical discoveries. After Afonso Álvares's prison, Portugal dispatched another agent to spy on all movements in the Casa during the 1510s: Francisco de Aguiar.\textsuperscript{153} Due to incidents such as these, in 1511, Vespucci was ordered to deliver nautical charts only to trustworthy individuals. According to a Spanish chronicler, the Portuguese plans to sail to Urabá and lay hands on Spanish geographical knowledge of the area were at stake.\textsuperscript{154}

The escalation of maritime tensions ensured that diplomacy and espionage continued to play a major role in the interactions between Portugal and Spain. In 1514, King Ferdinand sent an embassy to Portugal to complain about Portuguese preparations to sail to the Caribbean. The Portuguese fleet did not depart, but during that same year, some Portuguese individuals were jailed in the area due to the tension; they were only released in Seville

\textsuperscript{151} Garcia de Resende, \textit{Crónica de D. João II}, vol. II (Lisbon: Escriptorio, 1902), 46.
\textsuperscript{152} Herrera, \textit{Historia General}, Decade I, 248.
\textsuperscript{153} Moreno Madrid, "Circulation and Contacts," 7.
when it was proven that they were not connected to Lisbon’s plans.\textsuperscript{155} In 1515, Portugal protested to Spain, as Lisbon had become aware that Spanish nautical charts placed the Brazilian Cape of Saint Augustine within the Spanish hemisphere. As a result, in a meeting headed by the pilot-major João Dias de Solis, corrections were ordered on Spanish nautical charts by the Spanish cartographer André de Morales (1477–1517).\textsuperscript{156}

Nevertheless, Solis’s second expedition to the Plata River in 1515–16 further exacerbated the rivalry between the two sides. Some of the survivors of the return voyage had loaded products in Brazil, and Portugal considered this a violation and it imprisoned some Spaniards. On the Spanish side, some Portuguese in Seville were also jailed. Both sides issued diplomatic protests and the Portuguese king wrote directly to the Casa, instead of to King Ferdinand, to demand the release of the Portuguese. Spain refused to hand over the cargo, arguing that the mariners had loaded the merchandise in a Brazilian area that was out of the Portuguese hemisphere. The conflict ended with an exchange of prisoners,\textsuperscript{157} illustrating how both sides could not lose the knowledge of valuable seamen.

Shortly after Magellan and the Faleiro brothers’ passage to Spain in 1517, during the discussions to confirm the formal alliance between Portugal and Spain in 1518, Portugal asked Spain to respect the Portuguese hemisphere and also demanded that any Portuguese fugitives in Spain should be immediately handed over to Portugal. Spain refused the latter point.\textsuperscript{158} This rejection can be seen as an indirect acknowledgement of Spain’s need for Portuguese nautical expertise. Indeed, very few instances of the Spanish handing over Portuguese nautical experts at previous Portuguese request are known. Similar instances with France and England will also be reported in later chapters.

This Spanish response may have also directly influenced all of Portugal’s attempts to disrupt Magellan’s expedition. After Magellan had a meeting with King Charles I, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain protested. He was answered by King Charles I, influenced by the opinion of the bishop of Burgos, that he would not relinquish his rights. Consequently, the ambassador advised King Manuel I to discuss the approach to follow with his advisors.\textsuperscript{159} Fear of the Portuguese king’s reaction even motivated Ferdinand

\textsuperscript{155} Herrera, \textit{Historia General}, Decade I, 357–58 and 370.
\textsuperscript{156} Veitia Lineage, \textit{Norte de la Contratación}, 140.
\textsuperscript{157} Herrera, \textit{Historia General}, Decade II, 44; Toribio Medina, \textit{Juan Díaz de Solís}, CCXCVIC–CCCVII.
\textsuperscript{158} Mariño and Moran, \textit{Tratados Internacionales}, XXXIX and XL.
Columbus’s secret mission to Lisbon to gauge Portugal’s reaction. Word soon spread that the Portuguese ambassador in Spain intended to kill Magellan. The bishop of Burgos reacted by providing Magellan with a personal escort to ensure his safety, particularly at night. The bishop understood that if any Portuguese attempt to murder Magellan was successful, the journey would be at risk as the entire expedition was based on Magellan’s personal nautical skill and knowledge. There were different opinions in King Manuel I’s council. While some advocated that the Portuguese king should offer Magellan greater rewards than King Charles I, others insisted that he should be killed to prevent similar cases. In the end, King Manuel I sent the agent João Rodrigues to persuade Magellan and the Faleiro brothers to return, but the mission was not successful.160

During the preparations for Magellan’s departure in 1519, Sebastião Álvares, the Portuguese overseer in Andalusia,161 also approached him. Although Magellan refused to return to Portugal, Álvares was pleased to inform King Manuel I that Magellan had promised not to sail in Portuguese routes. He had also seen the nautical charts for Magellan’s expedition (prepared with the assistance of Portuguese cartographers Pedro and Jorge Reinel, as Sebastião Álvares mentioned), asserting that they were empty in the southern region of America.162 But by this time, it was already acknowledged that Magellan had heard, in Portugal, of the Strait that he would discover.163 Thus, it was a repetition of Christopher Columbus’s case and discoveries. The nautical challenges and uncertainties that Magellan’s expedition would face convinced the Portuguese king that the voyage would fail.164 However, still in 1520, King Manuel I ordered that the Portuguese Captain Jorge de Brito sail to the Moluccas to intercept a possible Spanish arrival there. The order was so secret that even the Portuguese governor of India was not to be informed of it.165

Between Elcano’s return from his voyage around the world in 1522 and the signing of the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529, Portugal not only lodged diplomatic

161 The Portuguese overseer played an important role in Portuguese-Spanish relations as has long been demonstrated (Manuel Corte-Real, A feitoria portuguesa de Andaluzia (1500–1532) (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1967), but his role is better understood in connection with studies of the Portuguese community at Andalusia (António Luis López Martínez, Cruzar la Raya. Portugueses en la Baja Andalucía (Seville: Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Consejería de la Presidencia, 2011).
165 Gil, El exilio portugués, 257.
protests at Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas, such as those led by García de Loaisa in 1525 and Sebastian Cabot in 1526, but also actively sought to disrupt these expeditions by depriving Spain of vital pilots. In 1523, shortly before Portuguese pilot Estêvão Gomes signed the agreement with King Charles I to find the northwestern passage to Asia via a North American strait, King John III thanked Luis da Silveira, the Portuguese ambassador in Spain, for his action. At the Portuguese king’s orders, the ambassador had approached Portuguese Captain D. Álvaro de Mesquita and the pilots Estêvão Gomes, Bernardo Pires, and João Rodrigues Mansinho to persuade them to return to Portugal. King John III was delighted to know that all were willing to return to Portugal and authorized the ambassador to promise the minor things they asked. Still, he was also worried that Estêvão Gomes was too much decided in not returning to Portugal. For this reason, he instructed the ambassador to insist with him on his return. As previously demonstrated, Gomes never returned to Portugal and died in Spanish service.

A quite similar instance happened with the abovementioned Simão de Alcáçova. Upon learning of his plans to sail under the flag of King Charles I in 1531–32, King John III sought to use Alcáçova’s contacts in Portugal to persuade him to return. The earl of Vimioso, one of King John III’s favorites and financial ministers, who was related to Alcáçova, mediated the attempt, which included a meeting at Évora. The king even issued a letter of pardon to Alcáçova and ordered the reinstatement of Portuguese payments to him, but Alcáçova did not return. Simão de Alcáçova’s desertion was even more embarrassing for the Portuguese king for another reason: he belonged to the family of King John III’s secretary. As his case could easily reach other European courts and affect his prestige, the king reacted quickly to try to revert the situation.

Thus, the Portuguese strategy of making diplomatic protests against all Spanish expeditions that intended to reach the Moluccas up to 1529 was also complemented by attempts to repatriate Portuguese nautical expertise. For this reason, it is plausible to assume that King John III intervened to avoid the possible defections of Diogo Lopes de Sequeira and Duarte Pacheco Pereira to Spain. The king himself was informed in 1524 by Sequeira that King Charles I personally wrote letters to convince the Portuguese cartographers Pedro and Jorge Reinel to work for him. In fact, there is no sign that Pedro

169  Sousa Viterbo, Trabalhos náuticos, 300.
and Jorge Reinel, like Diogo Ribeiro, switched from Portuguese to Spanish service, despite King Charles I’s offers. Soon afterwards, King John III issued new grants to them and also to the astrologer Simão Fernandes, whose services Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, as mentioned, had offered to King Charles I.

King Charles I faced difficulties in formally justifying to King John III his authorization for García de Loaísa to sail in 1525. These difficulties were further exacerbated in 1526 after Charles’s marriage to Empress Elizabeth, sister of King John III. By then, the Portuguese ambassador, D. Pedro de Meneses, marquis of Vila Real, confronted Charles with the need to finally resolve the dispute over the Moluccas. King Charles I was forced to admit that he had to rely on his cosmographers as he lacked the knowledge to respond directly to the demands. Thus, ultimately, King Charles I excused himself to King John III, stating that he was too busy dealing with France in the run-up to the Treaty of Madrid to make a final decision on allowing Loaísa’s departure. It is evident that Charles used the Spanish maritime preparations as a means to exercise pressure, just as King Manuel I had done with King Ferdinand in the abovementioned examples from the 1510s. Thus, in 1527, King Charles I replied to King John III’s complaints, stating that he would cancel a new Spanish expedition to the Moluccas if John were to pay for all the expenses incurred for the voyage.

This reply was already a preparation for King Charles I’s court’s change of position in the negotiations: instead of sustaining his rights, and given the costs of his Europeans wars, Charles would suspend his rights to the Moluccas in exchange for the right amount of money that Portugal was to offer. On the other side, although King John III recognized that the original idea of buying the alleged Spanish rights was not his, he wanted and needed to settle the dispute in the Moluccan islands in order to concentrate on a more delicate matter for Portugal: French interloping in West Africa and Brazil. Indeed, the French overseas challenge also influenced the Treaty of Zaragoza, as France also challenged the Spanish Atlantic, thus prompting a reconciliation on the Moluccan question between Kings John III and Charles I.

Nevertheless, the signature of the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529 did not end the tension and the need for spying on the rival’s overseas intentions on both sides; there continued to be stories that involved nautical experts and

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170 Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. I, 255.
171 Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. I, 84.
172 Mariño and Moran, Tratados Internacionales, LXXVI–LXXVIII and LXXXVII.
that fully document the importance of sea knowledge in this period. This section will start with the Portuguese side.

In 1531, Lope Hurtado de Mendoña, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, received an order to protest against new Portuguese preparations (likely those of Martim Afonso de Sousa’s fleet) for the Plata River. Spain, at that point ruled by the Empress Elizabeth of Portugal due to King Charles I’s absence, was worried that Portugal had repatriated the Portuguese pilot Gonçalo da Costa, alongside other Portuguese that had served Spain during Cabot’s expedition, and would attempt to occupy the Plata River. Although the embassy did not receive a favorable response, Spain was relieved to know that Portugal did not plan any other serious expedition in the region, as the goal was to expel French interlopers from Brazil.173 Also in the 1530s, Portugal was informed of the proposals that Portuguese cartographer João Rodrigues was making at the Spanish court, together with the Portuguese pilot Rodrigo Álvares, who has been mentioned previously as serving Spain in the Plata River. The Portuguese agent Francisco Dias was able to ensure that Rodrigues did not menace Portuguese interests.174 Still, Rodrigues was retained in Spain due to Ferdinand Columbus’s orders to give him everything on condition that Rodrigues designed globes for him.175

Similarly, Portugal formally lodged a complaint when the Spanish explorer Pedro de Alvarado (1485–1541) directly approached a Portuguese captain in the Moluccas to assist him in planning another Spanish expedition there. Alvarado openly acknowledged that the best option for sailing from New Spain to the Moluccas and the Philippines was to hire a Portuguese pilot. King Charles I replied to the Portuguese ambassador’s protest that Alvarado “could perfectly request some Portuguese to go with him as the King of Portugal also availed of the services of several Castilians.”176 This response illustrates the key importance of the intra-Iberian knowledge exchange and that the kings of both countries were aware of it. Therefore, it is not surprising that Portuguese and Spanish maritime espionage continued until the 1580 Iberian Union, and that it involved the hiring of experts in the field of seafaring.

During the late 1540s and 1550s, another area of tension involving Portuguese pilots serving Spain came to preoccupy Portugal: the Canaries. Spanish expeditions mounted from Seville and the Canaries to West Africa

173 Herrera, Historia General, Decade IV, 214.
175 Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. II, 205.
176 Sousa Viterbo, Trabalhos náuticos, 72.
with Portuguese pilots from Algarve were so regular that King John III felt forced to dispatch the agent Aires Cardoso. While his official mission was to ensure the best Canaries wine that Portugal needed for its India Run fleets, his non-declared mission was to report all Spanish voyages to West Africa. John used Cardoso's reports to present the proofs of Spanish violations of Portuguese Mare Clausum directly at the Spanish court, as well as of what he considered to be overuse of Portuguese pilots. Amidst threats against Cardoso's life, the Portuguese king's protests were to no avail. During the 1550s and 1560s, the Portuguese complaints against Spanish voyages to West Africa were met with counter-claims of Portuguese illegal voyages to the Spanish Indies, as is shown by a letter, dated August 27, 1558, from D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal, to Princess Juana of Austria (1535–73), ruler of Spain in the absence of King Philip II. The tensions in West Africa and the Spanish Indies prompted a formal complaint from Portugal to the Spanish court regarding the traditional Spanish violation of diplomatic immunity and the right to privacy of correspondence sent from Portugal to the Portuguese ambassador in Spain. This protest was made in response to the violation of Portuguese diplomatic bags that were opened upon reaching the Spanish border. This tactic employed by Spain was not novel; similar instances occurred in the Spanish relations to Valois France and Tudor England, although primarily for political and military, rather than maritime, motivations. Various examples are readily found in the legajos at the Simancas archive.

On May 27, 1558, King Philip II was concerned about illegal Portuguese voyages to the Spanish Indies, many of which originated from the region of Algarve. He instructed his ambassador in Portugal, D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza, to gather intelligence on these voyages and to use dissimulation to do so. Another 1558 real cédula sent to Ribera y Mendonza and formal instructions by King Philip II reinforced the same approach. After naming D. Alonso de Tovar as the new ambassador to Portugal in 1561, King Philip II ordered him, in October 22, 1563, to formally complain, while collecting all intelligence about men from Algarve who traded with the Spanish Indies. King Philip II also gave instructions on how to handle Spanish pilots who were secretly imprisoned in Lisbon. Tovar received similar instructions

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178 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 39.
179 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 81.
181 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 381, docs. 74, 98 and 104.
up to the end of his tenure as ambassador in 1567. The specific Algarve origin of many Portuguese pilots in Spanish service increased to almost half of the total of Portuguese pilots serving in Spain during the Iberian Union. The geographical proximity to Seville and the interconnection between Algarve, Andalusia, and Morocco help explain this number. Although the problem became more pronounced under King Philip II, it had already existed prior to his reign.

The tension in West Africa also helps to elucidate why Manuel de Mesquita Perestrelo, the renowned author of a Portuguese nautical rutter on the East African coast written at the Portuguese king's orders in 1576, also had a Spanish phase in his career. Temporarily occupying the captaincy on the Portuguese fortress of Mina due to the previous captain's death, Perestrelo was subsequently accused of embezzling money and failing to fight against the first voyage of John Hawkins (1532–95). He was imprisoned in Lisbon for some time. Perestrelo later fled to Spain, but Portugal managed to repatriate him. The negotiations for Perestrelo's return are not entirely clear, but they involved D. Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, who sheltered Perestrelo in his home for some time. Perestrelo's story is recorded in a letter of pardon by the king of Portugal. This is another important example of how Spain continued to be a tempting destination for Portuguese nautical experts who left Portugal for various reasons and particularly in the decades before the union with Spain.

Still, Portuguese maritime espionage in Spain had its flipside too, as has been demonstrated for the period up to 1529. It is impossible not to mention other important instances up to the 1580 Iberian Union. Most of the episodes took place under King Philip II. The king's espionage network within Europe is well-known, but it is surprising to observe that studies on this subject rarely mention Spanish geographical and maritime espionage in Portugal. Once more, a chronological overview will be followed.

An interesting first instance of Spanish acquisition of Portuguese nautical knowledge took place in 1545, when the Spanish royal cosmographer

185 Carlos Carnicer and Javier Marcos, Espías de Felipe II: los servicios secretos del imperio español (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005).
Alonso de Santa Cruz visited Portugal to solve several scientific doubts that he had concerning the possibility of measuring longitude with magnetic declination. Santa Cruz’s *Libro de Longitudes* is testimony to how easy it was for him to meet Portuguese pilots, exchange knowledge (including receiving Portuguese nautical rutters to India and the Moluccan Islands from Portuguese unnamed pilots) and also to learn from them. His meeting with Portuguese Captain D. João de Castro (1500–48) is also well-known. It is more controversial to assume that Castro handed over his famous nautical rutters to Santa Cruz. The Portuguese historian Luís de Albuquerque argued that Santa Cruz’s claim that Castro did so might be erroneous. Santa Cruz stated that Castro had taken magnetic measurements in his voyages with an instrument designed by the Spaniard Felipe Guillén. However, in reality, Castro used the instrument given to him by the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes. The controversy is connected to the fact that Santa Cruz also used several excerpts from Pedro Nunes’s main treatise in his *Libro de Longitudes*, without formally assuming Nunes’s authorship. Possibly for this reason too, he opened his book by crediting the Spaniard Felipe Guillén’s invention, stating that it was made in Portugal at the service of King John III, who had hired and paid Guillén during some years because of his instrument. But later in the book, Santa Cruz recognizes that Guillén returned to Spanish service during the 1530s. Guillén is also a rare case of a Spanish nautical expert who served in Portugal before returning to Spain.

As with the abovementioned case of Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, a previous governor of Portuguese Asia between 1518 and 1521 and member of the Portuguese commission at Badajoz-Elvas in 1524, Spain was also a temptation to Portuguese previous rulers of India who returned to Portugal. At any sign of dissatisfaction, Spanish ambassadors in Portugal intervened with tempting proposals. This happened with Francisco Barreto, a governor of Portuguese Asia between 1555 and 1558, whom King Philip II attempted to enlist in his service due to his nautical knowledge and prestige to assist him in the fight against Islamic pirates and corsairs. For this purpose, the Spanish ambassador D. Alonso de Tovar conducted negotiations with Barreto that

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appear in some of his letters to King Philip II. A similar instance took place with João de Mendonça, a provisional governor of Portuguese Asia in 1564, who was also displeased when he returned to Portugal. In 1567, King Philip II ordered his ambassador in Lisbon to gather information about Persia from him.

King Philip II also issued a similar order to his ambassador regarding Fernando de Oliveira (1507–85) in 1567. At that time, Oliveira had attracted Philip’s attention. In his early days as a priest, Oliveira had fled to Spain during the 1530s. Although he later returned to Portugal, he passed through Spain once more in the 1540s. During his first sojourn in Spain in the 1530s, he published the first Portuguese grammar. Oliveira published his *Art of Sea Warfare* in 1555, the first nautical warfare treatise to be published in Europe. Although this work had been published in Portuguese, it was certainly known at King Philip II’s court, owing to the many connections between the two Iberian courts. When the Spanish ambassador Fernando Carrillo de Mendonza became aware, in 1567, that Oliveira was negotiating joining the service of Valois France, he immediately stepped in, seeing an opportunity for Spain to engage him.

As the documents published by León Bourdon prove, the ambassador had personal meetings with Oliveira, in which they spoke about the conditions of his transfer to Spain. Oliveira started by showing ambassador Mendonza the French letters promising him rewards for his move to France. Oliveira also recalled the many times he had warned Queen Catherine of Austria and Cardinal Henry, the two Portuguese regents between 1557

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190 AGS, *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 381, doc. 89. Later, King Philip II even interfered directly in Barreto’s career at the Portuguese court. On Barreto’s career see also: Nuno Vila-Santa, *Do Algarve, a Marrocos e à Índia: Francisco Barreto e a Casa de Quarteira (Séculos XV–XVI)* (Loulé: Municipal Archive/Town Hall, 2021).


192 Bourdon, “Episodes inconnus,” 450–53.
and 1568, on French overseas expeditions prepared against the Portuguese *Mare Clausum*. The Spanish ambassador was so interested in Oliveira that he even wrote two different letters, recalling Oliveira’s previous career. He also went to speak with Queen Catherine of Austria and Cardinal Henry to inform them that he was in negotiations to have Oliveira come to Spain. As both did not credit Oliveira’s person and work much, there was no formal opposition to Oliveira’s move to Spain. Interestingly, the tone of disappointment in Mendonza’s letters to King Philip II is palpable, as he had to explain why Oliveira ultimately did not go to Spain despite the negotiations and promises. It should be noted that Mendonza’s efforts to recruit Oliveira were also motivated by a desire to prevent him from joining the services of the Valois together with the Portuguese cosmographer Bartolomeu Velho (who did eventually go to France). Ultimately, Oliveira’s potential hiring was primarily justified by his extensive geographical and nautical knowledge, which King Philip II highly valued.

Fernando Carrillo de Mendonza’s correspondence continues to prove how attentive he always was to any similar opportunities that might present themselves for Spain. In November 1569, as relations between Spain and England were rapidly deteriorating, the ambassador, stationed in Lisbon, reported on news of Portuguese merchants in the Netherlands collaborating with London merchants to plan English trade overseas. However, he also recognized the potential opportunity for Spain. When António Fogaça, an experienced Portuguese who had spent time in England, returned to Portugal, Carrillo de Mendonza promptly suggested that King Philip II hire Fogaça for maritime espionage in England. The advantage of Fogaça’s long experience and Portuguese background, which would enable him to act as a spy for Spain without arousing suspicion from the English, was evident. While Philip did not formally respond to the suggestion, Carrillo employed Fogaça as his spy in French and English ports. Finally, in December 1569, Philip approved Fogaça’s formal hiring to work for D. Guerrau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador in England between 1568 and 1571. Fogaça served effectively, but was eventually imprisoned in 1579 when his espionage activities were discovered. Thus, Ambassador Carrillo de Mendonza used his embassy in Lisbon, like his predecessor D. Alonso de Tovar had done, to deal also with Spanish *Mare Clausum* issues and policies in Europe.

193 AGS, *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 385, doc. 70 and last document of the *legajo*.
194 AGS, *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 386. This *legajo* does not have folio numeration. The letters in question are from November-December 1569.
Another interesting case of a Portuguese nautical expert who considered serving Spain was that of the pilot Bartolomeu Baião. Two undated papers (likely dated 1564–65) in the archive of Simancas and addressed to the Spanish court, show that the Portuguese pilot was interested in entering King Philip II’s service. The negotiation was likely mediated by D. Alonso de Tovar, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal. Baião promised to reveal a secret nautical instrument to measure latitude at sea whenever there was no sunlight (the typical examples he provided were in the midst of a storm or during cloudy weather). He argued that Spain, as the great maritime power of the time, would need his invention more than any other seaborne empire and offered it to King Philip II, as no one in Portugal valued his creation. In a second more detailed document, he also suggested that the king could use his long experience at sea to have important geographical information on the Florida question. He also claimed to possess secret and sensitive intelligence precisely when the French and the Spanish were fighting each other in the region.\textsuperscript{196}

Baião received no reply as his alleged invention, even by the way he wrote, seemed to be a façade. Baião, then, went to England, where he participated in English privateering against the Spanish and the Portuguese, resulting in accusations of piracy.\textsuperscript{197} Owing to this, D. Guerrau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador in England, conducted negotiations with the Portuguese pilot during the summer of 1570 to try to avoid his going with John Hawkins to the Spanish Indies. The ambassador was tricked on several occasions by Baião, but it seems that Baião in the end wished to return to King Philip II’s service if he was pardoned for his piracy.\textsuperscript{198} As we shall see in the following chapters, Baião’s history was far from unique. Still, it is an enlightening example of how King Philip II’s failure to reply a request of employment could have dire consequences for Spain.

Finally, during the 1570s, the tension created by the Spanish establishment in the Philippines was reflected in the espionage mission of Juan Baptista Gesio (?–1580), a Neapolitan subject of King Philip II. Gesio had been sending intelligence to Philip since 1569.\textsuperscript{199} When D. Juan de Borja was appointed Spanish ambassador to Portugal, King Philip II ordered him in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[196] AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 382. This legajo does not have folio numeration. On the Franco-Spanish skirmishes in Florida see: John T. McGrath, \textit{The French in Early Florida: In the Eye of the Hurricane} (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2000).
\item[197] Hume, \textit{Calendar ... (Simancas)}, 1568–1579, doc. 2721.
\item[198] Hume, \textit{Calendar ... (Simancas)}, 1568–1579, docs. 185, 186, 189, 193, 198–200, 202–5, 210 and 213.
\item[199] Portuondo, \textit{Secret Science}, 186.
\end{footnotes}
an instruction dated December 6, 1569 to use dissimulation to acquire all important Portuguese geographical knowledge. Given Portuguese protests regarding the Spanish presence in the Philippines, Philip instructed Borja to respond that the matter was still being discussed at his court in the Consejo de Indias. Although only the geographical and nautical espionage will be mentioned here, Borja also became an expert on political espionage, earning the reputation of espía-embajador (spy-ambassador).

One of Borja’s primary concerns upon his appointment as ambassador to Portugal was with the movements of the Portuguese Captain Manuel Mesquita Perestrello, particularly due to his prior presence in Spain. By way of a certain Diogo Lopes, a Portuguese pilot from Ceuta, Portuguese authorities had convinced Perestrello to return to Portugal, pardoning his past offenses and appointing him to lead the abovementioned expedition to the Moluccas. Borja’s initial concern was heightened when he discovered the “secret” instructions delivered to Perestrello by the Portuguese Crown, which included fighting the Spanish in the Moluccas and the Philippines. In another missive, dated September 27, 1570, Borja confessed that Perestrello had been convinced to return to his homeland by D. Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, who retained him in his house to debate the Moluccas question. Perestrello’s retention in the Portuguese ambassador’s house in Spain is similar to incidents that took place at the same time involving the Portuguese ambassador in France, as shall be detailed in chapter 4. Borja was so concerned with Perestrello’s expertise that he tried to prevent his expedition, but what he regretted most was that Spain had lost the service of such a skilled cosmographer. In his own words, written to King Philip II he stated that Perestrello “is seen here as a great mariner and cosmographer and they [the Portuguese] think that he will do great things there.”

While attempting to disrupt Perestrello’s expedition, Borja did not neglect King Philip II’s initial directive for espionage. In two of his first letters, dated July 14 and August 6, 1570, addressed to the king, the ambassador admitted that he had employed someone to work for him on nautical charts and rutters. He also revealed that he was learning as much as he could on the subject himself. Although Borja never refers directly to names, he was
probably referring to Juan Baptista Gesio and the Portuguese cartographer Luís Jorge Barbuda. Indeed, Borja had brought Gesio with him to Lisbon and hired him to access Portuguese geographical accounts and knowledge. For the same reason, Borja suggested to King Philip II that he should hire an unnamed Spanish friar who was old and wise and had served in Portuguese India for years. The Spanish friar had offered to help Philip in the Moluccan and Philippines question. Even though recommended by Borja, the king declined to engage the friar’s services for Spain. 204

Borja’s espionage activities continued after 1570 through the services of Gesio. Gesio obtained geographical accounts and facilitated relations with the Portuguese cartographer Luís Jorge Barbuda, who defected to Spain in 1579. This knowledge benefited the Spanish royal chronicler Juan Lopez de Velasco (1530–98) and El Escorial library. 205 The goal was fully achieved when Gesio provided Spain with key Portuguese geographical knowledge, as a letter by Velasco proves: several Portuguese nautical rutters, two reports on Ferdinand Magellan’s voyage, the 1569 manuscript version of a treatise on Brazil written by Pero de Magalhães de Gândavo and originally dedicated to Cardinal Henry, D. João de Castro’s nautical rutter of the Red Sea and a manuscript version of Duarte Pacheco Pereira’s Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, written in the first years of the 16th century. In the course of his activities, Gesio also tried to convince King Philip II to declare war on Portugal over the Portuguese use of geographical knowledge against Spanish interests, an idea that the king did not consider owing to the ongoing negotiations for King Sebastian of Portugal’s (1557–78) possible marriage with his daughter, Isabel Clara Eugénia (1566–1630). After D. Juan de Borja was replaced as ambassador by D. Juan de Silva in 1575, who was similarly instructed by the king to procure as much Portuguese cartography and nautical rutters as he could manage, using dissimulation and secrecy if necessary, 206 Gesio left Lisbon together with Borja. Gesio and Borja tried to bring the Portuguese cartographer Barbuda with them, but King Sebastian ordered Barbuda’s arrest at the border in Olivenza due to a scandal at court. Barbuda was well-known to have been willing to defect to Spain for years. When Gesio died in Madrid in 1580, a note indicated that he had died as a result of his service (of espionage) in Portugal. 207 The 1580 union between Portugal and Spain obviated the need for this type of technical espionage.

204 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 387, doc. 34.
205 Albuquerque, A projeção da náutica, 12.
Conclusion

It is evident that during the exchange of nautical knowledge between Portugal and Spain, not only was the intensity of exchange always high, but also that it significantly and deeply influenced both sides in their overseas endeavors. While it is true that in the early 16th century, Spain relied more on Portuguese nautical skill and knowledge than vice versa, it is still important to note that Portugal also appropriated Spanish knowledge on several occasions. In most cases, the Portuguese acquisition of Spanish geographical knowledge was primarily utilized as a diplomatic tool of intimidation rather than as a genuine attempt to plan expeditions to Spanish overseas territories. In this sense, what can be observed for Portugal is remarkably similar to what will be detailed in the following chapters regarding England and France: the counter-espionage attempts of the Portuguese were primarily defensive tactics to help plan diplomatic responses. Therefore, and although this has not been treated here until now, this fact should also be considered when approaching the global interchange between Portugal and Spain. For this reason, not only joint Portuguese-Spanish diplomatic efforts will be identified, but also military expeditions that engaged both sides against French and English maritime plans. This was, perhaps, one of the areas in which Portuguese reliance on Spain increased up to the 1580 Iberian Union: the Portuguese need for Spanish maritime and diplomatic cooperation to fight against English and the French interlopers in the Atlantic. Still, none of this means that the Portuguese did not contribute to the Spanish art of navigation, and thus directly to the nautical practices that fostered scientific practices in the Iberian maritime milieu. Although on a lesser scale, the same might be said concerning the reverse.

The Iberian Union marked the end of the need to raise barriers, resort to espionage, or use diplomatic pressure on both sides. Thus, it is no surprise that after King Philip II’s stay in Lisbon between 1581 and 1583, the king brought the Portuguese cosmographers João Baptista Lavanha (1550–1624) and Luís Jorge Barbuda with him to Madrid. Both played a key role when Philip founded the Royal Academy of Mathematics in Madrid and they worked closely with Juan de Herrera (1530–97), the king’s architect of El Escorial. João Baptista Lavanha’s role, as Portuguese royal cosmographer, in reorganizing Portuguese nautical knowledge is well-known but it did not

only affect Portugal. It had a deep influence in Spain as it coincided with a generation of other Portuguese experts working at the Madrid court. Similarly, under the Iberian Union, Portuguese sailors continued to serve in the Spanish hemisphere areas with fewer problems. Pedro Fernandes Queirós, Luis Vaz Torres, and Sebastião Rodrigues Suromenho are examples of Portuguese pilots who served under Spanish expeditions in the Pacific in the late 16th century and early 17th century, reviving the previous tradition of Spanish employ of Portuguese nautical experts in the region.

Thus, within this context, it is not surprising to find nautical rutters of Spanish and Portuguese areas joined together for imperial and maritime purposes. A good example is Mateo Jorge’s 1615 compilation. The son of Portuguese cartographer Luís Jorge Barbuda, Mateo Jorge compiled the main nautical routes pertaining to both Iberian overseas empires across the globe. His compilation is preserved today at the Madrid Maritime Museum, and is an excellent by-product and consequence of the nautical interchange that took place between Portugal and Spain during the 16th century. A similar case is found in an early 17th-century nautical compilation, preserved in the Spanish National Library, which seems to have belonged to the Portuguese royal cosmographer João Baptista Lavanha. It is composed of several nautical rutters in Portuguese and Spanish and encompasses the whole world. This interchange, as has been demonstrated, not only took place in privileged places for knowledge interchanges (such as the Sevillian Casa de la Contratación, the Portuguese Casa da Índia or the Portuguese and Spanish courts), but also took deep root in overseas territories such as Brazil, South America, the Caribbean, Florida, West Africa, or the Moluccas. All these areas became privileged places were nautical knowledge circulated informally, deeply influencing both sides’ initiatives. The truly planetary scope of the Portuguese-Spanish nautical interchange, the first to achieve

210 On this topic see Mariano Cuesta Domingo, Tres cartógrafos portugueses en la corte de España: Ribeiro, Lavanha, Teixeira (Lisbon: Portuguese History Academy, 2010).
212 José Manuel Malhão Pereira, “Roteiros Portugueses, Séculos XVI a XVIII. Sua Génese e Influência no Estudo da Hidrografia, da Meteorologia e do Magnetismo Terrestre” (PhD diss., Lisbon University, 2018), 79–86.
213 BNE (Biblioteca Nacional de España), Derroteros de Indias, MS. 3176. A transcription of several of this rutters will be made available online on the RUTTER project website.
such a scale, can be seen as the first nautical interchange in history, fostered and pioneered by the consequences of 16th-century globalization. Thus, Portuguese and Spanish nautical science became so deeply intertwined during the 16th century that it would be a challenge to understand one without the other. The same goes for nautical and cartographical experts working for both sides. These facts also explain many similarities between the Portuguese and Spanish overseas empires.\textsuperscript{214}

By 1580 when the Iberian Union occurred, there was not so much a Spanish nautical tradition as an Iberian nautical tradition, as Mateo Jorge’s and João Baptista Lavanha’s nautical compilations illustrate. Curiously, it was exactly as such that Iberian nautical knowledge came to be perceived in the early 17th century by Iberia’s maritime rivals, France, England, and the Dutch Republic. It is, thus, time to study how Portuguese maritime knowledge was also circulating to other maritime rivals, starting with England.

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\item \textsuperscript{214} On this topic see: Paulo Pinto, “No extremo da redonda esfera: relações luso–castelhanas na Ásia, 1565–1640 – um ensaio sobre os impérios ibéricos” (PhD diss., Catholic University of Lisbon, 2012).
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2. Unexpected or Predictable Espionage and Diplomacy? Portuguese Nautical Knowledge and the English Voyages to West Africa (1551–59)

Abstract
This chapter examines Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations, drawing on recently discovered original documents that detail one of the earliest episodes of interchange and rivalry between Portugal and England: the first systematic English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s. It analyzes the diplomacy, espionage, and interchange of maritime knowledge between both sides and its role in the re-emergence of English overseas expansion. The goal is to demonstrate how, already during the early 1550s, the pattern of rivalry, emulation, and interchange of nautical knowledge was present in Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations.

Keywords: John III, Mary I, Philip II, pilots, maritime espionage, West Africa

Introduction

The exchange of nautical knowledge between England and the Iberian Peninsula since the 15th century played a crucial role in the development of English overseas endeavors. This has been acknowledged by notable English scholars for a long time.¹ The first English oceanic explorations,


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from Bristol, under King Henry VII (1485–1509) with John Cabot (1450–1500), his son Sebastian Cabot’s (1474–1557) later sojourn in Spain, and even the Portuguese involvement in those attempts from Bristol are generally known. However, the fact that King Henry VIII (1509–47) did not become a full patron of oceanic exploration slowed English overseas plans. It was under King Edward VI (1547–53), and above all Queens Mary I (1553–58) and Elizabeth I (1558–1603), that English overseas expansion fully restarted. While the first Iberian kingdom to be affected by the English overseas voyages was Portugal, particularly in West Africa under Queen Mary I, Spain also soon felt the impact, as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I showed. Nevertheless, behind the superficial maritime rivalry that emerged between England, Portugal, and Spain in the middle of 16th century, there was also, as has been underlined in the previous chapter for Portuguese-Spanish maritime relations, a less visible process of decisive maritime knowledge circulation. The intensity of this process and its overall impact on the restart of English overseas plans in the mid-16th century will be the focus of this chapter, which will deal mainly with Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and nautical interchange. The analysis will focus on the time of Queen Mary I, whose reign has been revised by historians in terms of its impact in nautical matters. Recent studies argued that the development and growth of the English navy under Queen Elizabeth I should be seen in light of the events of Queen Mary I’s reign.

During the analysis, it will become clear that the intensity of this process existed from the beginning and how it came to have a deep influence on key English overseas plans, much in the same way that has been observed for Portugal and Spain. However, it is important to highlight that for Anglo-Portuguese relations, sources are not as abundant as for the Portuguese-Spanish interchange. But the perception that this exchange was not as intense as the Portuguese-Spanish one is misleading. It is essential to bear in mind that Portugal and England had one of the oldest military alliances in world history, and that this alliance always played a key role
in their maritime relations. Thus, for Anglo-Portuguese relations, there is a plausible suspicion that many more episodes occurred in addition to those that will be detailed.

To examine the Anglo-Portuguese interchange, the study will begin by providing a brief overview of the influence of Iberian maritime knowledge on the first English overseas projects in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. It will then delve into how the English systematic voyages to West Africa in the 1550s were shaped by this pattern of Anglo-Portuguese nautical interchange, using a set of recently found Portuguese archival records that document Portuguese maritime espionage in England in this period. Through an examination of the motivations of the skilled Portuguese pilot who inspired Thomas Wydham’s voyage in 1553, the study will also address the official response of the Portuguese. During this analysis, attention will be paid to all the other English voyages up to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth I in 1558, including the diplomacy, espionage, and knowledge exchange that occurred. It will become clear that the cases studied in the 1550s are an intensification of a process that was already underway since the late 15th century. Finally, the conclusion will consider the extent to which this Anglo-Portuguese interchange may have contributed to the development of the English scientific milieu that supported England’s overseas expansion and scientific progress under Queen Elizabeth I. The continuation of this process of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and interchange, which intensified under Queen Elizabeth I, will be further explored in chapter 4 when examining João Pereira Dantas’s embassies to France and England in the 1560s.

2.1 The Iberian Connection in the Early English Overseas Projects

The Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry that came into full clarity under Queen Mary I had its initial manifestations in the 15th century. Early English voyages to Morocco in 1465 and 1469, together with King Edward IV’s (1461–70; 1471–83) petition to the pope to authorize English trade in the area,3 were the first signs of Portugal’s and England’s conflicting overseas interests. Still, the 1386 Treaty of Windsor (the oldest European alliance

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between the two realms) prevented a major breakdown of relations. Under King John II’s reign (1481–95), however, tensions escalated. The issue at stake was the prevention of the participation of two Englishmen in the Atlantic ventures that Lopo de Albuquerque, the Portuguese earl of Penamacor, who had fled to England, intended to organize. An opponent of King John II’s centralistic policy, Penamacor fled to England after his participation in the first attempt to dethrone King John. Soon afterwards, the Spanish duke of Medina Sidonia also attempted to hire Portuguese and Englishmen to aid in his Atlantic ventures against Portuguese interests. Medina Sidonia’s plans were connected to the Portuguese-Castilian rivalry in the Atlantic between King John II and the Catholic Kings. With these events in mind, John sent two embassies to England to disrupt the plans of the earl of Penamacor. He succeeded in reiterating the traditional alliance with England, but only after several fruitless bids to have Penamacor jailed in the Tower of London. Although Penamacor was imprisoned at one point, he was never extradited to Portuguese authorities to face justice, and he ended his days in Spain.

In this process, King John II benefited from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and chiefly from the fact that English maritime ambitions were very limited, as England lacked the requisite nautical knowledge by then only accumulated by the Iberians. In this way, the English attempted voyages in the 1480s, as well as the first two Flemish voyages to West Africa, were all organized during or as consequence of the Portuguese-Castilian war between 1475–79. All these voyages employed Andalusian crews and pilots, based on the contacts of Flemish and English merchants in Andalusia, and profited from Castille’s attempt to enter the West African market against Portuguese interests. Aware of these facts, King John II ordered the building of the fortress of São Jorge da Mina in 1482, to dissuade intruders (Castilians, English, and French) from breaking the Portuguese monopoly.

Worried about possible English interests in West Africa, even after erecting the Mina fortress, John also pressed King Henry VII to hand over Portuguese exiles who might assist in the preparation of any English expeditions. In 1485, King Henry VII agreed to forbid Englishmen from participating in such schemes, but refused to extradite the Portuguese collaborators. To confirm the formal alliance, Henry also approved a law prohibiting non-Englishmen

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from serving in the English navy. Nevertheless, he subsequently took steps to facilitate the naturalization of foreign seamen, thus guaranteeing that England would have a constant supply of the best nautical knowledge for overseas voyaging. It is in this context that, in 1489, King John II forced the Catholic Kings to pass a motion forbidding English merchants in Spain from recruiting Iberian pilots to sail for Guinea. John might have been aware of the plans by Bartholomew Columbus, brother of Christopher Columbus, to enter Tudor service after 1492. Although these plans did not materialize, the king was well-aware that English overseas ambitions could seriously harm Portugal and Spain's interests.

Nevertheless, Anglo-Portuguese maritime contacts remained very intense during the 1490s and escaped control by the Portuguese Crown, despite King John II's attempts. The first voyages of John Cabot (1450–1500) in the service of King Henry VII, although they did not target areas granted to the Portuguese by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, were financed and secured by an Anglo-Portuguese syndicate from Bristol. This joint collaboration took place in the context of intense commercial contacts between Bristol and Portugal, and can be fully understood when looking at Portuguese commercial networks in late medieval Europe, which included important connections with England. As a consequence of this collaboration and following the abovementioned policy, King Henry VII naturalized some of the Portuguese members of this syndicate.

It is also well-known that King Henry VII authorized two Portuguese in 1502 to sail with the Bristol merchants Thomas Ashurt and Hugh Elliot to

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7 Pagden and Subrahmanyan, “Roots and Branches,” 280.


undertake geographical discoveries in North America, on the condition that they would not visit Portuguese overseas areas. These Portuguese sailors were João Gonçalves and Francisco Fernandes, who came to Bristol after the Portuguese inability to continue the Corte-Real’s discovery expeditions. Despite the fact that this order indicated that the English monarch wished to maintain good relations with Portugal, it is undeniable that Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry was re-emerging. King Manuel I (1495–1521) disputed King Henry VII’s supposed discovery and rights of occupation to Newfoundland, particularly in the wake of the Portuguese expeditions of the Corte-Real brothers. However, the controversy did not last long as both monarchs later dropped their plans, owing to other priorities. Still, the intersection between Portuguese and English private interests was a reality in these first episodes of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and it continued to play a pivotal role.

The arrival of Sebastian Cabot in Spain in 1512, combined with the accession to the throne of King Henry VIII in 1509, meant a slowing down of English overseas plans. Still, in 1517, profiting from the knowledge brought by John Cabot’s expeditions, a new (albeit unsuccessful) mission to explore Newfoundland was launched from Bristol. While not so vocal a supporter of oceanic exploration as his father, Henry VIII played a key part in the process of English maritime expansion. In 1513, he had a motion passed enabling the hiring of experienced pilots who were not English or Scottish by birth for the main commercial routes that the English used in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, thus creating the conditions for foreign pilots to pursue legitimate careers in England. In a way, this law was a continuation of his father’s of 1489. Taking advantage of England’s intense contacts with maritime ports in France, the Iberian Peninsula, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, Henry was able to develop a systematic policy for recruiting French, Spanish, and Portuguese pilots. If his focus was mainly on European policy, the king did not neglect new opportunities.

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14 Varela, Ingleses en España y Portugal, 63.
In 1526, Robert Thorne and English merchants of Seville arranged for the participation of Roger Barlow and Henry Latimer in Sebastian Cabot’s expedition to the River Plate. During this expedition, Barlow accumulated experience and knowledge not only on the Spanish side, but also from several Portuguese with whom he contacted during the voyage. Indeed, it has been underscored in the previous chapter how Sebastian Cabot’s voyage in 1526 was deeply influenced by the knowledge of several Portuguese pilots. Furthermore, previously Barlow had also acquired trading experience in Portuguese fortresses on the Moroccan coast and Portuguese Atlantic islands. King Henry VIII was duly informed of these events. He was urged to organize an expedition to Asia through the Strait of Magellan, but instead patronized the 1527 voyage of John Rutt in search of a route to Asia through the Arctic. Like his father, Henry VIII was reluctant, in 1527, to challenge the Portuguese overseas areas openly, which explains why he supported an attempt to reach Asia that did not include the Portuguese hemisphere.

Between 1525 and 1527, the Tudor court also discussed the possibility of buying the Spanish rights to the Moluccas, which were being negotiated between Portugal and Spain as has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Despite Archbishop Edward Lee of York’s (1482?–1544) favorable opinion, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (1473–1530) opposed it and the idea was abandoned. A French historian has also stated that King Henry VIII wrote to the Verrazzano brothers, after their expedition’s return to France, in 1525, to convince them to come to England. Although the project failed, Henry received the latest cartographical knowledge of North America brought by the Verrazano brothers. Almost at the same time, Robert Thorne tried to convince Henry VIII to buy the Spanish rights, but the Tudor monarch declined due to England’s lack of money. When Thorne published his 1531 geography demanding support from the English Crown for the discovery of the northwestern passage to Asia, his appeal remained unanswered. In the meantime, Roger Barlow failed to entice Sebastian Cabot to return to England in 1530 and to convince King Henry VIII to patronize other attempts overseas. A notable exception seems to have occurred in 1536 with the Londoner Mr. Hore’s voyage to North America, an expedition

that ended in piracy against the French.\textsuperscript{20} Even though there were some English overseers established in Mexico as part of Anglo-Spanish networks of trade with Western Indies during the second quarter of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, this did not motivate the beginning of a new English interest overseas.\textsuperscript{21} Still, Barlow continued to gather important knowledge in case the English Crown were to advance with explorations, and dedicated his \textit{Brief Summe of Geography} to King Henry VIII.

Although the 1530s were not conductive to the plans that Barlow and Thorne wanted the English Crown to pursue, the decade witnessed the voyages of William Hawkins the Elder to West Africa and Brazil in 1530, 1532, and 1540. William Hawkins, like his son John Hawkins (1532–95), employed Portuguese pilots for such expeditions whenever possible,\textsuperscript{22} but his voyages did not make much of an impact due to the Tudor court’s limited support of oceanic navigation. It is usually assumed that William Hawkins also spent some years in Spain and Portugal between 1525 and 1530, as Harry Kelsey suspects, based on Spanish documents, that he sailed to the Caribbean as early as 1527.\textsuperscript{23} What is certain is that William Hawkins used these contacts in Portugal and Spain to plan his 1530 and 1532 triangular voyages between England, Guinea, and Brazil. On the last one, he brought an Indian native to King Henry VIII.

William Hawkins’s voyages are undocumented in Portuguese sources, as the Portuguese were focused on fighting French interlopers in both Guinea and Brazil. Still, it is likely that Hawkins hired Portuguese or French pilots. Collaboration between English and French merchants also took place in 1539–40 in a syndicate.\textsuperscript{24} This early Anglo-French collaboration did not pass unnoticed to Portuguese spies in Europe. João Fernandes Lagarto, a Portuguese spy in France, traveled to England around 1541–42 after reports that French ships from Dieppe were being prepared in English ports to head for Brazil. He found that an unnamed Englishman was promised a role in the voyage and a share of its profits.\textsuperscript{25} Lagarto’s findings were not, 

\textsuperscript{20} Loads, \textit{England’s Maritime Empire}, 34 and 43.
\textsuperscript{22} Wright, \textit{English Explorers’ Debt}, 5–6; Waters, \textit{English Navigational Books}, 5. The authors do not mention the pilots’ names.
thus, new, but they did not seem to have bothered the Portuguese king too much. Once more no formal reaction is known, and it was certainly not comparable to the one that will be detailed below for the reign of Queen Mary I.

Nevertheless, the 1540s marked a change in English attitudes towards oceanic navigation. In 1541, King Henry VIII wrote to King John III (1521–57) asking for permission for some Englishmen to sail to Calicut in Portuguese India Run ships, a request firmly refused by the Portuguese monarch.26 King Henry VIII’s interest in navigation to Asia may be linked with the fact that in 1533, John More, son of Thomas More (1478–1535), had translated into English a Portuguese report about Prester John and Ethiopia, written by the Portuguese humanist Damião de Góis (1502–74).27 It is also well-known that the main character in Thomas More’s Utopia, the bringer of news, was the Portuguese Raphael Hythlodaeus. More’s choice of a Portuguese character is usually associated with an unnamed Portuguese sailor that More met in Antwerp,28 but it can be interpreted as a sign of burgeoning English curiosity about the New Worlds being discovered by the Iberians. After all, as Barlow and Thorne’s story demonstrate, the English connection to the Iberian Peninsula was very intense already by the 1520s.

In light of ongoing wars with Francis I (1515–47), King Henry VIII saw fit to fortify the English navy, creating the post of Lord Admiral in 1545 and offering it to John Dudley (1504–53), later duke of Northumberland.29 With Anglo-French rivalry and traditional interchange of knowledge unfolding simultaneously, Henry displayed an increasing interest in acquiring French maritime knowledge. In 1542, he hired Jean Rotz as his royal hydrographer and arranged for Rotz’s famous atlas, originally meant for King Francis I, to be dedicated to him. The king’s evident concern with geographical and mathematical knowledge likewise prompted German mathematician Petrus Apianus (1495–1552) to send the monarch some of his work, in 1546.

In terms of his nautical practitioners, King Henry VIII sought experts of various national origins. French experts such as Jean Ribault (1520–65) and Nicholas de Nicolay (1517–83) were successfully persuaded to serve the English Crown, and John Dudley stopped at nothing, including

26 Susana Oliveira, “Uma cartografia das mentalidades. A diplomacia portuguesa na corte isabelina” (PhD diss., University of Lisbon, 2018), 42.
27 Ana Paula Menino Avelar, Veredas de Modernidade. Escrevendo o Mundo no Portugal de Quinhentos (Lisbon: Colibri Editions, 2022), 36.
28 Andrade, Mundos Novos, vol. 1, 741.
imprisonment, to deter them from returning to French employ. During the 1540s, King Henry VIII also hired the French mathematician and cosmographer Jean Mallard. Despite the open war with France in the 1540s, Henry patronized Anglo-French interchange, precisely as he did for the Anglo-Portuguese one.

It was not only for geographical purposes that the English monarch drew on foreign knowledge—when building up his fleet, King Henry frequently engaged Portuguese shipbuilders. The Portuguese Fernando Oliveira (1507–85) provides an interesting example. Captured during a naval fight between the French and the English during the war between Henry VIII and Francis I in the 1540s, Oliveira in those days already was an important authority on shipbuilding. He had traveled to Spain, France, and Italy and had taken notes on nautical construction techniques. Oliveira did not waste his stay in England to enlarge his experience and knowledge on the matter. Thus, he ended collaborating in 1546 with James Bakker and his son Mathew, appointed by King Henry VIII to reinforce the English navy. Indeed, Mathew Bakker’s (1530–1613) first English treatise on shipbuilding, written during the Elizabethan era, shows some influence from Oliveira. Later, Oliveira was sent to Portugal by King Edward VI with an embassy.

In the meantime, he was very well treated by Henry VIII and Edward VI and awarded with substantial sums. Still, it remains unclear what exactly was his role in those times: that of a Portuguese pilot sharing Iberian nautical knowledge or a diplomat between Portugal and England? The question remains open, as some of the English awards are related to diplomatic missions to Portugal. Without finding new documents it will be difficult to uncover this decisive phase in Oliveira’s career. What is certain is that Oliveira’s stay in England later influenced his problems with the Portuguese Inquisition in 1552, particularly because he had dressed as a layman and

31 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, 44.
ate at Henry VIII’s table. But Oliveira’s case is not a single one at the end of King Henry VIII’s reign.

A similar story took place with Portuguese cartographer Diogo Homem, who was also in England, together with Fernando Gonçalo, a Portuguese navy captain well-versed in cosmography, in 1547, where he composed an important atlas. The value of Diogo Homem’s cartographical works was recognized by an English court. Diogo Homem went to court to claim payment for his works as his original Venetian order-taker refused to pay. Evaluations of Diogo Homem’s atlas were made, all of them with higher prices, proving how valuable this knowledge was in England. King John III (1521-57) was duly informed, in 1547, by Gaspar de Figueiredo, a Portuguese envoy sent to England to complain to Henry VIII of English seizures of Portuguese ships, of Diogo Homem’s presence in London. He instructed Figueiredo to negotiate his return to Portugal. Yet in 1547, the Portuguese king issued a letter of pardon to Diogo Homem on the condition that he returned to Portugal. The letter identified him as the son of Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem. Nonetheless, there is no sign that Diogo Homem returned to Portugal, even considering that his father tried to repatriate him. As has been argued, the fact that Diogo Homem went to an English court to have a written testimony in Latin, indicates that he was likely seeking employment outside England. Possibly, he considered employment in a place where maritime plans were more advanced (Spain or France), although it would be an irony that his appearance in England took place in the same year when Sebastian Cabot accepted to come to England. Still, it is important to recall that Diogo Homem was the son of Lopo Homem, the Portuguese royal cosmographer whom the Spanish ambassadors in Lisbon in the 1520s attempted to hire for Spain, as has been underscored in the previous chapter. Diogo Homem was not the only son of the Portuguese royal cosmographer over whom the European nations quarreled for his knowledge. These disputes lead us to think that the 16th-century familial tradition of cartographical craft learning was followed in Diogo Homem’s case, as his works have a clear connection with his father’s.

Although it remains unknown if Diogo Homem remained in England during the next years, it can be assumed that he was in England in 1557–58.

37 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Coleção de São Vicente (CSV), vol. IV, fl. 155v.
This was due to another atlas authored by Diogo Homem, which comprised maps from all the world, and which seems to have been commissioned by Queen Mary I. It is usually assumed that this atlas dates from 1557–58 and that it was a special gift from Queen Mary I to King Philip that was not delivered due to the queen’s death.41 Furthermore, Diogo Homem’s atlas shows clear analogies and similarities with the one signed by his brother André Homem in Antwerp in 1559. As it happened across Europe, new geographical knowledge was also a precious gift for royal matrimonial occasions. Yet, it is worth highlighting that Queen Mary I could not have asked many of her English subjects to make such an atlas, and instead had to choose a Portuguese. As has been highlighted in the previous chapter and as will be seen in the next chapter concerning France, this fact indicates the degree to which the cartographical techniques and works of the Portuguese were valued in England and more generally in Europe.

Two other figures also probably played an important role as mediators of knowledge between Portugal and England in the later stages of King Henry VIII’s reign. The first was the London merchant Robert Brasentur, who traveled to Persia in the 1530s in the service of Emperor Charles V. After he finished his mission, he went to Portuguese Hormuz and embarked from there to Lisbon. It remains unknown whether he learned nautical knowledge from the Portuguese, but the possibility must not be completely ruled out. Another more critical example is that of the Scotsman George Buchanan (1506–82), who lectured at Coimbra University from 1547 onwards in King John III’s service. Some of his writings from this period evidence clear admiration of the Portuguese ability to create an overseas empire that stretched the oceans of the globe, and they even include important praise of the Portuguese king. Still, it remains unknown whether Buchanan accumulated any sort of Portuguese nautical knowledge and used it, particularly after leaving Portugal in 1560.42

Thus, by King Henry VIII’s death, English attraction to oceanic exploration was taking root, thanks in part to the king’s contributions. No wonder, then, that the process initiated by Henry developed significantly under King Edward VI. During Northumberland’s regency, Sebastian Cabot was offered appealing conditions for a return to England, and more systematic training in astronomical and oceanic techniques was put in place.43 In this context,

41 British Library (BL), Add MS 5415 A.
42 Pagden and Subrahmanyan, “Roots and Branches,” 289–92.
Richard Chancellor’s (1521–56) inaugural 1553 voyage to Russia, supported by King Edward VI, Dudley, and Cabot, takes pride of place as the first systematic school of navigation in the English environment. In the same year, Richard Eden (1520?–76) began translating the work of the German cosmographer Sebastian Munster (1488–1552) into English.\footnote{Waters, The Art of Navigation, 83 and 86.}

From 1548 onwards, profiting from the recent Portuguese withdrawal from some fortresses in the region, Dudley supported the full resumption of English trade with Morocco.\footnote{Taylor, The Haven-Finding Art, 195.} This proposition emerged against a background of considerable diplomatic tensions, with King John III having been notified that Englishmen were selling weapons to Muslims in North Africa. With the English refused to cease this trade, the problem soon escalated, and was certainly not ameliorated by the 1553 English voyage to Guinea, which was guided by a Portuguese pilot newly arrived in England.

2.2 Pilot António Eanes Pinteado’s Career: A Typical Nautical Broker between Portugal and England (1547–53)

António Eanes Pinteado was born in Oporto. Few details about him are known, except that he was a skilled pilot and became an important captain and merchant doing business from Northern Europe to the South Atlantic. Pinteado also had a personal history with England. In 1545, he appeared in England to complain about the seizure, by English privateers, of French cargo. In 1547, King John III appointed him to escort Portuguese ships to Brazil during the ongoing French-Portuguese maritime rivalry. In this capacity, Pinteado was noted for his victories over French interlopers. After he seized a French ship, Pinteado was jailed at King John’s orders upon his return to Lisbon, possibly in 1548.\footnote{Taylor, The English Debt, 6.} A letter from Pinteado to the Portuguese king, dated April 4, 1553, and signed from London, together with other sources allow the reconstruction of these events.

Pinteado began his letter by saying that he had felt forced to go to England because of the injustices he had suffered. He stressed that he was Portuguese by birth, had not wanted to betray his king and underscored the fact that King John III’s ministers had ordered him to serve with his ship against the French in Morocco, Guinea, and Brazil. Pinteado pointed to his long career at sea and to the reputation he had acquired by fighting the French and the
Scottish. He then complained that he had spent two years in jail in Lisbon because of the accusations a Portuguese and a Spaniard had made against him. Doubting that he would ever be treated fairly, he fled to England. Since his arrival, Pinteado continued, the English had tried to enlist him in their maritime expeditions, but he had refused. Instead of the royal decree from King John III promising that Portuguese authorities would not prosecute him for a year, Pinteado proposed his own conditions for returning home: he would come back if all his seized goods were restored to him, and if he was granted a reward. He finished by recalling that although he was an old man, he was still able to serve the king. But the key question that must be solved is: why did Pinteado choose to flee to London above all other possible places?

The letter summarized above indirectly explains this decision. As he had already exchanged hostilities with French ships, he could not think of following the example of other Portuguese pilots and fleeing to France. Spain, too, was a risky option—it was the first place that Portuguese pilots tended to go when defecting, and Pinteado’s previous quarrel with a Spaniard made it likelier he would face an extradition order if discovered. In King Edward VI’s England, however, Pinteado knew that apprehension by Portuguese authorities was improbable, given that religious differences had decreased political and judicial collaboration between the two realms. He probably heard of the resumption of English voyages to Morocco from 1548 onwards, and may have been aware of Thomas Wyndham’s North African voyages in 1551 and 1552. As Pinteado himself had served in Morocco, he was likely to have been acquainted with the fact that Wyndham traded in the abandoned Portuguese fortresses of Safi and Azamor. Wyndham had a long career as a privateer against Iberian navigation in the English Channel under Henry VIII and Edward VI, and had learned nautical techniques from French sailors. Furthermore, like Pinteado himself, Wyndham had fought against the Scots and the French and had been promoted to the rank of vice admiral. When Wyndham started to serve in London merchants’ overseas ventures, he was already an experienced and important character in the English maritime milieu. Thus, when Pinteado came to England he knew that he would have a ready market for his knowledge in Wyndham.

47 ANTT, Corpo Cronológico (CC) I–89–120, fo. 1–1v.
Foreseeing the danger of having a skilled ocean pilot offering his knowledge to England, precisely in the same way the cartographer Diogo Homem had done in 1547, the Portuguese king reacted immediately. In late 1551, he knighted Pinteado and gave him a corresponding pension. With Pinteado still abroad, he probably asked his brother, Prince Luís (1506–55), to write him in December 1552. The letter was published by Richard Hakluyt (1553–1616) in his *Principal Navigations*. The prince in this letter begged for Pinteado to return, assuring him that the king had already given him a royal pardon and that he would grant him new privileges upon his arrival. As proof of the Portuguese king’s good will, the prince stated that he was also sending an emissary, Pedro Gonçalves, to convince him to come back. However, by the time Pinteado replied to the king in April 1553, other events had already transpired.

Together with the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues, well-versed in West African navigation, and who was also in England by that time, Pinteado had offered his services to Wyndham. Richard Eden, who met him personally, inherited his belongings, and later published the report of the first English voyage to Guinea, stated that Pinteado was “a wise, discreet, and sober man, who for his cunning in sailing” was “as well an expert Pilot as a politike captaine.” Eden portrayed Pinteado’s coming to England as a happy miracle. When reprinting Eden’s original report, Richard Hakluyt not only published the abovementioned letters to Pinteado, but also Eden’s final notes in defense of Pinteado’s memory (he was ultimately mistreated by Wyndham during the voyage). During this period, Rodrigues proposed to Wyndham that he should be the pilot of the English expedition to Guinea and Pinteado the captain. It was Pinteado who had suggested to Wyndham that such a voyage be organized in the first place. Pinteado likewise supported Richard Chancellor’s plan to sail to Russia and gave Richard Eden the *Decades of the New World* by Peter Martyr d’Anghiera (1457–1526), which Eden later translated into English. In the end, neither Pinteado

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51 Although the document is undated and does not allow for a full confirmation, it is possible that this Francisco Rodrigues is the same who had offered his knowledge to António Carneiro, Portuguese secretary of state, to organize mercantile voyages to Guinea in partnership with a man from Oporto (Sousa Viterbo, *Trabalhos náuticos*, 307–8).
54 Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, vol. 11, 82.
nor Rodrigues were captains during the first English voyage to Guinea, but their role throughout the expedition is well-documented. Thus, when Pinteado wrote the abovementioned letter to King John III, he had already decided not to return to Portugal. As Hakluyt states, he feared being killed.

Pinteado’s action is also intimately tied up with the context of Sebastian Cabot’s role in the English voyages of the 1550s, a convergence of interests from different actors, such as merchants, seamen, and cosmographers. It was precisely this ambience that fostered the creation of the Muscovy Company in 1555. It is important to highlight how Pinteado, both a seafarer and a merchant, fitted so well into this English milieu, just like previously other Portuguese sailors mixed well in the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate from Bristol that financed John Cabot’s expeditions. This pattern of collaboration continued to influence Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations.

Pinteado’s final decision was influenced by the arrival in England of King John III’s agents. Although their instructions are unknown, it seems clear that they were sent to spy on the first English voyage to Guinea and, if possible, sabotage it. Estêvão da Mota and Pedro Gonçalves managed to convince pilot Francisco Rodrigues to return to Portugal, as well as other Portuguese that lived in England. Such repatriations sometimes went hand in hand with a considerable degree of coercion. Pinteado himself had already faced threats when Wyndham intervened. Mota and Gonçalves’s actions are confirmed by a letter written to Lord Admiral William Howard (1510–73) on February 28, 1553. Prior, in March 1552, the two agents had already been jailed for making offending statements, but they were released as the accusation was not proved. On March 3, 1553, Wyndham asked the High Court of Admiralty to jail Mota and Gonçalves, as they were disrupting his departure by threatening pilots Rodrigues and Pinteado. He reminded the High Court that the voyage had been authorized by King Edward VI. Wyndham’s request was granted, the agents imprisoned, and plans for the voyage to Guinea went ahead unimpeded.

Jean Schefve (1515–83?), Emperor Charles V’s ambassador in England between 1550 and 1553, reported in a letter to his master dated March 7, 1553, that Pinteado and Rodrigues were planning to sail on an English expedition.

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57 Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, vol. 11, 82–83. Also see illustration 2.
He stated that Pinteado had used his letters of pardon from the Portuguese king to bolster his reputation before the members of the Privy Council, a ploy so effective that Schefve considered Pinteado to be solely responsible for the Portuguese agents’ imprisonment. On May 11, after being asked by Emperor Charles V to facilitate the Portuguese agents’ release, Schefve replied that he would attempt to help them, but that Pinteado would sail with the English nonetheless. He could not know for sure if Pinteado was going to sail with Wyndham to Guinea or with Chancellor to Russia. It is also very likely that Pinteado collaborated with Sebastian Cabot in planning Chancellor’s voyage to Russia, and he was certainly acquainted with John Dudley. Thus, when Pinteado wrote to King John III on April 4, 1553, his aim was to deceive the king and his agents. He had already chosen his path. The Portuguese authorities did not halt their vigilant watch on Pinteado’s movements, even after his departure for Guinea with Wyndham. Keeping track of Pinteado proved a constant challenge, but King John had good reasons for his concern. Yet in 1553, Pinteado participated in the attacks on Madeira and Deserta Islands. News of Pinteado’s death reached England when Wyndham’s fleet returned in August 1554. By that time, Queen Mary I had ascended to the throne and Portugal already had a new strategy.

Shortly after her coronation, Queen Mary’s court seriously considered reviving the 1537–38 negotiations to marry the now-queen to the Portuguese Prince Luís. Aware of these deliberations, King John III instructed Ambassador Lourenço Pires de Távora (1500–73) on September 20, 1553 to personally congratulate Mary on her succession and discuss the plan in the Tudor court. Queen Catherine of Austria (1507–78), wife of King John III, as well as the Portuguese Princess Mary (1521–77), John’s sister, also wrote to Queen Mary concerning her succession and Távora’s embassy. Both documents are in the British Library. King John also wrote an undated letter to Emperor

61 Royall Tyler, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Spain, 1553 (London: By His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1916), 14.
62 Tyler, Calendar ... Spain, 1553, 38–39.
63 Royall Tyler, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Spain (1554–1558 (London: By Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), doc. 28.
65 BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F III, fl. 100r–v (for the Portuguese Princess Mary’s letter, dated October 1553) and Cotton MS Titus B II/1, fl. 133 (for Queen Catherine of Austria’s letter, dated September 1553).
Charles V with news of his matrimonial proposal.\textsuperscript{66} Prince Luís was a highly suitable candidate for Queen Mary, as they were close in age.\textsuperscript{67}

Nevertheless, Emperor Charles V could not lose the opportunity to place his son on the English throne. For this reason, he retained Ambassador Távora in Brussels for a month, buying himself time to negotiate Prince Philip's marriage with Queen Mary. He also stalled the negotiations, already very advanced, for Prince Philip's wedding with the Portuguese Princess Mary. Even after receiving formal confirmation of the intended marriage from England, when Távora was finally authorized to leave Brussels to visit Queen Mary in December 1553, Charles ordered agents to spy on his movements. The emperor needed to be sure that Portugal's proposal would not spoil his plans.\textsuperscript{68}

For this reason, a crisis erupted at the court in Lisbon when news spread that Prince Philip would not marry Princess Mary. The king sent a special ambassador to complain to Emperor Charles and Prince Luís wrote a letter to Prince Philip urging him to disobey his father's orders. Despite these maneuvers, and although he was personally interested in marrying the Portuguese princess, Prince Philip was not in a condition to challenge his father's decision.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, Ambassador Távora left the Tudor court empty-handed. Antoine de Noailles (1504–63), the French ambassador to England between 1553 and 1556, informed King Henry II (1547–59) that Távora was so upset with Emperor Charles V that France should attempt to benefit from this. As Távora was going to France, Noailles recommended that a great reception should be given for him at the Valois court.\textsuperscript{70} Until Prince Luís's death in 1555, a potential marriage with the future Queen Elizabeth I was debated but the project came to nothing.\textsuperscript{71}

The failed Portuguese attempt to marry Prince Luís to Queen Mary was also linked to another 1554 event in Portuguese-Spanish relations that

\textsuperscript{66} ANTT, CSV, Vol. III, fo. 220. Almost all of the letters from this collection that will be quoted are undated.
\textsuperscript{67} David M. Loades, \textit{Mary Tudor} (Stroud: Amberley, 2012), 140.
\textsuperscript{68} Tyler, \textit{Calendar ... Spain, 1553}, 380.
\textsuperscript{70} Abbé Vertot, \textit{Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre}, vol. II (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 322–23.
affected Anglo-Portuguese relations: the birth of the future King Sebastian, the premature death of the Portuguese heir John Manuel (1537–54) and the later return of Juana (1535–73), princess of Portugal and mother of King Sebastian, to Spain. As Princess Juana left Portugal and never assumed the role of regent, this facilitated the Spanish position of ending the negotiations for marrying Prince Philip to Princess Mary. In turn, this change sparked Tudor disapproval of a potential Portuguese marriage for Queen Mary.

Mary married Prince Philip in July 1554. Still, it is perfectly possible that King John III’s interest in his brother’s marriage to the English queen was related not only to the fact that England had returned to Catholicism, but also to the re-emerging Anglo-Portuguese overseas rivalry. As king consort of England, Philip used his power to delay the emergence of Anglo-Spanish overseas rivalry. It should be asked if this was not also King John III’s intention in 1553–54. I consider that King John III attempted to pursue this strategy, but the abovementioned Portuguese-Spanish relations disturbed his original plans. In any case, Prince Philip’s marriage to Queen Mary was used by Portugal to reinforce its claims in the Tudor court, as the appointment of Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa shows. Nor, for that matter, was Pinteado forgotten.

2.3 Spying on Wyndham, Lok, and Towerson’s Voyages to West Africa (1554–58)

2.3.1. Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa’s Appointment and the First Portuguese Diplomatic Protests against Wyndham and Lok’s Voyages (1554–55)

Sometime, King John III ordered his secretary to write a first draft of the instructions to Diogo Lopes de Sousa. The first instruction is undated but it is likely from October–November 1554. Sousa, a wealthy nobleman from an important Portuguese lineage, was formally named to pay a visit to King Philip in England and to congratulate him and Queen Mary I on their recent marriage. He was entrusted with letters to be delivered to the members of the Privy Council, and was told to inform Lisbon on the degree to which King Philip was accepted by his English subjects and whether he was in direct communication with Emperor Charles V. But the real purpose of this first instruction lay beyond these tasks. The king recalled that Sousa must have heard of a certain “Pinteado born in this kingdom,” about whom all manner of rumors were circulating. Some stated that he had sailed with an
English expedition that had gone badly and had perished. Others insisted that Pinteado was alive and well, and that the English had already loaded many goods along the Mina coast. Those who were of the latter opinion averred that Pinteado was planning to return that year to the region, and mentioned new English preparations. Thus, King John ordered Sousa to inform him “of what had happened [with Pinteado], and about the route they (the English) made and what happened to that expedition (Wyndham’s).” Sousa was also asked to report on all the merchandise that the English trafficked, as well as where they acquired it and from whom. Concerning the new English fleet said to be in preparation, Sousa was instructed to provide intelligence on the names of the ships, the people and artillery that went on board, and the route and calendar of departure. He was asked to report on all these details without delay. Toward the end of the instruction, the king stated that Sousa would bring with him “a cypher so that you can write me all the things that seem to you important in a manner that nothing that you may write to me shall be lost.” Only in closing the instruction, the king mentioned that Sousa should present his formal condolences at King Edward VI’s death to the Tudor court. 72

In appointing a formal ambassador to England, King John III was in reality sending over a maritime spy. Sousa’s *de facto* goal was to profit from King Philip’s rule in order to disrupt new English expeditions to West Africa. It is important to highlight the fact that the Portuguese king not only wanted to know commercial details, but also ordered Sousa to undertake technical espionage by acquiring information about the routes in question. These orders were not merely connected to organizing a military naval response to the English challenge. King John III wanted to be informed on the quality of the English art of navigation to West Africa, as he knew the English were sailing with Portuguese knowledge. Thus, he also ordered Sousa to report on the route the second expedition would follow, so that he could determine if the English had improved their nautical expertise. His worry that other Portuguese might be assisting the next English fleet is clear from his request for intelligence about people on board. By this time, King John III had already got word of his agents’ failure in England in 1553, and knew that two of the

72 ANT T, CSV, Vol. V, fl. 457–462. It is important to note that King John III had ordered some of his ships to be sent in assistance to King Edward VI in 1553 to help the English in the war against the French and the Scots. The French ambassador to England reported the important contribution made by the well-armed Portuguese vessels to the English war efforts (Abbé Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, vol. III (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 31–32).
ships in Wyndham's voyage were from King Edward VI. It is no surprise that John instructed Sousa to react dispassionately to Edward's death. The way in which the instruction was written also strongly suggests that Sousa was to act more as an ambassador to King Philip than to Queen Mary, as, despite the formal Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the Portuguese king could not be sure of Mary's reaction to Wyndham's voyage. Concerning King Philip, John was much more certain, owing to his education (Philip had a Portuguese mother—Empress Elizabeth, John's sister), that he would favor his cause at the Tudor court. Other documents delivered to Sousa illustrate how uneasy the king felt about the English challenge in West Africa.

On November 7, 1554, Sousa was given an additional instruction. Large parts of this dispatch are crossed out, pointing to some hesitations. The king reminded Sousa of Pinteado's action against Portuguese interests and ordered him to press King Philip and Queen Mary to respect Portuguese maritime rights in West Africa. John explicitly asked that Sousa propose the cancelation of the next English expedition, invoking his personal affection for Philip and good relations with Mary as justification for this request.

Another undated document, probably dated November 1554, documents the confusion in Lisbon before Sousa's departure. Its author is unknown, but I believe it is likely the Provedor dos Armazéns, the Portuguese officer in charge of organizing the departure of Portuguese fleets at Lisbon's Casa da Índia. News had recently arrived from England that a new English fleet was being prepared to sail to Mina and that the English merchant Alexander Coles had come to Lisbon to buy merchandise and recruit Portuguese pilots for the expedition. Faced with these developments, the author of the document warned several Portuguese pilots not to betray the Portuguese Crown and recalled the fact that all pilots swore loyalty to King John III. The author also delivered the warning to Sousa, which explains why the document ended up in Sousa's instructions.

In this context, King John III ordered that Sousa, after visiting King Philip and Queen Mary, should also visit the duke and duchess of Alba and Rui Gomes da Silva. On the official accreditation letter to Philip and Mary, however, John merely presented Sousa as an ambassador arriving to congratulate Queen Mary on her wedding. This fact shows how behind
Sousa’s official mission, there was the unofficial and more important goal: maritime espionage. A list of the documentation delivered to Sousa shows that in addition to all these documents, he was given a cypher and five letters. These five letters were already written by King John III. Sousa was merely to add a heading specifying the addressee once he had arrived in England and chosen members of the Privy Council to contact. Unfortunately, the content of those letters has not survived, but what is extant from the documents transmitted to Sousa merits comment.

Firstly, the English fleet mentioned in these documents is that of John Lok, brother of Thomas Wyndham. Although at the writing time of these documents, the king of Portugal did not know that Pinteado had already died, he was worried that the English would sail to West Africa again. For this reason, and foreseeing that he could not prevent Pinteado from further navigation with the English, he instructed Sousa to present a diplomatic protest. This objection was to be made first to King Philip and only afterwards to Queen Mary I. The purpose of this strategy was to exploit Portugal’s closer relationship with Philip and, in turn, make use of the love and reverence that Mary always evidenced for him. Should this prove inadequate, the Portuguese king instructed Sousa to gather the support of important advisors that King Philip had brought with him to England: the duke of Alba and the Portuguese Rui Gomes da Silva, who had grown up with Philip while he was a prince and was an intimate friend and advisor. Silva, the king reasoned, could play an important mediator role.

To complement this strategy, King John III issued letters addressed to members of the Privy Council so that they could be persuaded of his main goal: the need to respect the Portuguese Mare Clausum and maritime rights for occupying and monopolizing all trades in West Africa. Such Portuguese intentions were merely a repetition of what had happened previously with France and, even, with Spain. Still nothing definitive can be said about the addressees of these missives and the potential use of bribery, since the letters themselves have been lost. That bribery may have been attempted is nevertheless plausible—in analogous situations with France, King John III ordered his agents, envoys, and ambassadors to ply key figures with gifts and money. In 1562, for example, as will be detailed in chapter 4, when

79 On the career of Rui Gomes da Silva see: James M. Boyden, The Courtier and the King: Ray Gómez de Silva, Philip II, and the Court of Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
80 As happened with Ambassador Rui Fernandes de Almada in the 1530s: Maria do Rosário Sampaio Themudo Barata Azevedo Cruz, Rui Fernandes de Almada. Diplomata português do século XVI (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1971), 148. On Portuguese maritime espionage in
João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador to France, was appointed to visit Queen Elizabeth I on a *Mare Clausum* embassy, he attempted to bribe William Cecil (1520–98). I think it is also likely that King John III gave Sousa oral instructions to get closer to Cardinal Reginald Pole (1500–58), Queen Mary I’s chief minister, as the king ordered the archbishop of Braga and other bishops to celebrate England’s return to Catholicism and the permission given to Pole in 1554 to return to England. As shall be detailed below, the king even wrote to Cardinal Pole.

Meanwhile, the king was notified too that the English had sent Alexander Coles to Lisbon in search of Portuguese pilots for their next expedition to West Africa. Even though Coles was an English merchant involved only in the trade with Morocco (and not with Guinea and Mina), John Lok’s 1554–55 voyage had no Portuguese pilots on board when it set sail from England in October 1554. Still this does not mean that the English would not need Portuguese nautical knowledge. Wyndham’s pioneer voyage had not gone well in nautical terms. His early death and that of Pintado forced the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues to guide the fleet as English sailors were not familiar with the Guinea currents that complicated any returning voyage to Europe. It is plausible that, in 1554, Coles was sent to gather such knowledge by hiring Portuguese pilots. Similarly, as Hakluyt records, Robert Tomson’s 1555 voyage to New Spain was only made possible by his sojourn of several years in Seville in the house of the English merchant John Fields, where he learned Spanish and the customs of the land. Furthermore, Coles’s and Tomson’s cases bear resemblance with Robert Thorne’s espionage and training in Seville during the 1520s.

The English need for Portuguese pilots and Portuguese nautical knowledge remained critical as late as Francis Drake’s (1540–96) circumnavigation, with Drake completing a maritime espionage mission in Lisbon before the voyage, and later employing Portuguese pilot Nuno da Silva during the

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86 In August 1579, the president of the Spanish Council of Indies advised King Philip II to order the Spanish ambassador in Portugal to contact the Portuguese cartographer that had provided
circumnavigation itself. David Waters states that between 1558 and 1568, all English fleets sailing ocean routes, with one exception, were guided by Portuguese, Spanish, or French pilots, and that in 1577, the president of the Spanish Consejo de Indias attested that most English fleets were still being guided by Portuguese pilots. As Taylor argues, it took England almost 50 years to raise sailors prepared to compete, in terms of skill, training, and requisite nautical knowledge, with their Iberian counterparts on long ocean routes. Other authors even speak of an English tradition of hiring of Portuguese pilots for the 16th-century great voyages of discovery. By the early 1550s, when England was recommencing its overseas expansion, this need for nautical knowledge was more salient.

For King John III, the English maritime re-awakening was disturbingly reminiscent of the maritime rivalry that he experienced with France. Like in his previous attempts concerning France, John also tried, in 1554, to monopolize the acquisition of nautical knowledge by his English rival, a reality that can also be observed in Franco-Spanish or even Anglo-French maritime relations in the period. Thus, French-Portuguese maritime rivalry unmistakably underpins the orders he gave to Sousa in 1554. It is, thus, important to look at the events after Sousa's arrival in England.

Soon after landing, probably in December 1554, Sousa wrote a letter to the Portuguese secretary of state declaring that he had not been able to present his protest to King Philip and Queen Mary I; when he arrived, Lok's expedition had already departed, and King John III had not explicitly directed him to present a protest under such circumstances. It may be that the crossed-out order mentioned previously was not included in the final instruction delivered to Sousa, due to King John's hesitations on this point. Tracking Sousa's subsequent actions is impeded by the loss of most of his letters and the fact that his extant communications do not address maritime affairs and espionage. Still, other surviving documents show how the Portuguese king envisaged and directed his mission.

91 Biblioteca Nacional Portugal (BNP), *Coleção Pereira e Sousa*, maço 6, fl. 306v.–7.
Probably in January 1555, the king asked Sousa to petition King Philip on the issue of French navigation to the Portuguese *Mare Clausum*, as soon as war between Spain and France came to a close. The request was made because Emperor Charles V was too busy with war against the Valois to take up the issue himself. King John III also wrote a formal letter to Philip and Mary congratulating them on their marriage and England’s return to Catholicism and, in May 1555, praising them on the birth of a son. Queen Mary’s response to Queen Catherine of Austria, on January 30, 1555, is also known. The English queen reported that Sousa had been very well received at her court, and expressed her admiration for the Portuguese queen. Also on August 18, 1555, Mary wrote to King John III thanking him for the January letter regarding the restoration of Catholicism in England.

Thus, Sousa only made his formal protest after Lok’s return. As Sousa puts it in his letter of August 20, 1555, it was thanks more to Mary than to Philip that the decision to embargo the next English voyage to West Africa had been made. Sousa states that when he approached King Philip, he was already working on the issue with Queen Mary. He also mentioned that Philip demanded of him the record of the English shipowners and merchants who had participated in Lok’s expedition, which Sousa immediately delivered. In reporting these events, Sousa recognized what has been underscored previously: that by his own departure from Lisbon, King John III doubted that Queen Mary I’s position could be more favorable to Portugal than that of King Philip’s.

Sousa’s reaction was also connected to the fact that Mary had not authorized Lok’s voyage. Before his departure, Lok was ordered not to sail to Portuguese overseas areas. In this case, this would mean that he should not trade directly in current or abandoned Portuguese outposts but nothing stopped him from doing so in West Africa in general, as by this time the London merchants that financed Lok’s voyage already contested the Portuguese rhetoric of *Mare Clausum* in the entirety of West Africa. Thus, as has been argued, it seems that Queen Mary was persuaded to patronize

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93 Ibid., fo. 173, 175, 177, 485 and 487v. Queen Mary I had previously sent an emissary to Portugal notifying the king of this news, see John Roche Dasent, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, vol. 5, 1554–1556 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1892).
95 ANT, CC I–96–61.
96 ANT, CC I–96–65.
Lok’s departure in secrecy and, as a consequence, was not surprised by Sousa’s formal protest. However, the queen’s position is justified: while secretly patronizing English overseas attempts, she did not and could not jeopardize the commercial and political relations with Portugal, especially now that she was married to King Philip, whom she knew would likely (owing to familiar connections) stand up for Portuguese interests.

In this first conversation, Sousa also benefited from the fact that King Philip was still in England, something that changed after Emperor Charles V’s abdication. Under these circumstances, and doubtless influenced by Lok’s successes in his voyage (despite encounters with the Portuguese in Mina and Martin Frobisher’s (1535–94) imprisonment there), King John III decided to send a new envoy to England. Sousa was supposed to return to Portugal as soon as Manuel de Melo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador to Charles, was appointed ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands.99 Sousa’s mission was, by all indications, complete, although the time it took for King John III’s new agent to arrive prolonged his embassy in England. If the embargo on English navigation was complicated by King Philip’s absence from England, the Portuguese could still rely on his interference in English affairs, as he was kept well-informed by Cardinal Pole,100 maintained a representative in England, and received minutes of the topics debated by the Privy Council. Still, the orders King John III gave to his new agent prove that Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry continued to escalate.

2.3.2 A New Agent for a New Challenge? The Spy João Rodrigues Correia and Towerson’s Voyages (1555–58)

In August 1555, King John III chose João Rodrigues Correia for a mission in England. He provided him with three different sets of instructions, each of them documenting more Portuguese efforts at maritime espionage in England. It is relevant to underscore that by the time of his appointment, Correia was already an experienced agent trained in the classical “schools” of Portuguese maritime espionage in Europe: Spain and France. In 1553, the king had sent him to Spain with secret orders to secure the Spanish document from the Consejo de Indias by which Emperor Charles V forbade his Spanish subjects of Asunción and Peru from crossing the Brazilian frontier in search of gold. Correia was also directed to intercede with Prince Philip in order

100 Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 47.
to abort an expedition that was being prepared in Seville to the River Plate (which King John III claimed belonged to Portugal). Although further details of Correia’s mission in Spain are unknown, it is plausible that he had some degree of success, as King John rarely entrusted secret missions to unsuccessful spies. Furthermore, the context with England in 1555 advised the choice of an experienced person, as João Rodrigues Correia was.

Correia’s first instruction was written after Lisbon received a letter from the captain of Mina fortress (originally dated January 1555), in which the presence of Lok’s six ships was mentioned. The Portuguese court could not have failed, by then, to notice that the new English voyage to West Africa had been much better planned than Wyndham’s, and most decisively, secured a more powerful and numerous fleet. Thus, King John III complained about the violation of the Portuguese Mare Clausum and maritime rights and noted indignantly that the English gold trade in the area constituted an overt challenge to his monopoly. On the grounds of their mutual affection and familial ties, King John expected King Philip to punish his English subjects. He demanded that measures be taken against the English merchants and shipowners who had financed Lok’s voyage and that any Portuguese collaborator be delivered to him. Correia was given a list of people who had participated in Lok’s voyage so that English authorities would have no excuse not to act immediately. In a crossed-out section of this letter, the Portuguese king authorized Correia to hint at military retaliation should the English attempt to return to Mina and Guinea. He also ordered Correia to collaborate with Sousa to gather more intelligence on the ships, people, goods, and merchants involved in Lok’s voyage. If the English prepared another expedition, Correia was asked to gather the same information and to report on the new ships’ names, routes, and calendar of departure. This intelligence was to be sent to the king quickly—it was a matter of urgency. In seeking out such news with respect to the second English voyage to West Africa, John wanted to confirm the information received from his captain in West Africa and mainly aimed at evaluating the state of English nautical knowledge.

The second instruction to Correia was written after the king received Sousa’s letter, dated July 17, 1555, in which the ambassador mentioned that the Privy Council had asked for proof of the Portuguese property rights in West Africa. King John III revealed his astonishment at such a request and demanded a full embargo on English sailing to West Africa, the handover

101 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 49 and 93.
of Portuguese collaborators and all goods acquired during Lok’s voyage. He could not understand how the Privy Council dared to ask for Portuguese rights, as they would never have had the audacity to contest Emperor Charles V’s rights to the Antilles. John then allowed Correia to threaten the use of force if the English returned to West Africa, but depending on how Sousa’s negotiations progressed in London. Once again, Correia was to apply to King Philip before approaching Queen Mary I. If Philip had already left for the Netherlands, Correia should make his appeal to the queen and the Privy Council. Correia was then to present the case to Cardinal Pole, to whom the king addressed a letter. Additionally, he was to speak with Rui Gomes da Silva, the earl of Arundel (then Henry Fitzalan (1512–80)), and the English chancellor (then Stephen Gardiner (1483–55)). In concluding this second instruction, the Portuguese king ordered Correia to let him know of the results speedily. 103

Correia’s third instruction bears even more amendments than the previous ones, with almost all of its text crossed out and with annotations to several parts. King John III ordered him to confirm a critical piece of intelligence he had received from Sousa: that Lok’s fleet had included ships owned by Queen Mary I. 104 The king wanted to know if the queen was following the example of King Edward VI, in which case, diplomatic approaches would need to be adjusted. Attached to Correia’s third instruction were other relevant documents. Firstly, the letter to Cardinal Pole, in which King John praised his role in English Catholic affairs and informed him that he was sending Correia to assist Sousa in a very important matter, for which he begged his attention. This “matter,” however, is not specified in the letter. Secondly, the letter to Rui Gomes da Silva, thanking him for his services and enlisting his help once more. Thirdly, the accreditation letters given to Correia, in which the Mina/Guinea affair is not mentioned directly. Instead, the letters state that Correia was sent to present the Portuguese king’s response to an “exorbitant” affair that endangered the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Fourthly, there was a letter to Sousa asking him to assist Correia in his meetings, but to let Correia take the lead and deliver the main speech. Sousa was also instructed to accompany Correia during his meetings with Cardinal Pole and Rui Gomes da Silva. Fifthly, Correia received a list of the London merchants who had financed Lok’s voyage, with the English names in Portuguese form. Among the merchants, there seems to be one Portuguese (one “Peter George, marchyant aportugall”) and a note that

104 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 170
Lok had hired three French pilots to guide his expedition and one surgeon from Rouen. Therefore, it seems that Lok ultimately sailed with French nautical knowledge, as the voyage promoters failed to hire Portuguese pilots in Lisbon in 1554. Similarly, Portuguese merchants were also cooperating with the London merchants that patronized Lok’s voyage, without King John III being able to stop it.

Thus, Correia departed with clear orders and instruments to pressure the Privy Council and Queen Mary I personally. For the first time, King John allowed hints of the use of force against England to be used. The king, engrossed in the traditional Portuguese rhetoric, diplomatic, and legal approach to *Mare Clausum* and the maritime rights conferred to Portugal by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, failed to understand that the maritime protest could not be treated as a political matter between two realms. The organization of Wyndham’s and Lok’s voyages by far surpassed King Philip’s and Queen Mary I’s ability to control all its details, something that John did not realize. This may be due to the fact that Portuguese and Spanish maritime expeditions were usually organized officially by the Crown, whereas in these early times of the English overseas expansion they were organized by private merchants and the direct involvement of the English Crown was not always clear. This fact certainly confused the king, explaining why he asked for details on this issue.

Beyond (and based upon) the dispute on political and maritime compensation between Portugal and England, there was the combination of commercial and private interests that fostered Wyndham’s and Lok’s expeditions, precisely as had happened previously in John Cabot’s expeditions. This time, the London merchant Barne played a key role in financing and organizing both Wyndham’s and Lok’s voyages. However, other London merchants, such as Edward Castlyn, Anthony Hickman, Sir Thomas Wrocth, and Sir John Yorke had also financed Wyndham’s and Lok’s voyages, and would continue to patronize Towerson and several other voyages under Queen Elizabeth I. Therefore, not only a diplomatic protest was required to ensure that there would be no new English voyage. Direct attempts to sabotage or to negotiate with the promoters of the voyages were needed, especially considering that 1555 was the foundational year of the Muscovy Company. The Company was formally approved by the English Crown and the appointment of Sebastian Cabot as its first director (a

position he maintained until his death),\textsuperscript{108} signaled to Portuguese agents that English maritime plans would not stop, but, on the contrary, were receiving a new boost. This factor explains why Ambassador Sousa understood, when receiving Correia, that his stay at the Tudor court was by no means finished.

Prior to Correia’s arrival, Sousa had already succeeded in halting the departure of a new fleet.\textsuperscript{109} Unfortunately, no documentary evidence was found for the means he employed in this attempt. With Correia’s arrival, Sousa had a reinforced margin of maneuver to petition the English government, even though King Philip was already in the Netherlands. On October 21, 1555, Giovanni Michelli, the Venetian ambassador to England, wrote to the Venetian senate and doge with word that King John III had sent an envoy (Correia) to complain about the English voyages to Guinea and Mina. He stated that the envoy had issued a warning: if English ships were again found there by the Portuguese, the English should expect an attack. On November 4, the petition was presented to Queen Mary and the Privy Council and the Venetian ambassador reported that Correia was expecting a final answer as soon as Philip had been acquainted with the case. On December 16, Michelli wrote that Sousa had achieved all his goals. After hearing King Philip’s position, Queen Mary had declared an embargo for London merchants on the expedition to West Africa. He also mentioned the expenses that the London merchants had accrued in preparations, and their complaint over the cancelation. The merchants asked for the final authorization to depart, while Sousa claimed Portugal’s rights in coastal areas that the Portuguese were unable to control. Finally, on December 23, the Venetian ambassador reported that Sousa had also successfully managed to oppose a formal authorization for the expedition. Still, Michelli stated that two or three ships were able to depart in secrecy.\textsuperscript{110} The English merchants presented a formal complaint to Queen Mary and King Philip for their losses, demanding authorization to make the voyage as they had not previously traded in Portuguese areas.\textsuperscript{111} Mary and Philip asked Portugal for financial compensation for the merchants, suggesting that King John III should buy up the goods that had been assembled for their journey.

\textsuperscript{108} Dalton, Merchants and Explorers, 183.
\textsuperscript{109} Joaquim José da Silva Mendes Leal, Visconde de Santarém and Luiz Augusto Rebello da Silva, Quadro elementar das relações políticas e diplomáticas de Portugal com as diversas potencias do mundo, desde o principio da monarchia portugueza ate aos nossos dias, vol. XV (Paris: Oficina Typografica de Fain e Thunot, 1865), LXXXIII/94–96.
\textsuperscript{110} Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish Bentinck, eds., Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1554–1558 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1877), docs. 251, 269 and 316.
The issue was also debated in Brussels between King Philip and the English envoy John Masson, as, in a letter dated December 17, 1555, Masson reports a meeting with Philip. Masson understood that Philip would ask King John to compensate the English merchants for their losses but Masson was forced to apologize when he perceived King Philip's preference for a policy of banning all English sailing to West Africa.112 On December 18, Queen Mary wrote to King John informing him that she had forbidden her subjects from sailing to Mina and Guinea. As for Portuguese collaborators on the English voyages, she was unable to hand them over as they were absent or dead.113 But if Sousa was able to delay the departure of a new expedition as soon as Lok returned, he was unable to prevent William Towerson from departing before the end of 1555,114 as he sailed prior to Queen Mary I's formal prohibition.115 Towerson's small fleet left England after spreading news that the French were preparing a voyage to Mina and Guinea, which motivated London merchants to risk the venture.116

Towerson's first voyage was a success, as he had received prior advice from Lok himself,117 followed Lok's route, and returned in May 1556 with profits. It is possible that Sousa's and Correia's protests did not prevent other departures, since on the return voyage, Towerson found other English ships heading for West Africa.118 Thanks to Lok's voyage, the most successful English voyage to West Africa in the 1550s, Richard Eden was able to publish the first English nautical rutter on navigation to West Africa,119 thus codifying English knowledge of the area. King John III was likely not informed of this, as he continued to fight for a formal decree, signed by the queen's government, forbidding all English navigation to West Africa. Despite the queen's formal position in August 1555, the Privy Council delayed the publication of a decree until August 1556, given the resistance it provoked among merchants.120

This fact is another example of the resistance aroused in early modern states by conflicting public-state intentions and private-commercial interests. Overall, with Towerson's first departure, even if the English government was pressed and decided in favor of Portuguese protests, the tensions between the queen's will and the Privy Council ended up playing a key role in the continuation of English voyages to West Africa. Indeed, if it is true that Queen Mary I delayed a formal answer to King John III for months, it is undeniable that she ordered the mayors of London and Bristol to forbid any new expeditions to West Africa. The queen's order motivated the abovementioned merchants’ protest on their losses for the preparation of the voyage and even Queen Mary's decision to financially compensate them in December 1555. In this context, it is not surprising that Portuguese protests and espionage continued.

In early 1556, King John III wrote to Manuel de Melo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador to Emperor Charles V, informing him that he had previously sent Correia to England to urge Queen Mary and King Philip to embargo English navigation to West Africa. In the meantime, the Portuguese king received news that Correia had accomplished his goals and rejoiced at these events. To maintain good relations with Queen Mary, King John had also ordered Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese consul/overseer in the Netherlands, to buy the goods assembled for the aborted voyage from the English merchants. In another letter, addressed to Manuel de Melo Coutinho and rife with strikethroughs and annotations, John revealed his true feelings about the recent events. He writes that it was unfair to ask him to buy the goods from the English merchants, as they had violated his rights by planning such a voyage to begin with. He had refrained from making a formal protest only because of his love for Queen Mary and King Philip, and his appreciation for the way they had reacted to the situation. He therefore directed letters to the queen and king thanking them for their interventions, although not without hinting at his displeasure about paying the London merchants (in the letter to Queen Mary I). John then authorized Sousa to return to Portugal and instructed him to leave Correia in charge of all diplomatic affairs. Finally, the Portuguese king wrote to Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos confirming his orders to buy all the goods that the English merchants had bought, working together with Sousa and Correia if needed. Thus, these documents show that King John III was not informed that Queen Mary I had already paid financial compensation to the London merchants.

But, while these letters were being written, neither Sousa nor Correia left England. 123 On May 19, 1556, Queen Mary I addressed a letter to King John III stating that she and the Privy Council had once more banned English navigation to Mina and Guinea. The queen so trusted Sousa that she informed King John that he could speak as her proxy, as he had been present at the Privy Council meeting that deliberated on the matter of West African navigation. 124 Cardinal Pole also wrote to the Portuguese king, on May 25, answering his previous letter. He, too, signaled his support for Sousa’s position on the Mina-Guinea affair. Pole likewise promised King John that he would continue to protect Portuguese claims, and even insinuated that Queen Mary and King Philip were so deeply obliged to Portugal that he had no reasons for further worry. 125 Pole’s letter is testimony to how Queen Mary I at that point intended to follow the agreement with Portugal very closely. However, the queen and the Privy Council were unable to fully control the movements of her subjects, especially when they planned new maritime expeditions in secrecy, as happened with Towerson’s first voyage.

Successfully maintaining monopoly required constant diplomatic and espionage activity. When Towerson returned from his first voyage, Sousa hastened to petition, in May 1556, for another embargo on English voyages to the Portuguese monopoly zones. Yet despite the letters mentioned above (and Sousa and Correia’s opposition), Towerson soon set off on his second voyage. 126 Like in 1555, despite a formal prohibition and orders by the Privy Council not to depart, Towerson was able to elude port authorities and set sail. 127 As a consequence, Sousa found himself presenting yet another protest in July 1556, demanding that Queen Mary I and King Philip forbid all English navigation to Mina, Guinea, and Brazil. Sousa’s wish was granted the same month, as published documents from the Privy Council show. 128

Still, the outlawing of sailing to Brazil, raises the question: did Portugal already envisage an English interest in that area? Although there is no known documented English voyage to Brazil in these years, it is perfectly

123 The French ambassador Noialles confirms that Sousa only left England some days before him in May 1556. It is also noteworthy that both ambassadors were close, as Noialles’s letters reveal. Noialles recounted how Sousa argued twice with him, in 1555, that France should sign a peace with Emperor Charles V and even gave him information on this topic (Abbé Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, vol. V (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 259–260, 284 and 370).
124 *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*, vol. I, 64–765.
possible that, owing to the first shipment of slaves to England in Lok’s voyage and especially after the formalization of the Muscovy Company, English merchants were already planning to expand their trade market to Brazil and the Caribbean. It is likely that Sousa realized this interest and intervened to prevent it being acted upon by forcing Queen Mary to sign a prohibition of voyages to Brazil. A possible concretization of English interest in Brazil during the 1550s was a terrifying scenario for the Portuguese Crown, particularly as it coincided with the Portuguese war against France Antarctique, as shall be detailed in the next chapter.

It was probably after being informed of the queen's ban that King John III ordered Correia to return to Portugal, considering that his work was done. Around this time, the Portuguese king also wrote to Cardinal Pole and Rui Gomes da Silva thanking them for their assistance and begging their help in securing Correia's authorization to leave England. Only after this did King John III definitively allow Correia to return, and he informed him that he had already acknowledged Cardinal Pole for his aid. Following up on the matter of the London merchants, he directed Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos to pay Rui Gomes da Silva the money given to the thwarted traders, as Silva had advanced funds for the compensation and the Portuguese king did not want to inflict debts upon such a devoted servant. Although all these letters are undated, they were likely written after July–August 1556, when Sousa effected the formal prohibition.129

Meanwhile, Towerson’s second voyage was another success, as he struck an alliance with the French captain Blundell to fight Portuguese ships and he received a local proposal to build an English fortress in West Africa. After his return, Towerson readied a third expedition to depart in October 1557. John William Blake states that Portugal appealed to the English government to forbid the voyage,130 but no documents to this effect were found in Portuguese archives. Assuming this voyage triggered another pressure campaign, who lodged the complaints at the Tudor court: Sousa, Correia, or both? It is possible that Correia remained in England until 1557 to fulfil his mission, despite the abovementioned letters by King John III allowing him to return.

After all, the Portuguese king could not hazard being left without a good agent in England to report on English maritime preparations. In the event King John III’s decided that, he still knew he could rely upon his ambassador to King Philip to obtain updates on English maritime movements, since Philip was still king consort of England. This was precisely what happened

when Towerson returned in 1558 from his third voyage. The expedition had been a disaster, even though Towerson had charted the whole West African coast on his second voyage and brought the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues on board for his third voyage. Rodrigues was the one responsible for providing Towerson with Portuguese nautical charts of West Africa, a common practice in early English sailings as Sarah Tyacke argued. The fact that he found a strong Portuguese fleet in West Africa, combined with the war declared between France and England in Europe, forced him to leave the area without trade, resorting instead to privateering against the French to recuperate his losses. When Towerson returned, he lacked both means and conditions to repeat the voyage. Did Portuguese espionage in England influence this outcome?

2.4 A New English Monarch and a New Portuguese Spy: The Missions of D. João Pereira and Francisco de Mesquita (1558–59)

Towerson’s third voyage departed from England in January 1558. A formal decree by the Privy Council of January 22, 1558, forbade Towerson from sailing again to Guinea. However, he departed on January, 30, disobeying this order. As has been underscored previously, the tension between Queen Mary I’s orders and the Privy Council’s intentions offered a chance to all voyage organizers to directly defy the queen’s orders without fear of incurring royal displeasure. After all, the profits that could be achieved were considerable, as Lok’s and Towerson’s previous voyages had shown. Once more, Portuguese agents immediately understood the danger for Portuguese interests. Thus, this time a stronger reaction was afoot.

After Towerson’s departure, the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip pressed him to take a stand. On February 4, King Philip ordered his representative in England, the earl of Feria, to protest once more against Towerson’s voyage. On February 26, King Philip was informed of the

136 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, 66.
137 On Feria’s role in Anglo-Spanish relations see the work by Alberto M. Viso Outeiriño, “La influencia hispana en la restauracion católica inglesa de María Tudor (1553–1558)” (PhD diss., UNED, 2015).
Privy Council’s existing prohibition and he thanked Feria for Queen Mary I’s measures.138 In July 1558, new problems emerged when the English seized the Portuguese ship Raposa. Portugal urged King Philip to intervene, as aboard the ship were the correspondence of the Portuguese ambassador in France, several books, and the now-kidnapped Portuguese pilot Francisco Dias Salgado, already a familiar character to the English. In response to outcry from the pilot Roque Fernandes at his comrade’s capture, Portugal made it clear that the ship and all its contents were to be returned.139

Lisbon issued an ultimatum to King Philip: if he did not intervene, Portugal would send another ambassador to England to present a formal protest. In reply, Philip ordered Feria to press Queen Mary to return the ship, the cargo, and the artillery to the Portuguese, and told the Portuguese ambassador in the Netherlands that there was no need to send a new envoy to England. He would handle the situation himself out of love for his nephew, the new Portuguese King Sebastian (1557–78).140 Still under Queen Mary’s reign, the Privy Council ordered the case to be fully investigated.141 On November 25, 1558, Feria replied to King Philip, stating that even though Mary had given favorable orders, her death had endangered their appeal. After Queen Elizabeth I’s accession, Feria promised that he would do his best, but he realized he was unable to make any guarantees.142

Some days earlier, Cardinal Reginald Pole had died, leaving King Philip without an important support in the Tudor court. With Queen Mary I’s death, Philip ceased to be king consort of England. Furthermore, Philip and Mary had struggled, almost since the beginning of their reign, with a party in England that opposed the re-Catholization program, and likewise with resistance to the limits placed on English overseas voyages for the sake of Iberian interests. The English corsair Killigrew, who seems to have been responsible for capturing the abovementioned ship Raposa, is a good example. Since he was prohibited from entering the Spanish Mare Clausum, Killigrew had made his living on seizures in the English Channel, later taking to privateering around Guinea and Mina.143 The tension worsened in Queen Mary I’s final months when Calais was lost to France. Somehow surprisingly, Lisbon served for Spain as a place to gather intelligence concerning the

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138 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1554–1558*, docs. 398 and 408.
139 ANTT, CC I–102–113, fl. 1–2.
140 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1554–1558*, doc. 459.
English plans to recover Calais.\textsuperscript{144} Although the queen set aside King Philip's original orders relating to Calais, her premature death further reduced the space in which Philip could maneuver in defense of Portuguese maritime interests. It is in this setting that Portugal considered sending new agents to England.

Confirmation of Towerson's return from his third voyage cast further doubt on King Philip's capacity to protect Portuguese interests, especially when it was discovered that two ships belonging to Queen Mary and two to the Lord Admiral William Howard had sailed with the fleet.\textsuperscript{145} Despite imposing formal prohibitions upon her subjects, Queen Mary I herself was a clear supporter of English voyages to West Africa, and had acted exactly as King Edward VI had when he patronized Wyndham's voyage to Guinea. For Portugal, this demonstrated for the first time that Mary had given official cover to English sailings to West Africa, something that contradicted her previous action to forbid her subjects from sailing to the Portuguese\textit{ Mare Clausum}. As King Philip was considered responsible for the failure to halt Towerson's voyage, Portugal reacted more harshly. Given Queen Elizabeth I's reign, the Portuguese contemplated sending agents to England.

D. Francisco Pereira, the new Portuguese ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands,\textsuperscript{146} addressed a letter to King Sebastian on November 21, 1558 (that is, after Queen Mary I's death) expressing his outrage at Towerson's return and stating that he was considering sending his son D. João Pereira to protest. Since his son was ill at the time, he sent the agent Manuel de Figueiredo in his place to ask Feria to represent Portuguese interests. D. Francisco Pereira had also made representations to King Philip, and was instructed to address the issue with Feria. Finally, he promised King Sebastian that he would gather all possible intelligence related to Towerson's third voyage. He also advised Lisbon to station a powerful fleet on the Mina and Guinea coasts, and to sink all English and French interlopers without mercy. To

\textsuperscript{144} D. Juan de Mendonza y Ribera, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, in a letter dated February 1558, reported how he had interviewed several Englishmen who had arrived in Lisbon to gather more details about the loss of Calais and the English plans to recover it (Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretaria de Estado, Estado 380, doc. 60). The ambassador’s action in Lisbon is another sign of the distrust between the Spanish and the English that began with the Calais affair during Queen Mary I’s life.

\textsuperscript{145} Andrews,\textit{ Trade, Plunder, and Settlement}, 104.

\textsuperscript{146} D. Francisco Pereira was appointed to replace Manuel de Sousa Coutinho as the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands in September 1557 (AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 11) but he only assumed his duties during the year of 1558 owing to the theft of his documents and personal belongings in France (\textit{Idem}, Legajo 380, docs. 26 and 29). This topic will be discussed in the chapter 3.
Pereira’s mind, harsh measures were the only way to prevent the damage the English and the French were inflicting on Portugal and to conclusively stop what he considered to be an intolerable challenge to Portuguese rights.\textsuperscript{147}

Shortly afterwards, in a letter likely dated December 1558, the Portuguese king thanked Pereira for the information he had sent regarding Towerson’s third voyage and for his appeals to King Philip to punish those involved in the expedition. Having been apprised of Queen Mary I’s death in a December 1558 letter from Spain, the Portuguese king also approved Pereira’s offer to enlist Feria’s assistance and urge Elizabeth’s government to hand over the \textit{Raposa}. In another letter, King Sebastian ordered Pereira, as King John III had done previously, to raise the issue of French navigation in the Portuguese \textit{Mare Clausum} in the negotiations for the peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis between Spain and France.\textsuperscript{148} Thus, in the absence of a formal ambassador or agent after João Rodrigues Correia’s likely departure from England somewhere in 1557, Portugal used the Spanish network and its ambassador to King Philip to manage English affairs.

It was probably in January 1559 that King Sebastian notified D. Francisco Pereira of his decision to send his son D. João Pereira to visit Queen Elizabeth I and congratulate her on her accession to the throne. He was also to deliver letters to the new queen from King Sebastian and Queen Catherine of Austria, the Portuguese regent due to the minority of her nephew.\textsuperscript{149} Queen Catherine also ordered D. Francisco Pereira to offer condolences to King Philip on the death of Queen Mary.\textsuperscript{150} These missives offered the expected congratulations, and moreover included requests for the formal confirmation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. In tandem with this typical diplomatic envoy, King Sebastian launched an unofficial mission in January 1559, precisely as King John III had done with Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa in 1554. He ordered Francisco de Mesquita to accompany D. João Pereira, providing him with a set of guidelines entitled “instructions to you that shall reside in the court of England.” This document, like so many others discussed above, was subject to many revisions. It shows that Mesquita was not to work as a permanent ambassador, but was primarily intended to operate as a spy.

The king of Portugal began the instruction by noting that he had sent D. João Pereira to congratulate Queen Elizabeth I on her accession to the throne, but had seen fit to enlist Mesquita to take care of “other affairs.”

\textsuperscript{147} Blake, \textit{Europeans in West Africa}, vol. II, 341.
\textsuperscript{150} AGS, \textit{Secretaria de Estado}, Legajo 380, doc. 96.
Upon arriving in England, Mesquita was to proceed to Feria’s house. Feria would arrange his meeting with Queen Elizabeth, since he had been handling the issue of English navigation to West Africa with King Philip and Queen Elizabeth. Before speaking to Elizabeth and the Privy Council about the seizure of the *Raposa* in his capacity as official Portuguese envoy, Mesquita should hear the advice of Feria. During his time in England, King Sebastian instructed Mesquita to “have particular care in knowing the names of ships, the qualities of people that are planning the voyages, the route they will follow, from which port they are, the munition and artillery they bring and the calendar in which they plan to depart. All of this you shall warn me as soon as you can.” The Portuguese king also added: “If you come to know that some of these ships are being prepared to the Mina coast or any other of my overseas places, you will work, within your possibilities, to sabotage it and you will immediately demand the Queen [Elizabeth I] and her Council [the Privy Council] not to allow it.” Finally, the king ordered Mesquita to write on the recent return to Anglicanism under Elizabeth, but as a second mission, and provided him a cypher.

Attached to this letter was another one from the Portuguese king to Feria, acknowledging his assistance in the Mina affair and begging him to assist Mesquita in his mission. Interestingly, King Sebastian recognized in the letter that the Spanish ambassador in England had defended Portuguese interests owing to King Philip’s love for him.151 King Philip was also likely informed of Mesquita’s mission, as he wrote to Feria again on January 20, 1559 to settle the affair the Portuguese had in England. He also wrote personally to Queen Elizabeth on the matter.152

Thus, even after losing his role as king consort of England, King Philip continued to play an active part, often in the defense of Portuguese interests. Although the outcome of D. João Pereira’s and Francisco Mesquita’s espionage remains unknown because their letters have not survived, it is clear that Queen Elizabeth I was pleased by the desire of King Sebastian and Queen Catherine of Austria to confirm the traditional alliance. D. João Pereira was well received, as Elizabeth wrote in letters to both Sebastian and Catherine,153 even though his mission was in response to Towerson’s third voyage.154 As for the Portuguese protests against Towerson’s voyage,

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neither Queen Elizabeth nor her chief minister William Cecil (1520–98) provided a definitive answer. The fact that Towerson was not able to launch another expedition in the wake of his disastrous third voyage can in part be attributed to opposition from Portugal and Spain.

Nevertheless, English navigation to West Africa continued, forcing the dispatch of another Portuguese spy, Manuel de Araújo, in 1561. Araújo's correspondence is incomplete, but it is evident that he worked for João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France for whom he had previous acted as an agent in the French ports. The preparations for John Hawkins's first voyage would also prompt King Sebastian to appoint Dantas for a mission to England the next year. Once more, in 1562, and again in 1564 and 1567, for Hawkins's voyages, Dantas, and Portuguese maritime espionage and counter-espionage is documented in England, as shall be described in chapter 4. But, as the documents presented in this chapter prove, Dantas's activities in the 1560s were merely an escalation of a process already underway during the reign of Queen Mary I.

This fact is connected with the initial question raised by recent studies: that Mary and Elizabeth shared important features in their maritime and overseas policies. Why did Portugal envisage Marian England as a serious competitor, as all this maritime espionage documents? The answer is connected to the development of a scientific milieu under Queen Mary I of which Queen Elizabeth I became the main beneficiary. This was also the ambience in which all Portuguese maritime espionage took place and it played a role in the escalation of tension between both sides. Again, aside from superficial maritime rivalry, there is another key factor that influenced English overseas expansion: the Anglo-Iberian maritime knowledge interchange.

2.5 The Development of the English Scientific Milieu under Queen Mary I

In 1555, when Queen Mary I and King Philip approved the charter for the creation of the Muscovy Company, Philip hoped to avoid a clash between England and Spain overseas. His support is usually seen as an attempt to deviate the English from dangerous overseas ambitions, although it becomes clear that he intended to boost Anglo-Spanish maritime collaboration particularly towards France. The chief importance of the creation of the Company was that it allowed for the systematic training of the first generation of England's

sailors in oceanic and astronomical navigation. Richard Chancellor, Stephen and William Borough were trained in the context of the Muscovy Company, together with other major figures of the Elizabethan era: Richard Record, Richard Eden, and John Dee (1527–1608). It was also within this Company that Richard Eden translated the abovementioned works of Apiannus, Pietro Martyr, and González de Oviedo. The English translations of the first Spanish accounts of the Americas played a key role in instructing and inspiring the first sailors that Queen Elizabeth I inherited. But, once more, neither the arrival of this knowledge in England nor Eden’s work can be understood without considering the particulars of Queen Mary I’s reign.

It was because of Queen Mary’s marriage with Philip that, in 1558, Stephen Borough was allowed (by Philip himself) to make a personal visit to the Casa de la Contratación in Seville. The dynastic bond between England and Spain, together with King Philip’s attempt to acquire more information on the English ambition of sailing to Asia via an Arctic route, provided the English with a crucial technical work: the nautical treatise of Martín Cortés de Albacar (1510–82), which contained knowledge from Portuguese nautical science, as has been noted in the previous chapter. Borough brought this book to England, and was so impressed by the Spanish system that, in 1561, he urged Elizabeth’s government to create the office of pilot-major of England. Interestingly, it later became clear that the English did not fully understand the workings of the institution they were trying to emulate.

Although his idea was not adopted, Borough was able to convince the Muscovy Company’s merchants to finance the translation of Cortés’s treatise into English. Richard Eden soon finished it and it became the most important manual for the 16th-century English sailor. After Cortés’s English edition and Borough’s visit to Seville, English development of the art of navigation was correctly deemed inevitable. At Richard Chancellor’s and Sebastian Cabot’s deaths, during Queen Elizabeth I’s early years, Stephen Borough and John Dee stepped in to fulfill their approximate roles. Elizabeth inherited a scientific and maritime milieu fully favorable to maritime and overseas expansion.

160 On this topic see: Ash and Sandman, “Sebastian Cabot.”
Thus, it is no wonder that Elizabethan London became a global experimental city with conditions ripe for making contributions to the emergence of modern science in Europe, as has already been argued by Deborah E. Harkness.\textsuperscript{163} Still, this link cannot be explained without acknowledging the critical role that Queen Mary played, in the creation of the Muscovy Company, by supporting William Towerson’s third voyage, and more dramatically, despite her marriage to Philip, by continuing to deny Spain’s requests to turn over Sebastian Cabot. The most important moment in this refusal came precisely in 1555, when the Muscovy Company was created and Cabot’s appointment meant that England could not consider allowing Cabot’s possible return to Spain any longer given his role in directing overseas expeditions.\textsuperscript{164}

Another vital element in the successes of the Elizabethan era that had roots in Queen Mary I’s reign are the activities of John Dee. Dee was trained in the context of the Muscovy Company and played a key role during Elizabeth’s reign as an advisor to English maritime expeditions. It was during Mary’s reign and Elizabeth’s early years that Dee began to publish his most important works. Among his important contacts was that with the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes (1502–78). Dee not only kept Nunes’s works in his personal library throughout his life, but in 1558 appointed Nunes executor of one of his mathematical works in the event of his death.\textsuperscript{165} In 1559 and 1560, two more of his works were dedicated to Nunes,\textsuperscript{166} and as late as 1584, Dee was still performing experiments with nautical instruments designed by Nunes.\textsuperscript{167} Although the letters that Nunes and Dee exchanged have not survived, this scientific connection is worth highlighting, since it is analogous to the Spanish cases discussed above.

During the Elizabethan era, direct references to Nunes’s works are also easily found in the works of English nautical literature written by mathematical practitioners. Such is the case for William Bourne’s (1544–1625) \textit{Nautical Supply} in 1597 or even Edward Wright’s (1561–1615) famous \textit{Certaine Errors in Navigation} from 1599, which include explicit references to Pedro Nunes’s works.\textsuperscript{168} Considering also the scientific role that John Dee played

\begin{footnotes}

\item[164] Loades, \textit{England’s Maritime Empire}, 58.


\item[168] Almeida, \textit{A carta de navegar}, 312–13 and 322–24.
\end{footnotes}
under Queen Elizabeth I, a question arises: Did Nunes, owing to his pan-European reputation as a great mathematician, serve as a scientific role model for Dee in the same manner that the pilot-major of the Casa de la Contratación did for Stephen Borough? It is impossible to provide a final answer, but the possibility should not be forgotten when considering the ways that Anglo-Iberian nautical/scientific relations of the 1550s influenced the re-emergence of the English overseas expansion.

The character of these relations has been the focus of this chapter thus far, since it is arguably under the umbrella of such knowledge exchanges that Portuguese maritime espionage in England under Queen Mary I falls. The same avenues for the circulation of maritime and scientific knowledge that led Dee to Nunes's works also motivated Portuguese pilots, such as António Eanes Pinteado or Francisco Rodrigues, to come to England to offer their nautical expertise. If the English were trained in the art of oceanic navigation through Spanish manuals of navigation (in particular, those of Cortés and Pedro de Medina (1493–1567)) during the 1550s and 1560s, their formative interactions with Portuguese pilots should not be neglected either. As has been argued, beneath the surface of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry, there was also a less visible process of English nautical apprenticeship with their Portuguese and Spanish counterparts in the art of navigation. This process contributed to the cultivation of an English nautical literature from the late 1560s onwards. Once more, the roots are to be found in Queen Mary I's reign, whose role in the overall process of English overseas expansion can be reassessed based on the Portuguese espionage and diplomatic documents presented in this chapter.

**Conclusion**

As has been demonstrated, the connection between England, Portugal, and Spain in nautical matters was always intense. The rivalry that emerged from the 1550s onwards between Portugal and England was a significant episode, but not the first. Similarly to the relationship between Portugal and Spain in maritime affairs, behind the Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry there was also a process of circulation of nautical experts that remained largely unregulated by the Portuguese Crown from the late 15th century to the 1550s. António Eanes Pinteado, the Portuguese pilot who suggested that Wyndham should organize the English voyage to Guinea, serves as a reminder of the consequences that such circulation had for both sides. As previously argued, Pinteado should be seen as another Portuguese character who contributed
to the emergence of the English overseas expansion process, similar to his predecessor, the earl of Penamacor. 169

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that King John III’s maritime espionage goals vis-à-vis Marian England ended up failing as it did in Spain: in the end, despite Queen Mary’s formal prohibitions, the English voyages to West Africa continued and defied Portuguese overseas interests in the way that King John II had already, in the late 15th century, envisioned. In the next chapter concerning France, a similar process shall be observed. This rivalry between England and Portugal also led to the development of a sophisticated Portuguese espionage and diplomatic apparatus, which, because of this competition and that with France, and in parallel with other European cases, 170 forced King John III to resort to a plurality of agents—from the ambassador (Diogo Lopes de Sousa), to the special agent (João Rodrigues Correia), to the classical spy (Francisco de Mesquita). It is also crucial to emphasize the pivotal role that Queen Mary I played in the broader context of English overseas expansion and its correlation to the accomplishments of Elizabethan England.

If it is true that Queen Mary publicly condemned and forbade her English subjects from sailing to West Africa, it has also been observed how the queen allowed Lok’s departure in secrecy, how she commissioned an atlas from the Portuguese cartographer Diogo Homem, and how she sent her own ships in the fleet of Towerson’s third voyage in 1558. Furthermore, it has already been argued in respect of this voyage of 1558 that the participation of the queen’s ships might mean that she herself was promised a share in the voyage’s profits. 171 Queen Mary I, like King Henry VII did with regard to King John II’s requests, never extradited Portuguese collaborators in the English overseas ventures, arguing that they were either absent or dead. Mary’s position on this topic needs to be compared with her position towards the authorization for Sebastian Cabot’s possible return to Spain: in the end the queen refused it, despite her marriage and all her reverence and love for Philip. These facts show clearly, as has been underscored with the examples in the previous chapter concerning Emperor Charles V and even King Philip II concerning the role of Portuguese nautical experts, that Mary understood the importance of nautical knowledge coming from

171 Blum, “Empire Later,” 52.
Portugal. That knowledge could be readily used by England to recommence its overseas ventures in search for opportunities to increase wealth.

In this process, Queen Mary I understood, like King John III, Emperor Charles V and King Philip II, that controlling and monopolizing nautical knowledge was pivotal to sustaining English overseas plans. Her views on the topic were no doubt understood by Queen Elizabeth I from the very beginning of her reign, despite all the religious and personal differences that separated the new queen from the old. The main difference between Mary and Elizabeth with regard to English ventures in Portuguese overseas areas was that, by Elizabeth’s reign, England had achieved a stronger position than it had at the beginning of Mary’s reign. England’s previous preparation, its larger dimension and population, allowed Elizabeth to progressively defy Portuguese interests abroad and to answer Portuguese diplomatic pressure differently.\(^{172}\) The character of that change will be analyzed in chapter 4, with the study of Anglo-Portuguese rivalry and interchange in the 1560s, but it is important to highlight that even in the Elizabethan era the Portuguese nautical contribution to England’s overseas ventures remained very intense, following the pattern already inaugurated by the end of the 15\(^{th}\) century.

There is another key factor that decisively influenced Marian and Elizabethan England’s maritime achievements: France. As has been mentioned, English nautical apprenticeship was not solely with Portugal and Spain, but also included France, as the hiring of French nautical experts by King Henry VIII or even the presence of French pilots for John Lok’s voyage evidences. Furthermore, by Queen Mary I’s reign, France had succeeded in challenging Portuguese and Spanish attempted maritime hegemony overseas. The French nautical example was also relevant for England’s ventures overseas and was even more important for Marian England, considering that on the other side of the Channel, France was being ruled by King Henry II (1547–59), the 16\(^{th}\)-century French predecessor to Colbert, as the Valois monarch was called by the renowned French historian Charles de La Roncière.\(^{173}\) King Henry II’s program for the development of the French navy was a maritime menace to England but also triggered a process of competition between the two sides that encouraged England to develop its navy and also its overseas ventures based on the French example.\(^{174}\)


\(^{174}\) On this topic: Redding, The English and French Navies.
However, Valois France also presented a significant challenge for Portugal. Therefore, it is important to examine whether France also valued and utilized Iberian maritime knowledge to plan its overseas expeditions. Did King Henry II, like King John III, Emperor Charles V, King Philip II, Queen Mary I, and Queen Elizabeth I, also understand the importance of Iberian maritime knowledge and did he attempt to control the flow of nautical information? Was there an observable process similar to those ongoing in England and Spain regarding France? How does this connect to French-Portuguese maritime rivalry in the West Africa and Brazil? In the next chapter, the analysis of the French ambassadors’ correspondence in Portugal helps to uncover these questions.

Abstract
This chapter uses the correspondences of Michel de Seure and Jean Nicot, the French ambassadors to Portugal during the 1550s and 1560s, to study the French-Portuguese interchange of maritime knowledge during a pivotal period marked by official and unofficial confrontations in Brazil and West Africa. The study demonstrates how French overseas imperial ambitions were closely linked to French espionage and the acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge in Portugal, and how this connects to earlier French-Portuguese maritime rivalry.

Keywords: Henry II, Catherine de’ Medici, Sebastian, Brazil, West Africa, Lisbon

Introduction

As has been argued in the previous chapter, when King Henry VIII (1509–47) ascended to the English throne in 1509, this meant a slowdown in the English overseas expansionist process. However, on the other side of the English Channel, the opposite happened with France. Influenced by the Iberian maritime achievements and likely also by the early English attempts in North America, Valois France started to consider its first serious overseas projects. Although a French overseas interest can be traced back to the time of the Valois monarch Louis XII (1498–1515), it was during the reign of
King Francis I (1515–47) that France inaugurated more systematic overseas projects and expeditions, particularly from the 1520s. France’s maritime and overseas interest, unlike England’s, were directly tied to its rivalry with Spain and the attempt to contest Emperor Charles V’s (1519–56) European supremacy. Although France had a formal alliance with Portugal, it also began to challenge Portuguese overseas areas. Like what had happened with England, the first French documented ventures overseas also used Iberian maritime knowledge, as shall be detailed in this chapter, particularly by hiring Portuguese pilots.

Nevertheless, under King Francis I, French overseas expansion was marked by both advancements and setbacks as the monarch focused primarily on a European policy. For this king, the possibility of a French overseas empire was a secondary concern. For this reason, under his reign the most important French geographical discoveries were those made by Jacques Cartier (1491–1557) and Jean François de Roberval’s (1495–1560) expeditions to Canada in the 1530–40s. Despite this fact, the king proved unable to fully patronize a colonization policy in that region, or in others that he attempted to dispute Portugal’s and Spain’s possession of: West Africa, South America, Asia, or even the Caribbean. Still, the four major wars that occurred between King Francis I and Emperor Charles V all had an increasing maritime dimension that also fueled French overseas ambitions. If the Valois monarch was sometimes hesitant concerning his overseas policy, his subjects from Normandy, Brittany, and the French Atlantic ports were deeply invested in the profits to be made from long-distance maritime voyages to West Africa, Brazil, and South America. On several occasions, Francis’s overseas policy was defied by his own subjects, in the same way that has been documented for the 1550s concerning the English voyages to West Africa under Queen Mary I (1553–58).

The accession of King Henry II (1547–59) marked a significant change in French overseas plans. With this king’s rise to power, a new generation of courtiers who sought to fully support a French overseas expansionist process also gained influence. This fact imposed changes on French overseas ambitions that ended up directly influencing King Henry’s decisions, which were in contrast to his father’s policy. This chapter will draw on the correspondence of two French ambassadors to Portugal, Michel de Seure and

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Jean Nicot, to understand the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of Iberian maritime knowledge by Valois France. It will also document how this flow of knowledge to France affected broader French-Portuguese maritime rivalry and the planning of new French overseas expeditions. As the reader will quickly realize, in this process, similarly to what has been documented for Spain and England in the previous chapters, diplomacy, espionage, secrecy, and knowledge went hand in hand. If there were maritime knowledge exchanges taking place, it is critical to understand what the conditions were that favored them; mainly how France used its embassy in Lisbon to achieve its overseas goals. By looking in detail at Seure and Nicot's dispatches, and by matching them with other sources and studies, this chapter will discuss the French-Portuguese, or sometimes Franco-Iberian, interchange of nautical knowledge. To correctly interpret Seure and Nicot's maritime diplomacy and espionage, the political context behind their appointments and their later careers will also be addressed.

Despite the fact that Seure's and Nicot's letters from their embassies in Portugal have already been published by Edmond Falgairolle and Luís de Matos,² the way this correspondence relates to the circulation of maritime knowledge between France and Portugal in the 1560s was not fully studied. Such communications occurred against a backdrop of French-Portuguese maritime rivalry, best studied for King Francis I's reign. For the continued rivalry during King Henry II's reign and the last Valois period, stretching from 1547 to 1589, there is, however, a lack of studies. One notable episode in this period was the France Antarctique project of 1555–60, a French attempt at establishing a colony in Brazil undertaken by King Henry II. Despite King Henry II's sudden death in 1559, and the outbreak of the French Civil Wars,³ French-Portuguese maritime rivalry did not subside. Since these issues are both underexamined and essential context for Seure's and Nicot's embassy, this chapter likewise aims to bring them into better focus.


Using key studies on Seure and Nicot, as well as new sources, this chapter will re-examine several aspects of both embassies, highlighting Seure’s and Nicot’s role as brokers of maritime information. The analysis will begin with Michel de Seure’s embassy (1557–59) in order to contextualize Nicot’s appointment in 1559. Following this, a brief overview of the main official objectives of Nicot’s embassy will be provided. Afterwards, the unofficial factors guiding Nicot’s embassy will be discussed, including the French-Portuguese maritime rivalry and the conditions that underlie Nicot’s acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge. Before concluding, there will be a re-evaluation of the reasons for Nicot’s recall and a discussion of his activities as promulgator of Portuguese knowledge after returning home. Seure’s and Nicot’s strategies for the acquisition of maritime knowledge will be compared to his predecessor in the Portuguese embassy. Finally, the conclusion will reflect on the French acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge, comparing it to the previous cases of Spain and England.

3.1 A Spy Ambassador? Michel de Seure and his Portuguese Embassy (1557–59)

A few days after King John III’s (r. 1521–57) death, Michel de Seure (1523–95) arrived in Lisbon, as Emperor Charles V’s agent in the Portuguese capital, D. Sancho de Córdova reported in a letter dated June 25, 1557 to the Spanish secretary of state Juan Vasquez de Molina. The new French ambassador to Portugal was the son of the lord of Blois, and had been admitted into the Order of Malta in 1539; his reputation as a fearless knight granted him access to the Valois court. With the impending death of the Portuguese king, France sought to compete with Spain for the Portuguese alliance, and thus decided to send a new ambassador to Lisbon. Seure’s appointment was a strategic move by King Henry II, who, amidst the war between France and Spain, had decided to replace Honorais de Caix (?–1558), the previous French ambassador. Seure was sent to Lisbon with orders to spread the news that the French were on the verge of crushing the Spanish (a traditional French maneuver designed to turn the Portuguese against Spain). For this reason, Seure’s appointment had been granted by the courtier party that advocated open hostilities and global war with Spain. The leading figures of this policy were Francis, duke of Guise (1519–63), King Henry II’s great

4 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 164, fl. 2.
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French general for his military campaigns, and the French Constable Anne de Montmorency (1493–1567). Like Nicot’s mission later, and like the missions of the previously mentioned Portuguese agents dispatched to England in the 1550s, Seure’s mission had official and unofficial goals. To understand these, it is important to start the analysis with the political context, in which Seure and then Nicot acted, so that the conditions underlying their maritime espionage and acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge can later be rightly contextualized.

Seure’s arrival greatly affected the Portuguese court, for several reasons. Seure was replacing the elderly Honorais de Caix, who had been serving intermittently as the French ambassador in Lisbon (although he was born in Savoy) since the 1520s. By 1557, Caix was reported to be a man of peace who despised the conflicts between Portugal and France, especially the maritime ones, as was asserted by D. Sancho de Córdova in a missive to King Philip II (1556–98), dated July 21, 1557. D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza, King Philip II’s ambassador to Portugal, noted immediately that France had appointed a much more prestigious and honored ambassador to Lisbon. In his first letter to the Catholic King about Seure’s arrival, dated June 26, 1557, he remarked on the rumors that Seure was under secret orders from King Henry II to propose a marriage alliance between the French and Portuguese royal houses. Mendonza was not much worried about such rumors because the Portuguese regretted the fact that Seure had been French ambassador in Istanbul. Indeed, the traditional rivalry between the Portuguese and the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean did not sit well with the declared alliance between France and Istanbul.

In another missive, dated also June 26, but addressed to Juana of Austria (1535–73), princess of Portugal, mother of King Sebastian (1557–78) and by then ruler of Spain in the absence of King Philip II, Mendonza noted another relevant issue. To counterbalance the Portuguese criticism of his previous career in Istanbul, Seure had publicly announced that he would use his contacts there to provide intelligence on Ottoman movements and plans against the Portuguese. The Spanish ambassador tried to uncover Seure’s and King Henry II’s plans concerning the Portuguese embassy. In a letter penned on July 5, 1557 and addressed to Princess Juana, Mendonza provided news. The following updates were being given in Lisbon’s taverns

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6 Chichkine, “Mirage d’une alliance,” 44.
7 AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 117.
8 AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 53, fl. 4.
9 AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 65, fl. 4v.
on Seure’s mission: King Henry II was proposing a marriage between one of his daughters and King Sebastian; the French dowry would amount to the high sum of 700,000 Portuguese reais; France would return to Portugal all the ships and cargos apprehended during the last 10 years of French-Portuguese sea warfare in the Atlantic; for a fair price, the Valois court was willing to negotiate a commercial treaty in which France committed to supplying all the grain that Portugal needed; and finally, and most interestingly, France promised diplomatic and, if needed, military support to Portugal in its dispute with Spain over the Moluccas. Although Hurtado de Mendoza recognized that the Portuguese were highly pleased by such proposals, he was not overly concerned at the tempting French proposal of marriage to Portugal as he believed that while Emperor Charles V was alive, albeit living in retirement in a monastery in Yuste, the French-Portuguese marriage would never occur. 

However, in the last letter, D. Juan Hurtado de Mendoza already recognized that owing to the Portuguese political situation (the young King Sebastian was 3 years old and there was a regency during his minority) and to anti-Spanish feeling in Portugal, Seure had been very well-received by the Portuguese in his formal reception at the royal palace in Lisbon. He recognized in the abovementioned letter of July 5, 1557 to Princess Juana that Queen Catherine of Austria (1507–78), the Portuguese regent during the minority of King Sebastian, had ordered the courtier earl of Vimioso to bring Seure to the palace. When Seure arrived, he was received by all the prominent members of the Portuguese highest nobility, as well as by all members of the Portuguese royal family (including Cardinal Henry, King Sebastian’s uncle, and Princess Mary, King Sebastian’s aunt). Queen Catherine of Austria granted him a fifteen-minute audience and everyone commented on the courteous manner in which she treated Seure.

This commenting on the queen’s behavior was connected to Portuguese suspicions that she would always oppose a marriage alliance between Portugal and France. As Queen Catherine of Austria was Emperor Charles V’s sister and had owed her 1525 marriage to King John III to her brother, the Portuguese suspected that she would always defend a Habsburg marriage for young King Sebastian. Nonetheless, as has been underscored, the Portuguese

10 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 55, fl. 1.
11 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 55, fl. iv.
were seriously tempted by the French proposal which came at a time when
the young Portuguese king’s fragile health raised fears of a political union
with Spain, an idea fiercely opposed by several Portuguese. For this reason
and to lift pro-Spanish suspicions from her government, Queen Catherine
of Austria had even confided secretly to D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza,
King Philip II’s ambassador in Portugal, that if needed she would publicly
oppose the retired emperor’s intentions. The skilled Ambassador Mendonza,
who was aware that the emperor had ordered to have King Philip II’s heir
(Prince Charles of Spain) sworn also as heir to the Portuguese Crown, and
who knew of the polemics this had caused in Portugal, issued a warning.

In that context, in a missive to King Philip II dated July 12, 1557, Mendonza
asserted that the Spanish king needed to understand that, despite Queen
Catherine of Austria’s filial reverence for Charles and for himself, she was not
in position to accommodate the Spanish plans. As such King Philip II would
have to accept the public opposition that Queen Catherine would express
to the emperor’s intentions. Still, to assuage King Philip II’s feeling when
reading this letter, D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza assured that he firmly
believed that during the time Queen Catherine would be Portuguese regent
the matrimonial union between Portugal and France would never happen.13
It is precisely in this context that Seure’s alleged (it is not confirmed in his
 correspondence) French marriage proposal to Portugal came to severely
disturb Portuguese-Spanish relations and to draw Portugal closer into King
Henry II’s orbit. The agitation caused by Seure’s arrival is also evident in
the missives of D. Sancho de Córdova, Emperor Charles V’s agent in Lisbon.

Córdova’s letter sheds light on a previously unknown conflict between
Seure and Córdova. Both men were competing for the support of the Por-
tuguese court. At stake was winning Portuguese support, precisely as King
Francis I had done in 1525–26. In 1525-26, the Portuguese government decided
the matrimonial unions with Spain, thus rendering Francis I’s matrimonial
plans useless.14 Nevertheless, in 1557, the French proposal had a profound
impact in Portugal. In a missive dated July 4, 1557 addressed to Emperor
Charles V, Córdova provided a more detailed account of Seure’s formal
reception than that by D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza. After detailing Seure’s

13 AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 55, fl. 2–2v.
14 In 1525 and 1526, respectively, King John III married Catherine of Austria, Emperor Charles
V’s sister, and Charles married Elizabeth of Portugal, King John III’s sister. King Francis I at-
ttempted to thwart the plans by tempting King John III with a matrimonial proposal with one
of his daughters; it never materialized. On this topic see: Diogo Faria, “Negócios matrimoniais
entre Portugal e a França no tempo de Francisco I (1515–1547),” Anais de História de Além-Mar
ceremonial reception, the emperor’s special agent in Lisbon commented on Queen Catherine’s conversation with Seure, approving of her words to him. Córdova regarded the Portuguese queen’s behavior as important to mislead the Portuguese and the French with good words. Furthermore, Córdova revealed that he had uncovered intelligence about Seure’s personal dispute with the pope regarding a debt he owed. Like D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza, Córdova expressed confidence that King Henry II’s efforts to reconcile France and Portugal through Seure’s embassy in Lisbon would ultimately prove unsuccessful.15

In another letter addressed to the Spanish secretary of state Juan Vasquez de Molina on July 12, 1557, however, Córdova candidly expressed his real concerns about Seure’s reception. He confessed that he had requested to be present at the reception and to be given precedence over Seure. His request was denied by Queen Catherine and certain advisors on the grounds that he was not an ambassador. As such Seure would always take precedence over him. Infuriated by such a response, Córdova replied that he was the emperor’s agent. He argued that everyone considered him to be ambassador and that his status as an imperial knight was higher than Seure’s, who was a mere knight of the French Order of Saint John, which, in Córdova’s own words, lacked the prestige of the Military Order of the Golden Fleece. Faced with this situation, Queen Catherine summoned Córdova into her presence before Seure’s formal reception. Córdova omits what happened next and only reports that he came to the palace after Seure’s reception to speak with the queen. Nevertheless, he seems once more to have come empty-handed. Later, Queen Catherine attempted to summon Córdova twice, but he refused to attend.16 Informed of these events, Emperor Charles V wrote that Córdova was to remain in Portugal for some time. He also warned Philip II to be careful as Seure was using the Portuguese need for grain and desires for a Valois marriage to further France’s geostrategic goals.17

Thus, everything in Córdova’s letter suggests that Seure was given precedence over him in the ceremony. Although Seure’s surviving French correspondence does not mention this episode, Córdova’s later comments about Seure suggest that he was deeply offended by this preferential treatment. As a result, in a letter addressed to King Philip II on July 21, 1557, Córdova accused Seure of using the possibility of a marriage between Portugal and

15 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 110, fl. 1v.–2.
16 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 160, fl. 1v.–2.
France to disrupt Portuguese-Spanish relations, and he asked King Philip for instructions on how to proceed. Córdova recognized that there was a favorable attitude towards Seure and France, and an anti-Spanish feeling in Portugal. This was the reason why, on July 12, 1557, he had written to Emperor Charles V, requesting instructions on how to deal with Seure. He also mentioned that he had previously proposed a strategy to deal with Seure to the emperor, but as he had not received a reply, he urged him to take a stand as the situation was delicate. Unfortunately, Charles’s answer remains unknown. Still, Córdova’s letters document very well the impact that Seure’s arrival had in Lisbon in June–July 1557.

Nevertheless, things soon changed, as Seure began to encounter difficulties in August 1557. The first challenges came with news of French defeats in Europe at the hands of the Spanish. The propaganda concerning the war between Spain and France explains why Seure changed his public attitude. Owing to reports sent to Lisbon by João Pereira Dantas, the recently arrived Portuguese ambassador to France who will be discussed in the following chapter, on French military difficulties on the battlefield of Saint-Quentin, Seure became more hostile in public. Reacting emotionally to this news, Seure reportedly approached Córdova with anger during an encounter at the Portuguese court. According to Córdova’s letter, it seems that Seure was returning home after having visited Princess Mary (1521–77), a figure that Seure and Nicot came to admire very much due to her pan-European reputation of richness, beauty, and cultural interests. Knowing of Córdova’s previous dispute with Queen Catherine of Austria regarding precedence, Seure looked at Córdova, who had his hat in his hand as a sign of reverence to Seure, and bowed his head to Córdova. However, Seure interpreted Córdova’s actions as an intention to dispute precedence with him. As a consequence, Seure became outraged in the presence of several ladies of the court and left the room suddenly, causing comments among those present. In reporting these events to Emperor Charles V, in a missive dated August 25, 1557, Córdova did not hide his happiness.

18 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 117, fl. 5v.
19 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 178.
21 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 184.
However, several days before this incident, the Spanish representatives had already suffered another defeat at Seure’s hands. A dispute between Spanish and French ships arriving in Lisbon from Brittany was resolved in Seure’s favor by Queen Catherine, who ordered that the valuable Breton grain be unloaded in Lisbon, despite Spanish opposition, as Portugal was in dire need of it. According to Córdova’s letter to the emperor, dated August 12, 1557, Seure had stepped in and achieved this outcome. At the same time, an anonymous Spanish intelligence report (undated but likely from October 1557) stated that Seure had received a new package of letters from France, which included missives from King Henry II, the French constable, and a French secretary of state. The letters were sent unencrypted, in order to check if the Spanish would intercept and open them. If they did, they would only find news of the Franco-Spanish war in Flanders and nothing more. To counteract the bad news for the French side in the war against the Spanish, Seure had spread the rumor in Lisbon that the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean was planning to attack the Spanish island of Majorca. Most importantly, the report states that Seure had petitioned Queen Catherine of Austria regarding the possibility of a French marriage and her response was: “it is said that the queen has replied to the ambassador that she is determined to marry the king of Portugal in France.” Taking advantage of this favorable atmosphere, Seure also demanded that Cardinal Henry (1512–80), as the head of the Portuguese Inquisition, release a number of Frenchmen. The cardinal told Seure to speak with Queen Catherine, but for some unknown reason, Seure did not do so. None of this prevented the Portuguese government from sending naval and military reinforcements to Brazil to oppose the French. According to the report, this was the Portuguese answer to the news that the French Admiral Gaspard de Coligny (1519–72) had sent 300 men to the region. However, Seure was quickly disabused of his illusions as information sent by Córdova to Princess Juana, dated October 1557, evidences. In that missive, it was stated that Seure was no longer under any illusion that a French marriage in Portugal would ever happen, as the main Portuguese courtiers were all in favor of Spain.

By the end of 1557, Seure faced additional challenges in his propaganda war against the Spanish in Lisbon, particularly with the confirmation of

22 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 182, fl. 1v.
23 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 153; For King Henry II’s and the cardinal of Lorraine’s orders, dated October 1557, to Seure to provide updated news of the war in Portugal see also Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, Michel de Seure, embaixador francês em Portugal (1557–1559) (offprint by Arquivos do Centro Cultural Português, 1969a), 457–58.
the news of the Battle of Saint-Quentin. When news of the French military disaster reached Lisbon via a letter from the Portuguese ambassador in France dated August 28, 1557, Seure ordered everyone in his household to remain silent on the topic, as recorded by D. Juan de Hurtado Mendonza in a letter to the Spanish secretary of state Juan Vasquez de Molina, dated October 14, 1557. Yet in August 1557, Seure created another incident that came to show the Portuguese that he was unworthy of any trust, in Mendonza’s words. In a missive dated August 26 and addressed to King Philip II, Mendonza asserted that owing to some incidents between French and Portuguese seafarers near Lisbon, stemming from the West African trade dispute, Seure had publicly threatened retaliation, stating that the mistreated Frenchmen were vassals of King Henry II. Seure’s manner of issuing the warning convinced the Portuguese not to trust him, according to Mendonza, which greatly pleased King Philip II. This action by Seure was directly related to what is evident in his French correspondence: maritime espionage.

In addition to Seure’s official mission, King Henry II had tasked his ambassador with another major goal. Seure records the order in a letter: the king wished him to obtain access to all possible intelligence relating to the Spanish and Portuguese fleets overseas. Among other things, Seure was supposed to report on the departure of fleets from Seville and Lisbon. The need to monitor Portuguese movements was linked to King Henry II’s support of Nicholas Durand de Villegagnon’s (1510–71) departure to Brazil in 1555, and the monarch’s financial backing of France Antarctique. Two years earlier, King Henry had sent the French explorer and cartographer Guillaume Le Testu (1509–73) to map coastal Brazil. In tandem with King Henry II’s financial support of the Dieppe cartographical school, Le Testu published his own cosmography in 1556, earning him the title of royal pilot. Le Testu’s atlas was dedicated to Admiral Coligny. King Henry II also ordered the translation into French of the important Spanish nautical treatise of Pedro de Medina (1493–1567) to instruct French pilots, as part of

25 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 182, fl. iv.
26 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 60, fl. 2.
30 Charles-André Julien, Les voyages de découverte et les premiers établissements (Gérard Monfort; Brionne, 1978), 184.
his policy of supporting the cartographical school of Dieppe.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore, the French king was more than vaguely interested in oceanic navigation: he fully understood that he needed Iberian maritime knowledge to successfully launch French overseas plans. This was similar to what was discussed in the previous chapter regarding the English understanding, under Queen Mary I, of the importance of translating Iberian nautical works. Like his father Francis I in 1545, Henry II also attempted to repatriate all French nautical experts working in England.\textsuperscript{32} He was aware that England under Queen Mary was becoming a competitor to French ambitions overseas, just like the Portuguese and Spanish already were. Given the ongoing French-Portuguese maritime rivalry, Henry II wanted to be informed of Portuguese movements in order to provide timely military assistance to the newly founded Fort Coligny. An analysis of Seure’s extant letters, in conjunction with Spanish diplomatic dispatches from Lisbon, reveals that his mission was essentially that of a maritime spy-ambassador.

On February 12, 1558, Seure wrote to Anne de Montmorency, the French constable, to inform him that he had secured intelligence from Portuguese India. The findings were apparently sensitive enough for him to announce that he would transmit them in person. He also requested, on behalf of Princess Mary, Queen Eleonor of Austria’s daughter (1498–1558), that the nuptial contract between her mother and King Francis I be sent to her.\textsuperscript{33} Princess Mary lacked confirmation of the goods and lands that she had inherited from her mother in Southern France, and needed the Valois Crown’s validation.\textsuperscript{34} Seure hoped to assist the princess. On the same day, Seure sent a letter to Charles de Guise (1524–74), cardinal of Lorraine, with information about China that had just arrived on a Portuguese India Run fleet. He also sent marble, per the cardinal’s request. In another missive, addressed to the lord of Fresnes and also dated February 12, 1558, Seure revealed concerns that his ambassadorship was going to last longer than he had expected or wanted. In light of this, he explicitly asked for authorization to leave Portugal.\textsuperscript{35} The causes for his request become clear in the missive sent to King Henry II on January 30, 1559.

Seure started the letter by alerting the king to his personal correspondence with the Spanish marquis of Tenerife. He then disclosed the destinations of

\textsuperscript{31} Brossard, “La France de la Renaissance,” 311.
\textsuperscript{32} Brossard, “La France de la Renaissance,” 315
\textsuperscript{33} Matos, Les Portugais en France, 278.
\textsuperscript{34} On this topic: Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, A Infanta Dona Maria (1521–1557) e a sua fortuna no Sul da França (Lisbon: edition by Álvaro Pinto, 1955), 43–74.
\textsuperscript{35} Matos, Les Portugais en France, 279–81.
two important Spanish fleets: the Caribbean and the Plata River. Furthermore, a Portuguese informant had reported to Seure that the Spanish were attempting to establish a settlement along the Plata River, their interest doubtless piqued by Portuguese proximity in Brazil and the River’s alleged propinquity to the Peruvian goldmines of Potosi. Seure likewise related intelligence on a Honduras-bound Spanish fleet that could easily be taken by the French. Seure warned that this could only be achieved if a peace treaty with England was signed, and if the French captains were ready to endure 40 days’ of waiting to ambush in the right location. He urged King Henry not to allow an assault on the Spanish fleet during its return to Europe, while passing through the Azores, because the Portuguese and the Spanish Admiral D. Álvaro de Bazan (1526–88) would be expecting a French attack. The same unnamed Portuguese source also passed along intelligence relating to a land north of Cape Saint Agustin (on the Brazilian coast). Seure claimed that this new land lay very close to the Potosi mines, and could readily be occupied by the French. He also reported that an unspecified Spanish governor of South America was planning to launch another expedition to the Moluccas, something that infuriated the Portuguese. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Crown had accumulated many debts (most of which, to Seure’s dismay, had been paid off with profits from Indian pepper). This pepper was bought by some Italians and Seure had tried, without success, to prevent Italian cash from arriving in Lisbon. By that time Seure was also negotiating with the French ambassador in Spain for the release of French prisoners from Seville. In his letter to the king, Seure reiterated his plea to favor the petitions of Princess Mary. He ended the letter by apologizing for writing down such details, justifying his behavior by citing the unavailability of a good courier to transmit the news personally to the king. He further requested that Henry II recall him, because his espionage activities had been discovered. And, as if the missive were not already full of bombshells, Seure also sent the king a highly interesting annex.36

In this last document, Seure described all the revenues and expenses from every Portuguese overseas settlement. The conclusions were very clear: despite tremendous profits from Asia, Lisbon did not receive any net gains from India (not even from the rich Moluccas) because of the staggering expenses connected to their Asian empire. The Portuguese Crown was, in fact, forced to rely on the commercial revenues from West Africa, Brazil, and the Atlantic islands for survival. A large part of these funds, Seure emphasized, were used to finance the maintenance of defensive fleets in these last areas.

Gold trade profits from Mina were declining and the Portuguese Crown was still recovering from earlier financial outlays in Morocco. Shipwrecks had begun to garner increased attention because of their considerable costliness. In this annex, Seure also stressed Portuguese-Spanish rivalry overseas. He reminded King Henry II that since the times of Prince Henry (1394–1460), the Portuguese had entrusted all their maritime property rights to the Order of Christ so that they could avoid loss in case of the Spanish rule of Portugal. Seure went on to briefly describe Portugal, stating that the country was split in half by the Tagus River (and that Lisbon ranked as one of the biggest and most beautiful cities that he had ever known). This annex was not Seure’s first communication to France on the Portuguese Empire. In December 1558, in addition to his requests to assist Princess Mary and to send him more money to pay his debts, Seure had relayed summaries of news of Portuguese India, as well as some products from China.

In another letter to King Henry II, this one undated, Seure provided similar intelligence but with a curious detail seemingly foreshadowing plans later materialized by Francis Drake (1540–96). The French could easily attack the Spanish island of Santo Domingo, Seure argued, and then proceed to Nombre de Dios and to Panama, where they could launch an offensive against Spanish navigation in the Pacific Ocean. For such a plan to be carried out, Seure explained, the French would need to depart at specific times of the year. If chance was on their side, they would also be able to strike Havana on their return trip. When leaving the Antilles for Europe, Seure counseled not to attack the Azores Sea. In the letter he also noted Portuguese plans to colonize Orinoco, although it was out of their hemisphere according to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Seure compared Portuguese interest in Orinoco with the Portuguese-Spanish rivalry over the Moluccas. This particular missive by Seure was a result of King Henry II’s previous decision that France would launch a strong maritime operation in 1559 to strike the Spanish Caribbean and potentially reach as far as Peru. Therefore, Seure provided all the necessary advice for the French captains to successfully execute the surprise attack. Due to peace treaty negotiations with Spain, King Henry II canceled all the maritime plans almost at the last minute. Nonetheless, this did not halt the departure of French raiders. The French

38 Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 72–74.
39 Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 76–81.
41 McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 79.
overseas attacks were so successful that they even reduced the strength of Spanish *Mare Clausum* arguments, as has already been argued.\(^{42}\) How could Spain claim rights when the French raided the seas it claimed with impunity? While stationed in Lisbon, Seure contributed to this outcome. Thus, it is no wonder that once his espionage was discovered, the Portuguese court demanded Seure’s withdrawal. The ambassador’s *lettres de rappel* were prepared at the Valois court precisely in January 1559.

The first letter, possibly written by Anne de Montmorency, notified Seure that the Portuguese regent, Queen Catherine of Austria, had demanded his withdrawal. The second and most significant letter was from King Henry II. The French king wrote to apprise Seure of the fact that João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France, had complained about him on behalf of the Portuguese regent. Although King Henry II had decided to recall his ambassador, he assured Seure that he was very pleased with his services and promised to receive him well. The third letter may have been composed by the cardinal of Lorraine. Seure was again alerted to Dantas’s protest, and also commended him for his diligence in serving King Henry II; indeed, he was to receive a pension for a whole year to finance his return to France via Spain. He was even asked to continue reporting everything he could while in Spain.\(^{43}\) Seure did not receive these letters until later. Unaware of the developments they contained, on February 14, 1559 he wrote to King Henry II urging him to appoint a new ambassador in Lisbon, reminding him that he had been discovered and was being treated very badly. He once again asked for the payment of his debts and briefed the king on the destination of more Spanish fleets. Revolted by Spanish abuses against French seamen, he recommended lifting the embargo on French navigation to the West Indies, enabling the French to take revenge against the Spanish.\(^{44}\) It was only on February 18, 1559 that Seure was informed of Jean Nicot’s appointment. In a letter to Anne de Montmorency, dated April 18, 1559, Seure noted that it took him two months to receive his *lettres de rappel*.\(^{45}\) As late as May 1559, Seure was still negotiating with Portuguese and Spanish authorities to gain authorization to depart from Portugal.\(^{46}\) He left Portugal before Nicot’s arrival.\(^{47}\) Still, it is relevant to question what had motivated the Portuguese complaints against Seure. Once again, in the absence of an answer in Seure’s

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\(^{42}\) Catellan, “Iberian Expansion,” 22.


\(^{44}\) Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 82–84.

\(^{45}\) Matos, *Les Portugais en France*, 283; Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 84–85.


incomplete correspondence, the reports from the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon provide additional insights.

As early as November 1556, Seure’s predecessor in office, the Ambassador Honorais de Caix was accused in a Spanish intelligence document written in Lisbon probably by one of D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza’s agents, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal, of plotting to engaging the services of the Spanish friar Pedro de Godoy for the Valois. Godoy had been sentenced to death in Peru, but had managed to escape. Before arriving in Lisbon, Godoy made contact with Caix. Among his belongings, letters addressed to Caix and Anne de Montmorency were found, in which he promised to pilot a French expedition to Peru or the Magellan Strait. In reply, King Philip II issued a judicial order to detain him when he disembarked in Lisbon.48 In a letter dated April 30, 1557 and addressed to King Philip II, D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza revealed that Godoy had escaped prison in the Antilles and that he was planning to flee to France to serve the Valois. As the matter involved Caix, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon had devised a plan to capture Godoy. He sent the Spaniard D. Alonso Henriquez to win his trust and propose that Godoy go with him to the house of the Spanish duke of Vila Nova, who would assist them in their escape to France. But the duke would detain Godoy and deliver him to face Spanish justice.49 In another letter addressed to King Philip II and dated June 2, 1557, Mendonza revealed that he had laid hands on all of Godoy’s papers and that he was about to send them to Spain.50 The vigilance with regard to Godoy is similar to cases of French mariners with knowledge of the Spanish Indies who ended up jailed at the Casa de la Contratación.51 Thus, the “Godoy problem” seems to have only been solved after Seure’s arrival.

In light of the evidence of espionage found in Seure’s correspondence, it is plausible that Seure was made aware of Godoy’s plans by his predecessor Honorais de Caix and may have played a role in the case, although documented evidence did not survive. As previously established, one of
Seure’s duties was to gather intelligence on Spanish maritime movements in the Atlantic for France. The potential for a Spaniard to provide valuable knowledge to the French for planning overseas expeditions would not have been overlooked. These suspicions are further supported by the 1558 accusations of Seure’s espionage, which ultimately led to his recall. Therefore, it is crucial to address this issue.

In February 1558, a large French fleet approached Lisbon to anchor and unload the precious grain that Portugal needed so much. The presence of such a large fleet caused unease within the city. As the ongoing war between France and Spain continued to escalate in the Atlantic and Europe, D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza, the new Spanish ambassador to Lisbon, had received troubling news that he reported to Princess Juana on February 24, 1558. The ambassador had obtained intelligence from an unnamed informant, stating that several of the recently arrived Frenchmen had received orders to organize a French attack on Galicia in conjunction with Ambassador Seure. He warned Galician authorities to be prepared. The French fleet consisted of nearly 3,000 men and several artillery pieces, further fueling the Spanish ambassador’s suspicions. D. Juan Ribera y Mendonza advised Princess Juana that it would be wise to also inform Queen Catherine of Austria, as the French could also be planning a surprise attack on the Portuguese. He expressed his concerns by stating that “they behave like mad men.” He also warned that these Frenchmen were able to make “a non-sense especially if this ambassador of France [Seure] commands them to it as he is a mad man.” To solidify Ribera y Mendonza’s suspicions even more, the 5th duke of Braganza had also given him a similar warning. Upon hearing these French plans from Ribera y Mendonza, Princess Mary started to suspect that her mother’s death had not been due to natural causes.

Some days later, on March 2, 1558 in a letter to King Philip II, Ribera y Mendonza revealed that after the news of the French takeover of Calais reached Lisbon, Ambassador Seure had gathered the French pilots and captains of the 100 French ships that were anchored in Lisbon in his house. After their arrival, the Spanish ambassador went to speak with Queen Catherine of Austria to warn her that the French fleet could potentially attack Spain or Portugal. The queen did not entirely believe his advice, but

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52 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 41, fl. 1–1v. This comment is related to the fact that Queen Eleanor of Austria, Emperor Charles V’s sister, had married King Manuel I before marrying King Francis I. As queen of France, Eleanor of Austria tried several times to defend Portuguese and Spanish interests at the Valois Court. Her actions were not approved by the courtier party that supported open war with Spain.
commanded him to provide more intelligence if he received it.\textsuperscript{53} Three days later in a missive to the Spanish secretary of state Juan Vasquez de Molina, Ribera y Mendonza commented that there had been a great outcry in Seure’s house when news arrived of a new French defeat at the hands of the Spanish. He could not know the details for sure as Seure had decided to bring the recently received letters from France around his neck (certainly to avoid them being stolen by the Spanish). Rumors were circulating that the 150 French ships and almost 3,000 Frenchmen that were in Lisbon were preparing an assault against the Portuguese island of Berlengas, a key place\textit{ en route} for ships sailing from the Azores Sea to continental Portugal and for commercial ships navigating from the south to the north of Portugal. However, Ribera y Mendonza refused to believe that the French would go as far as to proceed in such a way against Portugal.\textsuperscript{54} But why did he give such an opinion if he considered Seure to have been the mastermind behind the French plans?

The explanation for this can be found in another letter by Ribera y Mendonza, also addressed to Juan Vasquez de Molina but dated March 2, 1558. In this letter, Ribera y Mendonza provides further details about his conversation with Queen Catherine of Austria. When he realized that the queen did not take the potential French threat seriously and denied his request to allow the French fleet to depart in small groups rather than as a whole, he made another argument. As 100 of the total 150 French ships were near Belém Palace, where King Sebastian was without royal guard, Ribera y Mendonza argued that if the French desired, they could easily disembark 1,000 soldiers at night and kidnap the young king. According to his report, once he used this argument, the queen was “persuaded.” She asked him not to disclose the matter and seems to have planned the Portuguese response as she also requested that he provide written testimony. But, in the end, nothing came of it. According to Ribera y Mendonza, there was another meeting in Seure’s residence in which it was decided that Seure would not command or participate in the alleged French attack.\textsuperscript{55} The next day in a missive to King Philip II, Ribera y Mendonza reported the details of his secret negotiations with Queen Catherine and her willingness to take any necessary measures to avoid danger.\textsuperscript{56} On March 8, 1558, Philip II formally replied to Ribera y Mendonza, thanking him for his action, approving the

\textsuperscript{53} AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 32, fl. 1v.–2.
\textsuperscript{54} AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 48, fl. 1–1v.
\textsuperscript{55} AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 49, fl. 1–1v.
\textsuperscript{56} AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 55.
deal of secrecy with Queen Catherine on the matter of the French fleet. He also reassured Ribera y Mendonza: he had given orders for Spain to prepare itself for a French blow.\textsuperscript{57} This communication suggests that by March, Queen Catherine was aware of the French maritime threat and, due to her vigilant nature, likely increased her surveillance of Seure, as she may have suspected that King Henry II’s ambassador in Lisbon was providing critical intelligence to fuel France’s maritime plans against Portugal. The Portuguese regent’s worst fears were just about to be confirmed.

In a letter dated May 6, 1558, D. Juan Ribera y Mendonza expressed his concerns to Juan Vasquez de Molina about a recent event. A Portuguese individual who had secretly disembarked from a French ship in Cascais, near Lisbon, had come to the Portuguese court with a warning. He reported that a fleet of nine well-armed vessels had recently set sail from Dieppe and Le Havre, guided by two Portuguese pilots. While the official reason given for the voyage was to raid Spanish ships returning from the Antilles, the two pilots had also urged the Portuguese to deliver a warning to Queen Catherine of Austria. King Henry II had issued a letter of marque, giving permission for the French privateers to raid Portuguese ships in order to compensate for losses of 200,000 ducats. This revelation caused a scandal at the Portuguese court. Still, it was not the first time this happened, as similar instances had already taken place under King Francis I. The real cause for concern was the information that King Henry II had summoned his Conseil Privé to discuss a possible declaration of war against Portugal.\textsuperscript{58} The document in question does not provide explicit reasoning for the French king’s inclination to declaring war on Portugal. However, it is not difficult to infer potential motives. At the time, the Valois court had been unsuccessful in convincing Portugal to align against Spain in its maritime war. Additionally, Portugal was viewed as an ally of King Philip II. As a result, France may have seen an opportunity to openly declare war on Portugal. This possibility was further reinforced by the fact that King Henry had recently succeeded in strengthening the French navy through the conquest of Calais, which served as evidence of France’s military and maritime prowess to the rest of Europe.

The threat posed by French maritime activities escalated in the following months. On March 30, 1558, D. Juan Ribera y Mendonza informed Juan Vasquez de Molina that the French had seized Portuguese and Spanish vessels loaded with wealth as they were approaching Lisbon. He regretted that with the riches on board each captured Portuguese ship, the French

\textsuperscript{57} AGS, \textit{Secretaria de Estado}, Legajo 380, doc. 80.

\textsuperscript{58} AGS, \textit{Secretaria de Estado}, Legajo 380, doc. 51, fl. 1.
king had been able to fund his war against Spain for several months. He also asserted that this “black grain that is brought here from Brittany makes Portugal suffer the French dependency even more and this is very harmful for Castile [also].”\(^{59}\) Thus, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal recognized that France was using economic leverage, specifically grain, to strengthen its relationship with Portugal. Ribera y Mendonza was far from misinformed. The Venetian ambassador Michel Suriano, writing his 1562 *relazzione* to the Venetian senate and doge, recognized with astonishment that amidst the intense war between Henry II and Philip II, France and Spain kept multiple commercial channels open. The profits and needs of both monarchies surpassed all formal prohibitions.\(^{60}\)

Seure was also aware of this as a missive he sent to the duke of Etampes, the lieutenant of Brittany, on July 17, 1558, evidences. He noted that Portugal was always in need of French grain, as demonstrated by the February 1558 stopover of 150 French vessels in Lisbon. Additionally, Seure also highlighted that due to a drought in the Iberian Peninsula in 1558, both Portugal and Spain would be in need of French grain, which would weaken both Iberian monarchies’ ability to effectively address their challenges abroad. However, Seure also expressed concern that Breton merchants were not paying taxes owed to King Henry II, which was depriving the Valois court of important funds. Therefore, he urged the duke to take action and he sent him a list of sixty Breton shipowners who were evading tax and also wrote about this issue to the cardinal of Lorraine.\(^{61}\)

In this context, the escalating conflicts between the Portuguese and the French in the Atlantic, along with the ongoing open war in Brazil led by Villegagnon’s expedition, prompted Queen Catherine of Austria to repeat King John III’s decision made in 1552: to unite the Portuguese and Spanish navies in the Azores Sea to combat French privateers.\(^{62}\) An order by King Philip II to D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza, dated June 6, 1558, shows that Spain demanded that Portugal collaborate with D. Álvaro de Bazan’s fleet in the Azores to protect the arrival of Spanish and Portuguese ships as they


\(^{62}\) In 1552, this happened owing to the attack executed by François Le Clerc, better known in France as *Jambe de Bois* and as *Pie de Palo* in Spain, on the smaller island of Madeira of Porto Santo. As Le Clerc was searching for Spanish Indies vessels, he also ended up attacking the Portuguese. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean*, 85.
returned to the Iberian Peninsula. Pierre Chaunu and Huguette have argued that it was Portugal that informed Spain of the plans of French interlopers against the Spanish Carrera de Indias in 1558 and they have even documented how Spain reacted to the French menace using Portuguese intermediaries. According to Chaunu and Huguette, the collaboration between Portugal and Spain in 1558 was first requested by Portugal; Spain accepted because of its great need to use the Portuguese Azores, even though that meant ignoring the many complaints that arrived in Seville concerning Portuguese illicit trade in the Spanish Indies, as has also been mentioned in the first chapter. This collaboration is also evidenced in Seure’s missive to King Henry II, which states that Lisbon had ordered the Portuguese fleet in the Azores to collaborate with the Spanish fleet of D. Álvaro de Bazan.

It becomes apparent that while French-Portuguese maritime rivalry and conflicts increased, Queen Catherine of Austria should have remained vigilant with regard to Seure’s actions, whether on her own initiative or through information provided by the Spanish ambassador D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza. In this context, it is important to consider the incident that led to Seure’s plea for recall, although it is not detailed in his correspondence. The incident in question involved the robbery of the possessions of the new Portuguese ambassador to King Philip II in the Netherlands, D. Francisco Pereira, who was appointed in 1557. Due to the escalation of French-Portuguese incidents at sea, Seure was concerned about a possible more permanent Portuguese maritime rapprochement to Spain. Seure continued to broadcast propaganda to the French side, even after the incident with Queen Catherine of Austria in August 1558. After Emperor Charles V’s death, in September 1558, Seure came to the Portuguese regent to promise her that King Henry II would conquer Brussels. He had received new orders from King Henry II and the cardinal of Lorraine to do so, as D. Juan Hurtado y Mendonza averred in a letter to King Philip II dated September 28, 1558.

D. Francisco Pereira, who had traveled from Portugal to the Netherlands via Spain and France and had a safe-conduct to travel within France, which he had obtained through João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France, was robbed of all his belongings. Reports from the Venetian ambassador in France, dated November 1557, shed light on this event. The

65 Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 61–71.
66 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 34.
first report states that D. Francisco Pereira was robbed of an amount of around 13,000 crowns and initially suspected that the English may have ordered it, as they knew that Portuguese ambassadors usually brought letters from Emperor Charles V to the kings of England. However, this hypothesis was quickly dismissed as the robbery took place on French soil. Another Venetian report also discussed the reasons behind the theft, considering that Pereira had a safe-conduct and his diplomatic immunity was clearly violated by the French. The report concludes that Pereira was robbed in order to determine if he was carrying letters from Emperor Charles V. As he did not have any, the situation became scandalous.67

When news of this event, which was widely commented on in Europe at the time, arrived in Portugal, there were immediate orders for João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France, to petition the French government for the return of all the stolen goods. It was in this process that Queen Catherine of Austria discovered in Lisbon that the robbery had originally been ordered by Seure, as a letter by D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza to Princess Juana, dated August 27, 1558, reveals. In it, it is stated that Queen Catherine ordered a courier to depart to France in the past days “to demand that the king of France recall his ambassador here [Seure] because they have certain intelligence that he was the cause of what happened to D. Francisco Pereira and that they [the French] did this after the many discourtesies and war at sea that Frenchmen did to the Portuguese.” The report also added that “And lastly because in the last day he [Seure] came to complain to the queen [Catherine of Austria] about a dispatch from the Portuguese king and he [Seure] did it with such insolence and defiance that the queen being bored replied to him [Seure] that he should thank her for not placing him in his ship and sending him back to France in that exact moment.” According to this account, Seure was so surprised at the regent’s answer and harsh tone that he became depressed in the following days.68

Therefore, it was after discovering Seure’s espionage activities in Lisbon and how they threatened not only Portuguese interests but also overall Portuguese-Spanish relations, that Queen Catherine of Austria resorted to action and demanded Seure’s recall. The Portuguese regent, after all the incidents in Lisbon with Seure, thus firmly believed Seure to be involved in the theft of documentation sent from Portugal to D. Francisco Pereira.69

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67 Brown and Bentinck, Calendar ... Venice, 1554–1558, docs. 1089 and 1094.
68 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 39, fl. 1.
Seure’s espionage is easily proved in his French correspondence, as well as in the Spanish reports, but it did not help matters that Seure had a bad opinion of the Portuguese. This can further be seen in Seure’s delighted announcement to the Spanish ambassador in England, in 1561, that the Portuguese would suffer heavily at the hands of Villegagnon’s next fleet, which would be departing to destroy Portuguese ships overseas. The ambassador’s evident disdain for the Portuguese stands in sharp contrast to the views of his predecessor Honorais de Caix. Having been appointed to deescalate the French-Portuguese maritime rivalry, Seure ended up worsening tensions, and he even advocated the closure of the French embassy in Lisbon. In a way, what the comparison of Seure’s missives with the Spanish diplomatic network in Portugal documents for this period reveal was that Lisbon was more than simply a global city where goods, people, and ideas circulated, as has already been argued. It was also a global city for espionage, even for issues that were apparently unrelated to Portuguese affairs (like the Franco-Spanish war in Europe). This is the main reason why Seure’s rivalry with D. Juan Hurtado de Mendonza and D. Juan Ribera y Mendonza so closely resembles to what is known for the rival French and Imperial ambassadors (the Noialles brothers and Simon Renard) at Queen Mary I’s court during the 1550s.

Neither of these points mean that Seure’s mission was a failure. On the contrary, he had accomplished King Henry II’s main goal: acquiring intelligence on Iberian nautical and imperial movements. This is why Henry reacted when alerted to protests, quickly sending off the above-mentioned letter to Seure. After returning to France, Seure was appointed ambassador to Elizabethan England, holding the post between 1560–61. He was very well-received, despite the challenging times for Anglo-French relations. Later on, he was named royal counsellor by Queen Mother Catherine de’ Medici (1519–89), and worked at the Valois King’s chamber. Finally, in 1566, Seure became ambassador to Rome. Thus, Seure’s tenure

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70 Mendes Leal and Rebello da Silva, Quadro elementar, vol. XV, 117–18.
73 On this topic see: E. Harris Harbison, Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).
74 Edmond Falgairolle, 1895, 58.
75 Serrão, A Infanta Dona Maria, 61.
76 Estelle Paranque, Elizabeth I of England through Valois Eyes: Power, Representation, and Diplomacy in the Reign of the Queen, 1558–1588 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 28 and 47.
at the Portuguese embassy did not negatively affect his later career. But how did Seure’s activities in Lisbon relate to Jean Nicot’s appointment, especially considering that Seure was nominated by the courtier party that defended war against Spain (the Guises and Montmorency) while Nicot was appointed by the pacifist party led by Dianne de Poitiers (1500–66), the mistress of King Henry II? In the following sections, I will analyze how Seure’s espionage mission had a direct impact both on Nicot’s nomination, and on his approach to Portuguese affairs. In doing so, the analysis will demonstrate how the French-Portuguese maritime interchange only reinforced itself.

3.2 Jean Nicot and the New Valois Approach (1559–61)

3.2.1. Fresh Hope for the Portuguese Embassy?

In order to understand Nicot’s embassy, it is important to describe who he was and outline his previous career before coming to Portugal. Jean Nicot was born c. 1520–25, in Nîmes, an important city in southeastern France. He was the firstborn of a family of eleven children; his father was a public notary. Nicot received a good education: he started his studies at Nîmes college and then proceeded to the Nîmes faculty of arts. He rapidly became close to Guillaume Bigot (1502–50) and Claude Baudel (1491–1561), the two first rectors of this faculty. Later, at his father’s urging, Nicot obtained a doctorate in law. Rather than become a lawyer, he went to the Valois court in late 1553, hoping to capitalize on the respect he had won for his solid humanist training. His rising status is clear in a letter from 1551 by Guillaume Pellicer (1490–1568), bishop of Montpellier, asking Nicot’s advice on the works of Pliny (23/24–79 AD). Publicly known as an aficionado of the classics, Nicot was granted access to the Valois court by Claude Baudel, a figure connected to Jeanne d’Albrecht (1528–72), the queen of Navarre. At court, Nicot worked alongside Sebastien de Roulye under the supervision of Jean Bertrandi, the seal keeper and archbishop of Sens. He was employed as map keeper and later as the ambulant archivist. Soon after, Nicot forged ties with Diane de Poitiers. This relationship facilitated Nicot’s first appointment, by
King Henry II, as keeper of the archives.\textsuperscript{80} Nicot’s reputation as a humanist flourished up to 1559.

In 1556, Guy de Bruès, a good friend of Nicot’s, published his Dialogues and praised Nicot for his knowledge of philosophy.\textsuperscript{81} Nicot’s relationship with the poet Joachim du Bellay (1522–60), one of the founders of the Pléiade group, also dates to this period. Given his office as keeper of the archives, Nicot became interested in history and he worked on a new edition of a history of France that had been printed in 1514 with several mistakes.\textsuperscript{82} Nicot’s humanist identity went hand in hand with his status at King Henry II’s court.\textsuperscript{83} In 1556, the king appointed Nicot as his personal secretary. This position was short-lived, with the king appointing Nicot maître de requêtes de son hôtel shortly after.\textsuperscript{84}

The office of maître was an ancient one and very prestigious in France. It comprised judicial powers, mainly applied to the king’s palace, but also conferred upon its bearer the duty to communicate with the highest judicial and political authorities, and it included dealings in the king’s political councils and in the Paris Parliament. Nicot belonged to the long list of maîtres that were appointed because of wealth, good connections at court, and political protection. He was also another example of a maître promoted before being made ambassador. This was part of the traditional itinerancy and the voyages that the maître was supposed to undertake in the French king’s service.\textsuperscript{85} Furthermore, the maître title conferred a special status and renown upon its holder. In turn, this fact easily impressed foreigners with the prestige of the Valois household,\textsuperscript{86} and assisted in displaying France’s military and political power in Europe.

During the brief period he served as King Henry II’s secretary, Nicot must have had access to copious secret documentation and been responsible for drafting the king’s legal decrees. Nicot’s abilities were apparently noticed by Queen Catherine de Medici, for soon after his appointment as maître, the queen sent Nicot to Florence to negotiate her share of the Medici clan inheritance.\textsuperscript{87} Upon his return, Nicot was seriously considered as a suc-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, XXIV.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Matos, Les Portugais en France, 83.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Edmond, “Jean Nicot,” 179–80.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} On this topic: H. Noel Williams, Henri II: His Court and His Times (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1910).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Matos, Les Portugais en France, 90.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} M. Etchechoury, Les maîtres des requêtes de l’hôtel du roi sous les derniers Valois (1553–1589) (Geneve: École National des Chartes, 1991), 27, 52 and 89.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Jean-François Solnon, La Cour de France (Tempus Perin, 2014), 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Baudry, Jean Nicot, 29.
\end{itemize}
cessor to Seure at the Portuguese embassy. Although he was only formally appointed in April 1559, Nicot’s ambassadorship was the object of careful preparations by King Henry II. This groundwork was directly influenced by the signing of the peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis between France, Spain, and England. This development had consequences for France’s approach to Spain, but it also affected the French strategy regarding Portugal, and, in turn, had repercussions on Nicot’s appointment.

Renewed hope for a lasting peace and alliance between the erstwhile rivals Spain and France meant that a spy-ambassador, like Seure, was unfit for the job. Already in January 1559, Anne de Montmorency had outlined a new policy proposal to govern relations with Portugal. In a letter addressed to Queen Catherine of Austria, the French constable started by saying that he was aware that she disapproved of Seure’s behavior. He notified her of Seure’s recall, and informed her that his successor had already been named. While never revealing the identity of Seure’s replacement, Montmorency presented Nicot as a celebrated personage at court and an advocate of the traditional French-Portuguese alliance. Montmorency also confessed his admiration for Queen Catherine, and said that although he had thought of writing her a long letter, a previous Portuguese ambassador in France (Gaspar Palha) had advised against it. Montmorency’s charm offensive worked; in a letter to a close advisor, the Portuguese queen expressed her joy at the impending arrival of the new ambassador (said to be very different from Seure), as had been confirmed by the Portuguese ambassador in France.

But even more important than Montmorency’s letter to Queen Catherine was the information about Nicot that João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France of whom we will speak in the next chapter, had sent to Portugal via Gaspar Palha, by then a Portuguese courier, probably in March 1559. It is important to quote his statements in full to understand the deep impact that Dantas’s words about Jean Nicot had on the beginning of his embassy. After describing to Queen Catherine of Austria how King Henry II personally and publicly resented the fact that Seure had worsened relations, Dantas wrote:

“Another ambassador that had already been appointed is due to leave [to Portugal] in twelve or fifteenth days and is going to take his [Seure’s] place. He is a maître de requêtes of the valor and caliber of the cardinal of Sens. A meek and sly man more inclined to translate a good story than to mathematics. He is poor and has had no embassy, although he has already been sent by the king to Rome twice. The cardinal [of Sens] sends Your Highness his good testimony and tells him [Nicot] to take account of it when honoring and receiving favors, and that he will be very grateful, for he is the author of his [Nicot] coming. He offered to send him [Nicot] very well informed and instructed on what he must do to confirm and increase the friendship [between Portugal and France].”

Dantas also asked Palha to enquire of Queen Catherine what she would do “regarding this ambassador of France and if she will grant him any favor.” Essentially, Dantas was asking the queen if he could grant favors to Nicot before his departure from France, as in the missive he also asked Lisbon to send to France the formal authorization for Nicot to travel to and enter Portugal. This presentation of Nicot as a peaceful man certainly delighted Queen Catherine. Even though the formal answer of the queen to Dantas has not survived, the queen’s joy and curiosity about the new French ambassador to Portugal is completely confirmed in the French documents about Nicot’s embassy.

On May 6, 1559, King Henry II gave Nicot his instructions. The king ordered him to view Portugal as an allied kingdom and to reaffirm the French-Portuguese alliance. Bilateral commercial relations were to be reinforced, imbued with aspirations for the new era opened by the Franco-Spanish alliance. Nicot should also provide updates on the marriage plans being made between the Valois and the Habsburgs. On that same day, King Henry II addressed letters to Cardinal Henry and Queen Catherine informing them that he had recalled Seure and asking for a good reception of Nicot.

One of Nicot’s main missions was to pave the way for a marriage alliance between France and Portugal, through the marriage of Princess Margaret of Valois (1553–1615), King Henry II’s daughter, and King Sebastian. Thus, King Henry II officially advanced the matrimonial proposal in 1559 in the context of Jean Nicot’s appointment. However, the king’s plans, like previous French attempts, failed. Regardless of the outcome, it is important to stress

92 ANTT, Fragmentos, Box 1, maço 1, doc. 34, fl. 2.
93 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 81–85.
94 On this topic: Diogo Faria, “Negócios matrimoniais.”
that it was one of Henry's ambitions vis-à-vis Portugal, and one that fit well with the diplomatic environment created by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. Nonetheless, as had been the case for his predecessor, Nicot's official mission was supplemented by another crucial task: gathering intelligence on the developments of the Portuguese navy and empire.95

Since he was operating at a time of ostensible peace, Nicot had to proceed more carefully. His humanist persona had already won this rather young man an appointment that was rare in 16th-century French diplomacy. Although some previous maîtres had gone on to become ambassadors,96 in 1559 Nicot was not yet an experienced diplomat, a venerable churchman, or a military leader (as were, for instance, the French ambassadors in Spain during the 1560s).97 His mission in Portugal would also be fraught with the same thorny questions of French-Portuguese maritime rivalry that had been an unrelenting reality during Seure's tenure.98 Shortly after Nicot's arrival in Lisbon, João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France, had issued a warning to Queen Catherine: Cateau-Cambrésis and King Henry II's promises that the French would not sail to Guinea, Mina, and Brazil were a façade. The Portuguese should have armed fleets in all these places to fight the French.99 Nevertheless, Nicot could count on some support in Lisbon because the Portuguese feared the Spanish. This was due to Emperor Charles V and later to King Philip II's attempts at having Prince Charles (1545–68) sworn as heir to the Portuguese Crown because of King Sebastian's minority, youth, and fragile health. Seure, and certainly Nicot, were aware that in such a situation, the Portuguese would rather support a French or Muslim king than a Spanish one, as the Spanish ambassador wrote after King John III's death in 1557.100 It is now time to analyze how Nicot dealt with this political environment and coped with the main goals of his embassy, in order to later understand his approach to the broader French-Portuguese maritime rivalry and his acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge.

3.2.2 Overview of Important Topics during the Embassy

Jean Nicot's embassy was marked by several events, some of which have already been alluded to: the planning of a marriage between King Sebastian

96 Baudry, Jean Nicot, 33.
97 Ribera, Diplomatie et espionage, 44.
100 Buescu, Catarina de Áustria, 331–34.
and Princess Margaret of Valois; changing dynastic relations due to the death of King Henry II and the accessions of Kings Francis II (1559–60) and Charles IX (1560–74); agreements with Princess Mary and the French envoys extraordinary to Lisbon; several business opportunities; bilateral maritime attacks; and the imprisonment of Frenchmen in Portugal. Nicot’s actions in relation to each of these matters will be described, although all these issues are in some fashion interconnected.

The intended marriage between the Valois and the Avis royal houses was of pivotal importance for Nicot’s embassy, and became the *leitmotif* of his major actions. The matrimony never came to pass; in 1572, Princess Margaret married Henry, king of Navarre (1553–1610). But at the time of Nicot’s arrival in Lisbon, the Valois-Avis wedding had long been desired by the French and Portuguese courts. Nicot was mindful of King Philip II’s probable objections. He confirmed this during a short stay in Tordesillas *en route* to Portugal, having been forced to travel via Spain due to threats of English piracy in La Rochelle. In Tordesillas, Nicot met Princess Juana of Austria, King Sebastian’s mother, and realized that a French marriage for King Sebastian would face strong opposition from Spain.\(^{101}\) When Nicot arrived in Lisbon, he was granted a special reception as French ambassador, and received by the earls palatine and all the members of the Portuguese royal family,\(^ {102}\) a repetition, in other words, of Seure’s 1557 formal reception. Nicot attributed the warm welcome to the desire, shared by everyone from the lowest to the highest station in Portugal, to see the French marriage realized.\(^ {103}\)

Nicot was soon beset with worries about rumors that Princess Juana would return to Portugal to assume the regency. Although this threat did not ultimately materialize, in November 1559, Nicot pointed to the potential French marriage as the main cause of Portuguese-Spanish tension. He noted that the Portuguese would never tolerate a Spanish ruler. In December 1559, Nicot was contacted by two unnamed Portuguese courtiers. Both told him that they wanted the French wedding to proceed, as they were admirers of France. This enthusiasm was soon threatened. King Philip II ordered his ambassador to spread the word in Lisbon that Queen Catherine de’ Medici was negotiating a marriage between Princess Margaret and the Spanish Prince Charles.\(^ {104}\) None of the Spanish ambassadorial documents on Simancas refer to Nicot, as there is a lack of documents from late 1558

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101 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, XXXVII–XXXVIII.
103 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 4–5 and 8.
104 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 46 and 48.
Almost until late 1561. Although these talks about a Spanish wedding for Princess Margaret were later aborted, Queen Catherine de’ Medici’s hesitation was felt in Portugal. Between 1560 and 1561, in the aftermath of King Philip II’s maneuvers, Kings Francis II and Charles IX sent four special envoys to Portugal to reassert France’s commitment to the Portuguese wedding. In July 1561, Queen Catherine de’ Medici even sent a portrait of Princess Margaret celebrating her birthday. Although there already were doubts surrounding the notion that Queen Catherine de’ Medici would marry off her daughter to the Portuguese king, Nicot was still able to sell the marriage. He was so successful that several courtiers asked him to write home again, communicating Portugal’s fervent wish that the French wedding would take place. Despite her fondness for her nephew King Philip II, Nicot considered Regent Catherine of Austria a stauncher supporter of the French marriage than Cardinal Henry.

The close connections (and desire to mend relations) between the Portuguese and French courts were important during Nicot’s tenure. Nicot arrived in Portugal after the death of King Henry II. Following the coronation of Francis II, the Portuguese court sent an envoy extraordinary to France, the renowned D. Álvaro de Castro (1500–48). Castro was well-received by the Valois court, as a profusion of letters attests. King Francis II started by writing to Princess Juana to express his admiration. Shortly afterwards, Queen Catherine de’ Medici addressed a formal letter to King Sebastian, confirming the old alliance between France and Portugal. This letter was succeeded by two others meriting closer examination. In the first, Queen Catherine wrote to Regent Catherine of Austria, mentioning the renewal of their alliance and remarking that their mutual condition as female regents and mothers of kings should help them provide each other counsel. In the second, Catherine de’ Medici wrote to Cardinal Henry, communicating the esteem in which she held D. Álvaro de Castro, and swearing to maintain and deepen the ties between France and Portugal. King Francis likewise wrote to Cardinal Henry with promises that he would never forget his father’s and France’s alliance with Portugal.

105 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajos 380 and 381. For some strange reason, the documents seem not to have survived. I have searched for the missing documents in other collections in Simancas and Seville (at AGI) but did not find them. The missing documents are the letters from the Spanish ambassadors D. Juan de Ribera y Mendonza and the first letters by D. Alonso de Tovar. At Legajo 381, Tovar’s first letters date to late 1561.

106 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 65–68.

107 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 86–91.
Princess Mary was another supporter of friendly relations with France. Nicknamed *Always-Bride* by historians because she never married, despite several serious proposals from across Europe,108 Princess Mary was the focus of veneration from Nicot, as she had been from Seure. This was a consequence of a campaign devised by the Portuguese court and by Mary’s mother, Eleanor of Austria, queen of France, to spread this image of Princess Mary in Europe.109 In one of his first letters from Lisbon, penned in September 1559, Nicot commented that she was a great lady and an admirer of France, and was both very beautiful and very rich. He recorded being impressed by the number of pearls that she had worn at his reception. But Nicot went further, contending that relations between France and Portugal would be even better if she held political power.110 It was in this context that Nicot gladly fulfilled all the princess’s requests regarding her inheritance in southern France. In 1561, when he was asked about worrying news, Nicot assured the princess that all her properties would be safe, and wrote to France asking for updates.111 Meanwhile, following Jean de Ébrard’s visit in April 1561, which was to protest formally at French losses in Brazil, Nicot participated in negotiations with Princess Mary to have Ébrard named administrator of her French lands in Roverge. Ébrard was appointed thanks to the princess’s confidence in Nicot and her admiration for King Henry II.112 However, before Ébard’s visit to Portugal in 1561, two other major French embassies extraordinary had occurred. Both are mentioned by Nicot.

In early 1560, fearing the consequences of a possible handover of the Portuguese regency to Princess Juana, King Francis II sent Jean de Ébrard to Portugal to confirm the Portuguese commitment to Princess Margaret’s wedding.113 Ébrard brought with him a portrait of Princess Margaret, authored by the famous French painter François Clouet (1510–72), to be presented at the Portuguese court.114 Queen Catherine de Medici dispatched letters to Nicot asking him to help Ébrard’s mission and to Cardinal Henry informing him of Ébrard’s visit. Cardinal Henry wrote personally to King Francis to reassure him that the French marriage would go ahead. Nicot wrote that Ébrard was well-received in March 1560 by the Portuguese royal family.115

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108 On this topic: Alferes Pinto, *A Infanta Dona Maria*.
109 For further details see: Jordan Gschwend, “The Queen’s Gambit.”
110 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 8–9 and 14.
111 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 32 and 34–35.
113 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 65–68.
115 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LIII and 95–99.
The Venetian ambassador in France who witnessed Ébrard’s departure stated that he went to propose the marriage, but also asserted that the English ambassador had received news that Ébrard went with a secret mission: to negotiate for the acquisition of Portuguese India Run vessels. Though there is no known other reference to this, the intention might have been there, as it is consistent with the maritime espionage undertaken by Nicot, as we shall see. Still, English informants in Spain also noticed this embassy to Portugal, stating that the French king had chosen a gentleman of his household. This gentleman would answer Portuguese complaints about French seizures of Portuguese ships by accusing Protestant English instead as the responsible for such actions. However, the biggest event of 1560 was yet to come: the naval embassy led by François de Guise (1534–63), the brother of the duke of Guise. The commander in chief of the French army was steering his fleet from the Mediterranean to Scotland and was ordered to make a stop in Lisbon. The visit confirmed the French dedication to Princess Margaret’s wedding and to appointments by Princess Mary for her French estates. It is also possible that Guise suggested himself as a suitable husband for the princess.

In a letter to the duke of Guise, Nicot reported that François de Guise was visited by all members of the Portuguese royal family and the most influential noblemen because he was a famous military leader, and that his presence had helped to improve French relations with Portugal. In a letter to King Francis II, Nicot also stated that François de Guise had been received in such a manner because he was a French prince of the blood and such royal visits were uncommon in Portugal. Indeed, court rules were changed to provide for pageantry suitable for Guise’s visit, and Regent Catherine of Austria paid for all of his men’s supplies and food. As for François de Guise’s intentions to wed Princess Mary, the project came to nothing (supposing that he made any serious efforts, profiting from Nicot’s good relations with the princess). François de Guise’s visit was one of the greatest successes of French diplomacy in Portugal in the 16th century.

Yet in July 1561, François de Guise sent his lieutenant, the lord of Carses

116 Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish Bentinck, eds., Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1558–1580 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1890), doc. 150.
118 C. Coutinho, O Grão Prior de França e a sua armada no Tejo em 1560. Subsídio para um pretenso noivado da Infanta D. Maria (offprint by Arquivo Histórico de Portugal, 1936), 6–9.
119 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LX–LXXII and 55.
120 Chichkine, “Mirage d’une alliance,” 49.
(a member of the party accompanying him in 1560) to Lisbon. This visit was ordered by King Charles IX, who still wanted to work towards the Portuguese marriage of his sister Princess Margaret. Although Cares was not as warmly welcomed as his predecessors (because of Queen Catherine de’ Medici’s conversations with King Philip II about Princess Margaret’s marriage to the Spanish Prince Charles), he was personally presented to Princess Mary and was updated on Mediterranean events by the Portuguese ambassador in Rome.¹²¹

This favorable atmosphere was indispensable to Nicot’s acquisition of information on commercial opportunities for France. In one of his first letters from Lisbon, addressed to King Francis, Nicot underscored Portugal’s dependency on French imports of grain and argued that France should use this to her benefit. When King Charles IX assumed the French Crown, Nicot reiterated this advice and sent the new monarch the letters he had written previously. Later on, he tried to negotiate the loading of several Indian pepper shipments to France with Regent Catherine of Austria. Since he did not believe the regent would be able to honor her commitments, Nicot opened talks with merchants in Lisbon to ensure that pepper would arrive in France.¹²² These discussions were possibly related to the bankruptcy that the Casa da Índia faced in 1560,¹²³ and perhaps, to an agreement Queen Catherine of Austria may have made stating that Portugal would provide France with Indian pepper. During King Francis I’s reign, there were unfinished conversations about the establishment of a Portuguese factory in Rouen to supply France with spices.¹²⁴

For his part, Nicot was able to convince a Venetian merchant, owner of a sugar factory in Lisbon, to come to France. This merchant may have been enticed by Nicot’s promises of excellent trading conditions in France; in Portugal, the merchant lacked supplies and authorities had refused to coordinate provision of them. It is unknown whether this merchant is the same as the one who is documented to have settled in La Rochelle shortly after this episode.¹²⁵ However, it is undeniable that Nicot profited from his commercial links with the French community in Lisbon. After all, Nicot also came from a family of merchants, and as such, business language was something familiar to Nicot. On the other hand, it was that same community

¹²¹ Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, XXXIII, 62 and 65; Coutinho, O Grão Prior de França, 14.
¹²² Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 7, 63 and 107.
¹²³ Buescu, Catarina de Austria, 341.
¹²⁴ Pereira Ferreira, Problemas marítimos, 197.
¹²⁵ Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 52 and LXIV.
that caused the daily troubles for Nicot that complicated his relations with the Portuguese. These troubles are particularly salient in Nicot’s letters.

Shortly after his arrival in 1559, Nicot received word that several Frenchmen in Portuguese jails were suffering deplorable treatment. The imprisonments were justified by French navigation to Portuguese overseas territories, but were also due to the violation by French seamen and merchants of previous accords between Kings John III and Francis I. Nicot started by convincing Regent Catherine of Austria to pardon five death sentences. He then requested of France that any documents that could aid in his countrymen’s defense be sent to him. But the crimes of the jailed Frenchmen were hard to look past, as another letter from Nicot clearly lays out. Several of them had habitually departed from France on ships loaded with grain without paying duties to the French Crown. As the matter had already been reported by Seure, King Henry II had ordered Nicot to resolve the issue, but the ambassador was hard-pressed to stand up for these compatriots, who had flouted even French rules. Witnessing the non-stop arrival of French grain-carrying vessels in Lisbon, Nicot even asked Portuguese authorities to halt the French ships’ entry so that he could personally speak with the offending captains. Nicot stressed that such behavior was deleterious to the reputation of France in Portugal, and lamented the greed of French merchants who were more interested in the profits won by selling grain in Lisbon than in provisioning their home country.126 Nicot’s outburst was similar to Seure’s, although it seems that there were important developments in relation to this issue during Nicot’s tenure.

By October 1559, the customs-dodging debacle had worsened further. Nicot estimated that since his arrival (in September 1559) up to 150 French vessels had anchored in Lisbon. Almost all of them lacked documentation and were thus in breach of established laws. Faced with this situation, Nicot feared the danger of a severe grain deficit in France. He advised authorities to start controlling departures from all ports in France, demanding written documents proving payment of duties, and full lists of cargo and passengers. Until such orders had been implemented, he would advise the Portuguese authorities (using permission already granted him by King Henry II) to arrest French ships. To sustain relations with Portugal as the shipping fiasco unfolded, Nicot worked to please the Portuguese regent and Cardinal Henry. He and a contact in England successfully negotiated the return of a Portuguese cargo captured by the same English pirate that had molested

126 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 6, 15 and 18–24.
him in La Rochelle. Sadly, the situation did not readily improve, as Nicot’s letters from November 1559 corroborate. 127

Yet in December 1559, after he was informed of the publication of a royal decree forbidding French seamen and merchants from trading with Portugal if they lacked the needed documentation, Nicot reported that new merchant fleets were being prepared in French ports. These incidents created serious problems with the Portuguese authorities, as Nicot noted regretfully in his letters. A couple of days later, Nicot received a letter from King Francis II insisting that he enforce the new decree and asking him to oppose any Portuguese mistreatment of Frenchmen jailed for other reasons. The king also gave Nicot powers to negotiate a trade treaty with Queen Catherine of Austria concerning the shipping of French grain supplies to Portugal. 128 No agreement seems to have been reached. In September 1560, commenting on how he envisaged the maintenance of the alliance with Portugal, King Charles IX urged Nicot to defend the imprisoned Frenchmen more vigorously, feeling that their treatment was more akin to what captives of an enemy power could expect than subjects of an allied state. Nicot was also asked to coordinate a response with the French ambassador in Spain. Another undated dispatch from King Charles IX to Nicot documents the king’s fury at this state of affairs: the monarch wrote that if matters did not improve, he would not assume responsibility for any further French maritime retaliations against the Portuguese. 129

In December 1560, Nicot reported that the situation had only worsened. He recognized that if France could neither control Frenchmen coming to Portugal with grain, nor prevent their attacks on the Portuguese while at sea, relations between the two monarchies would be doomed. Despite this maritime tension, Nicot told Charles in the same letter that there was no need for him to declare a renewal of the French-Portuguese alliance thanks to Queen Catherine de’ Medici’s and the queen of Navarre’s widespread fame in Portugal. Still, the bilateral maritime attacks persisted, as did French aggressions against Spanish ships (something that Nicot, in July 1561, would also urge Charles IX to put an end to in order to salvage France’s reputation). 130

The escalation of maritime hostilities between the Portuguese and the French eventually caused a major breakdown, exemplified by the case of Captain Lyard (discussed below). For his part, Nicot turned a blind eye to

128 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 42, 47, 54 and 91–93.
129 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 100–2.
130 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 64 and 118–20.
a good deal of Portuguese abuse against the Frenchmen, cognizant that commercial relations between Portugal, Britany, and Normandy were at stake.131 As France could not risk endangering the profits to be derived from these partners, Nicot knew he could not directly antagonize the Portuguese without facing serious repercussions. Nevertheless, he defended French interests, and sometimes took a more forceful stand, as his action concerning the rivalry overseas confirms.

3.2.3 Encompassing the Globe: Nicot and French-Portuguese Overseas Rivalry

Seure’s and Nicot’s embassies in Lisbon coincided with Villegagnon’s *France Antarctique*, a project that had earlier origins. As Marco Oliveira Borges has argued, although French efforts up to 1547 to compete in Portuguese overseas areas, ended up a failure, it would be a mistake to interpret French overseas expansion as no more than a misstructured project.132 Under King Francis I, the French did much more than bait ships on the Portuguese India Run. They started to make trips to Brazil as early as 1502, and extended their sphere of influence to Portuguese Mina and Guinea. During the 1520s, some French expeditions were sent to the Indian Ocean as well. Initially, these voyagers relied on Portuguese pilots and knowledge, but by the time of one of the Parmentier brothers’ expeditions, the French enterprise no long required this external resource.133 Failure to meaningfully maintain expeditions to Asia was followed by investment in Brazil and Guinea. In the 1530s, Portugal’s fear of French competition in the Atlantic was so severe that Guinea and Brazil were considered more or less lost. King John III was overcome by worry by news that the French intended to dispatch a member of the royal family to colonize Brazil,134 and that the French were fortifying Santa Helena Island.135 He rightly understood that France’s fight for the South Atlantic was groundwork for their entry into the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese king was therefore relieved to learn that King Francis I had turned his attention to Canada. However, Portuguese concerns were resurrected when King Henry II authorized the departure of Villegagnon to Brazil in 1555. Maritime conflicts between the Portuguese and the French intensified during Seure’s

131 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LXXIV–LXXV.
133 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897: 333–34.
embassy in Lisbon, leading him to make a stunning endorsement of open-war maritime policy against Portugal. Jean Nicot had a different approach. Still, his letters unequivocally display that French ambitions and interests were not confined to Brazil and Guinea, but encompassed the whole globe.

Shortly after reaching Lisbon, in his second letter to King Francis II, Nicot warned that the Portuguese were already preparing a new fleet, despite his warm reception and Queen Catherine of Austria’s speech on the French-Portuguese alliance. Although he could not be sure of the fleet’s destination, Nicot warned France, perturbed by the possibility that the ships sailed in pursuit of Villegagnon. Some days later, he reported the departure of another fleet, heading for Brazil with six ships and 200 soldiers. In December 1559, Nicot counseled the cardinal of Lorraine to push for a re-evaluation of the ban on French navigation to Guinea and Brazil. He had discovered that Portuguese trade in Guinea was declining (as Seure had also reported to King Henry II), and believed the Portuguese would focus their financial outlay on Asia. He advised a French investment in Guinea that used moderation, secrecy, and well-armed vessels to both avoid a major Portuguese reaction and force Portugal to pay more for French grain. The notion that the Portuguese prioritized their position in Asia (and would be willing to cede control over Brazil and Guinea) was a very common reading in France well before Nicot’s embassy. Nicot was to witness the error in this idea and even personally pay a price for defending it.

In another letter, from late 1559, Nicot denounced a law officer called Almeida who frequently imposed the death penalty and disproportionately harsh treatment on the Frenchmen imprisoned in Portuguese overseas areas. In the same missive, Nicot supported a recent petition by the parliament of Normandy asking King Francis II to lift the prohibition on French navigation to these areas. Infuriated by Almeida’s actions, he went so far as to claim that France had exhausted its policy of friendly gestures and affirmations of alliance with Portugal, even asserting that such indulgence had encouraged the Portuguese to behave arrogantly with Frenchmen. If Portugal was to respect France, it needed to suffer a good bastonade (i.e., a severe maritime blow).

This specific letter by Nicot is reminiscent of the famous writing of Pierre Crignon de Dieppe (?–1540), the French cosmographer and traveler to Asia during the 1520s, who wrote in 1539 concerning the traditional

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137 Pereira Ferreira, Problemas marítimos, 147.
138 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 43–45.
Portuguese maritime attitude towards Frenchmen that: “Even though they [the Portuguese] are the smallest people in the world, it does not seem big enough to satisfy their greed. I think they must have drunk of the dust of King Alexander’s heart to be stirred by such inordinate ambition. They believe they hold in their clenched fist what they could not embrace with both hands. And I believe that they are convinced that God made the sea and the land for them alone and that the other nations are not worthy of sailing. Certainly, if it were in their power to close the seas from Cape Finisterre to Ireland, they would have done so long ago.”

The Portuguese nautical pride criticized by Crignon was also contested by Nicot. Nicot’s desire for a violent French response to Portuguese aggression and ambitions had several consequences at sea. At the time, the Portuguese also accused the French of cruelty. The French Huguenot traveler Jean de Léry (1534–1611) protested against his countrymen for the treatment given to the Portuguese. Léry reminded his audience that the Portuguese were allies of France and regarded it as an indignity that French captains, each time they encountered Portuguese ships at sea, deprived them of all the food and victuals to sail, instead of sinking them. He confronted the French captains, stating that when attacking the Portuguese in such a way they were mistreating friends and behaving in a non-Christian way, but the reply was that this was common behavior during sea warfare. French claims against the Portuguese at sea, as Nicot’s letters easily show, included very similar instances.

Nicot was innovating when he recommended a French bastonade to Portugal. This was the only time during Nicot’s embassy where his attitudes and recommendations mirrored Seure’s; he did not take this stance long, as he was perfectly aware of the costs to France associated with naval assaults. Evolving in his strategy, Nicot developed a new approach: rather than propose full-blown war with the Portuguese, he concentrated on obtaining and transmitting all the intelligence he could about the Portuguese Empire. Meanwhile, he took every opportunity to openly defend and advocate for French interests. The change in Nicot’s attitude is quickly noticeable in his missives.

Yet around the same time as the letter described above, Nicot sent France news that Viceroy D. Constantino de Braganza (1558–61) had conquered Daman in India. This meant the occupation of almost 300 villages and a

139 Julien, Les voyages de découverte, 3, note 1.
140 Julien, Les voyages de découverte, 67–68.
huge income. He had been alerted to the situation by a Jewish courier sent from India by land (and was enthralled by the description of his journey). Near the end of 1560, Nicot wrote to King Charles IX with intelligence he received from the Portuguese ambassador in Rome. The Ottomans had just opened a channel between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, permitting them to intensify attacks against Portuguese Asia. Nicot rejoiced at these tidings. In the same letter, he commented that Queen Catherine of Austria had withdrawn her decision to leave a fortress in Morocco (Mazagan), in part due to the impact it would have on the reputation of the king of Portugal. This state of affairs was relevant to Nicot’s report to King Charles, sent in August 1561, that the Portuguese were preparing to launch an expedition to Mutapa, on the east coast of Africa. Nicot was unsure on the exact location of this famous empire, but believed it to be between the Congo and Nile rivers. He was, however, fully convinced that the Portuguese wanted to explore gold mines in the region (and cut off movement of that precious metal to West Africa, something that could harm the French trade in Guinea). In the letter, Nicot implied that France ought to do something, although he conceded that navigation to East Africa was difficult. Because Coligny, the French admiral, was interested in such matters, Nicot also sent him this intelligence. The Portuguese expedition to Mutapa did not depart until 1569, but Nicot was absolutely right in pointing out its potential impact.

Nicot also kept the Valois court briefed on other developments related to Portuguese overseas movements. In April 1561, Nicot counseled Queen Catherine de’ Medici on the exploration of certain unspecified southern countries, because they would bring much wealth to France. Along with the letter, the queen mother of France was to find a packet of information on that area. The next month, Nicot informed King Charles IX on the Moroccan sultan’s siege of Mazagan, and explained that French requests for Portuguese maritime assistance in the Mediterranean were not likely to receive a positive response. His prognosis was based on a report from a Frenchman, lately returned to Lisbon, who had witnessed the size and might of the Moroccan army. The same month, summarizing intelligence brought by India Run ships, Nicot reported that Viceroy D. Constantino had staged a revolt in Asia, and intended to declare independence from Portugal. In this letter, Nicot noted that Portuguese authorities had approached him about the capture of a Portuguese ship by the Scottish. Despite the alliance between France and Scotland, Nicot maintained that this had nothing to do

143 On this topic: Vila-Santa, Do Algarve, a Marrocos, 130–74.
with him. But he ended up writing to Queen Mary Stuart (1542–87) about this maritime case. In fact, the Portuguese were justified in approaching him, since France used to hide captured Portuguese ships in Scotland.\textsuperscript{144} Although the news on the Asian revolt turned out to be false, it is illustrative of the surprising degree to which Nicot could obtain secret information through contacts at the Portuguese court.

Nicot was not the only one sending intelligence to France. The Portuguese-born António Almeida, \textit{en route} to France at Princess Mary’s request, offered his services to the cardinal of Lorraine. His rhetorical strategy to elevate himself as an informant is documented in his 1560 letter. Pleading his love for France and the fact that many years would pass before the young King Sebastian could assume the government of Portugal, he promised the French cardinal information about Portugal and its empire. He also stated that Nicot had been very well-received and was much appreciated in Portugal. Finally, he advised Lorraine to take good care of João Pereira Dantas, but to never forget that the Portuguese ambassador in Paris was a deadly enemy of France’s maritime ambitions. He even offered his personal advice on how to deal with Dantas if the graces he sought were granted. Since Almeida wrote that he had Nicot’s letters to France,\textsuperscript{145} it is quite likely that he was one of the ambassador’s couriers or agents. After all, in this task of acquiring intelligence about the Portuguese Empire, Nicot could follow the example of his predecessor Seure and try, albeit with greater discretion, to create his own networks of informants in Portugal. This explains why Nicot reported all the abovementioned details to France. The ongoing maritime rivalry discussed so far both compelled and conditioned the next topic: Nicot’s acquisition of Portuguese nautical knowledge.

3.2.4 Diplomacy and Humanism: Nicot and the Acquisition of Portuguese Maritime Knowledge

Nicot’s access to Portuguese maritime knowledge is explained by France’s maritime projects and linked with the ambassador’s personal interests. Using his status as a renowned French humanist,\textsuperscript{146} Nicot was able to access a particular milieu in Portugal. Although humanism in Portugal was not in its heyday by the 1560s, this did not prevent Nicot from enjoying an enthusiastic reception from important Portuguese intellectuals. In this section, Nicot’s

\textsuperscript{146} Matos, \textit{Les Portugais en France}, 95–96.
contacts in learned Portuguese circles and the requests he received from the Valois court will be discussed, while sketching the methods Nicot employed to acquire Portuguese knowledge for each specific case.

In one of his first letters to France, Nicot promised he would send jelly from India as soon as he could. With work on the Louvre ongoing, Nicot also sent several samples of marble, as his predecessor Seure had done. By April 1560, Nicot sent the first full package of natural products to Queen Catherine de’ Medici: oranges from Algarve, fig and lemon seeds, as well as the leaves of the tobacco plant, which he said possessed miraculous medicinal properties. King Charles IX was so delighted with the oranges that he ordered Nicot to dispatch more, along with their seeds, so that the king could begin cultivating them in the Loire valley. In 1561, a letter from Nicot expresses regret that lack of funds prevented him from fulfilling a request to send strawberries. He was nonetheless able to send over some indigo. In this same letter, he notes that these products came to Portugal not by India Run ships, but via land routes. Nicot had been obliged to bribe several people to purchase his samples, since the business was in the hands of Spanish merchants. 147 Nicot’s active gathering of natural or scientific materials in Portugal was not always at the request of the Valois court, as the case of the tobacco shows. This suggests that he was directed to collect them prior to his coming to Portugal, a topic that will now be addressed.

The first hypothesis on previous French requests to Nicot relates to André Thevet (1516–90). The famous Franciscan traveler published his Cosmography of the Levant in 1554, spent four months in Brazil and returned to France in 1556. Thevet also published his famous Singularities of France Antarctique, in 1556, 148 with the support of the court’s keeper of the seals (with whom Nicot had previously collaborated). Members of the Pléiade group (with whom Nicot would later become close) also supported Thevet, as did Pierre de Ronsard (1524–85). 149 Thevet was appointed French royal cosmographer in 1559, the same year that Nicot departed for Portugal. As royal cosmographer, Thevet may have asked Nicot to acquire nautical rutters and treatises and cartographical knowledge in Lisbon. At least from 1563, Thevet had in his possession a copy of the Portuguese seamanship

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147 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 12, 35, 50, 103, 121, 128 and 147–48.
book by Manuel Álvares.\textsuperscript{150} It is possible that Nicot was the one who brought the book to Thevet either at his request, or because he knew Thevet’s interests. Thevet declared himself in his \textit{Universal Cosmography} (1575) that he had been to Lisbon, and that he gathered intelligence regarding Goa there in conversation with Portuguese pilots. Unfortunately, he does not specify dates.\textsuperscript{151} It is possible that Nicot was the agent who brought Thevet the seamanship book of Manuel Álvares, as Nicot himself had the Portuguese seamanship book by André Pires in his library.\textsuperscript{152} Since both books circulated in manuscript form and were the most up-to-date Portuguese nautical compilations of the time, Nicot is likely to have acquired both in Portugal. Whether resorting to bribery or simply exploiting his daily contacts with French and Portuguese seamen and merchants in Lisbon, the fact that Nicot acquired seamanship books for his personal collection suggests a sincere fascination with the subject. At the same time, given that it was in the form of technical knowledge that Portugal was desperate to keep from its rivals, Nicot could be certain that this would captivate the Valois court and win him enhanced status upon his return.

Nicot’s pursuit of sensitive knowledge was, moreover, directly related to a special request from the cardinal of Lorraine and Admiral Gaspard de Coligny. Before Nicot’s departure from France, they had tasked him with hiring two good Portuguese pilots to guide a French expedition to India and the Moluccas. Cognizant of Queen Catherine of Austria’s vigilance, Nicot argued that he would attempt to fulfil the assignment, but noted that the matter demanded special discretion. Nicot did succeed in sending over two pilots (although it is unknown whether they were actually experts on the route to India and the Moluccas).\textsuperscript{153} The request itself illustrates a larger issue: that King Henry II and Coligny were bent on developing policies to create a French overseas empire in the area assigned to Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas. This raises the question on earlier French borrowing of Portuguese navigational expertise.

The first French voyage to Brazil in 1502 captained by Binot Palmier de Gonneville was only possible because the French captain hired Portuguese pilots in Lisbon. According to the report of his sojourn in Lisbon, Gonneville and his companions “took on two Portuguese who had returned, one named

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} O \textit{livro de marinharia de Manuel Álvares}, ed. Luís de Albuquerque and Armando Cortesão (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1969), 6–9.
  \item \textsuperscript{151} André Thevet, \textit{Cosmographie universelle}, vol. I (Paris: chez Pierre L’Huilier, 1575), f1s. 385v. and 387.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Matos, \textit{Les Portugais en France}, 99.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897: 35–36.
\end{itemize}
Bastiam Moura and the other Diègue Cohinto, to help them with their knowledge on the road to India." The French were keen on sailing to the Moluccas as early as the 1520s. Giovanni Verazzano (1485–1528) is said to have planned to sail to the Moluccas via the Magellan Strait, although the trip was eventually canceled. King John III’s agents in France stepped in and attempted to convince Giovanni Verrazano to come to Portugal in 1525. The incomplete references seem to indicate that the Portuguese king was successful for a short time, as Giovanni later returned to France. Also in 1531, Gaspar Palha, a Portuguese agent in France, was forced to negotiate with Leone Pancaldo, one of Magellan’s pilots, because the Venetian Giovanni Francesco intended to use Pancaldo to guide him to the Moluccas. In 1533, even after the failure of the Parmentier brother’s expedition to Asia, the French shipowner and corsair Jean Ango (1480–1551) prepared another French expedition to Madagascar and Sumatra Islands. In 1535, Palha reported that King Francis I considered Pancaldo to be the best pilot to sail to the Moluccas. As a consequence, Palha was forced to deal with Pancaldo again, although the outcome is not clear.

In 1538, King Francis I officially hired João Pacheco as his cosmographer, the Portuguese mariner (mentioned in chapter 1) who proposed an expedition in the Pacific to King Charles I of Spain. Portuguese authorities were alarmed by this increasing drainage of pilots, cartographers, and cosmographical experts to Spain, and then to England and France. In the late 15th century, they attempted to stem the outward flow of expertise by issuing strict rules (under penalty of death) for any pilot who betrayed Portugal by handing over sensitive information to its rivals, as has been underscored in the first chapter. As regards Northern Europe, Portuguese pilots started by serving in England, as has been documented in the previous chapter, but France was always interested in hiring such technical personnel to launch overseas expeditions. These tactics explain King John III’s decisive battle with the French shipowner and corsair Jean Ango,
who sometimes had support from King Francis I and the French admirals. When the Portuguese agents in France were not able to delay the departure of fleets, they resorted to bribery. For instance, the French Admiral Phillipe de Chabot (1492–1543) received payments from the Portuguese in the 1530s to abort or delay French overseas voyages. Nevertheless, and once more, neither of this prevented the circulation of Portuguese nautical experts to Europe, and in this particular to Valois France.

The most critical and best-known case was that of the Portuguese pilot João Afonso, a naturalized Frenchman under the name of Jean Alphonse de Saintonge (1484?–1544/49?). He had experience in Portuguese navigation to West Africa, Brazil, and South America, and fled to France at an uncertain date. By 1531, Afonso’s presence was noticed by the Portuguese agent Gaspar Palha at La Rochelle. In 1532, another Portuguese agent in France, the lawyer Gaspar Vaz, attempted to convince Afonso to return to Portugal. King John III even issued a letter of pardon for him in 1533. A similar attempt in 1532 to repatriate Afonso, this time by Diogo Gouveia (1471–1557), the renowned Portuguese rector at Paris University, also failed. Afonso never returned to Portugal, as has been underscored in the first chapter for Portuguese pilots in Spain such as Simão de Alcâçova or Estevão Gomes, or António Eanes Pinteado concerning England in the previous chapter. In the meantime, Afonso participated in French voyages to West Africa and became a French subject. In the following years, Afonso became known as the Portuguese who piloted several French interlopers’ attacks against Portuguese and Spanish navigation in the Atlantic. Owing to this, some of his sons also served in the French navy. Afonso was officially named as pilot of Jean-François de Roberval’s expedition to Canada in 1542. He is believed to have died in 1547 at the hands of Spanish captain Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (1519–74). He wrote two important works that were posthumously published in France. Afonso was celebrated by the Pléiade as one of France’s contemporary great sailors, comparable to those of antiquity.

Owing to his extensive experience in Portuguese navigation, it can be assumed that Afonso was one of the most significant contributors to the

161 Voyages au Canada..., 64.
French cartographical school of Dieppe. Although the history of this school is difficult to trace, older and more recent authors agree that most of the surviving cartographical depictions from the school were made based on Portuguese nautical knowledge provided by Portuguese pilots, cartographers, and cosmographers who served the Valois.\textsuperscript{164} The Portuguese influence is noticeable in atlases composed at Dieppe in 1538 and 1547.\textsuperscript{165} Similarities and influences between the works of the French cartographers Pierre Desceliers and Nicolay Desliens and those of the Portuguese cartographers Pedro Reinel, Lopo Homem, and Gaspar Viegas, respectively, have been identified.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, in view of the school’s creation in the late 1520s and of Afonso’s own career in France and his cosmographical works, it is likely that he was one of its most important members, if not a founder.

In the 1540s, when King Francis I concentrated his maritime endeavors in Canada,\textsuperscript{167} French desires for maritime voyages to Brazil, Guinea, and Asia were by no means extinguished. Quite to the contrary, they only fed the commercial ambitions of Norman and Breton ports in France, amply proving that there was in those days a full problem in France of emulating the Portuguese model for overseas expansion with regard to Brazil, as has been argued by Frank Lestringant.\textsuperscript{168} Thus it has been recently stated, ironically but accurately, that “For this sovereign [King Francis I], buying a foreign pilot, especially a Portuguese one, was like buying the key to a safe.”\textsuperscript{169} Precisely because of this, and probably in 1538–39, King John III even sent a fake Portuguese pilot to try to deceive King Francis I personally in his chamber. The Portuguese João Fernandes, nicknamed Lagarto, who presented fake nautical rutters and charts and heard the Valois overseas plans from Francis’s mouth. Lagarto was able to trick the Valois king,


\textsuperscript{165} Kildushevskaya and Pinheiro Marques, Atlas Universal, 105.


\textsuperscript{169} Montaigne, La découverte du Brésil, 18.
presenting himself as another Portuguese who wished to serve France.\textsuperscript{170} Later, during the 1540s, the Portuguese king even sent a young and beautiful Portuguese nobleman to get close to King Francis I’s mistress, the duchess of Etampes. The man œuvre succeeded so well that the young nobleman was able to relay all French maritime plans to King John III and even get the king’s mistress to influence the king.\textsuperscript{171} With French ambitions always perilously rising, the Portuguese Courts (which had assembled in 1562–63 to hand over power to Cardinal Henry) passed a motion demanding better treatment of Portuguese pilots. The motion hoped to remedy the flight of experts to serve abroad, who evidently were not prized enough in Portugal.\textsuperscript{172} What was at stake was avoiding new instances like that of the Portuguese pilot João Afonso, whose case was far from being singular, and was widely known and commented on in Europe.

At the beginning of his reign, King Henry II maintained the prohibition on French navigation to Portuguese overseas territories, despite Portuguese attacks on French ships in the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{173} However, the 1551 royal entry of King Henry II and Queen Catherine de’ Medici in Rouen, prepared for months by Norman authorities, merchants, and shipowners to convince the king to formally adopt a full policy of overseas expansion, made such a personal impact that King Henry II changed his policy.\textsuperscript{174} He ultimately decided to change his maritime policy towards Portugal in 1552, despite warnings from Portuguese agents.\textsuperscript{175} The shift took place as part of Henry’s war against Emperor Charles V. It is within this scope that the king’s reaction when asked by Admiral Coligny to support Villegagnon’s plan for \textit{France Antarctique} should be perceived: formal support. The question on who personally convinced King Henry to support the establishment of a French colony in the Americas, known as \textit{France Antarctique}, remains a matter of debate. Some historians credit Admiral Coligny, while others point to the expedition leader, Villegagnon.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{171} Julien, \textit{Les voyages de découverte}, 138–39 and 140.
\textsuperscript{172} Matos, \textit{Les Portugais en France}, 6.
Still, King Henry II declared the French Crown's support for Villegagnon's departure in 1555. Similarly, attention has been drawn to Henry II's patronage of Guillaume Testu's previous voyages to Brazil to map the area in the early 1550s and probably prepare an expedition like the one Villegagnon was entrusted with. It is also worth noting that the support for the *France Antarctique* project was not limited to Admiral Coligny and Villegagnon. The French Constable Anne de Montmorency, in the midst of his war plans against Emperor Charles V, supported the idea of disturbing Spanish and Portuguese hegemony in the Atlantic.\(^{177}\) Similarly, the cardinal of Lorraine, a rising figure at the Valois court, and the son of the duke of Guise, the king's great military leader, also championed a policy of contesting Spanish attempted hegemony in Europe. Thus, despite the lack of concrete evidence, it can be assumed that King Henry II agreed to give Villegagnon the title of viceroy, besides the documented funding, ships, and men.\(^{178}\)

Rather than vacillating on his maritime policy vis-à-vis Portugal in the manner of Francis I, Henry II opted to back the most serious challenge the French would mount to Portuguese maritime hegemony throughout the 16th century. His action cannot be disconnected from his policies to build up a French navy fit to match the power and maritime ambitions of Spain,\(^{179}\) and especially for the results achieved by the king's policy in the early 1550s,\(^{180}\) which had prompted Spanish and English fears, as has been seen in the last chapter. Furthermore, King Henry II's decision took place at the same time that he supported the full-blown war of the "French Sea-Dogs" against Spain in the Caribbean, pursued by the famous François Le Clerc, known by the Spanish as the *Pié de Pallo* or as *Wooden Leg* in English. However, Le Clerc was not the only notable figure in French naval efforts. Another individual, Jacques de Soria, emerged as a formidable presence on the seas, striking fear into the hearts of both the Spanish and the Portuguese. He

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led a surprise attack and destruction of Cuba in 1555, and later, in 1570, orchestrated a bloody attack against the Portuguese fleet carrying Jesuits and a new governor to Brazil. King Henry II personally knighted Le Clerc for his maritime services to France, and it can be inferred that Soria also received recognition for his maritime achievements. The king's personal choice had dire consequences, to the point that a Spanish maritime commander wrote to Emperor Charles V that the French were so strong at sea that no bird could fly without being noticed by them.181 These statements sent to the emperor are reminiscent of the warning of the Portuguese humanist Diogo de Gouveia to King John III in 1529: the French were very strong at sea and had no place to expand, so that the Portuguese king should not have any illusions that he would ever be able to control French movements to the Portuguese Mare Clausum.182

These choices throw new light on King Henry II's orders to Seure and Nicot to send him intelligence on the Portuguese navy, which he clearly conceived as a model worth emulation. But a navy to be admired is a navy to be feared: Henry prepared his Brazilian plan under utmost secrecy, so that Portugal and Spain would not interfere before Villegagnon's departure. King Henry II's attempted secrecy in 1555, which mirrored similar Portuguese and Spanish attempts,183 failed in 1556 when Villegagnon asked for reinforcements. His claim for 3,000 or 4,000 men to assist France Antarctique, was reported by Simon Renard, Emperor Charles's ambassador in France, to Queen Catherine of Austria.184 Renard also warned Charles of the dangers of allowing France to create a base in Brazil that would be used to raid the Spanish.185 As a result of Renard's warning, the Portuguese launched a strong reaction in 1557, including the appointment of a new ambassador to France (João Pereira Dantas) and a new governor to Brazil (Mem de Sá). While ambassador Dantas, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, likely received orders to contest France Antarctique, Mem de Sá was given reinforcements and ordered to plan a military reaction to Villegagnon's expedition.

The episode of France Antarctique culminated in a French defeat during Nicot's embassy (in 1560), as shall be discussed below. Still, King Henry II's and Coligny's aims influenced Nicot's actions in Lisbon. If Nicot, like the

181 Boucher, France and the American Tropics, 42 and 45.
182 Ana Maria Pereira Ferreira, “Mare Clausum, Mare Liberum: Dimensão Doutrinal de um Foco de Tensões Políticas” (BA thesis, Nova University of Lisbon, 1983), 46.
184 Provençal and Mariz, Villegagnon e a França Antártica, 103.
king and Coligny, was not favorable to Villegagnon’s whim of proclaiming himself king of America,\textsuperscript{186} this was because, while in Lisbon, he quickly grasped that ownership of Fort Coligny was not worthy of such a title. Sensing that \textit{France Antarctique} would fail, Nicot redoubled his efforts to deliver intelligence to France that could assist in the preparation of new expeditions. In 1561, after the defeat in Brazil, Coligny seriously considered organizing an expedition to the Moluccas and Mutapa (hence his abovementioned request for pilots to Nicot). Nicot’s considerations on the Moluccas and Mutapa most likely influenced Coligny’s decision. The destination of Coligny’s intended expedition (plans for which were taking shape amidst the first French civil war, an anti-Spanish policy, and disagreements with Queen Catherine de’ Medici) was subsequently changed to Florida. It was there that Coligny next attempted the construction of a French base.\textsuperscript{187} Until his death in 1572, Coligny continued to resort to very similar intelligence methods as those Nicot used, to plan more French expeditions against Portuguese and Spanish overseas areas. But, contrary to his ancestors in office, Admiral Coligny was not bought by Portuguese money. Portuguese bribery at the Valois court did not work on Coligny,\textsuperscript{188} as shall be shown in the next chapter. Regardless of the precise location from which to launch an empire, the consequences of Coligny’s and the Valois’s maritime ambitions are easily traceable throughout Nicot’s embassy.

Nicot’s acquisition of a 1520s text giving a secret technical opinion on the Moluccas,\textsuperscript{189} written by Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem, is related to these imperial aims. In a letter to France, Nicot used Lopo Homem’s opinion, originally addressed to the Portuguese king, to detail all the historical and scientific roots of Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in the Moluccas. He informed France that the Portuguese Casa da Índia had orders to falsify distance in nautical charts, allowing the Portuguese to furnish cartographical proof that the Moluccas fell on their side of the antemeridian of Tordesillas.\textsuperscript{190} It is very likely that Nicot was personally acquainted with Lopo Homem; it is almost inconceivable, however, that Lopo Homem would have offered such sensitive and secret information to a French ambassador. By this time, Lopo Homem was an experienced cosmographer of a venerable age.

\textsuperscript{186} Whitehead, \textit{Gaspard de Coligny}, 178.
\textsuperscript{188} Julien, \textit{Les voyages de découverte}, 265–66 and 436.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Portugaliae...}, vol. I, 1956, 51.
\textsuperscript{190} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 109–13.
nautical and cartographical knowledge, especially because some of his sons were examples of Portuguese experts working abroad. He also knew that the Portuguese Crown exacted severe punishment on the perpetrators of such actions. Thus, it is more plausible that Nicot secured Homem’s text via bribery. Nicot may also have obtained cartographical knowledge using bribery and the contacts that he had established in Portugal during his embassy. If he did, however, no direct mention is known.

The case of the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes was directly connected with that of Lopo Homem. Nicot was responsible for bringing one of Nunes’s major works to France: the *Treatise in Defense of the Sea Charter* (1537). Nicot’s covering letter is extent, in which he advised that it should be translated into French under the supervision of the mathematician Pierre Danés (1497–1577). Nicot’s dispatch reflects a pre-existing interest in Nunes’s works in France. The French humanist Élie Vinet (1509–87), who met Nunes in Portugal during the 1540s, had already brought a short chapter of this book to France. Nunes himself had contacts with the mathematician Jacques Peletier du Main (1517–82). The mathematician Oronce Finé (1494–1555), target of one of Nunes’s works, and Jean Fernel (1497–1558), King Henry II’s personal doctor, were also curious about Nunes’s major texts. The professed interest of such scholars may have prompted figures like the cardinal of Lorraine, Élie Vinet, or Jacques Peletier, to ask Nicot to send Nunes’s works to France. Members of the cartographical school of Dieppe may have joined the chorus of requests to Nicot. The letter Nicot sent with the book, addressed to the cardinal of Lorraine, notes that Nunes was the royal chief of Portuguese nautical charts and a great mathematician. Because of Nunes’s status, when transmitting his book Nicot took precautions analogous to those used when he sent the Portuguese pilots to France.

In sending Nunes’s book to France, Nicot was again cognizant of heightened Portuguese vigilance with regard to technical espionage. However, while Nicot probably did meet Nunes at court, there was no need for him to rely on personal connections to gain access to the book, which was on sale in the markets of Lisbon. Although there is no formal evidence that Nicot learned Portuguese, Nicot’s suggestion that the book should be

translated suggests he had previously had a look at Nunes’s text. If the main audience for Nunes’s works consisted of cosmographers, teachers of mathematics, cartographers, and nautical instrument makers, Nicot also saw its utility outside the French court and academia. Potential readership among French seamen explains his desire for a French edition of Nunes’s book. Unfortunately, publication was halted by the death of the book’s printer, even though the translation of the book itself was ready for release. One copy is still preserved today at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

Nicot’s familiarity with the work of Pedro Nunes may imply his ongoing contact with the Portuguese humanists Fernando Oliveira (1507–85), João de Barros (1496–1570), Damião de Góis (1502–74) and others. Although these relationships are not evidenced in Nicot’s surviving letters, circumstantial clues, such as those suggested by Luís de Matos concerning Nicot’s library, are convincing enough to accept the presumption that such interpersonal connections existed. It is relevant to consider the humanist circles in which Nicot might have moved while in Portugal, bearing in mind that all these interactions took place in the global city that Lisbon was at the time, and that Nicot lived there. Lisbon’s intellectual milieu was not that big during the 1550s and 1560s and its members tended to know each other. Each new coming foreigner with a humanist reputation was immediately noticed, and this was precisely what Nicot was.

Given Nicot’s personal interest in navigational issues, it is possible that he sought out Fernando Oliveira for discussion on such topics. By the time of Nicot’s stay in Lisbon, Oliveira had already worked for the French. In 1541, in his attempt to travel to Italy, Oliveira was caught by the French in the Mediterranean. Brought to Marseille, he served as pilot for the French before returning to Portugal in 1543. In that year, when the French baron of Saint Blanchard stopped in Lisbon, Oliveira took the chance to sail with him once more. Oliveira’s choice was made even though Saint Blanchard had in the 1530s mounted one of the French’ most serious attempts to create a colonial base in Brazil against Portuguese interests, and the fact that he held high rank: he was King Francis I’s admiral of the Mediterranean

196 BNF, Français 1338, fl. 22v.
fleet. As has been shown in the previous chapter, Oliveira found himself in the English Channel during the war between Francis I and Henry VIII and was jailed by the English. Indeed, Richard Barker even suggested that, while at the Tudor court, Oliveira might have been employed by Odet de Selve (c. 1504–63), the French ambassador in England between 1546 and 1549, to negotiate the release of the Frenchmen imprisoned by the English or to collect Greek manuscripts in England at Francis I’s order. After his return to Lisbon in 1555, he published his *Art of Sea Warfare*, a work that Nicot probably became familiar with while stationed in Lisbon. Thus, Nicot’s contact with Oliveira would have been facilitated by his almost daily interactions with seamen, and Oliveira’s previous career abroad. During Nicot’s embassy, Oliveira was not a Portuguese Crown official; thus, it remains a plausible hypothesis that he shared material with Nicot.

Similarly, João de Barros may have given Nicot information directly (Nicot had Barros’s first two *Decades* in his library, one of which seems to have been acquired in Portugal). Barros, who was at the time an officer in the Casa da Índia, may have given Nicot the famous Latin letter that King Manuel I (1495–1521) wrote to Pope Julius II (1503–13) on the Portuguese victories in India. As Luís de Matos argues, this letter, erroneously identified as Nicot’s own report on the East Indies, might have been translated into French by Nicot’s brother, Gille, who had come to Lisbon to serve as his secretary. Further evidence for this possibility is the fact that Gille Nicot seems to have settled in Portugal; his son was Filipe de Brito Nicote (1566–1616), a famous Portuguese captain in Burma in the 17th century. Nicot could have got hold of the letter purely by means of his status and connections, without any espionage, since its contents did not violate Portuguese secrecy policies. Quite the opposite, the letter constituted a piece of Portuguese imperial propaganda that favorably presented Portuguese power abroad. As for Barros’s *Decades*, Nicot might have acquired them in the markets of Lisbon (like Nunes’s treatise), after personal acquaintance with Barros.

Another work in Nicot’s library, the *Itinerario* by António Tenreiro (1485–1560?), might have come to him by way of the Jewish courier sent to Portugal by the viceroy of India in 1560, or through Damião de Góis. Góis is likely to have been one of Nicot’s humanist contacts. Góis was King Manuel

201 Barker, *Fernando Oliveira*, 8 and 15.
203 The French translation is in BNF, *Ms. Collections des Cinqs Cents de Colbert* 483, fl. 433v.
I's chronicler and certainly met Nicot at his arrival in 1559, since Góis made a practice of attending the reception of all ambassadors. The two men would have had plenty to discuss, since Nicot had worked in France as keeper of the archives, the same post Góis held in Portugal. They could also have exchanged knowledge on Portuguese history and literature. As a reputable humanist, Nicot would have been deemed a worthy interlocutor. Nicot could even present Góis with his ongoing work on the re-edition of French history mentioned earlier, something that would motivate Góis to reciprocate. Thus, aside from Barros, Góis is another possible route through which Nicot might have received King Manuel's famous letter to Pope Julius II.

Nicot's philological interests (which later inspired him to publish the *Treasure*) make close connections with João de Barros and Fernando Oliveira even more plausible, since both published Portuguese grammars. Princess Mary, to whom Barros dedicated a famous panegyric in 1545, might have acquainted Nicot with Barros and his work. She might even have also introduced Nicot to Diogo Sigeu, a fellow native of Nîmes. This servant of Princess Mary was another contact of Nicot’s, and their connection can help elucidate the curious fact that certain sonnets by the Portuguese writer André de Resende (1498–1573) were published in France in 1566 (Sigeu gave such sonnets to Nicot, but Nicot was not the one who published them). Still, considering a 1566 letter from Nicot to Sigeu, it is highly probable that he contributed to the project, since Resende’s sonnets would enchant La Pléiade, the group that Nicot joined after his return to France.

Despite the incomplete documentary evidence for Nicot’s social circle, some humanist contacts within the Portuguese nobility are also quite likely. I would strongly argue that he was acquainted with the dukes of Braganza and Aveiro, whose controversial marriages in 1559 are mentioned in Nicot’s letters. His hypothetical contact with the 5th duke of Braganza, D. Teodósio (1510–63), might have arisen through Diogo Sigeu, who had been in D. Teodósio’s service. Nicot may have met some courtier earls (like those of Redondo, Portalegre, and Castanheira) as well, in addition to the baron of Alvito, who is mentioned in Nicot’s letters. All of them attended his ceremonial reception, if not some of his meetings with Queen Catherine of Austria. Furthermore, Nicot reports being called on several times by high

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205 Matos, “Un diplomate humaniste,” 33.
208 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 32.
courtiers. Such relationships were valuable: winning the trust of important noblemen could well have helped Nicot to access strategic information.

Nicot’s reputation and engaging personality, together with the fact that he was the sole official representative of mighty France, set the stage for fact-finding at the Portuguese court. By appropriating the renown that King Henry II, Queen Jeanne d’Albret and Queen Catherine de’ Medici enjoyed in Portugal, Nicot was also able to acquire Portuguese maritime knowledge, which, at the time, was difficult for foreigners to come by. Having laid the groundwork and fostered a diverse social network, Nicot may have wished to remain in Portugal longer, deepening his humanist connections or even becoming a sort of a permanent ambassador (like his predecessor Honorais de Caix in the 1540s and 1550s). But King Charles IX, in his decision to recall Nicot, was motivated by a different set of factors. Thus, it is critical to analyze the circumstances of Nicot’s abrupt departure.

### 3.2.5 Crisis in the Embassy: *La lettre de rappel*

Although the end of Nicot’s embassy is normally associated with the loss of Fort Coligny in Brazil, his letters reveal that much more was at play. The French ambassador had piled up a huge debt that he was unable to repay. The scandalous case of a French captain called Bastien de Lyard, along with Nicot’s actions regarding his cook and some Frenchmen suspected of being secret Protestants, did irreparable damage to his embassy. A brief description of each of these strikes against the ambassador’s name will be made, before we discuss the factors behind Nicot’s recall.

Ever since his arrival in 1559, Jean Nicot had asked that money be sent to him in a timely manner, having found that life abroad entailed significant expenses. Just a year later, in a letter to the French ambassador in Spain, Nicot revealed that he was bankrupt. The situation was so serious that he had to sell some of his own properties in France to keep himself afloat. In April 1561, Nicot wrote to King Charles IX stating again that he had gone bankrupt. This time, the insolvency had come about because Nicot (and his Francophile friend, one the Portuguese ministers of finance the baron

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209 A good example of this renown can be found in a letter by Teodósio, 5th duke of Braganza, to King Philip II concerning King Henry II’s death. One of the first noblemen in Portugal, he asserted that the Portuguese wept at King Henry II’s death as they used to mourn Spanish kings. This was due to King Henry’s great European fame and the signing of the peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which offered fresh hope for long-lasting peace in Europe (AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 380, doc. 101).

210 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LVIII–LIX, 16 and 116–17.
of Alvito) had made substantial funds available to finance François de Guise’s stay in Lisbon in 1560. His salary as ambassador was not enough, and both Nicot and Alvito became objects of ridicule at the Portuguese court. In May 1561, Nicot was desperate enough to beg for 2,000 écus from Queen Catherine de’ Medici to begin paying his debts (in the same letter, he bemoaned Guise’s attitude, considering that he was one of the richest noblemen in France). Nicot underscored that his own financial woes were tarnishing France’s reputation in Portugal.

Indeed, Nicot’s financial difficulties are a good example of a topic that always affected French, and more generally all European diplomats’, correspondence: the lack of funds.211 For this reason, diplomatic treatises always insisted that the ambassador needed to be wealthy in order not to depend on the money sent by his monarch as expenses at court and abroad were always high.212 This was precisely what happened with Nicot. Although in July he did receive the 2,000 écus, they were not enough. Nicot suggested to Queen Catherine de’ Medici that she directly collect the money Guise still owed and return it to him as soon as possible. In the letter, he also noted ruefully that his friend Alvito was a laughingstock at the Portuguese court, as he had recently been forced to sell his personal collections to pay for his French debt. In a letter to King Charles IX, Nicot even reported that Guise’s creditor had approached him at the Portuguese court to collect the money. As Nicot could not afford to pay, Guise’s creditor promised to go personally to France to recover his money.213 The humiliation suffered by the French ambassador was one of the arguments that King Charles IX used to recall Nicot. Another driving force behind his recall was the Lyard case that was unfolding at the same time.

The Breton Captain Bastien de Lyard and his entire crew were murdered in front of Lisbon’s royal palace in May 1561, due to what Nicot called traditional Portuguese arrogance. The Portuguese Captain Diogo Nunes was held responsible for this incident, since he had received orders from Queen Catherine of Austria to inspect French ships. Cognizant of Lyard’s status as a reputable seaman and soldier in France, Nicot ordered a judicial testimony be written up and he demanded compensation for Lyard’s widow and sons from the Portuguese queen. When Nicot went to the palace to confront Queen Catherine of Austria with this case, she accused Nicot and the French

212 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 144.
213 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 61, 122–24, 127, 133 and 150–52.
community in Lisbon of taking part in a recent English capture of a Portuguese ship. Since the queen refused to sympathize with the ambassador’s complaints, Nicot reminded her that he was the representative of a country which ought not be trifled with. The tenor of the conversation deteriorated to such a point that Nicot left the meeting. The next day, the queen announced she would provide compensation to Lyard’s widow, but Nicot refused to receive it in view of the queen’s haughty tone at their previous meeting. In a letter to King Charles IX, Nicot stated that he would not tolerate Queen Catherine of Austria treating him the same way she had treated Seure. At the same time, Nicot realized that the queen and her ministers distrusted him. In this context, Nicot confessed his inability to assist the many Frenchmen subjected to abuse and imprisonment by the Portuguese Inquisition. To worsen things, the case of Gaspar Treschel, a Frenchman from Lyon caught by the Inquisition with books by Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–64) that he intended to sell in Portugal, occurred around the same time. Nicot was able to persuade Cardinal Henry to release Treschel and ship the heretical books back to France, but his cook was accused of Protestantism by the Inquisition, condemned, and burned at the stake. A pall fell over Nicot himself, with the Villegagnon affair in progress and the arrival of news during 1561 about the atmosphere in France surrounding the first war of religion. The long-lasting consequences of the loss of Fort Coligny and the events that it provoked at the Valois court form the final factor in the crisis facing Nicot’s embassy.

As Nicot had anticipated, the loss of Fort Coligny was brought about by the arrival of a Portuguese fleet in March 1560. Nicot had warned previously about a Portuguese reinforcement fleet led by Bartolomeu da Cunha, which departed so heavily armed that he suspected the Portuguese were preparing an attack to Fort Coligny in Brazil. His suspicions proved correct; it was the Portuguese governor, Mem de Sá, who suggested to Queen Catherine of Austria to launch the attack on Fort Coligny, taking advantage of the fact that Villegagnon had temporarily returned to France to defend himself against

214 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 66 and 139–47.
religious and political accusations.\textsuperscript{218} I agree with the authors who argued that if Villegagnon had remained at Fort Coligny, governor Mem de Sá would not have risked a siege of the prestigious naval and military commander who had, no less, rescued Queen Mary Stuart from King Henry VIII’s attempt to detain her in the 1540s. Villegagnon’s deed was widely commented on in Europe. Governor Sá certainly knew about it; he openly acknowledged to Queen Catherine of Austria that the leader of *France Antarctique* conducted a wise policy with local Indians against the Portuguese, one that deeply damaged Portuguese interests in Brazil.\textsuperscript{219} During his stay in Brazil, Villegagnon had the opportunity to send scouts to the Plate River in search of the famous Spanish Potosí mines, thus proving that Spain also had reasons to be worried. Therefore, Villegagnon’s departure to France offered the opportunity for the Portuguese to strike against the French. The outcome could have been very different, had Villegagnon remained at Fort Coligny.

Since King Francis II had given his blessing to *France Antarctique*,\textsuperscript{220} the news of the fort’s surrender caused great agitation at the Valois court. Shortly after his return to France, Villegagnon was appointed to command a fleet of eleven vessels that would attack Portuguese India Run ships. But the 1560 Amboise conspiracy put a stop to Villegagnon’s departure and a major military reaction.\textsuperscript{221} The chief reason why Villegagnon did not receive the relief he had asked for was Admiral Gaspard de Coligny’s detention by the Spanish at the battle of Saint-Quentin in 1557. As the French admiral was only released in 1559, he was unable to send the reinforcements.\textsuperscript{222} Because of the Brazilian loss, and after hearing his Conseil Privé, in January 1561, King Charles IX demanded a 200,000 écus in compensation from João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France.\textsuperscript{223} Since Dantas refused this and declined to temporarily return Fort Coligny to France,\textsuperscript{224} Charles IX issued letters of marque. This was a traditional French tactic for pressuring Portugal and was aimed at recovering the amount demanded by the French Crown by means of attacks on Portuguese vessels. The tension

\textsuperscript{218} Provençal and Mariz, *Villegagnon e a França Antártica*, 118–20.
\textsuperscript{219} Julien, *Les voyages de découverte*, 203.
\textsuperscript{220} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LXIX.
\textsuperscript{222} McGrath, *The French in Early Florida*, 35–36.
\textsuperscript{223} Montaigne, *La découverte du Brésil*, 285.
\textsuperscript{224} Ana Maria Pereira Ferreira, “Da defesa do monopólio do ‘Mare Clausum’: Alguns apontamentos na correspondência de João Pereira Dantas (1562–1565),” in *A Viagem de Bartolomeu Dias e a problemática dos Descobrimentos* (Maia: Secretaria Regional da Educação e Cultura, 1989), 164.
prompted Queen Catherine de Medici to seize ambassador Dantas’s missives, in which he warned Portugal that King Charles had issued the letters.\(^{225}\) Meanwhile, from England, the Portuguese agent Manuel de Araújo also sounded the alarm in April 1561: Villegagnon was returning to Brazil in three ships.\(^{226}\) In the end, again, Villegagnon did not leave France, in spite of his calls for action against the Portuguese.\(^{227}\) Nevertheless, in 1561, Charles IX and Queen Catherine de’ Medici, realizing that ambassador Dantas would not meet their demands, placed all their hopes in Nicot. Once again, they named Jean Ébrard, the future French ambassador in Spain from 1562 to 1565, as envoy extraordinary to Portugal and sent him to insist on financial compensation.\(^{228}\) Ébrard’s return to Portugal was reported to King Philip II by the Spanish ambassador in France.\(^{229}\)

In April 1561, Nicot addressed a letter to King Charles IX concerning Ébrard’s arrival and the Brazilian case. Nicot started by informing the French king that the Portuguese court was astonished to learn that Charles dared to demand compensation. When Nicot had confronted Queen Catherine of Austria, she had replied with reports from Dantas that Villegagnon was considered an outlaw in France (because of his harboring Huguenots in Brazil and alleged conversion to Protestantism). She also argued that the French had been attacking the Portuguese, and cited rumors that they even fed their enemies’ bodies to Brazilian Indians. In such a scenario, despite the supposed French-Portuguese alliance, the Portuguese were forced to expel the French from Brazil. To keep the delicate peace, the queen agreed to free some Frenchmen who had been imprisoned in Brazil. Nicot reminded King Charles of what he had written to King Francis II: France would only be taken seriously by Portugal if it enforced a tougher maritime policy. Since Nicot knew that would hardly happen, he continued his attempts to free Frenchmen imprisoned in Mina. He watched powerlessly as his request for Portuguese maritime assistance against English corsairs were declined. Nicot could see that Portuguese policy was targeted at forcing France to renounce its maritime and imperial ambitions. Ébrard was very well-received by Queen Catherine of Austria, probably due to his social status. In May 1561, Nicot wrote to King Charles that the queen was so impressed by him that

\(^{228}\) Edmond Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ébrard: seigneur de Saint-Sulpice de 1562 à 1565 et mission de ce diplomate dans le même pays en 1566* (Nouguès, 1903), 12.
she even sought his political advice. Still, the Portuguese regent did not agree to Ébrard’s demands for payment as her formal reply to him shows.\footnote{230 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 124–27, 134–37; Matos, Les Portugais en France, 303–5.}

Even after King Charles’s decision to recall Nicot in July 1561 (of which he became aware when the lord of Careses arrived in Lisbon that month),\footnote{231 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LXXXIII–LXXXIV.} the ambassador continued to worry about the Frenchmen imprisoned in Mina. Nicot’s letters from August 1561 document his ongoing demands for compensation to France for the loss of Fort Coligny, and his efforts in obtaining information on captured French ships. Nicot also tried to secure, without success, Portuguese assistance for French ships taken by the Ottoman fleet.\footnote{232 Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 66–71.} The accumulation of all these factors, as well as Nicot’s letter to Charles IX, confessing that he had lost all hope of being able to defend French interests because he was distrusted by Queen Catherine of Austria and her ministers, sealed his fate.

On July 8, 1561, Queen Catherine de’ Medici addressed a letter to Nicot ordering him to return to France, sending him money for his journey, and asking him to keep protesting about the Brazilian affair. On July 18, 1561, she informed the French ambassador in Spain of her decision and asked him to ensure that Nicot received the funds.\footnote{233 M. L. de C. Hector de la Ferrière, ed., Lettres de Catherine de Médicis, tome I (Paris: Imprimerie National, 1880), 210–211 and 216.} The formal \textit{lettre de rappel} was written by King Charles IX on July 9, 1561. The king explained the decision by stating that Nicot had become useless, since he was unable to provide justice for mistreated Frenchmen abroad, and there appeared to be no profit in maintaining a French embassy in Portugal. He instructed Nicot to reply, should he be asked again about his debt, that he was tired of such inquiries. He would depart from Portugal at the king’s orders, although he was not to disclose the exact date of his departure. Nicot was authorized to express Charles’s displeasure at the way Nicot had been treated in Portugal. The king saw Nicot’s treatment as unworthy of such a great humanist, and doubly inappropriate in the context of an existing alliance between the two kingdoms. Before leaving Portugal, Nicot was likewise ordered to make petitions for jailed Frenchmen and yet again push for compensation for Fort Coligny.

However, it is unclear whether it was King Charles IX himself who wrote the letter to Nicot. It is widely accepted that during his early years, as was the case with King Francis II, it was the queen mother, Catherine de’ Medici,
the Guises, and some French secretaries of state who wrote the letters on his behalf.\textsuperscript{234} Studying the queen mother’s correspondence in depth, Mathieu Gellard concluded that almost half of the letters written by the queen were addressed to French ambassadors in Europe. The author also concluded that several of her letters were written by French secretaries and signed by the queen, but only after she either read them personally or was given an account of them. Thus, out of 5,958 letters official letters by Queen Catherine de’ Medici, only 819 were really written by her hand. Furthermore, the queen fought during Charles’s minority to be entrusted with the writing of the king’s formal replies.\textsuperscript{235} Thus, it is highly probable that the content of Nicot’s recall letter was written by the queen mother and her ministers and given for signature to the king.

In September 1561, Nicot replied to Charles IX, stating that he had already received the letter from his mother and was taking care of several issues. He was prepared to leave by the end of that month. Before Nicot’s departure from Portugal, he lodged a complaint with the regent regarding a subsidy that Portugal had conceded to France, which was to be paid due to the confiscation of several French cargoes in Lisbon. Nicot knew that the compensation did not represent even a tenth of revenues the Portuguese Crown had received with the seizures of French properties. Instead of confiscating the French goods, Nicot suggested that the Portuguese Crown send lists of apprehended captains and cargos to France. Only open collaboration in the matter of these confiscations, so it seemed to Nicot, could deescalate French-Portuguese maritime rivalry. This undated letter ends with the assertion that an agreement should be reached between Christian kings in compliance with civil and canonical law.\textsuperscript{236} The way the document ends is a reminder of how Nicot never forgot his judicial office of maître in France and attempted to use the authority bestowed upon him by that office to continue to openly defend French interests in Portugal, even in adverse circumstances.

It is possible that this letter referred to the maritime incidents also mentioned in an undated Spanish document from the Simancas archive. This document, which appears to date from early 1561 as it mentions Charles IX as the new king of France, reports another episode of French-Portuguese warfare in the Algarve Sea. On board French captured ships there were some Frenchmen who had been sentenced to death. However, at the last

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{235} Gellard, \textit{Une reine épistolaire}, 94, 111 and 186.
\textsuperscript{236} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, 74–78 and 154–55.
\end{footnotesize}
moment, Nicot intervened to save their lives by presenting letters from the king of France. As a result, the Frenchmen were released and their goods were restored.\textsuperscript{237} Afterwards, a new Portuguese representative was sent to offer condolences on the death of King Francis II. This suggests that in early 1561, Nicot was able to use King Charles IX’s recent accession to convince Portuguese authorities to spare the lives of the Frenchmen. However, by the summer of 1561, Nicot’s position had changed and he no longer had the same level of influence to repeat this type of success for his countrymen.

Therefore, King Charles personally took charge of Nicot and made an impulsive decision: No French representative would be stationed in Portugal for several years after Nicot’s recall.\textsuperscript{238} Instead, Charles and Queen Catherine de’ Medici chose to simply have an ambassador in Spain. It is hard to pinpoint the main cause for Charles IX’s decision. As Vladimir Chichkine has argued, owing to its internal situation, France also had less revenue to finance all its temporary embassies in Europe.\textsuperscript{239} Indeed, France had never stationed a permanent embassy in Portugal in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, as it did for instance in England or Rome. Maritime tensions between France and Portugal also seem a likely explanation for the Valois court’s decision. The loss of Fort Coligny must also have been a key factor in the decision, although France’s debts and bad image were also at stake. However, despite the loss of Fort Coligny, the French still kept their hold in Brazil at Cape Cold until 1577 when the remaining French were expelled by the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{240} This is not to imply that the surrender of the Brazilian fortress stalled French overseas and imperial plans. As has been shown, Admiral Coligny first considered expeditions to the Moluccas and Mutapa, but in 1561 shifted to preparing an expedition to Florida (which departed in 1562).\textsuperscript{241} Coligny certainly changed his plans because of the ongoing negotiations between Portugal and Villegagnon for financial compensation.

Allies in Europe and discreet rivals in the Atlantic, as João Paulo Oliveira e Costa outlined, the French and the Portuguese could not endure a long-lasting war against each other. If France was militarily defeated in Brazil, it should not be forgotten that it successfully contributed to the Portuguese commercial decline in Mina and Guinea.\textsuperscript{242} Portugal would

\textsuperscript{237} AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo 381, doc. 19.
\textsuperscript{238} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LXXI–LXXXII.
\textsuperscript{239} Chichkine, “Mirage d’une alliance,” 51.
\textsuperscript{240} Amorim, “A política externa,” 43–44.
\textsuperscript{241} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LXVII.
\textsuperscript{242} João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, Mare Nostrum. Em busca de honra e riqueza (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2013), 218–21.
have had difficulty conducting a long Atlantic maritime war with France. On the other hand, France could not hazard overt hostilities and the loss of an ally against Spain. This accounts for King Charles IX's choice to accept compensation from Portugal and delay the Brazilian project for a time.\textsuperscript{243} Later on in the 1560s, Charles and Catherine de’ Medici were similarly unable to react forcefully to the French expulsion from Florida by the Spanish. Strong pressure from Admiral Coligny could entice neither to start a risky war with Spain.\textsuperscript{244}

Thus, it is relevant not to conflate the Valois’s failure in their Brazilian project with the results of Nicot’s Portuguese embassy. If Nicot was unable to ameliorate maritime frictions between Portugal and France (and his embassy ended on a sour note), he succeeded in his overall strategy for improving French-Portuguese relations. When he departed from Portugal, the proposed French marriage of King Sebastian, Nicot’s main task, was still viable. It was confirmed by the Portuguese Courts in 1562–63. Because of King Sebastian’s and Princess Margaret’s young age, Nicot departed before any wedding could materialize. This has often led historians to state wrongly that Nicot’s embassy failed.\textsuperscript{245} But plans for the wedding were only scrapped much later and for reasons wholly unconnected to Nicot’s embassy. The fact that Nicot had compiled maritime knowledge which he successfully sent to France, where it could assist in overseas plans, is another point in his favor. An analysis of Nicot’s role as a translator of knowledge once he returned to France will further demonstrate that his embassy was far from a debacle.

3.3 Nicot’s Role as a Go-between for Portuguese Knowledge in France (1561–1600)

After returning to France, Jean Nicot’s status was enhanced, just as Seure’s had been. Resettling in Paris, Nicot soon connected with members of the Pléiade, including Ronsard and Pierre Ramus (1515–72). He finished his edition of the history of France, which was printed in 1567. Nicot then collaborated with François de Belleforest (1530–83) on his cosmography, providing information on historical monuments from Nîmes. He also gave Denys Lambin (1520–72) three manuscripts of Horace (65–8 BC) for publication, and convinced Marc-Antoine Muret (1526–85) to publish his Latin correspondence. Nicot

\textsuperscript{243} Heulhard, \textit{Villegagnon, roi d’Amérique}, 242–45.
\textsuperscript{244} For more details see: Ribera, \textit{Diplomatie et espionnage}, 443–64.
\textsuperscript{245} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, LVII and LXXXIX.
himself thought of preparing editions of Tacitus's (AD 56–120) and Livy's (59 BC– AD 19) texts.\textsuperscript{246} His abandonment of this project was due to Nicot's joint work with printer Jacques Depuys on a Latin-French dictionary that was printed in 1573. Unsatisfied with his own work, he soon started to work on a more complete edition: the \textit{Treasure of the French Language}. Nicot labored on the \textit{Treasure} for several years, trying to improve upon the renowned dictionary published by Robert Estienne (1503–59). The work was only published in 1606, six years after Nicot's death.\textsuperscript{247}

Nicot also kept busy managing his family affairs, and remained close to the last Valois. Not much is known about his life at court aside from his success in promoting tobacco (helped along by Queen Catherine de’ Medici's endorsement of the exotic product).\textsuperscript{248} He arranged for his nephew (also named Jean Nicot) to become his heir. By the end of his life, Nicot was still \textit{maître} and counsellor,\textsuperscript{249} although he is considered in this phase to be an extraordinary \textit{maître} and only between 1571 and 1580.\textsuperscript{250} Still, it is important to note that in 16th-century France it was normal that \textit{maîtres}, like Nicot, had important personal libraries in the fields of law, history, religion, and theology.\textsuperscript{251} This was somehow part of the cultural ambience that fostered academies in 16th-century France,\textsuperscript{252} and should be perceived as a consequence of what has been termed the second Renaissance in France under King Henry II.\textsuperscript{253} Thus, the fact that Nicot formally remained a \textit{maître} contributed to his interest in cultivating knowledge.

Nicot's embassy in Portugal afforded him authority to give advice on any matter related to Portugal, its empire, and navigation in general. In 1564, Nicot prevented a map of France prepared by the Portuguese cosmographer André Homem, from falling into the hands of the Spanish ambassador. Nicot's intervention ensured that the map was given to King Charles IX.\textsuperscript{254} The episode, mentioned in the \textit{Treasure}, involved Ambassador João Pereira

\textsuperscript{246} Matos, \textit{Les Portugais en France}, 91–93.
\textsuperscript{247} Baudry, \textit{Jean Nicot}, 123 and 173.
\textsuperscript{249} Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, CIX and 177; Baudry, \textit{Jean Nicot}, 163–70.
\textsuperscript{250} Etchechoury, \textit{Les maîtres des requêtes}, 273.
\textsuperscript{251} Etchechoury, \textit{Les maîtres des requêtes}, 189.
\textsuperscript{253} Huguier, \textit{Henri II}, 355.
Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France, who tried without success, as shall be detailed in the following chapter, to prevent André Homem from being accepted as royal cosmographer of the king of France. The details of Nicot’s intervention are unknown, but it seems probable that he acted to protect French interests: after all, while in Lisbon he had become a victim of Dantas’s actions in Paris. Ill feeling between Nicot and Dantas is also attested in an incident at the Valois court in 1562.

Following Nicot’s return to France and protests about French prisoners in Lisbon, Dantas had to justify Portuguese policies at the Conseil Privé. Dantas presented the Portuguese position with documents proving that out of the thirty-seven Frenchmen that Nicot mentioned were in jail, only three were French and none were receiving poor treatment. Thus, Nicot’s credibility was in question, as Dantas convinced the Conseil Privé. The incident was also noticed by the English ambassador in France, who feared that an English envoy to Spain who was facing problems with the Spanish Inquisition, could be refused on the grounds of religious tension, as had happened with Nicot. By then, Nicot had personal reasons to wish for Dantas’s demotion at the Valois court. Since Dantas was known to harbor Portuguese cartographers and pilots in his house and negotiate their return to Portugal, as shall be detailed in the next chapter, it is possible that Nicot sabotaged Dantas’s plans in 1565. If he made any such attempt, it was successful: André Homem, Gaspar Caldeira, and Antão Luís did not return to Portugal in 1565, despite Dantas’s efforts. Nor would it be extraordinary that Nicot might have contributed to the cartographical school of Dieppe with personal materials and his own knowledge. Still, there is no direct proof that he did so. This matter is closely tied to another major role that Nicot likely played: as a disseminator of Portuguese knowledge in France.

Nicot’s library, one of the most extensive to be found in late 16th-century France, included important items related to Portugal. As has been shown, Nicot used his stay in Lisbon to compile a number of Portuguese works for his collection. Some of these, like André Pires’s seamanship book,
the report on the voyage of Ferdinand Magellan, also helped him write a section on artillery and nautical issues in his edition of the Latin-French dictionary. \(^{259}\) Nicot’s etymological treatise on naval construction contains features shared with the Portuguese work of Fernando Oliveira. In this text, Nicot details the meaning of several nautical terms that were introduced into the French language. Some of these words had a Portuguese origin and influenced his first edition of the Latin-French dictionary as well as the second edition of the *Treasure*. \(^{260}\) This is another example of how Portuguese information could be worked, developed, adapted, and transformed into a body of knowledge, in this case, suited for French purposes.

Although it is clear that Nicot acquired André Pires’s book in Portugal, the source of Magellan’s report is less certain. After all, such reports were available in France long before Nicot’s embassy. Although this is what can be documented, Nicot’s original library might have included other items related to Portugal, especially considering that his library was dispersed after his death and that La Pléiade used to circulate and share materials among its members. Thus, after returning home, Nicot probably went from recommending that translations be undertaken, as he had done for Nunes’s book, to assuming the role of promulgator of Portuguese nautical knowledge in France. How then ought the legacy of Nicot’s embassy to be assessed when compared with his predecessors Caix and Seure?

### 3.4 Caix, Seure, and Nicot: French Diplomacy and Espionage Tactics vis-à-vis Portugal

A literary and scientific man at heart, Jean Nicot is an excellent example of the 16th-century French humanist diplomat. \(^{261}\) His achievements at the Portuguese embassy cannot be examined without considering the role played by his predecessors in office. As has been shown, Michel de Seure was essentially a spy-ambassador. His inability to adapt to the Portuguese environment and his clearly anti-Iberian approach \(^{262}\) resulted in Portuguese

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\(^{259}\) Edmond Falgairolle, 1897, CV–CVI. Also see illustration 3.

\(^{260}\) Baudry, Jean Nicot, 84, 112 and 177. A project from Toronto University has made Nicot’s major works available, including the nautical treatise: http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~wulfric/marine/traite.html [accessed on December 16, 2022]. See also: Maxime Lanusse, *De Joanne Nicotio philologo* (Gratianopoli: Ex typis J. Allier 1893) and M. Puech, “Un homme de lettres au XVIe siècle” in *Memoires de l’Academie de Nimes*, tome XIV (1891), 203–252.

\(^{261}\) Matos, “Un diplomate humaniste,” 35.

\(^{262}\) Serrão, *Michel de Seure*, 194.
complaints to King Henry II and demands that he be recalled. Henry II’s
decision to reward Seure’s services is also related to the outcome of Honorais
de Caix’s embassy.

During his years as ambassador in Portugal, which coincided with the
entire reign of King John III, Caix became too well adapted to the Portuguese
environment. The meagre surviving documents from Caix’s embassy, dating
to the late 1520s and 1530s, evidence his transformation into a defender of
Portuguese Mare Clausum policies. At decisive moments, he opposed France’s
interests, such as when King Francis I gave Jean Ango brand letters in 1531.
He also personally went to France as an agent of King John III on several
occasions (to try to recover cargo from Breton and Norman captains, for
example), as well as to negotiate at the Valois court in the shadow of the
Portuguese ambassador (as John instructed Caix and his formal ambassador).
Although he was never formally named King John III’s ambassador, he
was accused on multiple occasions of neglecting French interests and was
physically threatened because of it. At the basis of Caix’s behavior was his
belief that France should leave overseas expansion to Portugal and simply
try to profit from it. Championing a policy of conciliation, like the one Jean
Bodin (1530–1596) came to advise later, Caix failed to convince King Francis
I that France should not engage in maritime wars with Portugal since that
could enable him to negotiate a good commercial treaty with John III.263 At
the end of his life, the French ambassador had been forgotten by King Henry
II, as a revealing 1558 letter of Queen Catherine of Austria to Ambassador
Dantas testifies. In this missive, she asked Dantas to wait for Caix’s advice,
and to petition Henry to reward Caix, as his advanced age prevented travel
to France, but his devoted service to King John III deserved recognition.264
Given this precedent, it is possible that Henry II’s appointment of and mission
to Seure were also provoked by Caix’s disinterest in promoting French causes.

The espionage Seure undertook while in Lisbon was partly prompted by
Henry’s support of France Antarctique. However, after Seure was discovered,
the king was forced to appoint a new ambassador. To improve relations with
Portugal and ensure that his new ambassador would not be immediately
mistrusted, he chose a man with a very different profile. Instead of a knight
(Seure), Henry opted for a humanist (Nicot). The more sympathetic approach
of a humanist would and did make the Portuguese forget Seure’s espionage.
But appearances can be misleading: I am fully convinced that Henry II also
instructed Nicot to acquire all the knowledge he could on the Portuguese

263 Serrão, Michel de Seure, 162–63, 182 and 186.
empire and navy, while cautioning him not to adopt Seure's tactics. As has been demonstrated, Henry's ploy succeeded, even before Nicot's arrival, in kindling Queen Catherine of Austria's curiosity concerning the new French ambassador.

Thus, Nicot was fated to become an ambassador who fell midway between Caix's and Seure's approaches. This is precisely what can be observed in his correspondence. While promoting the union between France and Portugal (expressed in the planned marriage of King Sebastian and Princess Margaret of Valois), Nicot also stood up for French interests. Nicot was ready to denounce any injustice visited on Frenchmen, like Seure, but also warned the Portuguese of illegal French activities, like Caix. His middle ground positions were targeted at winning Portuguese maritime assistance for France against English and Ottoman corsairs, but as has been shown, this did not happen. Studying the Portuguese and their history, Nicot understood that he could exploit Portuguese fears of and rivalry with Spain to France's benefit. This context enabled him to make numerous contacts at the Portuguese court and secure the conditions needed for fulfilling King Henry II's original directives (later confirmed by Kings Francis II, Charles IX, and Queen Catherine de' Medici) of transmitting intelligence on the Portuguese imperial and nautical status quo.

If we consider the new era of French-Spanish relations inaugurated by King Henry II with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis and the action of French ambassadors in Spain up to the death of Queen Elisabeth of Valois (1545–1568), King Philip II's third wife,265 we are faced with a question. Did King Henry II intend, in appointing Nicot to his embassy and action, to focus France's overseas action against Portugal, instead of following the tradition of a clash with Spain? It is important to note that by signing peace with Spain and England, King Henry II became free to launch informal Atlantic war against Portugal if he so wished. After Cateau-Cambrésis, Henry II knew that Spain would back Portuguese complaints against France but not to the point of another war. Furthermore, as shall be detailed in the next chapter, Spain did not totally back Portuguese diplomatic requests vis-à-vis France. As with several other questions concerning King Henry II's policy after the signing of the peace, the king's death buried the answer. However, this hypothesis remains a possibility, and it might have affected Nicot's actions in Lisbon even after Henry II's death. Knowing Queen Catherine de' Medici personally, Nicot recognized that there would be a continuity of French overseas interests via the role she played during the rule of Kings Francis II and Charles IX.

Nicot’s access to the details of Portuguese operations in Brazil, Guinea, Mina, Mutapa, and Asia document French maritime interest in Portuguese activities very well. If Nicot became a victim of the loss of Fort Coligny, he was still able to send sensitive intelligence to France. However, his awareness of Portuguese naval capacity explains why Nicot did not push for all-out maritime war, as Seure had done. Nor was Nicot, like Raymond de Forqueveaux (1508–74), the later French ambassador in Spain between 1565 and 1572, a paladin of French overseas expansion against the Iberians.266 In this matter, Nicot’s views also run counter to Caix’s, who proposed an end to French overseas ambitions. Nicot advised that if France wanted to take a tougher position against Portugal, it would have to prepare itself for the conflict. Thus, Nicot exploited every possible chance to get his hands on sensitive nautical knowledge while in Lisbon, and very likely established important connections with people with robust knowledge of these topics, such as Fernando Oliveira, Damião de Góis, and João de Barros. These endeavors were likely preparatory to his later work disseminating Portuguese nautical knowledge. As Nicot knew, the French civil wars would eventually end, and France would regain the capacity to launch serious maritime projects; to meet the moment when it arrived, preparation was essential. In this context, Nicot was more than an influential figure in the rise of the modern French language with his famous Treasure. He also laid the foundations for the major maritime successes that France achieved in the 17th century, despite dying too early to see it happen.

Conclusion

Seure’s and Nicot’s embassies have analogues in the paths taken by Spanish ambassadors to Portugal during the 1560s and 1570s, such as D. Alonso de Tovar, D. Juan de Borja, D. Juan de Silva, and D. Cristobal de Moura. For all of them, as has been underscored in the first chapter, the same can be observed: an attempt to gather sensitive imperial and maritime information. D. Juan de Borja is often dubbed a spy-ambassador. D. Juan de Silva was instructed by King Philip II (in 1575) to gather Portuguese cartography and nautical rutters, employing discretion and secrecy to avoid detection.267 These orders are not very different from King Henry II’s to Seure and Nicot.

266 Matos, Les Portugais en France, 11–12.
Such cases suggest a common modus operandi of nautical and imperial espionage among 16th-century French and Spanish ambassadors to Portugal. What differentiates Seure and Nicot from his Spanish contemporaries was the degree of political espionage they were able to achieve. Seure and Nicot occasionally reported on political matters, but their main goals were elsewhere. Their quarry was technical (meaning, maritime) intelligence.

At the core of Seure’s and Nicot’s actions, as well as those of their Spanish colleagues in Portugal, was the realization that Portuguese nautical knowledge was crucial in planning overseas voyages. This awareness was also evident on the Portuguese side, prompting the need to counteract these intentions through other means. As previously discussed in chapters 1 and 2, it was not only Spain and England, represented by Emperor Charles V, King Philip II, or Queen Mary I, that recognized the value of Portuguese maritime knowledge. The same conclusion can be drawn regarding Valois France under Kings Francis I, Henry II, Francis II, Charles IX, and Queen Catherine de’ Medici. This raises a question: was the Portuguese government aware that Valois France and Tudor England were highly interested in acquiring Portuguese nautical knowledge, at a time when the renewal of English overseas plans coincided with the maritime leadership of Admiral Coligny in France? If the Portuguese government was conscious of this and also of the espionage methods employed by the French and the English to acquire Portuguese nautical knowledge, what measures did it take to counter them?

By analyzing the correspondence of a Portuguese ambassador in France and England in the 1550s and 1560s, the next chapter examines how Portugal dealt with the simultaneous maritime challenges posed by England and France overseas. Through this process, it will become clear how Portugal’s attempts to implement secrecy policies regarding the circulation of sensitive nautical and cartographical knowledge to both England and France were unsuccessful. This period was marked by the rise of Elizabethan England and also set the stage for the emergence and success of the Dutch Republic, which benefited from maritime knowledge exchanges with France and England. Despite the Portuguese failure, the mere existence of such attempts by Portugal highlights their awareness that French and Spanish ambassadors also had their own methods of obtaining Portuguese technical knowledge. Were not the Portuguese ambassadors in Spain or England also tasked with espionage, as previously discussed? Taking a connected history approach, the next chapter will use the correspondence of João Pereira Dantas to study how Portugal attempted to counter such technical espionage.
4. **Mare Clausum and Secret Science: João Pereira Dantas and the Portuguese Strategies to Control French and English Overseas Plans (1557–68)**

Abstract
This chapter deals with the Portuguese strategies to counteract the French and English acquisition of Portuguese maritime knowledge during the critical period of the 1550s and 1560s. The study of the correspondence of a Portuguese ambassador to France and England will be used to understand how Portugal attempted to stem the flow of Portuguese maritime knowledge and expertise from entering French and English service. The chapter focuses on the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* and *Secret Science* policies, and demonstrates the difference between these policies and their actual results.

**Keywords:** Elizabeth I, Charles IX, Catherine de’ Medici, maritime espionage, Philip II, secrecy policies

Introduction
Mostly known as the diplomat who harbored Portuguese pilots, cosmographers, and cartographers in his house abroad, João Pereira Dantas is also on record as the man who proposed the fortification of the Cape Good Hope to King John III (1521–57) in 1556. However, in 1557, when Dantas was appointed ambassador to France, he came to be known for quite different reasons. His embassies to France, between 1557 and 1568, and to England, in 1562, were

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marked by his attempts to impose the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* during the same period that *France Antarctique* was being launched in Brazil (between 1555 and 1560), and major English expeditions under Queens Mary I (1553–58) and Elizabeth I (1558–1603) were underway. The Portuguese government relied on Dantas’s ability to ease maritime tensions and prevent the departure of English and French expeditions. A fierce opponent of France and England’s overseas ambitions, Dantas resorted to classical espionage and counter-espionage to ensure that Portuguese nautical experts did not serve France and England. In the course of these activities, Dantas’s maneuvers were widely commented on, leading to his renown across Europe.

In his role as a diplomat and advisor to the Portuguese government, Dantas sought to control French and English overseas movements through a combination of espionage and diplomacy. Utilizing the diplomatic and legal rhetoric that had been developed by Portugal since the late 15th century, Dantas attempted to persuade France and England to respect Portuguese rights to *Mare Clausum*, and all its commercial monopolies in West Africa and Brazil. Besides diplomacy, Dantas employed a *Secret Science* policy, which entailed housing Portuguese nautical experts abroad and negotiating their return to Portuguese service in an effort to uphold Portugal’s secrecy policies.

During the tenure of João Pereira Dantas as ambassador to France and England, the task of protecting Portuguese control over the seas (*Mare Clausum*) became increasingly difficult due to the maritime leadership of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny in France, and Queen Elizabeth I’s determination to shore up England’s overseas presence. While France and England informally collaborated abroad against the Portuguese and the Spanish, Dantas understood that Portugal needed, more than ever, to make a formal maritime league with Spain to protect its own *Mare Clausum*. Thus, the collaboration traced in chapters 2 and 3 between Portuguese and Spanish diplomacies intensified during Dantas’s term. Maritime intelligence (in the form of details of English or French overseas fleets) and even Portuguese nautical experts’ careers became the focus of formal interchanges, alliances, and tensions between Spain and Portugal in their shared attempts to disrupt French and English overseas expeditions. Again, like in the previous chapters, processes of emulation and rivalry went hand in hand and Dantas’s

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embassies constitute eloquent proof of the failure of Portuguese and Spanish secrecy policies.

Despite the importance of Dantas’s missives and the existence of some studies on his career, there has been no systematic examination of his embassies. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on his ambassadorial activities, insofar as they document maritime knowledge exchanges, utilizing Dantas’s letters whenever possible. Dantas’s correspondence is incomplete, and only around 150 letters written by or addressed to him between 1557 and 1568 have been identified. Complementing this corpus with Spanish, English, and French sources, it will be possible to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Portuguese Mare Clausum and Secret Science policies during a time when France and England emerged as serious competitors to the Iberians. The influence of French and English overseas projects also had an impact on the Dutch Republic, which was just beginning to emerge as a maritime power following the rebellion against King Philip II. Through this examination, it will become clear that despite being formal adversaries, Dantas used similar methods as the French (as detailed in the previous chapter) and English ambassadors for the acquisition of maritime intelligence. Dantas is also an example of the complexification of diplomacy, as bribery and espionage played a key role in his operations from the outset.

This chapter will begin by analyzing Dantas’s activities in Valois France, and will later address his approach towards Elizabethan England. In the first section, a thorough examination of the maritime affairs of Dantas’s embassy in France will be essayed. In the second section, the focus will shift to Dantas’s strategies concerning specific cases of Portuguese nautical experts residing abroad, and his attempts to negotiate their return to Portuguese service. Additionally, and within the context of Dantas’s embassy in France, the issue of Portuguese-Spanish diplomatic collaboration will be explored, in order to understand the reasons behind his downfall in 1567-68. The second major part of this chapter deals with Dantas’s espionage activities in Elizabethan England. First, both the antecedents and Dantas’s embassy to Queen Elizabeth I in 1562 will be probed. Then, the consequences of the 1562 diplomatic failure of Portuguese goals will be considered in light of the intensification of Portuguese espionage and counter-espionage activities


with regard to England. The importance of leaks of Portuguese knowledge and agents circulating for the systematic launch of French and English maritime voyages in this period will be highlighted. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the significance of Dantas’s embassies in the processes of Portuguese maritime knowledge circulation.

4.1 João Pereira Dantas’s Embassy to France (1557–68)

4.1.1 Spying on the French: Dantas and the French-Portuguese Maritime Rivalry

Dantas arrived in France with a commission by King John III to negotiate the renewal of the previous treaties of mutual détente concerning maritime attacks between French and Portuguese seafarers with King Henry II (1547–59). Most likely what was at stake was the fact that, in 1556, King Henry II had renewed a letter of marque against the Portuguese originally given to the Dieppe merchant Guillaume Scot in the 1530s. Dantas most certainly received an order to attempt to have the renewal reversed, although no documentary proof has survived. Still, the ambassador succeeded in securing the renewal of the treaty shortly after his arrival, in June 1557. However, the French challenge in Brazil most likely constituted the main driver of Dantas’s embassy when he departed from Portugal. As has been underscored in the previous chapter, in 1556, Simon Renard, Emperor Charles V’s ambassador in France, warned Queen Catherine of Austria (1507–78), of Nicholas Durrand de Villegagnon’s (1509–1571) request for military reinforcements to *France Antarctique*. Yet in 1557, after appointing Mem de Sá as the new Portuguese governor to Brazil, although no further documents are known, Dantas was chosen as ambassador to France. From the beginning, he was to serve not as a mere envoy, but as an ambassador, signaling the importance of his appointment for Lisbon.

There are some indications that Dantas’s appointment had already been made in the final months of King John III’s life, although he only left for France some days after the monarch’s death. Although his formal instruction is lost, the Spanish diplomatic network in Lisbon commented upon it. In one document, undated but likely from June 1557, it was asserted that

7 Bibliothèque de Saint Geneviève, Ms. 3429, fl. 48–56.
8 Cruz, *As regências na menoridade*, vol. I, 222.
9 Provençal and Mariz, *Villegagnon e a França Antárctica*, 103.
Dantas had set out on his French embassy some days after King John III’s death (June 11). His departure took place amidst rumors in Lisbon that Brazil had been lost to the French, something that must have motivated the Portuguese regent, by then Queen Catherine of Austria, to order Dantas to present a Portuguese protest against France Antarctique at King Henry II’s court. As a consequence, Dantas tried to ensure that in the 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis between Spain and France, King Henry II would forbid Frenchmen from sailing to other Portuguese overseas areas. But by July 1559, D. Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip II, confirmed that France had yet to commit to this in writing. Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay (1521–71), the Spanish ambassador to France between 1559 and 1564 and brother of the famous Cardinal Granvelle, likewise negotiated with King Francis II (1559–60) to secure that France would respect Spanish and Portuguese Mare Clausum.

One of Dantas’s letters, undated but probably from March 1559, mentions that he revoked several French letters of marque against Portugal and had new Portuguese and French judges appointed for the court of Bayonne to judge maritime incidents between Portugal and France. He also mentioned that France was not committing on not sailing to Portuguese overseas areas, despite all his attempts, and those by the Portuguese ambassador in Flanders and by Granvelle. Furthermore, D. Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba (1507–82), a member of the Spanish delegation in Paris that was further negotiating details of the peace treaty between Spain and France, wrote an interesting piece to Rui Gomes da Silva, the influential Portuguese courtier in King Philip II’s service. In a missive penned on July 22, 1559, Alba stated that he had spoken with Charles de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine (1524–74). As Lorraine was a member of the French delegation, Alba spoke with him regarding limiting French navigation in Spanish and Portuguese overseas areas. At the end of the conversation, Lorraine requested a written agreement

10 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 379, doc. 153.
11 On the treaty negotiations see: Haan, Une paix.
14 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Cartas Missivas, Maço 2, nº 141, fls. 1–2; Archivo, Vol. I, 1950, doc. 23.
15 ANTT, Fragmentos, box 1, maço 1, nº 34, fls. 1–iv.
16 On Rui Gomes da Silva see: Boyden, The Courtier and the King.
from Alba. In turn, Alba went to speak with Dantas, so that he could provide the Portuguese government’s written position. Alba noticed how “familiar” (plático in Spanish) Dantas was with navigational issues, due undoubtedly to his abovementioned interest in nautical science. Dantas’s writing was later sent to King Philip II, who responded approvingly in a letter dated August 7, 1559. The king moreover acknowledged that the French would likely not commit to any more than they already had, but expressed a desire for the written agreement to be promptly published in French ports. Nevertheless, Philip instructed Alba to secretly negotiate further before leaving Paris to compel France to recognize the Spanish ban on French overseas voyages.

The Spanish project for King Francis II to sign on the limitation of French navigation according to certain lines in the Atlantic stated in vague terms that France would not sail to the lands discovered by the kings of Portugal and Spain. However, this arrangement was not accepted. The only agreement reached was that if French sailors were caught navigating outside of the agreed boundaries without authorization, they could be arrested and tried by Portuguese and Spanish courts, and France would not be able to intervene. This oral agreement between Spain and France also allowed the French to navigate in the northern hemisphere, up to the tropic of Cancer, including all of North America and West Africa. This was a significant concession made to France by Spain, but it was not accepted by Portugal, as it allowed Frenchmen to enter the Portuguese *Mare Clausum*.

Another major factor contributing to the failure of Portuguese and Spanish diplomatic efforts to limit French navigation was the opposition of Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (1517–86), one of King Philip II’s most influential advisors. In a letter dated October 1558, Granvelle argued to the king that it would be unwise to jeopardize the benefits of securing peace with France over less significant issues, such as Portuguese maritime rights overseas. Although Philip and Princess Juana of Austria (1535–73) had issued a real cédula in October 1559 ordering the Spanish ambassador in Portugal to press Portuguese authorities to support Spanish diplomacy and force France to respect Iberian overseas territories, nothing came of this. This second failure took place, as the real cédula mentions, and it is known that French delegates argued at Cateau-Cambrésis, because France

distinguished between Spanish and Portuguese overseas territories and used this to reject any ban from both sides. This likely contributed to Dantas's warning to Portugal that the French promises regarding Iberian overseas territories at Cateau-Cambrésis should not be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{22}

As previously suggested (but not explicitly documented, due to the lack of primary correspondence for the years 1557–59), it is likely that after arriving in France in 1557, Dantas pressed the French government to respect Portuguese rights to \textit{Mare Clausum} in Brazil. It was only when this strategy failed, as has been underscored in the previous chapter, that the Portuguese regent ordered the departure of the reinforcement fleet, in September 1559, that would allow Mem de Sá, the Portuguese governor of Brazil, to expel the French from Fort Coligny.\textsuperscript{23} However, the return of Villegagnon to France, followed in 1560 by the news of the Portuguese capture of Fort Coligny, soon forced Dantas to negotiate with the formal leader of \textit{France Antarctique}.\textsuperscript{24}

On March 25, 1561, in a letter to King Philip II, Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay highlighted the impact of Fort Coligny's loss in France. He specifically mentioned the “feeling” of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, whom Chantonnay identified as the person who ordered the expedition, and insinuated the likelihood of him seeking revenge.\textsuperscript{25} In April 1561, Dantas received news from Álvaro de la Quadra (?–1564), bishop of Aquila and the Spanish ambassador to England between 1559 and 1563, and from Manuel de Araújo, a Portuguese agent in England, that Villegagnon was departing with a huge fleet to avenge the loss of Fort Coligny.\textsuperscript{26} The Spanish government’s concern about Villegagnon's plans was well-justified. In the Cateau-Cambrésis negotiations of 1559, Spain had been worried about the possibility of France establishing a permanent base in Brazil to raid Spanish ships. The news of Villegagnon’s departure in 1561 were linked to rumors that he would sail to Peru. This news was taken seriously, as the previous year François Le Clerc had attacked the Spanish Caribbean and reached as far as Panama. But such fears were alleviated by the French response: Villegagnon only had a letter of marque against the Portuguese and would not attack any vassal of King Philip II.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Maria do Rosário de Sampaio Themudo Barata Azevedo Cruz, Vol. I, 1992, 76, 233 and 236.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Couto, “A disputa luso-francesa,” 49.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Archivo, vol. II, 1950, doc. 268.
\item \textsuperscript{26} ANTT, \textit{Corpo Cronológico (CC)} I–3–2 and I–104–114, fl. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{27} McGrath, \textit{The French in Early Florida}, 29–30.
\end{itemize}
Nevertheless, in the end, Villegagnon did not depart on any expedition, to the relief of both the Portuguese and Spanish. Instead, Dantas was summoned to the Conseil Privé to explain the Portuguese takeover of Fort Coligny. Dantas argued that France had violated the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas with Villegagnon’s expedition, and that the French had attacked the Portuguese shortly after their arrival. France claimed, based on Jean Nicot’s previously discussed intelligence, that the order to attack Fort Coligny had come from Lisbon. Unsurprisingly, Dantas demanded to see proof of this. As the Valois government was unable to present any evidence, Dantas asserted that French contentions were baseless, and the issue was closed.28

As Chantonnay reports, the matter was so important that the queen mother, Catherine de’ Medici (1519–89), took part in the encounter and witnessed Admiral Coligny’s angry and abrupt termination of the meeting.29 Despite this initial success, Dantas was forced to keep negotiating with Villegagnon, primarily to prevent a formal reaction from the French Crown.

In January 1563, Dantas reported that Villegagnon had approached him with documents from the Conseil Privé demanding financial compensation. Dantas confessed his difficulties in countering Villegagnon’s sophisticated arguments. Besides being a prestigious military and maritime leader, Villegagnon was also well-educated. Having studied at the University of Paris, Villegagnon knew well how to bargain effectively. Under such circumstances, Dantas advised Portugal to pay the compensation, as he considered Villegagnon to be a dangerous adversary, as well as a devout Catholic. Dantas’s reference to Villegagnon’s Catholicism is linked to his role in fighting the Huguenots in the first French civil war, something that the Portuguese admired. Dantas also sent all the details of Villegagnon’s process to Portugal and asked for instructions. By March, Dantas assumed that he had dissimulated and delayed the dealings with Villegagnon, in order to take advantage of his downfall in court. Upon Villegagnon’s return to France, he and Coligny had become public enemies due to Coligny’s conversion to Protestantism and Villegagnon’s Catholicism. Although Villegagnon was able to secure the support of the Guises, his position in court circles became increasingly unstable following the news of the surrender of Fort Coligny.30 Nevertheless, Villegagnon continued to exert pressure as, in July, Dantas opened negotiations with Coligny and Michel de l’Hôpital, the French chancellor, in an effort to persuade them to serve

28  ANT, CC I–106–4, fl. iv.
30  Provençal and Mariz, Villegagnon e a França Antártica, 119 and 125.
Portuguese interests in Villegagnon’s Brazilian enterprise. In this context, Dantas even sent a copy of the letters he was exchanging with Coligny to King Sebastian (1557–78). Dantas’s negotiations with L’Hôpital may have been motivated by the French chancellor’s receipt of a dictionary of the Tupi language from Villegagnon, which served as evidence of the latter’s efforts to gain the support of influential political figures for his Brazilian endeavors.

In May 1564, despite having received orders from Portugal to proceed, Dantas delayed the negotiation once again. As Villegagnon approached him with additional documents from the Conseil Privé, Dantas re-addressed them to Lisbon and requested the Portuguese court’s final position. He admitted that he had been paying Coligny and L’Hôpital since 1562 in order to further his own case, but warned that he had suspended further payments until he received the final instructions. By November 1564, Dantas had not yet departed to accompany King Charles IX and the queen mother on their grand tour of France, as he intended to meet personally with Coligny at his personal estate in Châtillon. In a February 1565 letter, Dantas describes his meeting with the French admiral. Coligny had received him with many demonstrations of affection, but had also pointedly mentioned the execution of eleven Frenchmen in Lisbon. Dantas had asked Coligny to defend himself in the Conseil Privé and was unable to discuss Villegagnon’s case. Dantas justified his negotiations with Coligny by noting that King Charles IX did not make any important decisions without the admiral’s advice. He likewise tried to persuade Coligny not to send French expeditions to Guinea and Mina, but D. Francés de Alava y Beaumont (1519–86), the new Spanish ambassador to France since 1564, reported that Coligny was not convinced. In addition to his maneuvers with Coligny, Dantas likely attempted to gain the support of other powerful figures in French court circles. A letter dated February 1566, in which Dantas praised Constable Anne de Montmorency, suggests that he may have sought to bribe him to serve Portuguese interests. This hypothesis is not implausible, given that King John III had previously ordered his agents to bestow gifts upon Montmorency, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, it is not possible to reach a final conclusion regarding Dantas’s actions, as no further documents have been found.

31 Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), 49–X–9, fl. iv., 17v. and 30–30v. Unfortunately, none of the annexes that Dantas mentions in his letters have survived.
34 ANTT, CC I–107–105, fl. iv.
In an important letter to King Sebastian dated March 1565, Dantas details the negotiations he conducted with regard to the Villegagnon affair. Commenting on the formal response from the Conseil Privé, Dantas expresses his surprise, and, to explain the unexpected outcome, he recounts all the events that had unfolded thus far. He begins by noting that he had paid Coligny in 1562, 1563, and 1564, and L'Hôpital in 1563 and 1564, and that additional payments had been agreed upon. In exchange, L'Hôpital and Coligny would argue in the Conseil Privé that the Villegagnon affair did not concern the French Crown, but only Villegagnon. Dantas even mentions a written agreement with Coligny and L'Hôpital. In a previous meeting with Coligny, Dantas had prepared a gift and another payment for him, but Coligny had refused it, stating that he would still serve Portugal. Concerned by Coligny’s response, Dantas had written to a friend of L'Hôpital's, offering to pay his wife a pension with a diamond from a friend. However, L'Hôpital's friend accused Dantas of bribery and refused. Thus, Dantas maintained that the previous payment arrangements, as ordered by the Portuguese court, had led to this situation. He also criticized Lisbon for ordering him to engage in such dishonorable tactics. As Dantas had previously refused the idea of giving up Fort Coligny to the bishop of Orleans in exchange for him renouncing it on King Sebastian, he advised ending the payments altogether. Instead, he suggested exploiting the personal tensions between the Catholic Villegagnon and the Huguenot Coligny, as they would never agree and the French Crown would not assume responsibility for the Villegagnon affair. He concluded the letter by requesting final instructions. The ultimate position of Lisbon on this matter is not known, but it is documented that Portugal did approve compensation to Villegagnon in exchange for his renunciation of the Brazilian project.

Dantas's concern and negotiations with Villegagnon were fully justified by the rumors surrounding his departure, the letter of marque that was to be given to him, and the French overseas voyages that were in preparation in retaliation for the loss of Fort Coligny. Recently, Jean-Marc Montaigne has documented the fact that the loss of Fort Coligny in 1560 did not stall French voyages to Brazil in 1561 and 1562. The logs from Rouen alone, one of the main French ports at the time, contain records of several such expeditions. However, the author expressed doubt that Villegagnon was ever given a formal letter of marque. This interpretation is somewhat difficult to accept,

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35 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 70–71 and 72v.
36 Heulhard, Villegagnon, roi d'Amérique, 242–45.
37 Montaigne, La découverte du Brésil, 94–95 and 285.
given the documented negotiations between Dantas and Villegagnon, as well as the maritime intelligence on French overseas attempts that was sent to Portugal, which even led to Dantas's correspondence being seized by Queen Catherine de' Medici. The queen mother's seizure of Dantas's correspondence is a clear signal of her personal interest in the matter, as it is well-known that she used to issue such orders every time she sensed that France's geostrategic interests were at stake.

I concur with Charles-André Julien, who compared Dantas's negotiations with Villegagnon to those that Portuguese diplomacy initiated when Jean Ango received a letter of marque against the Portuguese in 1531. Julien pointed out that Dantas's discretion and skill allowed the Portuguese to resolve the issue much more easily than in 1531. Additionally, Dantas's aim was to permanently hinder all French overseas expeditions to Brazil, and the compensation that Villegagnon received from Portugal was important. While Dantas was occupied with these negotiations, he also fulfilled his orders to break other letters of marque against the Portuguese and spied the French expeditions to Florida.

Although Florida was outside the Portuguese sphere of influence according to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, Dantas warned Portugal of the preparations by Jean Ribault (1520–65), noting that the French had been there already in 1539. Dantas's December 1562 missive reveals not only his personal interest in the region, but also the fact that he had undertaken an espionage mission against the French. In this letter, Dantas detailed all the geographical discoveries made by Ribault's expedition in 1562. He described the coast of Florida and stated that he had in his possession the rutter and

39 Precisely for this reason, Queen Catherine ordered the seizure of the Spanish ambassadors’ correspondence and even the key to their cypher on several occasions. For more details see: Valentín Vásquez de Prada, *Felipe II y Francia. Política, Religión y Razón de Estado* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2004), 32–36.
41 It allowed Villegagnon to rebuild his life in France. It is important to underscore that after the deal with Dantas, Villegagnon remained a Catholic fighting the Huguenots in the French civil wars. Still, his life was complicated by his relations with the Huguenots to the point that he even considered entering King Philip II's service as he had served Emperor Charles V at Tunis in 1535. However, nothing came of this. It is worth highlighting this, though, as proof of how shifting circumstances could lead great naval commanders to serve a party they had previously perceived as their enemy. On Villegagnon's later days see: Provençal and Mariz, *Villegagnon e a França Antárctica*, 133–35.
cartography of the entire region made by the French. He offered to send the material to King Sebastian upon request—Dantas was worried about the effects of Ribault’s expedition, and eager to provide advice to Lisbon. Firstly, he warned that the French had sent Huguenots to deceive the inhabitants of the land. Secondly, he stated that the French were falsifying all the rutters and cartography to claim that the entire region had been discovered by them, in order to assert French ownership over the area in competition with Spain. Thirdly, he pointed out that the French were emulating the Portuguese tradition of placing landmarks with the arms of France on various sites to formally claim the area for the Valois. Dantas sent this intelligence because he feared that the French would attempt the same in Portuguese overseas areas. He also secretly sent his informant to Lisbon, requesting a reward for him. But why was Dantas so worried about Ribault?

The Portuguese ambassador knew well that Jean Ribault had started his career privateering against Portuguese and Spanish navigation in the fleets of Jean Ango in the English Channel. It is likely that Dantas was aware of Ribault’s previous dealings with England and France. What Dantas certainly did not ignore, and this would be chief among the reasons he transmitted the abovementioned details to Portugal, was that Ribault had the reputation of being one of France’s greatest naval commanders. Before Ribault’s departure in February 1562, Dantas must have been made aware that he was not going to sail to Portuguese overseas areas, as he lacked experience in long-distance Atlantic voyages. However, considering how French maritime plans against Spain frequently ended up targeting the Portuguese as well, Dantas decided to warn Lisbon before it was too late. As always in Dantas’s missives, promptly delivered maritime intelligence was the key to a successful response by the Portuguese government.

The information that Dantas sent to Lisbon was quickly assimilated by the Portuguese king, who instructed André Teles de Meneses, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, to inform King Philip II of the French plans in Florida. Despite the loss of the original, the contents of the letter that Dantas wrote to the king, detailing all the aspects of Ribault’s fleet and its departure in February 1562, were shared with King Philip II on March 6, 1562. In the communication, the Portuguese king explicitly mentioned the intelligence sent by Dantas from France. He instructed his ambassador to argue to King Philip II that Spain should take the French challenge in

43 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 4v.–5.
Florida seriously, as a French success would encourage even more raids by Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Scotsmen against the Iberian *Mare Clausum*. At this point, the Portuguese king came to his main argument: Philip II’s conflict with France in Florida was similar to the one Portugal had with the French in Brazil and West Africa. As such, Spain should respond swiftly.\(^{45}\)

Notably, on May 18, 1563, D. Alonso de Tovar, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon between 1561 and 1567, also reported some details to Philip II. Based on intelligence provided by the Portuguese government, Tovar mentioned preparations for another Anglo-French privateer fleet that had departed from Le Havre with the intention of attacking Spanish overseas territories.\(^{46}\)

Once more, the source of such details is likely to have been João Pereira Dantas’s letters from France. Still, how did Dantas obtain all this secret information, particularly on Jean Ribault’s expedition, which did not even target a Portuguese overseas area?

His correspondence reveals that, like his predecessors in France, Dantas had spies in the French ports. The Spanish ambassador Chantonnay reports in January 1563 how Dantas had acquired the intelligence: he had convinced the best pilot that the French employed in the expedition, who happened to be Portuguese, to return to his homeland.\(^{47}\) A recent study has told the story of the Portuguese pilot who had provided information to Dantas. Initially on the service of Spain, and later kidnapped by the French in the Caribbean, the Portuguese pilot Bartolomeu Borges was forced to guide French raids in the area and afterwards Jean Ribault’s expedition. The French continued to rely on Portuguese pilots for these purposes well after Borges.

For instance, in 1575, Luís Marques, a Portuguese pilot from Coimbra, was serving the French in the Caribbean.\(^{48}\) The situation recurred so frequent that a Spanish report sent from Santo Domingo to Spain in 1581 noted that “no French corsair ship comes to this land [the Caribbean] that does not bring a Portuguese pilot.”\(^{49}\) When Ribault’s fleet returned to France, Borges sought refuge and requested Dantas’s assistance going back to Portugal. Dantas provided him conditions to sail to Portugal, and it must have been part of the bargain that Dantas seized all the technical details of Ribault’s expedition from Borges.\(^{50}\) Thus, in a sense (and knowing that Ribault’s

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\(^{45}\) Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 381, doc. 41.

\(^{46}\) AGS, *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 380, doc. 88.


\(^{50}\) Vila-Santa, “The Untold Story,” 82–102.
expedition, as ordered by Coligny, was a continuation of French overseas plans in Brazil, albeit to a Spanish area. Dantas profited from this situation to gather details on the new geographical knowledge and to present it to King Sebastian. Dantas’s actions were not dissimilar to those of his rival ambassador Jean Nicot, as has been argued in the previous chapter, when he sent the work of Pedro Nunes to France. Both were attempting to take personal advantage of their countries’ maritime needs.

Nevertheless, Dantas’s interest in Florida and Ribault extended beyond mere gathering of intelligence. In March 1563, he informed Portugal that Jean Ribault had fled to England with a complete set of rutters and charts and warned that the English were rumored to be preparing expeditions to Florida. Although Dantas did not believe the rumors, he was concerned that English ships could use a French establishment in Florida as a base to launch raids on the Azores and specially against Portuguese East Indies vessels making their stopover there. He advised King Sebastian to discuss the matter with his advisors. Dantas did not mention the Englishman Thomas Stukley (1525–78) by name or his plans for a voyage to Florida in 1563 using Ribault’s pilots, but it is clear that Dantas was aware of these intentions. It is likely that Dantas did not report this to Portugal, although Stukley was given ships by Queen Elizabeth I to sail to Florida, but he did not voyage there. Cognizant of Coligny’s negotiations to bring Ribault back into Valois service, Dantas also sent word of Ribault’s failed attempt to return to France in July 1563. Dantas’s letters reveal that he was abreast of the collaboration at sea between French Huguenots and Protestant English against the Portuguese and Spanish. In May 1563, he discovered that the supposed English expedition to Florida was actually headed to Guinea and Mina. He lacked confirmation about French ships joining the English, as his agent Manuel de Araújo had refused to gather intelligence in French ports, due to fear of discovery and execution by the French. Taking stock of the situation, Dantas advised Portugal to send a fleet to the area to fight the English and French vessels, which is what ultimately happened. In this case, Dantas was well-informed and possessed accurate intelligence, even

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53 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 21v.–22v. and 31v.
54 ANTT, CC 1–106–70, fl. 1.
if he did not mention that Coligny provided victuals and materials for the English ships in 1563.\textsuperscript{55} Dantas's letters demonstrate that he was well-versed in the traditional exchange of maritime knowledge between England and France, specifically regarding Coligny and King Henry II's efforts to bring French pilots and cartographers, such as Jean Rotz or Jean Ribault, back to France.\textsuperscript{56} In a way, Dantas made his own contribution to the French defeat in Florida by providing critical intelligence on Ribault's expedition. The Portuguese royal family in February 1566 summoned D. Alonso de Tovar, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, to congratulate Spain on Pedro Menéndez de Avilés's (1519–74) victory over Jean Ribault.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, it is likely that Dantas also presented similar compliments to the Spanish ambassador in France, although no concrete reference is known. Dantas's correspondence also proves that, in addition to the abovementioned case of the Portuguese pilot on the Florida expedition, he employed all means necessary to prevent Portuguese nautical and cartographical expertise from landing in the hands of France and England. Dantas's attempts reveal the connection in his action between the Portuguese \textit{Mare Clausum} attempts vis-à-vis France that have been traced so far, and his \textit{Secret Science} policy. This policy was aimed at depriving France of Portuguese pilots for its overseas expeditions and also at disrupting their departures, the topic that will be analyzed below. Once more, Dantas's maneuvers are remarkably similar to what has been documented in chapters 1 and 2 for Spain and England. However, in Dantas's case, more details of Portuguese maritime espionage and counter-espionage are documented.

\textbf{4.1.2 Dantas's House of Talents: Harboring Portuguese Expertise Abroad}

During Dantas's embassy to France, encounters with Portuguese nautical experts were frequent. As in the previous case with Florida, they often involved Elizabethan England and later influenced King Philip II's action against Dantas. This was because Dantas's behavior towards the Portuguese in France was considered outrageous by Alava, the Spanish ambassador to France, and by some of King Sebastian's advisors.\textsuperscript{58} A description of each of

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\textsuperscript{55} Claire-Éliane Engel, \textit{L'Amiral de Coligny} (Genève; Labor et Fides, 1967), 162.


\textsuperscript{57} AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 384. This \textit{legajo} does not have folio numbers. The document is question is in the middle of the papers in a letter to King Philip II dated February 12, 1566.

\textsuperscript{58} Cruz, \textit{As regências na menoridade}, vol. II, 161.
these instances, from the least to the most significant, will lay the foundation for the subsequent discussion of Dantas’s downfall.

In October 1559, as France and England were contemplating sending a joint embassy to the sultan of Morocco, Dantas received word that the Portuguese Belchior Vaz de Azevedo was to depart as the ambassador. France had attempted to send Azevedo to Morocco in 1556, but he had been imprisoned in Spain. Upon his release, Dantas learned through his brother-in-law that Azevedo was secretly planning to negotiate an alliance between the sultan and Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, with the goal of expelling the Portuguese from their Moroccan fortresses and invading southern Spain. In a letter to Portugal, Dantas revealed these plans, promised to place a spy on board Azevedo’s vessel, and requested Portuguese-Spanish collaboration to prevent the French from landing in Morocco. In this case, he also recommended the execution of traitorous Portuguese like Azevedo.59 However, depending on the circumstances and on his own evaluation of Portuguese deserters’ motives, Dantas sometimes advocated for different strategies.

In December 1561, Dantas wrote a lengthy letter to Gaspar Ribeiro, a Portuguese merchant who had recently arrived in Lyon. Drawing upon arguments of biblical predestination, Dantas urged Ribeiro to return to Portugal, stressing the costliness of life in France and locals’ mistreatment of the Portuguese, as well as Ribeiro’s obligations as a patriot. Dantas stated that since Ribeiro’s departure from Portugal, he had been meaning to write him, despite this not being his usual practice. In response to Dantas’s letter, Ribeiro clarified that he had not come to France as a traitor, but rather because his wife and daughter had been imprisoned in Portugal and that he and his family had been received well in Lyon. He expressed gratitude for Dantas’s concern, but averred that he would not be returning to Portugal.60 Another missive from Dantas reveals that his actions were motivated by the circumstances under which Ribeiro had come to France: due to enticements from Jean Nicot. Dantas was outraged at Nicot’s negotiations to have Portuguese pilots sent to France;61 it has been underscored in the previous chapter how Coligny and the cardinal of Lorraine had made this special request of Nicot. Nevertheless, Dantas appears to have succeeded in sending Ribeiro away from France.62

59 ANTT, CC I–103–125, fls. 1–3.
60 ANTT, CC I–105–68/73.
61 ANTT, Fragmentos, box 1, maço 1, n.º 22, fls. 1–iv.
62 Ribeiro departed for business in Venice in June 1563. BA, 49–X–9, fl. 32v.
In the case of Gaspar Ribeiro, although there is no conclusive evidence of Ribeiro’s Jewish or New Christian origin, Dantas may have been influenced by the effects of a formal decree signed by King Henry II during the 1550s. This decree offered special conditions to Portuguese merchant Jews and New Christians who wanted to settle in France. Dantas intervened in such cases, and recommended that the Portuguese Inquisition soften persecution of Portuguese Jews and New Christians. Dantas presented this advice to King Sebastian in August 1562. Dantas excused himself for daring to speak about such delicate religious affairs, but maintained he did so due to the negative impact on his activities that the exodus of Portuguese Jews and New Christians from Portugal, and the resulting influx of money and knowledge into France, was having. He stated that he had personally met some of these families in France, and that most of them should be included in a general pardon that he proposed Portuguese authorities could issue in order to stop the draining of money and resources. There is no sign that Dantas’s advice on sensitive Inquisition persecutions against New Christians in Portugal was seriously considered.

In other cases, Dantas did not hesitate to steal servants from Queen Catherine de’ Medici to enlist them for Portuguese service, as he had done in the case of rutters and cartography on Florida. In January 1563, Dantas recommended to King Sebastian the services of the German Nicolau de Lambarch, whom he envisaged as a possible informant on Huguenot maritime movements against Portugal. Dantas states that he had negotiated in secrecy to have Lambarch come to Portugal, and had convinced Lambarch that the queen mother was unable to pay him what she had promised because France had been torn asunder by the first civil war. As Lambarch had an unspecified secret invention, and to ensure his departure to Portugal, Dantas offered him better conditions than the queen had. Despite their formal rivalry, a Portuguese ambassador (Dantas) could employ the same methods for acquiring knowledge as a French one (Nicot)—even if Dantas had criticized Nicot for this very tactic in the case of Gaspar Ribeiro.

In May 1564, Dantas accommodated a talented, 26-year-old German polyglot in his home, who besides his mother tongue spoke Flemish, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and a little English. He recommended that King Sebastian employ him as a royal interpreter and vowed that Portugal would never again find such a gifted individual. By March 1565, Dantas

63 Montaigne, La découverte du Brésil, 581–84.
64 ANTT, CC I–106–45, fl. iv.–2.
indicated that he was still housing this interpreter and promised to bring him along when he returned to Portugal. It is unclear if this German savant entered Portuguese service when Dantas returned to Portugal, but it is undeniable that despite being disturbed by the attempts of foreign crowns to woo Portuguese experts, the ambassador was always keen on recruiting foreign personnel into Portuguese service. It is not far-fetched to assume that he accommodated even more scientific experts in his house than those mentioned explicitly in his correspondence.

Meanwhile, Dantas also kept a close eye on Portuguese pilots arriving in France. In March 1563, he wrote that he had convinced the abovementioned Bartolomeu Borges (one of Jean Ribault’s pilots) to return to Portugal to prevent any damage from him speaking out. He was surprised therefore that King Sebastian had allowed him to return via Flanders, rather than directly by ship, which increased opportunities for Borges to flee. In this instance, as previously mentioned, Dantas intervened to ensure that Borges would sail to Portugal and not elsewhere. Additionally, in October 1564, Dantas commented on a denunciation against the pilot Gonçalo Birão sent from Portugal. Although Dantas does not mention the nature of the accusation, he advised caution in any dealings with the denouncers, as they could be lying. He warned that a good Portuguese pilot in France was not necessarily a traitor to Portugal, emphasizing the need to carefully analyze each case before reaching final conclusions. Such an outlook explains why Dantas would come to the defense of Portuguese pilots despite the officially declared goals of the Portuguese government, as will be detailed in the next section. Dantas’s reasons for hosting the Homem brothers, Portuguese cosmographers, are less obvious.

In September 1562, Dantas reported that the sons of Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem had been staying with him for two years, and requested stipends to them. But by July 1563, none had arrived from the Portuguese king, and Dantas complained of his difficulty retaining André, António, and Tomé Homem. He even claimed that they had considered fleeing his house, and that he had only prevented their escape with promises that King Sebastian would grant them an income in Portugal. Dantas insisted that all, but especially André, were leading experts in the science of chart

65 BA, 49–X–9, fl. 53–53v; ANTT, CC I–107–59, fls. 1–1v.
66 BA, 49–X–9, fl. 32v. and 65.
67 There has been a controversy over whether André Homem was the son of Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem, or a more distant relative. However, Dantas’s letters mentioned in the next note clearly refer to him as Lopo Homem’s son.
production and reiterated his own extensive experience and longstanding interest in this sort of personnel. He contended that the king should not hesitate to grant them what they asked, as they could find work in any part of the world, and requested a stipend of 100 cruzados so that he could convince the brothers to embark for India. He finished the letter by stating that it would be a terrible mistake not to prize the value of common people with such abilities as Lopo Homem’s sons. In May 1564, when Dantas finally received the money, he delayed the brothers’ departure in the face of André’s complaints that the payment was insufficient. As Dantas was about to leave Paris, he assured King Sebastian that, in his absence, André Homem would inform him about everything. 68 Dantas probably employed André as his agent for spying on Admiral Coligny’s movements and intentions.

Nevertheless, it is probable that during Dantas’s absence, as he accompanied King Charles IX and Queen Catherine de’ Medici on their grand tour of France, André entered Coligny’s service. Dantas reports in a March 1565 letter that, André had an altercation with one of his servants in July 1564, fled his home, and went to Coligny’s house to present him a globe. Coligny had in return given him money to keep him in French service. Thus, León Bourdon’s hypothesis that Dantas tried to negotiate André Homem’s repatriation in his meeting with Coligny at Châtillon, in late 1564, is very plausible. In the March 1565 missive, Dantas mentions that he had been trying to convince André to return to Portugal. 69 André Homem, in a February 1565 letter to Dantas, states that he had already been accepted as King Charles IX’s cosmographer and that Dantas’s efforts to undermine his scientific reputation had failed. He also notes that he had offered the globe to Coligny because Dantas had not fulfilled his promise to secure him a pension of 1350 cruzados from King Sebastian. André Homem states that he would still consider returning to Dantas’s house if his debts were paid and the pension was granted. 71 Dantas’s reply to this letter seems not to have survived. Regardless, by late 1566, the Spanish ambassador Alava reports that Dantas sent António and Tomé, but not André, to Portugal. 72

Dantas’s involvement with André Homem can be attributed to the exceptional cartographical abilities of the latter, as demonstrated by the atlas he authored in Antwerp in 1559. The date of André’s departure from

68 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 32v.–33, 52v. and 87.
69 Bourdon, André Homem, 16–17.
72 Bourdon, André Homem, 22–23.
Portugal is unknown, although it has been argued that it was prior to 1554. Though the individual or organization that commissioned the atlas remains unknown, Dantas’s abovementioned letters indicate that André Homem came to Dantas’s house shortly after its completion in 1560. As a man with a personal interest in nautical charts and cartography, Dantas may have learned of André Homem’s atlas in 1559–60. Moreover, given that Dantas maintained regular correspondence with Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese overseer/consul at Antwerp, to whom he sent Bartolomeu Borges (one of Jean Ribault’s pilots) in 1563, it is possible that Dantas was informed of André Homem’s atlas by Vasconcelos in 1559–60. It is likely that, as he did in the case of the merchant Gaspar Ribeiro, Dantas wrote to André Homem inviting him to his house in Paris and offering him employment. This must remain speculation, however, as Dantas’s correspondence for this period (1559–60) is conspicuously incomplete.

After entering Coligny’s service, it appears that André Homem spent some time in the service of King Charles IX. In 1567, he traveled to England with the Portuguese pilots Gaspar Caldeira and Antão Luís to propose an expedition to a West African Eldorado to Queen Elizabeth I. While it is unknown whether André Homem or his brother Diogo Homem, a well-known Portuguese cartographer with several maps made in Venice, was the first to arrive in England, it seems likely that it was André. Given the similarities in cartographical technique between André Homem’s Antwerp atlas of 1559 and his brother Diogo Homem’s atlas commissioned by Queen Mary I in 1558, it would appear that André had convinced his brother Diogo to come to England. But André Homem left England under hazy circumstances, and at some point, Diogo Homem was jailed by English authorities.74 When

74 This hypothesis arises from the fact that Diego Guzmán da Silva, the Spanish ambassador to England, mentions the imprisonment of Diogo Homem in a missive. However, Forquevaux, the French ambassador in Spain, mentions André Homem’s presence in northern Spain with the pilots Caldeira and Luís, when they were jailed. Therefore, it is possible that André initially went to England with Caldeira and Luís, but left before them. The lack of available documentation does not allow confirmation. It is known that Diogo Homem was jailed in England and after his release, he chose to live out his final days in Venice, far away from any attempts by Portugal to repatriate him by force in Spain, France, or England. By 1567–68, Diogo Homem had already made another atlas (estimated to have been created between 1563–65 according to some experts), which is preserved today in Russia and could have been used by any maritime power to plan overseas expeditions (as the atlas included charts of the entire world). However, it remains unclear what Diogo Homem’s intention was when he designed the atlas, but there is no doubt that it is another example of the exceptional cartographical skills of the Portuguese in the Late Renaissance (Kildushevskaya and Pinheiro Marques, Atlas Universal, 158, 189 and 255).
André returned to Coligny’s house (at an unspecified date, but probably still in 1567), Dantas sent Miguel Guedes to keep track of his movements. By 1567, Dantas seems to have regained André’s trust, for the latter had agreed to stay at Coligny’s house to spy on his activities.75

Dantas’s interactions with André Homem had an added element that differentiated them from his dealings with other Portuguese nautical experts. The Pereira lineage, of which Dantas was a descendant, had a special connection with the Homem lineage dating back to medieval times. According to one story, the first Homem had been nicknamed Homem by an influential Pereira after a fierce battle. To praise his soldier, Pereira called him “Homem” (“man” in English), to suggest that his military deeds had transformed him into a great man. From then onwards, there was a relationship of service and dependency between the two lineages, of which Dantas was certainly aware. One can sense remnants of this tradition between the Homem and Pereira lineages in the way he treated André Homem.

The cases of Gaspar Caldeira and Antão Luís, two Portuguese pilots Dantas attempted to accommodate in his house for some time, provide insight into Dantas’s espionage and counter-espionage activities in France and England. In order to understand Dantas’s maneuvers, we must first become acquainted with Caldeira and Luís and their reasons for migration. Caldeira and Luís left Portugal because the regent, Cardinal Henry, had seized their illegal trade cargos from West Africa in Lisbon. At the time, Caldeira and Luís belonged to a long list of private Portuguese adventurers who attempted to make personal profit by violating the Portuguese Crown’s commercial monopoly in West Africa. Within this context, Caldeira and Luís fled to Spain in 1564, where they proposed to organize an expedition to a non-fortified Portuguese area in West Africa. King Philip II gave them six months to launch the expedition and provided them with written documents formally authorizing their journey. When they failed to prepare it, they fled to France.76

By July 1565, Dantas reported, without mentioning their names, that two Portuguese men disguised as pepper and gold merchants had appeared at the Valois court. They were quickly received by the Queen Catherine de’ Medici and by the Constable Anne de Montmorency. Although Dantas was unable to discover what they said, he immediately suspected that they were to guide a French expedition to Benin. At that moment, he only knew that

75 León Bourdon, Deux aventuriers portugais: Gaspar Caldeira et Antão Luís (1564–1568) (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, 1955), 14.
76 Bourdon, Deux aventuriers portugais, 8–9.
they had been sent to serve Captain Peyrot de Monluc (?–1566), who was preparing a fleet for Canada in Guyenne. Possibly because of this, in August, during his secret meeting with the duke of Alba at the Franco-Spanish border in Bayonne, Dantas proposed a maritime alliance between Portugal and Spain against French and English forays into Florida and other places. The letter also implies that Dantas suggested an agreement to Alba to prevent Portuguese experts from crossing the Franco-Spanish border. Alba would have quickly recognized the importance of Dantas’s proposal, and consequently promised Dantas that he would raise the issue with the king upon his return to Madrid, and that King Philip II would reply directly to King Sebastian. Some days later after meeting Alba, Dantas already had Caldeira and Luís spied upon.

Examining Spanish documents, there are strong indications that Dantas was informed of the arrival of Gaspar Caldeira and Antão Luís in France by D. Francés de Alava, the Spanish ambassador in France, though Dantas did not admit it. In a letter dated June 13, 1565, which was written before Dantas’s first communication on the topic, Alava reported the arrival of Caldeira and Luís at the Valois court. Both were identified by Alava as “well-versed in the Indies of Portugal.” Alava stated that they had been attended to by the French constable, the queen mother, and all members of the Conseil Privé. After the meeting, the vice-admiralty of Guyenne had been granted to Peyrot de Monluc, and a new maritime expedition was being prepared with financial contributions from Peyrot’s uncle (the bishop of Valence) and Michel de Seure (?–1593), the French ambassador to Portugal between 1557 and 1559. Alava suspected it was to head to two islands near Brazil, but he could not be certain. Not long before, Alava had also been informed of two unnamed Portuguese sailors who had arrived in England with enticing promises for the English. As the matter was delicate, Alava informed King Philip II and Dantas.

Another missive, this time from the duke of Alba to Juan Manrique and King Philip II, dated June 28, 1565 and signed from Bayonne, mentions Alba’s meeting with Dantas. The letter is relevant in that it reveals how Dantas went about proposing a maritime alliance between Portugal and Spain to Alba. To gain Alba’s favor, Dantas began by expressing sympathy with Spain regarding the French expeditions to Florida, which Dantas deemed intolerable. Although Alba did not explicitly state it, it is likely that Dantas reminded Alba of his previous provisions of intelligence to Spain on French

77 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 79v.–80 and 83.
plans in Florida. Only after this ingratiating prelude did Dantas formally propose a maritime alliance between Portugal and Spain to defend both overseas hemispheres, not only from France but also from other potential intruders (an indirect reference to England). Alba replied that he was not familiar with those seas (i.e., the Atlantic) but that he considered Dantas's suggestion worthy of consideration and would raise the issue with King Philip II. With a well-crafted speech, Dantas had sought to both impress King Philip II's court, and again attempted to secure Spain's defense of Portuguese interests, arguing that doing so would deter not only France but also England. But Dantas's scheme had motives concerning the pilots Luís and Caldeira that were hidden from his interlocutor.

In August 1565, in response to Caldeira's and Luis' plans, Dantas interrupted his ambassadorial duties to accompany King Charles IX. Having discovered that the two pilots were being held prisoner in a castle in Guyenne, he sent the friar António Pinto and then his servant Diogo Ribeiro to speak with them. Dantas stated that Luís and Caldeira had a limited understanding of their fates. Still, Luís was more open to the idea of returning to Portugal than Caldeira. Dantas even sent King Sebastian his correspondence with Caldeira and Luís to further push them to go home, but stated that he did not promise them what had been promised to pilot António Eanes Pinteado when he fled to England in 1551–52 (and ended up training English seamen). Dantas further reported that Luís and Caldeira had presented Portuguese nautical rutters and charts to the French, some of which had been confiscated by Captain Peyrot de Monluc. For his part, Caldeira had complained that if he had known the French would treat him like this, he would have gone to serve in Istanbul, a comment revealing that what truly mattered to Portuguese nautical experts was being properly compensated for their technical knowledge. Hearing all this, Dantas was understandably worried that the nautical and cartographical intelligence presented by Caldeira and Luís to Monluc would motivate the French to sail not to Canada, as was officially stated, but to Guinea and Mina. Thus, Dantas urged the Portuguese king to send a fleet to the region and immediately spoke with his friend Jean Monluc (1502–79), the bishop of Valence and uncle of Captain Peyrot de Monluc. Dantas confronted him with his nephew's designs on Portuguese overseas areas and threatened to bring the case before King Charles IX. The bishop swore to Dantas that he knew nothing of it. Thus, Dantas advised Lisbon to send a formal protest letter to King Charles and he asked for instructions on what he should do regarding Caldeira if he did

not agree to return to Portugal. Essentially, Dantas was asking for formal authorization to order his killing. He finished this letter to King Sebastian by recommending a generous grant to Michel de Seure, as he disapproved of Peyrot de Monluc’s anti-Portuguese plans.80

Seure’s statement was intended to mislead Dantas about the true intentions of Monluc’s ships. As Alava confirmed, he was one of the investors of Monluc’s fleet, and the evidence put forth in the previous chapter demonstrates Seure’s anti-Portuguese approach both during his embassy in Lisbon and afterwards. Uncertainty about Monluc’s final destination is also attested in Spanish documents. In a letter to King Philip II, dated August 5, 1565, Alava asserted again that Monluc would sail to Brazil. However, in an October 31, 1565, missive addressed to King Philip II, he reported that a Portuguese woman had arrived in France with intelligence on the Portuguese war fleet, which she had given to Monluc. Thus, Alava was unsure whether Monluc might mean to simply attack the Portuguese war fleet. On March 2, 1566, further doubts were cast by another agent of King Philip II in France. This agent mentioned that although Monluc’s preparations were ostensibly for Brazil, he considered this to be a misdirected rumor. Instead, he believed that Monluc would sail to Florida to avenge Jean Ribault’s death and the defeat that Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had inflicted on the French. As late as October 1566, shortly before Madeira was attacked, Alava wrote to King Philip II that according to some mariners from Monluc’s fleet who had returned to Brittany, Monluc had his eye on the Portuguese fortress of Mina, which was not ready to withstand a surprise French attack.81

Alava’s mixed intelligence had also proved wrong in 1565 with respect to Jean Ribault’s expedition to Florida the same year. Alava had not taken the maritime preparations in Normandy seriously, and this fact had forced King Philip II to send a special spy from Madrid, Dr. Enveja, to check on the activities personally. Dr. Enveja was quick to confirm that Ribault’s ambitions were greater than what Alava had thought.82 Thus, in the 1566 Monluc case, as in 1565 regarding Ribault, Alava’s intelligence was largely incorrect. The true destination of Monluc’s expedition was a closely guarded secret, and neither Portuguese nor Spanish spies were able to find out that it would attack Madeira.83

80 BA, 49–X–9, fls. 85–85v. and 87v.–88v.
81Archivo, vol. VIII, 1954, docs. 1126, 1157, 1204 and 1300.
82 McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 129.
As has already been argued, there are good reasons to believe that Admiral Coligny also intervened in the affair (specifically by convincing Peyrot de Monluc to attack the Portuguese overseas to avenge the French defeat at Fort Coligny). It is important to remember that Dantas’s abovementioned reference to Coligny’s refusal of his bribe (in the March 1565 letter) could be connected with the admiral’s change of position. This shift might also have been influenced by events that led to the second French civil war in 1566. To help France recover from the religious wars, Coligny continually sought to unite French Catholics and Huguenots in a war against Spain; by supporting Peyrot de Monluc, he could achieve two goals simultaneously. He could continue to promote his anti-Spanish policy overseas, while simultaneously exploiting the rivalry between a Catholic son (Peyrot de Monluc) and his Catholic father (Blaise de Monluc), which would certainly be of interest to Coligny as a Huguenot leader. Additionally, there is documentary evidence in one of Coligny’s letters to Queen Catherine de’ Medici that he aided French explorations on the West African coast in 1566, lending further credence to the possibility of his involvement with Peyrot de Monluc. Coligny’s interference here would not have been dissimilar to what had occurred in 1565 with Jean Ribault’s expedition to Florida. Initially, Coligny had ordered Ribault not to wage war against the Spanish, but at the last moment, he wrote to Ribault informing him of Spanish plans against him and authorizing military action. This fact is confirmed by Ribault’s own speech to his men, already in Florida, when he was confronted with the arrival of the Spanish fleet of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. Ribault brandished Coligny’s letters, showing all present that the French admiral had written “Ribault, we have been warned that the Spaniard wants to attack you; see that you yield him nothing and you will be doing right.”

In February 1566, shortly before departing for Portugal, Dantas expressed hope that Luís would return to Portugal but stated that Caldeira would still serve the French, as Peyrot de Monluc’s fleet had not yet set sail. Taking stock


84 Julien, Les voyages de découverte, 227 and 264.
86 McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 141.
of the situation, Dantas wrote to King Sebastian that the Portuguese war fleet was not needed at sea to fight the French.87 This unfortunate letter would tarnish Dantas’s reputation; Peyrot de Monluc attacked Madeira in October 1566, and Luís and Caldeira guided the French fleet as pilots. Under unclear circumstances, Luís ultimately abandoned Dantas to serve Peyrot de Monluc. This is quite reminiscent of what had transpired with André Homem, and may in part explain why Luís and André Homem ended up collaborating against Dantas in England. Nevertheless, soon after Dantas returned to France in late 1566, he was ordered by Cardinal Henry to arrest Luís and Caldeira and send them to Portugal. This mandate triggered a counter-espionage operation involving England, France, and Spain, orchestrated by Dantas in an effort to capture the two pilots.

In February 1567, Dantas received word that the English were planning an expedition to China by sailing westwards, in which a prominent Portuguese cosmographer (likely André Homem or his brother Diogo Homem) would participate. By May 1567, Diego Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador to England between 1564 and 1568, reported that Caldeira and Luís had arrived in England. By September 1567, news confirmed that they were set to take part in John Hawkins’s (1532–95) third voyage, which would sail for Guinea and Mina.88 In response, Dantas ordered two of his men to travel to England and convince Luís and Caldeira to return to his service, and warned Portugal of their departure with Hawkins’s fleet. The dealings of Gabriel Pereira, one of Dantas’s agents, with Luís and Caldeira read like a 16th-century police thriller, complete with emotional accounts of persecution and accusations of treachery.89 Although Pereira failed to convince Luís and Caldeira to return, it is highly probable that they largely fled Hawkins’s service because of Dantas’s promises. One letter by Guzmán de Silva, dated September 27, 1567, states that Caldeira and Luís abandoned Hawkins because of Dantas’s assurances of a safe return to his house in France.90

Prior to these events, Guzmán de Silva had revealed that Luís and Caldeira had arrived in England under the guise of Spanish names, carrying letters from King Philip II detailing the organization of an expedition to West Africa. However, they had been met with suspicion as it was believed they could easily propose the same plan to France, which was, after all, closer to the intended destination. Thus, Luís and Caldeira attempted to hide

87 ANTT, CC I–107–105, fls. 1–1v.
90 Hume, Calendar … (Simancas), 1538–1567, 433.
the fact that they had guided Monluc's fleet to Madeira. Their attempt was prompted by Dantas's early efforts to ensure that Queen Elizabeth I would not harbor any of Monluc's men in England, as shall be detailed in another section of this chapter. After Luís and Caldeira's ploy had failed, both entered into direct contact with London merchants. It was at this point that Guzmán de Silva discovered their true identity and warned King Philip II of their involvement in guiding Monluc to Madeira.91 Still, both successfully absconded from Hawkins, deceiving William Wynter (1519–89) and the queen,92 to whom they had again proposed the expedition to a West African Eldorado. Hawkins was considered responsible for their escape by Edward Clinton (1512–1584), the English Lord Admiral, and had to justify himself to Queen Elizabeth I. In the end, Caldeira and Luís flight was also motivated by the theft of their goods by Anthony Godart, John Hawkins's fleet interpreter, and John Hawkins was able to use their fresh escape to confuse Guzmán de Silva about the final destination of his voyage.93

Dantas must have promised Luís and Caldeira that he would convince King Sebastian to pardon them. In late 1567, Dantas temporarily sheltered them in his home before sending them to the Spanish border in disguise,94 where they were arrested and sent to Portugal. In February 1568, Gaspar Caldeira, Antão Luís, and another pilot, Belchior Contreiras, were publicly executed in Lisbon for their guidance of Peyrot de Monluc's expedition to Madeira. Caldeira's and Luís's imprisonment at Fuenterrabia was only made possible, as Raymond de Fourquevaux (1508–74), the French ambassador to Spain between 1565 and 1572, noticed, because in November 1567, Portugal and Spain agreed to bar the arrival of Portuguese pilots and cartographers in France.95 Dantas's proposal to Alba and King Philip II in 1565 had finally taken effect in 1567. The agreement that Fourquevaux mentions was the Iberian reaction to another remarkable success of French nautical espionage in both Portugal and Spain during the same year.

After the appearance of the Portuguese cosmographer Bartolomeu Velho (?–1568) in France in 1567, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon succeeded in preventing the Portuguese nautical expert Fernando Oliveira (1507–85) from entering Valois service.96 The hiring of Velho and Oliveira had been

91 Hume, Calendar ... (Simancas), 1558–1567, 666–67.
92 Loades, England's Maritime Empire, 93.
93 Kelsey, Sir John Hawkins, 47 and 54. See also Calendar of the Cecil Papers, 1: doc. 1139.
94 Bourdon, Deux aventuriers portugais, 16–18, 21–22 and 26–30.
95 Bourdon, Deux aventuriers portugais, 31.
arranged by the Italian merchant Francisco d’Albagno, who had contacts in Lisbon and wrote to both on behalf of the king of France with various promises. Later, when visiting Lisbon, Albagno presented his proposals in person.97 It is plausible that the hiring of Velho had also involved Coligny, as it is unlikely that the negotiation in Lisbon could have been completed without the French admiral’s knowledge.98 This negotiation might have been facilitated by Nicot’s acquaintance with Oliveira’s work and probably a meeting with him in Lisbon somewhere between 1559 and 1561. Julien has argued that it was Nicot who suggested Coligny to hire Velho in 1567.99

For this reason, it is also likely that Coligny was interested in having Fernando Oliveira in the service of the Valois, given his previous services to France.100 Moreover, it is plausible that Nicot met Velho during his embassy in Lisbon, as Velho was probably Nicot’s informant on the secret package that Nicot had sent in April 1561 to Queen Catherine de’ Medici (regarding the “meridional countries”). Though, as has been demonstrated, Nicot did not specify the geographical area or identity of his informant, his report aligns with what Velho proposed to France in 1567: an expedition to a third continent rich in gold and free from Portuguese and Spanish presence. It is possible that Nicot’s “meridional countries” and Velho’s “third continent” refer to the same place: *Terra Australis*, which cosmographers commonly placed in low latitudes above the Strait of Magellan. If this is the case, it would explain why Nicot suggested that Coligny recruit Bartolomeu Velho and possibly Fernando Oliveira.

Even though Velho’s arrival in France did not immediately result in the materialization of French overseas plans, his ideas and data continued to be used by Coligny in 1571 and by the Huguenot writer Lancelor Voisin de La Popelinière (1541–1608) in 1582 for new French overseas projects. During the

1580s, and like Richard Hakluyt in England, La Popelinière clearly conceived the Portuguese overseas empire as a model worth emulating and studying. His 1582 Les trois mondes included entire sections about Portuguese overseas discoveries,101 and in 1584 he published L’amiral de France, a plea addressed to the French admiral at the time for France to follow Portuguese and Spanish maritime and overseas examples.102 Returning to Velho, the importance of his material is revealed by another fact. He had brought a proposal to France to measure longitude at sea with a sun watch, as can be seen in his Principles of Cosmography preserved today in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.103 Once Velho’s arrival in France was known in Portugal (certainly via a now lost letter by Dantas), Cardinal Henry asked King Philip II to jail André d’Albagno, Francisco d’Albagno’s brother, as he had used his residence in Spain to assist Velho in his passage from Spain to France. Spain granted this Portuguese wish, but King Philip II later released André d’Albagno at King Charles IX’s request, after Velho’s and Francisco d’Albagno’s deaths in France.104 The cardinal also ordered one of his officers to investigate how Velho had been able to leave Portugal without being noticed.105

The French attempts to hire Velho and Oliveira are directly related to Coligny’s maritime plans up to his death in 1572. Although they are not the focus of this chapter (as they fell outside the period of Dantas’s embassy), it is important to stress that the French admiral’s most aggressive maritime policy against Portuguese and Spanish overseas interests came precisely between 1568 and 1572. A good example of this is Jacques de Soria’s famous 1570 attack on a Portuguese fleet that carried several Jesuits and the new Portuguese governor of Brazil, D. Luís Vasconcelos e Meneses. The assault resulted in a similar outcome to the attack on Madeira of 1566, with some sources claiming that the sea turned red with blood. Soria acted under the direction of Coligny, who had long supported his vice-admiral. Likewise,

101 This could have been inspired by the author’s acquaintance with a manuscript version of the Treatise by the Portuguese António Galvão (1490–1557), which was an earlier Portuguese attempt at recounting Portuguese overseas history in the 16th century (See Giuseppe Marcocci, The Globe on Paper: Writing Histories of the World in Renaissance Europe & the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 76–77).
103 Cortesão, Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses, vol. II, 243; For Velho’s cosmography see: Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), GE 266.
in 1571, Coligny spent some months in La Rochelle, gathering geographical intelligence from Portuguese cartographers and pilots. His use of Portuguese pilots for French expeditions hints at a reason for his decisive intervention to save the Portuguese pilot Mimoso from execution by the French (to the fury of the Spanish ambassador Alava, as will be discussed in the next section). Coligny’s intention to employ Portuguese pilots and cartographers was already evident previously when dealing with Portuguese cosmographer André Homem, whom he placed in King Charles IX’s service in 1564, and with Bartolomeu Borges, the Portuguese pilot who guided Jean Ribault to Florida in 1562. Thus, future investigations may yet reveal further cases of Coligny’s hiring of Portuguese nautical experts.

Coligny’s maritime policy was not only anti-Spanish, it was also anti-Portuguese, a fact that explains his becoming one of the greatest enemies, not only of King Philip II,107 but also of King Sebastian. It is no coincidence that the Portuguese and Spanish courts were pleased by the admiral’s death in the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre in August 1572. With Coligny out of the picture, the Valois court lost the only man in France with a systematic policy for building up a French overseas empire, free from any attempts to disrupt his plans from outside (by Spain and Portugal) and from within France (the Catholic party and Queen Catherine de Medici’s general opposition owing to the fear of open war with Spain). Coligny’s maritime and Protestant leadership against Portugal and Spain also made an impact on England and later on the Dutch Republic, opening a door for newcomers to try their hand at overseas expansion. Again, it was not by chance that Coligny always maintained close relations with Protestant maritime leaders in both places and even prepared joint expeditions with English and Dutch leaders targeting the Spanish and the Portuguese.110

106 See Vila-Santa, “The Untold Story.”
108 This fact is revealed by both courts’ appeal to King Charles IX to organize a final “crusade” against the Huguenots. In King Sebastian’s case, this even motivated a long letter and the dispatch of D. Dinis de Lencastre, of Portuguese royal lineage, to King Charles IX (Chichkine, “Mirage d’une alliance,” 53).
110 Throughout this chapter, various examples of Anglo-French maritime collaboration have been identified. In particular, the Dutch case is noteworthy for its early occurrence, as only three years after the initiation of the rebellion against King Philip II in the Netherlands, Coligny began utilizing Dutch mariners in the French navy under the Protestant banner, as part of his anti-Iberian policy. This collaboration was further strengthened in 1571, with the arrival of Louis of Nassau, the brother of William of Orange, in France. Together, they assembled a fleet of seventy to eighty ships and formulated plans to launch attacks on Spanish overseas settlements.
Still, even Coligny’s death did not mean that French overseas ambitions and attacks against the Portuguese declined. Good evidence to this effect is provided in the correspondence of Monsignor Andrea Giovanni Caligari, the papal collector in Portugal between 1575 and 1577, with Rome.\textsuperscript{111}

It is important to return to the question of whether Dantas was aware of Coligny’s plans, Albagno’s negotiation in Lisbon, and Bartolomeu Velho’s defection to France. There is no known record of Dantas’s activities at this time, as the critical moments in these episodes unfolded in Lisbon, and Dantas’s correspondence in 1567 is incomplete. Still, some authors have proposed the hypothesis that Velho’s premature death shortly after arriving in France might have resulted from traditional Portuguese secrecy policies.\textsuperscript{112} Indirectly, it has even been suggested that Dantas might have been behind such a plot to kill Velho. Given Dantas’s espionage network, it is likely that at the very least he was apprised of the latest events, and it is still possible that some new documents may be found implicating Dantas in the premature death of Velho, as such a course fits well with his Secret Science policy. The dangers of the espionage and counter-espionage that Dantas undertook in France and England were noticed by Spain. Indeed, Dantas’s non-collaboration with Spain (due to the Portuguese pilot Mimoso) would shape the twilight of his embassy, in 1567–68.

4.1.3 “French and Huguenot”: Spain and Dantas’s Downfall

The termination of Dantas’s diplomatic mission to France can be traced back to the French attack on Madeira and to the negotiations for King Sebastian’s possible marriage with Princess Margaret of Valois (1553–1615). However, it must be noted that Dantas was not dismissed from his role as ambassador due to his alleged weak performance at the Valois court following the Madeira affair, but rather as a result of a systematic campaign against him by Alava, the Spanish ambassador to France. In order to fully understand Dantas’s downfall, it is crucial to contextualize these events.

\textsuperscript{111} In several of his letters, dated 1575, Caligari reveals his astonishment at the audacity of French Huguenot corsairs and pirates from La Rochelle, who not only robbed the Portuguese of large amounts of money, but nearly entered Lisbon’s harbour with impunity. According to his report, their raids were so frequent and successful that they even caused the Portuguese King’s planned voyage from Algarve to Morocco to be aborted in 1575 (Vatican Apostolic Archive (VAA), Nunziatura di Portugallo, 2, ffs. 60–61 and 124–124v.)

\textsuperscript{112} Kildushevskaya and Pinheiro Marques, Atlas Universal, 106.
In March 1566, Queen Catherine de’ Medici dispatched Dantas to Lisbon with the task of negotiating a dynastic marriage between King Sebastian and her daughter Margaret of Valois. On March 16, 1566, Alava reported the details of Dantas’s departure for Portugal to King Philip II. He began by noting that “of this ambassador of Portugal there is the opinion that he is so French in every way, as if he were a native of Paris.” Alava then denounced Dantas for frequently meeting with Admiral Coligny, which had raised suspicions about his intentions. After speaking with Queen Catherine de’ Medici on two or three occasions, Dantas approached Alava to express his grievances. He questioned why King Philip II was opposing the marriage of King Charles IX with Princess Elizabeth of Austria (1554–92), Emperor Maximilian II’s daughter (1527–76), instead advocating for King Sebastian to wed her. Dantas argued that such a marriage would not serve the best interests of Portugal, and pointed out that if King Sebastian were to marry into the French royal family, both Portugal and France would be united by marriage, as well as Spain. After delivering his public defense of King Sebastian’s marriage in France, Dantas made an impassioned speech to Alava on the greatness of Portugal, “that killed me,” as Alava commented. In response to Dantas’s argument for King Sebastian’s marriage to Princess Margaret of Valois, Alava excused himself for not taking a stance, citing his lack of knowledge about the details of King Philip’s negotiations with Emperor Maximilian, and promised Dantas that Spain would always defend Portuguese interests.

Ultimately, Alava revealed to King Philip II that Dantas had been dispatched by Queen Catherine de’ Medici and the French Constable Anne de Montmorency to propose the marriage of King Sebastian with Princess Margaret of Valois. If this marriage were to be successfully negotiated and consummated, the Portuguese Princess Mary would receive all the money that was owed to her on her French estates. Dantas would also financially benefit from this arrangement, as Princess Mary had promised to share a portion of the recovered funds with him. Alava concluded his letter to King

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113 Dantas was referring to the fact that King Philip II had already married Queen Elizabeth of Valois, also known in Spain as “Isabelle of Peace”, as part of the Cateau-Cambrésis peace treaty. In his speech, Dantas argued that a French-Portuguese marriage alliance would also aid efforts to improve Franco-Spanish relations. He attempted to convince Alava that Portugal would align itself with Spain in urging France to consider Iberian marriage proposals, as opposed to other potential offers from England, Germany, or Italy. Once again, Dantas employed wise arguments based on European politics to make his case.

114 These negotiations dealt with the Portuguese princess’s inheritance in southern France, left to her in her mother’s last will. For more details see: Serrão, A Infanta Dona Maria.
Philip II by reporting that Dantas would not be traveling to Portugal by land, but by sea, which was in line with his political stance of supporting the French position over the Spanish one. Upon reading this letter, King Philip II wrote: “it is important to consider warning Portugal or my sister.” Here, Philip had more in mind than just informing his sister Princess Juana of Austria, whom he knew to be opposed to the French marriage of her son King Sebastian. He was also thinking of his ambassador in Portugal, and particularly of his aunt, Queen Catherine of Austria, who, he expected, would not approve either of a French marriage for King Sebastian.

This letter from Alava illustrates several key points that must be taken into account when examining the circumstances surrounding Dantas's dismissal from his role as ambassador. Firstly, through his behavior, statements, and position, Dantas made it clear to Alava that he was opposed to any matrimonial alliance between Portugal and the Habsburg sphere of influence. Although Dantas advocated for a Spanish-Portuguese alliance in maritime matters, he believed that a French-Portuguese matrimonial alliance would be more advantageous for Portugal, particularly in terms of avoiding a Spanish claim to the Portuguese throne, as ultimately occurred in 1580. This is further highlighted in Alava's letter, when he describes Dantas's speech on the greatness of Portugal, which was intended to remind Alava that politically, Portugal was not dependent of Spain. Secondly, Dantas's position helps to explain why Alava, besides his insinuation of Dantas's entanglement with Admiral Coligny, which will be examined in the next paragraphs, wrote that Dantas behaved like a Frenchman from Paris. If Dantas had succeeded in negotiating a French-Portuguese matrimonial alliance, it would have represented a meaningful diplomatic defeat for Spain, and would have been widely discussed throughout Europe, particularly as Philip II had always presented himself as King Sebastian's protective older uncle. Recognizing the potential dangers that Dantas's stance could pose to Spain, Alava promptly informed Philip so that the Spanish court could respond swiftly.

Therefore, this letter represented the first move in a campaign against Dantas. It should be emphasized that this did not prevent continued Spanish-Portuguese collaboration in maritime matters against France and England. However, it is relevant to consider the impact of Dantas's position. By agreeing to serve as Queen Catherine de' Medici's ambassador to Portugal, Dantas was openly challenging Spanish interests and diplomacy. In fact, the issue of a French-Portuguese marriage alliance and the repercussions of

Peyrot de Monluc’s attack on Madeira not only affected Dantas’s embassy, they ultimately led to his dismissal.

In July 1566, already back in Lisbon, Dantas wrote to the Queen Catherine de’ Medici to remind her of her promise to safeguard Portuguese interests before his departure from France. He asked her to stop any expedition led by Peyrot de Monluc headed for Guinea, Brazil, or Congo. Dantas argued that it was false to maintain that Monluc’s expedition was bound for Canada, as he had intelligence confirming its actual destination.116 The means and tone Dantas employed in this letter to Catherine was not that of a simple Portuguese ambassador—it was the letter written by the queen’s own ambassador to Portugal, who did not ask, but rather demanded that Portuguese interests be defended in France during his absence, while he was publicly advocating French interests in Portugal. What Dantas could not anticipate in his relationship with Queen Catherine was how spectacularly his gamble would fail.

Another document preserved in Simancas reveals that an improbable outcome was on the brink of occurring: before Monluc’s departure, King Philip II opened negotiations through his agent Bordaxi to try to coax Monluc into his service. Although this did not come to fruition,117 it reveals a pattern in how Philip dealt with his greatest maritime enemies: he tempted them with money and career offers. What the Catholic King ordered regarding Peyrot de Monluc parallels his approach to aborting the voyage of Thomas Stukley to Florida in 1563, and mirrors Guzmán de Silva’s multiple negotiations with John Hawkins to bring him into Spain’s service. As a pragmatic leader in a time when maritime threats were becoming too numerous and serious, King Philip knew well that the right amount money and promises of rewards could keep more unpleasant developments from troubling him. Nor is his pattern of action much different from what has been documented in chapter 1 concerning King Charles I and his own orders to his ambassadors in Portugal vis-à-vis Portuguese nautical experts.

117 In June 1566, as Monluc was preparing his fleet, Bordaxi wrote to King Philip II, suggesting that Spain enlist him in its service. However, for this to happen, Philip would have to formally request King Charles IX’s permission. Philip replied too late, in November 1566 (after Monluc’s departure to Madeira). He instructed Bordaxi to convey to Monluc his admiration for all the information Monluc had provided to him (probably about the French Catholic wars against the Huguenots, as Monluc was the son of the famous Blaise de Monluc, a well-known Catholic leader). Philip II asked Monluc to continue his loyal service to Catholicism, in order to avoid conflicts and to allow him to travel to the Netherlands. Both documents are at AGS, Secretaría de Estado, Legajo K 1506 in the months of June and November 1566.
But Peyrot de Monluc did not enter Spanish service, and instead he attacked Madeira in October 1566, confirming Dantas’s worst fears. Since by this time Dantas was in Lisbon, it was one of his agents, Manuel de Araújo, who formally presented a complaint at the Valois court. Araújo confronted the queen mother and King Charles IX, both of whom condemned the attack and averred that they had not authorized it. They issued documents forbidding the return of Monluc’s fleet to France, but in a letter to Cardinal Henry, Araújo blamed Dantas for the attack, claiming that he had knowledge of the expedition before its departure but failed to take action. Nevertheless, Araújo offered to serve as temporary ambassador until Dantas’s return. In a second letter, also dated November 1566, Araújo advised hanging the Portuguese pilots who led Monluc to Madeira, and that is precisely what happened in February 1568 in Lisbon after Dantas’s counter-espionage in France and England.

Araújo’s criticism of Dantas’s track record requires closer examination. Not only had Dantas previously complained about Araújo for refusing to inspect the French ports as a disguised spy, but it seems that Araújo had also been the victim of a murder attempt in France while Dantas was in Lisbon. The intricacies of these events are fully revealed in D. Alonso de Tovar’s letters to King Philip II, which detail Dantas’s sojourn in Lisbon. The analysis of these letters discloses important aspects of the maritime tensions between Portugal, Spain, and France. In a missive penned from Lisbon on May 12, 1566, Tovar informed his master of the latest events. He had discovered that Dantas had come from France with a commission from Queen Catherine de’ Medici to negotiate King Sebastian’s marriage with Princess Margaret of Valois. Although this was not new to Tovar and Philip II, what worried Tovar was the fact that Dantas had been “shut up in a room with Cardinal Henry for several hours, and alone,” making his case for the benefits of the French marriage. At a time when Philip was mediating a possible marriage for King Sebastian with Princess Elizabeth of Austria, he was concerned about this turn of events. In Tovar’s letter he annotated “keep me informed on any development on this matter.” Later, Philip II even instructed Tovar to secretly raise objections to Sebastian’s French marriage, at least while he was waiting a final response from Austria. King Philip counselled Tovar to contend in Portugal that France’s proposals were never to be trusted,
eloquent testimony to the degree of mistrust still poisoning Franco-Spanish relations since Cateau-Cambrésis.\textsuperscript{121}

Tovar’s response to King Philip II’s order was obsessive, monitoring Dantas’s movements and assiduously reporting on his activities. On June 17, 1566, in a letter to the king Philip, Tovar reported that it had been decided that Dantas would return to France, but with a “short commission.” Portugal would not agree to the Valois marriage proposal without seeing the dowry that France would pay and other conditions. This news was good for Spain, but Tovar did not fail to inform Philip of another sensitive matter: his discovery that Dantas had exchanged letters with important French figures regarding the marriage proposal. Tovar had even obtained one of those letters and sent it enclosed to the king.\textsuperscript{122} At Simancas, there is a missive in French by Dantas, dated August 13, 1566, and seemingly directed to Princess Margaret of Valois. In the letter, Dantas reported his negotiations in Lisbon with Cardinal Henry, stating that the matter was so delicate that it would take him longer than expected to wrap things up in Portugal. He also noted that he had communicated all the details regarding the negotiations to the French Constable Anne de Montmorency.\textsuperscript{123} Thus, it becomes obvious that Tovar spied on Dantas while the latter was in Lisbon, even stealing his personal correspondence, mainly because he deemed Dantas’s intentions unfavorable to Spanish interests.

Two other letters by Tovar prove that he remained vigilant with respect to Dantas’s movements until his return to France. In a November 21, 1566, missive originally cyphered and addressed to King Philip II, Tovar commented at length on Dantas’s affairs in Lisbon. He reported that Dantas would not be permitted to return to France as a scandal had broken out. The Portuguese law officer Manuel de Almeida,\textsuperscript{124} would instead be sent to France to petition the Valois court on the Madeira affair and the French marriage proposal. The cause of Dantas’s demotion was that it had been noticed in Lisbon not long before that some members of his household in France had denounced his Lutheran friends and unsavory contacts in France. Dantas believed that his untrustworthy spy in French ports, Manuel de Araújo, was responsible for these accusations and as a result, ordered

\textsuperscript{121} On this topic see Ribera, \textit{Diplomatie et espionage}, particularly the author’s conclusions.
\textsuperscript{122} AGS, \textit{Secretaría de Estado}, Legajo 384. This legajo is not numbered, but the document is in its middle.
\textsuperscript{123} AGS, \textit{Secretaría de Estado}, Legajo 384. This legajo is not numbered, but the document is in its middle.
\textsuperscript{124} The same figure that Jean Nicot blamed for mistrusting Frenchmen in Lisbon, as has been underscored in the previous chapter. This was perceived by Tovar as favorable to Spain.
his men to kill him. Tovar stated that Araújo had miraculously managed to escape the attack.125

Dantas’s alleged instruction to murder Araújo may not have been solely motivated by the damaging accusations mentioned above, but also by a letter that Araújo had written to Cardinal Henry, in which he blamed Dantas for Monluc’s attack on Madeira and suggested that he should replace Dantas in the French embassy. Dantas, who was known for his strong reactions, would not have tolerated such insubordination from a spy whom he had personally instructed as an agent to England in 1560–61 (as will be detailed in the next section). However, a second letter from Tovar to King Philip II, dated December 16, 1566, shows that Dantas’s influence in the Portuguese government remained strong even after this scandal. Together with Portuguese secretary of state Pedro de Alcâçova Carneiro, Dantas convinced Cardinal Henry not to rule out the French marriage proposal, even after the attack on Madeira.126 Just a few days later, Dantas was officially cleared to return to France as the Portuguese ambassador.

A recent investigation of the Madeira attack has proven that King Charles IX and Queen Catherine de’ Medici did not authorize Monluc to attack either the Spanish or the Portuguese. Their hesitance was rooted in the Spanish ambassador Alava’s threat that if Monluc attacked any Spanish area, there would be open war between France and Spain. Knowing that King Philip II would back the Portuguese against any hypothetical attack from the French, the queen mother and King Charles, like Peyrot’s father (Blaise de Monluc), refrained from supporting Monluc’s plans outright, but allowed him to sail on the condition that he did not attack Iberian interests.127 Still, Monluc’s approach to the Iberians was but a repetition, albeit from a different area in maritime France (in this case Guyenne instead of Normandy, Picardy or Brittany).128 of the activities of earlier French and later English “sea-dogs”, as has been argued by Frank Lestringant.129 An example can be found in a letter written by John Hawkins in June 1570, in which he proposed to Queen Elizabeth I to sail to the Azores and raid the Portuguese and Spanish fleets, a scheme akin to French precedents.130

125 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 384. This legajo is not numbered, but the document is in the middle.
126 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 384. This legajo is not numbered, but the document is one of the last.
128 Boucher, France and the American Tropics, 42.
129 Lestringant, L’Huguenot et le sauvage, 158.
fact that Hawkins specifically mentioned the French strategy highlights the level of exchange and influence between the French and English in maritime matters. In the next section, this same conclusion will be reached when analyzing Dantas’s embassy to England in 1562.

In light of the attack on Madeira, Dantas was consulted in Lisbon on the Portuguese response. Cardinal Henry sent him back to France to protest, stipulating he should only proceed with the negotiation for King Sebastian’s wedding if the Valois court restored the stolen goods and pay compensation for the damage caused on Madeira. 131 In Spain, while on his way to France, Dantas arrested a Breton merchant, allegedly connected with the Madeira affair. 132 After his arrival, in November 1566, Alava testified that Dantas came out of his meeting with the queen mother and King Charles IX empty-handed. 133 He convinced King Charles IX to forbid Monluc’s men from returning, but France would not pay compensation. By December 1566, Dantas had no choice but to write two angry letters to the lord of Fresnes, Florimond Robertet, who was the French secretary of state in charge of Spanish and Portuguese matters. 134 Dantas complained that the decree barring Monluc’s men from returning had not been published in all the French ports. He also asked for the formal French answer to Portugal to avoid more scandal. 135

Shortly after these events, a meeting of the Conseil Privé was held. In it, the cardinal of Lorraine, whom Dantas greatly admired, 136 condemned the bloodshed caused by Monluc at Madeira. However, Coligny argued that the attack was the revenge for Villegagnon’s defeat in Brazil and, considering Monluc’s death, urged King Charles IX to pardon his men. Like Spain with respect to Florida, Portugal never received any official compensation for the destruction caused at Madeira. One of the reasons for this outcome was a rumor that spread in 1565, which alleged that some Portuguese had

131 ANTT, Coleção de São Vicente (CSV), vol. III, fls. 19–19v.
134 Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State, 30.
136 Dantas’s admiration for Lorraine was connected to his Catholic position and his support for the Guises. Proof of Dantas’s good relations with Lorraine can be found in a letter by Lorraine to Sébastien de L’Aubespine, then French ambassador in Spain, dated May 1560. In it, Lorraine begged L’Aubespine to help the Portuguese Lopo Vaz de Sequeira at the Spanish court, as Dantas had asked Lorraine to assist him. Sequeira knew Dantas and Lorraine promised Dantas that he would attempt to help him (Daniel Cuisat, Lettres du Cardinal Charles de Lorraine (1525–1574) (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1998), 396).
participated in the Spanish final assault on the French in Florida. Although false (neither French nor Spanish sources mention any Portuguese involvement in these events), this rumor decisively shaped Peyrot de Monluc's course of action. Not only did Monluc's men claim vengeance against the Portuguese collaboration with the Spanish in Florida during their attack on Madeira in 1566, but all of Monluc's preparations in France were molded by news of the bloodshed in Florida. It is also important to bear in mind that the same 1565 attack instigated French Dominique de Gourges's (1530–95) retaliatory assault, in 1567, on the Spanish outposts in Florida. Thus, as has been convincingly argued, Monluc's preparations took place in a distinctly anti-Iberian (not solely Spanish, but also Portuguese) context. Following Coligny's effective speech at the Conseil Privé, Monluc's men returned and an envoy was sent to Portugal to explain the shift in the French position. This unnamed French envoy is likely the one mentioned in the communications D. Alonso de Tovar, the Spanish ambassador to Portugal, sent in early 1567.

Writing to King Philip II on January 27, 1567, Tovar asserted that a French gentleman from King Charles IX's household had just arrived in Lisbon. He came to apologize, on Charles's behalf, for Monluc's attack on Madeira. Tovar suspected that his true purpose was to bolster the French marriage proposal for King Sebastian. Although he had yet to confirm this point, Tovar noted that the Portuguese had received him well, since many of them still advocated the marriage. Tovar also mentioned that he had refrained from reporting this matter to Philip II as he supposed that Alava had already done so. Like the episode with Seure in 1557, the arrival of the French envoy had caused a dispute over precedence at the Portuguese court. Tovar was humiliated by the fact that the French envoy was installed in the house of the duke of Aveiro, believing that this place should have been reserved for him. But Tovar's and Spain's concerns over etiquette were soon eclipsed by graver matters.

Using his contacts, Tovar got word, on January 30, 1567, from an important Portuguese bishop that the Frenchman had only come to apologize for the Madeira attack. Another unnamed Portuguese informant reported to Tovar that he had come to apologize for the attack, and to do so in such a way that it seemed as if all of France was deeply remorseful for the injustice done to the Portuguese. The Frenchman also stated that King Charles IX

138 Brehm and Trindade, "O Saque ao Funchal," 56.
139 The duke of Aveiro, together with the duke of Braganza, was the most powerful, rich, and influential nobleman in Portugal. This is why Tovar felt personally humiliated.
had ordered the detention of Monluc’s men, authorized the hanging of some of them, and delivered all the stolen goods from Madeira to Dantas (something that never actually happened). After this, like Seure had done in 1557, the Frenchman promised France’s support to Portugal in any war against the Muslims, the Ottomans, or the Spanish, reasserting the old French-Portuguese alliance. Only then had he asked for Portugal’s formal position regarding King Sebastian’s marriage in France. The unnamed Portuguese informant acquired all this intelligence from a “man” who had spoken with the Frenchman. This “man” also reported that the Frenchman was offered several feasts by some of the most powerful men of the Portuguese regent’s (Cardinal Henry) entourage.

Based on this intelligence, Tovar briefed King Philip II of all these events on February 6, 1567. He recounted how the Frenchman was warmly welcomed due to the Portuguese desire for a marriage between King Sebastian and the French royal household. Tovar revealed that the Frenchman had brought a letter from Queen Catherine de’ Medici, which emphasized the need for a marriage between King Charles IX and Princess Elizabeth of Austria. He acknowledged that he had obtained this intelligence from his secret informants at the Portuguese court, and implied that the bishop of Miranda was among them. Tovar attributed the Frenchman’s reception to the Portuguese eagerness for the French marriage, and mentioned again that he had been greeted by Cardinal Henry and the Portuguese secretary of state Pedro de Alcâçova Carneiro at Almeirim. Queen Catherine of Austria was absent at the time and the Frenchman bribed Alcâçova. Cardinal Henry disguised his wish for the French marriage when he received the envoy in secrecy with very few of his servants. Then came the part that King Philip II feared the most: there were already rumors that France was preparing to appoint a new ambassador to Lisbon, prompting Philip to write the following comment in the margins: “The King has read this document but has nothing to say for now.”

Still, until 1568 the remaining correspondence of Tovar and D. Fernando de Carrillo de Mendonza, his successor in the Portuguese embassy between 1567 and 1570, is filled with concerns about King Sebastian’s possible marriage and entry into the French orbit. Thus, Dantas’s support of the French marriage proposal influenced Philip’s attempts to block him from the Portuguese embassy in France.

As Dantas did not want to close the door on a French marriage for King Sebastian, he refrained from loud complaint at the Valois court about the
Madeira attack, as Constable Anne de Montmorency recorded in a letter to Portugal. Montmorency’s communication was driven by the fact that he had become a leading proponent within the Valois court of the French marriage, as Tovar and Alava duly informed King Philip II. Dantas’s position, especially after the Madeira attack, soon prompted the advice to Cardinal Henry that he be dismissed from the French embassy. But the cardinal declined.141 Documents prove that, even after receiving the order to return to Portugal, Dantas managed in February 1568 to negotiate a formal treaty between Portugal and France to exchange traitors and rebels. The document does not detail whether pilots and cartographers were included, but its terms seem to imply that they were.142 This particular hypothesis is connected to what French sources state about Dantas’s behavior, once he had returned to France, regarding the surviving men from Monluc’s expedition.

Two French chroniclers mention the “persecutions” of Monluc’s men ordered by the Portuguese ambassador in France.143 It is also well-known, from Jacques Auguste de Thou’s (1533–1617) account,144 that the fate of Monluc’s men was debated at the tense meeting of the Conseil Privé mentioned above (in which Coligny confronted his deadly enemy the cardinal of Lorraine). Coligny’s emotional speech about Peyrot de Monluc’s recovery of French maritime pride so impressed King Charles IX that, as has been stressed, the king changed stance and honored the survivors of Monluc’s expedition. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Dantas was attempting to make up for his earlier actions, which had been criticized at the Portuguese and Spanish courts. Nonetheless, like the earlier Portuguese requests in Spain and England detailed in chapters 1 and 2, there is no evidence that any Portuguese traitor was ever returned to Portugal by France.

During the year 1567, the deterioration of Dantas’s position in France was not caused by lack of results in the Madeira affair or in the negotiations for King Sebastian’s marriage, but was primarily due to his perceived allegedly treacherous (in Spanish eyes) behavior towards Portuguese pilots. This was the main cause for Alava’s campaign against Dantas, although it has been underscored in the previous section how Dantas was still able to send the Portuguese pilots Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira to Portugal in 1567, where they were publicly executed. Previously, Dantas had also collaborated

141 Cruz, As regências na menoridade, vol. II, 167 and 170–72.
with the Spanish ambassadors to France (Chantonnay and Alava). Dantas shared information with his Spanish colleague Chantonnay about the abovementioned French embassy to Morocco and even asked him to arrange a secret meeting with King Philip II.\textsuperscript{145} Alava also trusted Dantas to send a courier with his correspondence to Spain and also praised Manuel de Araújo, Dantas’s agent in the French ports, whom he even sent on a mission to Spain.\textsuperscript{146} Still, as previously mentioned, in March 1566 Alava briefed King Philip II about Dantas’s frequent talks with Coligny at Châtillon and how he was seen as a “Frenchman from Paris.” Although Dantas tried to convince Alava that he was in discussions with Coligny because of French plans in Guinea, Alava found it strange that Dantas always stopped at Châtillon and met so regularly with Coligny at the Valois court.\textsuperscript{147} Alava’s suspicions were further cemented by Dantas’s behavior towards the Portuguese pilot Francisco Dias Mimoso. To grasp the role Mimoso played in Dantas’s downfall, it is critical firstly to examine who Mimoso was.

Francisco Dias Mimoso was a Portuguese pilot who joined the French navy at an unknown date during the reign of King Henry II. By 1559, he had obtained a letter of naturalization as a Frenchman and had settled with his family in Le Havre. In 1561 and 1564, Mimoso participated in French attacks on Spanish navigation in the Atlantic, which led to demands for his execution by Spanish ambassadors Chantonnay and Alava. Despite this, Mimoso continued to take part in French expeditions, including the 1564 voyage to Florida and the 1566 expedition to Madeira led by Peyrot de Monluc. Alava viewed Mimoso as a threat due to his knowledge of Spanish Atlantic routes, a concern the Spanish court had with regard to Jean Ribault who was executed in Florida for the same reason. In 1566, when Dantas learned that Monluc intended to employ Mimoso (who had previously been sentenced to death) in the expedition that ended in Madeira, he attempted to convince Monluc to hand him over. Dantas argued that this would prevent Mimoso’s execution as a Portuguese traitor in France.\textsuperscript{148} Once again, when he deemed it appropriate, Dantas was ready and willing to defend a pilot.

Despite Dantas’s efforts, he did not manage to convince Monluc to hand over Mimoso and Dantas twice refused to collaborate with Alava in pressuring the queen mother and King Charles IX to carry out the pilot’s death.

\textsuperscript{146} Archivo, vol. VI, 1952, 151–52 and 394.
\textsuperscript{147} León Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso. Le “pilote portugais borgne” (1559–1569) (offprint by Revista da Faculdade de Letras, 1956), 66–67.
\textsuperscript{148} Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso, 6–13, 16, 18 and 20–22.
sentence. When Mimoso returned to France after the expedition to Madeira in March 1567, Alava was furious. He ordered his agents to spy on and then arrest Mimoso, and upon searching his belongings, Alava discovered letters from Dantas and the Valois court guaranteeing his safe passage to Paris. Alava confronted Dantas, who claimed that he was not betraying Portugal and that Alava would see that he was right. However, Alava found it suspicious that Dantas had not come to speak with him when Mimoso was arrested, citing illness as the reason for not leaving his bed (in fact, Dantas's poor health is recurrent in his missives). Alava also had suspicions about Dantas's behavior towards Mimoso while he was in prison; according to Alava, Dantas had sent some of his own servants to comfort the pilot during his incarceration.\textsuperscript{149}

In light of all these considerations, Alava wrote to King Philip II accusing Dantas of breaking his promise to provide assistance in the Mimoso affair, and suggesting that Dantas's secret dealings with Coligny were intended to steer French expeditions towards Spanish overseas territories instead of Portuguese ones. He advised King Philip to discuss the issue at the Consejo de Indias. Alava's misgivings about Dantas were further fueled by the fact that Dantas had only formally approved of Mimoso's arrest at Alava's orders.\textsuperscript{150} On May 25, 1567, Alava reported to King Philip II that Dantas had been attacked. A group of men from Gascony had appeared at Dantas's house and assaulted three or four of his servants, leaving them severely wounded. Although Alava did not comment on the reasons for the attack, in the same letter, he warned that France was already aware that the Portuguese king had sent a large naval fleet to strike French raiders.\textsuperscript{151} As Dantas was the representative of Portugal in France, he was perceived as the informant of King Sebastian and had fallen into the line of fire. Simultaneously, Dantas was the object of French hostility due to his attempts to establish a \textit{Mare Clausum} in France, and was perceived by Spain as a traitor and collaborator with Coligny. These bilateral, and on their face mutually exclusive, apprehensions would only intensify until Dantas was eventually demoted.

In response to the information sent to Madrid, in October 1567 King Philip II informed Alava that he had ordered his ambassador in Lisbon to denounce Dantas's abnormal conduct in France and to request formal collaboration in the matter of the pilot Mimoso.\textsuperscript{152} However, King Philip's

\textsuperscript{149} Archivo, vol. IX, 1955, docs. 1381 and 1386.
\textsuperscript{151} Archivo, vol. IX, 1955, doc. 1437.
\textsuperscript{152} Justina Rodríguez and Pedro Rodríguez, eds., \textit{Don Francés de Alava y Beamonte. Correspondencia inédita de Felipe II con su Embajador en París (1564–1570)} (Pamplona: Donostia-San Sebastian, 1991), 194.
orders were not the first in this regard, as he had already received news in February 1567 that the king of Portugal, through Dantas, was paying an annual bribe of 3,000 ducats to Coligny.\textsuperscript{153} This indicates that the Portuguese attempts at bribing Coligny continued even after Dantas’s complaints and suggestions to end it in his aforementioned 1565 letter. Lisbon still hoped to buy Coligny’s loyalty, as it had in the 1530s with the French Admiral Philippe de Chabot. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, even when Coligny accepted Portuguese bribes, he did not abandon his anti-Portuguese maritime plans, as evidenced by his speech at the Conseil Privé against the cardinal of Lorraine. In this respect, as Dantas’s 1565 letter illustrates, the failure was not Dantas’s personally, but rather an inevitable result of Lisbon’s policies. Dantas in his final days, like Nicot before him, became a victim of his homeland’s court position.

Returning to the issue of the pilot Mimoso, in May 1567, the regent Cardinal Henry replied to King Philip II, stating that he had written to Dantas and directed him to collaborate with Alava. By June 1567, Alava informed Philip that Dantas had delayed receiving Cardinal Henry’s courier. He also noted that Dantas had justified his actions to Coligny by claiming that he had not sent Mimoso to Paris to be kidnapped by Alava. Alava then insinuated that Dantas mistrusted Coligny and was in the habit of sending his men to Coligny’s home every ten days.\textsuperscript{154} Summing up, Alava accused Dantas of collaborating with Coligny for a second time, warning Philip II that he might have struck a deal with Coligny to leave Portuguese overseas areas alone in exchange for the Portuguese experts harbored in Dantas’s house.

In a missive penned on August 19, 1567 to King Philip II, Alava further escalated his imputations. Alava claimed that Dantas’s maneuvers with Coligny, including his attempts to stop French expeditions to West Africa, only fed Coligny and his corsairs’ desire to organize new voyages to the region. Indeed, Coligny was lining up new expeditions to the area, with the planned participation of Portuguese pilot Gaspar Caldeira. Alava reminded the king that he had confronted Dantas seven or eight months prior about his harboring of pilots who had betrayed the Portuguese king. Upon reading Alava’s suggestion that the French ambassador in Madrid should be confronted with this fact, Philip II wrote in the margin that this matter should instead be discussed with the Portuguese ambassador at his court. By September 12, 1567, in another letter to King Philip II, Alava could confirm that the French fleet was preparing to depart to West Africa with secret

\textsuperscript{153} Archivo, vol. IX, 1955, doc. 1363.

\textsuperscript{154} Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso, 72–76.
approval by Queen Catherine de’ Medici. He took this as confirmation of his earlier suspicion: Dantas was informing Coligny on West Africa. This time, Alava decided not to warn Dantas of Coligny’s plans.155

Yet in July 1567, King Philip II ordered his ambassador in Lisbon to press Queen Catherine of Austria and Regent Cardinal Henry once more on the matter. They both wrote to King Philip II with reassurances that they had ordered Dantas to collaborate with Alava in the Mimoso affair. But by the time the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon approached Queen Catherine of Austria and Cardinal Henry for the third time, the situation had become increasingly contentious. While the queen grew wary of Dantas’s intentions, the cardinal replied that he had ordered Dantas to accommodate the traitorous Portuguese pilots in France with the promise of a royal pardon, so that they could be sent to Portugal and executed at his own orders. This included Portuguese pilot Mimoso. The cardinal also contended that if any Portuguese nautical expert were to be executed by French authorities, all the others would flee, Dantas would lose the chance to repatriate them, and they would never face justice in Portugal. At this stage, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon concluded his argumentation, understanding that Dantas’s policy in France was no more than the enactment of the cardinal’s design (an outcome confirmed in D. Fernando de Carrillo y Mendonza’s original missive to King Philip II dated September 19, 1567, and preserved at Simancas).156 Carrillo’s fourth meeting on October 5, 1567 was again ineffective, with the cardinal stating that he still hoped to hear Dantas’s side of the story. Aware of a surprise attack at night on Dantas’s house, possibly ordered by Alava, the cardinal added that Alava was clearly campaigning against Dantas,157 revealing that he also knew of Alava’s surveillance of Dantas. Thus, Cardinal Henry condemned Spain’s espionage on Dantas, forcing Carrillo y Mendonza to drop the issue.

Unfortunately, it appears that most of the letters from Dantas during this period have been lost, with the exception of a fragmentary letter from 1567 in which he seems to defend himself against accusations related to pilots. However, as the document is incomplete and does not contain a date, it is impossible to determine if it was written during the critical months when King Philip II was pressuring the Portuguese regent to demote Dantas. It is plausible, nonetheless, that he did reach an agreement with Coligny to

156 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 385. This legajo is not numbered. The document is in its beginning.
157 Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso, 76–80.
prevent French attacks on Portuguese territories overseas. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that Dantas continued to advocate for King Sebastian's marriage in France, even after the attack on Madeira. In so doing, Dantas may have sought to take advantage of Coligny's anti-Spanish sentiments and policies.\footnote{Whitehead, \textit{Gaspar de Coligny}, 335–36.}

Given Cardinal Henry's responses to Carrillo y Mendonza in Lisbon, it is also possible that Cardinal Henry instructed Dantas to deceive Coligny with the promise of Portuguese collaboration. As the attempts at bribing Coligny were floundering, the Portuguese regent may have adopted a new strategy. This is consistent with what Cardinal Henry confided to Carrillo y Mendonza: that he had ordered Dantas to provide shelter to all Portuguese traitors, promising them pardons, so they would return to Portugal and be executed. Such a step from Cardinal Henry would have been a reaction to Bartolomeu Velho's recent escape to France, which took place in 1567, and an expression of his wish to stop Portuguese nautical experts from offering their knowledge to France and England. This also explains why Cardinal Henry consistently defended Dantas's intentions when Carrillo y Mendonza's claimed that he was being deceived by the French. Without more letters from this period, the question of whether this change in strategy was communicated by Cardinal Henry to Dantas, or suggested by Dantas himself, remains uncertain. However, it is clear that events in Lisbon and Madrid went beyond stratagems Dantas could devise to defend himself against these serious accusations.

On October 22, 1567, the fifth petition of the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon achieved King Philip II's desired outcome: Dantas's recall.\footnote{Bourdon, \textit{Francisco Dias Mimoso}, 81.} Consultation of the original letter reveals that even after ordering Dantas's recall, Cardinal Henry argued that Dantas had served the Portuguese Crown loyally for years, and that he still did not believe that Dantas had acted in bad faith. Nor could the cardinal support his being publicly dishonored.\footnote{AGS, \textit{Secretaria de Estado}, Legajo 385. This \textit{legajo} is not numbered, but the document is in its middle.} For this reason, the formal letter of recall states that Dantas was returning to Portugal because of his poor health, which could not withstand another winter in France.\footnote{This letter, alongside other diplomatic documents relating to Michel de Seure, Jean Nicot, and João Pereira Dantas's embassies are preserved at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Saint Petersburg. For details see: Chichkine, "Mirage d'une alliance," 52.} Previously, Dantas had already asked for King Charles IX's and Queen Catherine de' Medici's authorization to depart to Portugal due to the unhealthy climate of France.
Raymond de Fourquevaux, the French ambassador to Spain, reveals that Dantas's house had been spied on by four or five men on orders of ambassador Alava at least since July 1567. When it came out in Madrid that Dantas was to be exiled to his property in Portugal, Fourquevaux reported that he was under accusations of heretical activities with Coligny. It was in this precise context that Fourquevaux observed how Dantas was perceived by Philip II as a “Frenchman and Huguenot.” He observed that Philip appeared satisfied with the souring of French-Portuguese relations, preferring war to peaceful coexistence. The fact that Alava surveilled Dantas's movements is not a surprise. Permanent ambassadors like Alava and Dantas were often regarded with suspicion. Fourquevaux's observations that King Philip II was pleased with French-Portuguese tensions supports an assertion that has already been made: namely, that Spain did not want Portugal to be aligned with France, regardless of the reason.

Dantas' return to Portugal took place in May 1568, as Alava's missives evidence. In February 1568, Dantas had received formal authorization from King Charles IX and Queen Catherine de’ Medici to return to Portugal. He asked to bring the pilot Mimoso with him and they agreed, much to Alava's anger. In April 1568, Dantas was still purchasing horses to bring to King Sebastian. He ultimately failed to return to Portugal with the pilot Mimoso, who was murdered by Alava's agents in February 1569. Dantas may have been aware that Alava intended to kill Mimoso, with this concern motivating his request to bring the pilot with him. Insofar as Mimoso was only killed after he had left France, Dantas had arguably succeeded in his aims. Dantas also tried to repatriate the Portuguese cosmographer André Homem, but he refused. Dantas was consequently accused of involvement in a failed plot to kill André (allegedly because André had revealed Dantas's secrets). Although Dantas was summoned by King Charles IX to explain himself, no further repercussions are recorded in the lamentably incomplete extant documentation. André Homem's continued employment in Valois service was noticed. Alava informed King Philip II that “it is said that André Homem is now the first man here that prepares nautical charts [for the French].” Thus, Dantas's inability to bring back André Homem was no minor matter for Portugal and was again full of consequences.

163 Bély, L’art de la paix en Europe, 34.
164 Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso, 44 and 82–83.
Dantas departed on May 22, 1568 after pleading with the French chancellor to protect Portuguese interests, as he knew he would not have a formal successor in the embassy. When he finally returned to Lisbon, in August 1568, he was unable to defend himself adequately before King Sebastian, according to León Bourdon. However, in D. Fernando de Carriilo y Mendonza’s original letter, dated August 5, 1568, there is no mention of Dantas’s attempts to justify his actions; the missive merely states that he had arrived three or four days before. Nor, for that matter, is there any other reference to Dantas’s supposed botched defense. Dantas’s personality, as illustrated by all the episodes narrated so far, was hardly one that would accept the previous accusations without clearly replying to them at the Portuguese court.

As in 1566, there is evidence that Dantas in 1568 still hoped to be reappointed as ambassador to France. When ambassador Raymond de Fourquevaux contacted him (due to ongoing negotiations for King Sebastian’s wedding in France), Dantas informed him that he was to return to France as an ambassador to proceed with the discussions in December 1569. This was not to be—Dantas died in January 1570 without ever regaining his position in France. Moreover, Dantas’s illegitimate heir, Tomé da Silva, faced accusations of Protestantism by the Portuguese Inquisition in the next years. Even though he was deceased, Dantas was himself repudiated by members of his household for having employed a Lutheran tutor to raise his heir in Paris. It should be recalled, though, that this allegation only surfaced after Dantas’s death, further indicating his influence in Portugal even after his demotion from the French embassy.

In summary, Dantas’s downfall was primarily caused by his controversial harboring and use of Portuguese nautical experts in France. This was an uncommon reason for an ambassador’s undoing, particularly for previous Portuguese ambassadors in France, but it was the basis on which Alava could cast Dantas as Huguenot sympathizer and traitor to Portugal. Nevertheless, Dantas’s commentary on the French civil wars readily demonstrates that, far from being a crypto-Protestant, he was a staunch Catholic. In reality, Dantas’s strategy was rooted in his belief that to better defend Portuguese Mare Clausum policies in France, particularly during a time when Coligny’s

166 Bourdon, Francisco Dias Mimoso, 37–38 and 84.
167 AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 385. This legajo is not numerated. The document is toward the end.
leadership was perceived as a significant threat to Portugal, he needed a *Secret Science* policy that could adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, as was observed, Dantas formed specific opinions and tactics for each case involving Portuguese nautical experts. Additionally, Dantas’s actions in France and his controversial dealings with Coligny were a reaction to the emergence of major maritime expeditions under Queen Elizabeth I, a topic that will now be analyzed. Ultimately, Dantas was the first Portuguese ambassador in France who had to simultaneously coordinate a Portuguese response to two maritime rivals: France and England.

4.2 Dantas and Elizabethan England (1558–68)

4.2.1 Fighting for *Mare Clausum*: The Antecedents and Dantas’s Embassy to England (1558–1562)

In July 1558, the Portuguese pilot Roque Fernandes was returning to Portugal on his ship. His vessel and cargo had previously been seized by the French, but Dantas had negotiated the devolution of the cargo and ship in France. On the way to Portugal, Fernandes was attacked by an English pirate who stole all his cargo, Dantas’s letters and books, and who also kidnapped the Portuguese pilot Francisco Dias Salgado, who was already known to the English.\(^{170}\)

The letter from Roque Fernandes which was sent at the start of Dantas’s diplomatic mission to France highlights the growing concern about the maritime ambitions of the English, who were known to hire Portuguese pilots. Those ambitions were evident as early as Thomas Wyndham’s first voyage to Guinea in 1553, when Portuguese agents had tried to convince the Portuguese pilots Francisco Rodrigues and António Eanes Pinteado to return to Portugal. As documented in chapter 2, both ended up participating in the expedition because Edward Clinton (1512–85), the English Lord Admiral, imprisoned Portuguese agents until the departure of Wyndham’s fleet.\(^{171}\)

When news of Queen Mary I’s death reached Portugal, D. João Pereira, the son of D. Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip II, was instructed to visit Queen Elizabeth I and offer his congratulations on her succession to the throne. It has previously been assumed that it was Dantas who visited Elizabeth in 1559, but an examination of the historical


documents reveals that this was not the case. As has been underscored in chapter 2, D. João Pereira was nominated in January 1559 and he may have arrived in England by March or April, since his accreditation letter in the State Papers dates from April 15. Queen Elizabeth’s formal response to Queen Catherine of Austria, who was serving as regent of Portugal at the time, was positive and emphasized the long-standing alliance between Portugal and England. Still, the Portuguese Crown had not forgotten the English voyages to Guinea and Mina, nor could it fail to remember the embassy of Diogo Lopes de Sousa, who had formally pressured Queen Mary to forbid her English subjects from sailing to Portuguese overseas areas. This episode and its results, achieved through Portuguese diplomacy and espionage in England (as detailed in chapter 2), served as a template for Dantas’s own approach.

Consequently, after D. João Pereira’s return to Portugal, and possibly even at Dantas’s suggestion, Francisco de Mesquita was sent as an envoy to Queen Elizabeth in 1559 to protest against the renewed English navigation to West Africa. Concurrently, the bishop of Aquila, the Spanish ambassador in England between 1559 and 1563, was entrusted by King Philip II with the task of petitioning the English government on the recent capture of a Portuguese vessel sailing between Flanders and Portugal. Elizabeth I’s response was to request that the case be analyzed in the Court of Admiralty. It was not long before Dantas was required to travel to England as an ambassador, as he was undoubtedly aware of the outcome of D. João Pereira’s mission in 1559. This may not have been the first time Dantas had a hand in English affairs. In March 1559, after the peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had named

172 It has previously been assumed that Dantas, who signed as “João Pereira Dantas,” was D. João Pereira, the son of D. Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip II. This confusion arises from the fact that both individuals were named João Pereira. It should be noted that Dantas did not use the Portuguese nobiliary title of “D.” in his signature. Additionally, the earl of Feria, who reported on his meeting with Queen Elizabeth I to King Philip II, referred to the Portuguese envoy as the son of the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip II. This further demonstrates that Dantas and D. João Pereira are distinct individuals (Hume, Calendar ... (Simancas), 1558–1567, 49).
174 Oliveira, “Uma cartograf ia das mentalidades,” 48–49.
175 Cruz, As regências na menoridade, vol. I, 224.
Portugal the arbiter in the Calais affair between France and England,\textsuperscript{177} Dantas had received information from master André de Escochard on related Anglo-French dealings in his role as Portuguese ambassador in France.\textsuperscript{178}

In 1560, when the Portuguese government decided to send Manuel de Araújo to the English court to protest, Dantas wrote a letter in French, dated February 26, 1560, to Nicholas Throckmorton, the English ambassador in France between 1559 and 1564.\textsuperscript{179} In the missive, Dantas humbly requested Throckmorton's assistance in ensuring a favorable reception for Araújo at the Tudor court, going so far as to ask that Araújo be received as if he were Dantas himself.\textsuperscript{180} The style of the letter suggests that Dantas was not particularly familiar with Throckmorton, although he did know him personally. This distance was likely due to Throckmorton's dealings with Huguenots, which Dantas criticized in his correspondence about the first French civil war. Despite knowing that these negotiations were related to English plans for recovering Calais, Dantas predicted from the beginning that France would not, under any circumstances, return Calais to England.\textsuperscript{181} The specifics of Manuel de Araújo’s mission to England in 1560 are unknown, but it is clear that Dantas instructed him, as the abovementioned letter to Throckmorton shows. It is probable, considering the general pattern of such missions during this period, that Araújo’s primary aim was maritime espionage, but no documents from his journey of 1560 are currently known, nor does Dantas’s correspondence mention Araújo’s activities in that year.

In 1561, however, accumulating news of English overseas movements greatly worried Dantas. In April, he got word of English plans to attack Madeira. By September, the bishop of Aquila informed Dantas that an English fleet had recently returned from Mina, despite navigational difficulties, and that London merchants were already preparing for another voyage. Additionally, Queen Elizabeth was reported to be planning to send one of her own ships on the expedition, and to open negotiations with the Huguenot Louis de Bourbon, prince of Condé (1530–69), to send a joint ambassador to

\textsuperscript{177} Cruz, As regências na menoridade, vol. II, 175.
\textsuperscript{178} ANTT, Fragmentos, box 2, maço 2, n.º 66.
\textsuperscript{179} On Throckmorton's embassies in France and Scotland and his major role in the early years of Queen Elizabeth I’s reign see: Cary Carson, “The Embassies of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1559–64: Towards a New politics for Divided Europe” (PhD diss. Harvard University, 1973).
\textsuperscript{180} British Library (BL), Add MS 35830, fols. 72–72v.
the sultan of Morocco. In a letter to King Sebastian, also from September, the bishop of Aquila expressed regret at his inability to prevent the next English fleet from sailing, and warned that five French ships would be sailing alongside the English.\(^{182}\) Aquila’s dispatch had been prompted by a Portuguese request to lodge a protest in England, as Portugal did not at the time have a permanent ambassador in England (a state of affairs confirmed by a letter from Michel de Seure, the French ambassador to Queen Elizabeth, dated November 29, 1561 and addressed to King Charles IX).\(^{183}\)

Araújo’s original second appointment to England dated back to December 30, 1560 and had been ordered by King Sebastian, who had written to William Cecil (1520–96) requesting that Araújo be received cordially.\(^{184}\) Given that Araújo had previously worked for Dantas, one may assume that he departed for England after discussing strategy with Dantas, although the surviving documents are silent on this possibility. On March 14, 1561, before Araújo’s arrival in England, Nicholas Throckmorton wrote to William Cecil stating that while he favored granting the envoy entry to England as a normal diplomatic courtesy, he believed that Araújo’s main objective was to end English trade in West Africa.\(^{185}\) Furthermore, English documents confirm that Dantas followed Araújo’s mission to Elizabeth’s court from France.

On April 8, 1561, Manuel de Araújo presented a formal protest in which he demanded that the English cease their voyages to West Africa and Morocco. He also urged that this prohibition be published in all English ports, and decried the seizure of Portuguese ships by the English. Additionally, citing the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, Araújo petitioned Elizabeth to prevent Scottish pirates from entering English ports after raiding Portuguese ships.\(^{186}\) In response, Araújo was informed that the English queen had just equipped vessels to fight pirates, but that she did not acknowledge any Portuguese right to dictate where Englishmen could or could not sail. Queen Elizabeth did agree to impose heavy penalties on any Englishmen found to be assisting Scottish pirates,\(^{187}\) while Cecil and the lord admiral heard counsel on how best to reply to Araújo’s complaints.\(^{188}\)


\(^{184}\) Stevenson, *Calendar ... 1559–60*, doc. 467.

\(^{185}\) Stevenson, *Calendar ... 1561–62*, doc. 29.

\(^{186}\) Stevenson, *Calendar ... 1561–62*, docs. 96 and 97.

\(^{187}\) Stevenson, *Calendar ... 1561–62*, doc. 98.

At this point, it is likely that Araújo wrote to Dantas to update him on the situation, a hypothesis supported by Nicholas Throckmorton’s correspondence. In two letters, dated April 20, 1561, and sent to the English queen and Cecil, the English ambassador in France noted that Dantas was uneasy with the news of French preparations for voyages to West Africa, and was disturbed by the rumors that Araújo was being treated just as Dantas himself had been in the past. This suggests that before Araújo’s departure, Dantas had spoken personally with Throckmorton about the English voyages and received a similar reply. Only after this had Araújo lodged his final complaint, in which he tried to explain, with reasoning akin to that which Dantas would employ the next year, how the Portuguese Mare Clausum rights to all of West Africa implied a ban on English incursions.

On April 24, 1561, Queen Elizabeth I formally replied to the Portuguese regent, Queen Catherine of Austria, stating that she had received Araújo in the presence of the bishop of Aquila, the Spanish ambassador to England. Following their conversation, she had ordered that no Englishmen be allowed to sail to West Africa. However, in the safe-conduct given to Araújo for his return, also dated April 24, 1561, it was asserted that the English queen did not agree with the Portuguese arguments, and had merely issued the prohibition for the sake of good relations. The official response also stipulated that collaboration between Englishmen and Scottish pirates was prohibited. Subsequently, on May 1, 1561, she issued a directive to Lord Admiral Clinton to promulgate the prohibition decree in English ports. She also wrote to Queen Mary Stuart (1542–87) about the Portuguese protests against Scottish pirates, an intervention which caused a Scottish letter of marque against the Portuguese to be revoked. Notwithstanding these gestures, there is evidence that Englishmen and Scotsmen jointly assaulted Portuguese vessels as early as 1563.

Once apprised of the formal response, King Sebastian wrote to Queen Elizabeth approving the measures taken by England, and instructed the

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189 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, docs. 124 and 125.
190 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, doc. 128.
191 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, docs. 137 and 138.
192 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, doc. 157.
193 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, docs. 452 and 488.
194 The Englishman Montgomery explicitly begged Cecil and Queen Elizabeth I to be allowed to bring Scottish captains with a letter of marque against the Portuguese to English ports: Joseph Stevenson, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1562 (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1868), docs. 175 and 177.
bishop of Aquila to deliver his compliments.¹⁹⁵ King Sebastian also acknowledged the bishop of Aquila’s assistance to Araújo’s mission. Two letters from Aquila in 1561 prove that he did more than simply lodge Araújo in his house. As Araújo’s debates with members of the Privy Council took place in Aquila’s house, the Spanish ambassador intervened in them directly in his effort to strengthen Portuguese arguments against English rhetoric.¹⁹⁶ But while these negotiations and replies were underway, and despite the apparent success of Araújo’s mission, Martin Frobisher (1535–94) sailed to Mina.¹⁹⁷ This provides a clear indication that Elizabeth was well on her way to adopting the policy of her predecessor, Queen Mary I, as discussed in chapter 2. There is further evidence of this tendency in another missive from Elizabeth, dated July 28, 1561, shortly after Araújo’s mission to the Tudor court. In the letter, the queen ordered the seasoned Captain John Lok, who had captained the English voyage to West Africa in 1554–55, to lead a new expedition to Guinea that would include royal ships. Although Lok refused, the queen’s decision to openly challenge Portugal’s overseas claims is unmistakable.¹⁹⁸

Thus, when Dantas at the end of 1561 received the troubling intelligence from England that the queen’s prohibition was not being respected, he hastened to inform King Sebastian. The king of Portugal reacted by instructing the bishop of Aquila to lodge another protest to Queen Elizabeth I, and commanded him to endeavor to disrupt the departure of the English expedition (as Aquila confessed in a letter to King Philip II in November 27, 1561).¹⁹⁹ In March 1562, a denunciation of Aquila to the English authorities even stated that he used to provide maritime intelligence to Spain and also to Portugal to help oppose English voyages to West Africa.²⁰⁰ Thus, Aquila paid personally for his defense of Portuguese interests at the Tudor court. In the meantime, Dantas provided all the details of the next English voyage: the fleet was composed of six ships and, worse still, it would carry materials to build a fortress in West Africa. Dantas suggested that Portugal send a formal ambassador to complain about such English voyages, just as he had discussed with Aquila. Although he could not recommend anyone,

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¹⁹⁵ Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, doc. 628.
¹⁹⁹ Hume, Calendar ... (Simancas), 1558–1567, doc. 144.
Dantas observed that this ambassador would have to make a case against Law, and argue directly before secretary of state William Cecil and Lord Clinton. Dantas's advice was astute, but he could not predict how the new English queen's tenacity would affect the final outcome.\footnote{Kervyn de Lettenhove, \textit{Relations politiques}, vol. II, 630–34, 640–41, 644–45 and 650–51.}

By late 1561, Dantas had again sent his agent Manuel de Araújo to England to gather details on the next English fleets, and it is probable that some of the intelligence that he delivered to Portugal came to him via Araújo. In January 1562, to his great pleasure, Dantas was able to inform Lisbon that the English expedition had gone home, although he could not be sure whether the fleet would return to the sea in the future. Later that month, the bishop of Aquila told Dantas that he found it very unlikely the English fleet would depart in the winter, and reported that the English were planning to join the French in the Berlangas Islands to attack ships \textit{en route} to continental Portugal.\footnote{ANTT, \textit{CC} I–105–62 and I–105–88.} It was undoubtedly after this letter that Dantas was named ambassador to England, and on April 25, 1562, Dantas wrote to Aquila revealing his joy at having the opportunity to kiss the hand of a monarch for whom he harbored a personal admiration: Queen Elizabeth I.

Nicholas Throckmorton’s warnings to England before Dantas’s arrival at the English court are worth stressing here. Well aware of Dantas’s intelligence gathering methods on French and English maritime movements, Throckmorton alerted Queen Elizabeth, in a letter dated March 6, 1562, that the Portuguese king had both received reports on the characteristics of all the English vessels heading for West Africa, and been notified that the expedition included both private and royal ships. As a result, Portugal had prepared a fleet to pursue the English and had even given orders to attack the queen’s ships.\footnote{Stevenson, \textit{Calendar … 1561–62}, doc. 924.} Although Throckmorton could not be certain, it is obvious that Dantas was the informant of Portugal. Having cautioned the queen, Throckmorton kept a vigilant eye on Dantas.

When reports of Dantas’s appointment to Elizabeth’s court emerged, Throckmorton warned Cecil that Dantas “is in great estimation here [France], and with his Queen [Catherine of Austria], and such as govern in Portugal [King Sebastian].”\footnote{Stevenson, \textit{Calendar … 1561–62}, doc. 944.} On April 24, 1562, he confirmed to Queen Elizabeth I that Dantas was about to depart to England, having waited for D. Afonso de Lencastre, his replacement in France, to arrive.\footnote{Stevenson, \textit{Calendar … 1561–62}, doc. 1043.}
was finally ready to set sail, Throckmorton wrote to Cecil, on April 27, 1562, with all the details. The way Throckmorton described Dantas shall now be quoted in full, so that readers may appreciate how Dantas, mortal enemy to France and England’s overseas ambitions, was understood by his rival ambassador:

“Sends herewith a packet for the Bishop of Aquila from Don Juan Pereira Dantes, late Ambassador of Portugal in France, and now delegated to go in legation from his King to the Queen. He will take his journey from hence about the end of this month, and will lodge with the Bishop of Aquila. He is a devout servant to the Pope and this estate, and there with a cunning negotiator. Amongst his errands for navigation and such matters, Cecil may hear of an overture of marriage, and, in the end, of sending to the Council. The King has dealt liberally with him to make this journey, so he is like to come in good order, and expects to be entertained there accordingly. The King of Portugal has made him a Cavaliere di Christo for his services done in France, and has given him a good commandry.”206

The Venetian ambassador to France also commented on Dantas’s departure. Marc’Antonio Barbaro’s letter to Venice, dated April 29, 1562, corroborates Throckmorton’s words. Upon learning that Dantas would be sent to Queen Elizabeth I as an ambassador, Pope Pius IV (1560–65) reportedly stated that Dantas should address religious matters with the English queen and convince her to send delegates to the Council of Trent. Additionally, Barbaro noted that Throckmorton had confided in him that Dantas would propose a marriage between Queen Elizabeth I and King Sebastian, though Throckmorton was not convinced of its feasibility due to the twenty-year age gap between the two monarchs. Overall, Barbaro, like Throckmorton, recognized that Dantas’s mission was a typical Mare Clausum embassy.207 The grants that Throckmorton said Dantas received in 1562 in the context of his embassy to England are likewise substantiated in Portuguese documents. In 1561, Dantas was given a new grant prior to being instated as a knight of the Order of Christ (the main Portuguese military order of the time). The next year he received his appointment. Finally, in 1563 he was formally named counsellor to King Sebastian.208 These documents signal the importance

206 Stevenson, Calendar … 1561–62, doc. 1060.
207 Brown and Bentinck, Calendar … Venice, 1558–1580, doc. 285.
208 Madeira Santos, O caráter experimental, 45–46.
attached to his mission in 1562, as Dantas did not receive any substantial awards until his death despite repeated requests.209

When Dantas at last arrived at Elizabeth's court, as the abovementioned documents show, his identity and mission were hardly a surprise. Queen Elizabeth I and Cecil knew who he was and quickly understood that this time Portugal had named an experienced diplomat, as it had done with Diogo Lopes de Sousa in the reign of Queen Mary, to deal with English affairs. Throckmorton had not failed to report, as Alba had some years before, Dantas's familiarity with nautical matters. Thus, the queen and Cecil must have suspected that Dantas would lodge the usual Portuguese protests, but they were still uncertain whether he had any other important cards to play, especially given his clearance to propose an English marriage for King Sebastian. Once more, Portugal intended to use a matrimonial proposal to appease Anglo-Portuguese overseas rivalry, precisely as had transpired under Queen Mary, as detailed in chapter 2. For Dantas's embassy, however, any such aims failed to materialize. Apart from Elizabeth's well-known desire not to wed, there were other serious reasons, even prior to Dantas's arrival, that convinced the Tudor court to reject any Portuguese offer of marriage.

The first of these was Nicholas Throckmorton's warning to Cecil on May 5, 1562 about the objectives of Dantas's embassy: that he sought to impede English navigation to Morocco and West Africa, and threatened the use of force.210 The most serious cause for misgivings came on May 11, however, when English agent Randolph wrote to Throckmorton after speaking with a Portuguese nobleman. This unnamed nobleman had passed on alarming rumors that there were Portuguese agents in England planning a Catholic uprising against Queen Elizabeth.211 Given Throckmorton's earlier assertions that Dantas was a loyal servant of Pope Pius IV, and considering the fact that he intended to stay with the bishop of Aquila, suspicion that the ambassador was somehow involved in the alleged plot quickly surfaced. Under such circumstances, the possibility of a Portuguese marriage proposal could not be accepted at the Tudor court until both Dantas and the Portuguese king were cleared of any suspicion. In truth, it is still unknown whether Dantas or Sebastian were actually involved in the scheme. Still, the chief issue at hand was the maritime tension between England and Portugal and the continuation of English voyages to West Africa and Morocco. This led to an

209 On this topic see Vila-Santa, “Reporting for a King.”
211 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1562, 31.
exchange of arguments between Dantas and the Privy Council (recorded in the State Papers). Dantas seems to have personally written them in French, although some appear to be unfinished.  

Dantas presented an initial petition to Queen Elizabeth on May 22, using the traditional *Mare Clausum* rhetoric already employed by his ancestors in the French embassy during the 1530s. The next day, he wrote a letter to William Cecil's wife offering her a rent, on behalf of Portugal, for the dowry of her daughter. Dantas reminded Mildred Cecil of King Sebastian's prestige, pressing her on these grounds to accept the offer. However, there is no record of acceptance by Mildred Cecil. The Privy Council replied by contesting Portugal's maritime property rights to regions without a fortress, and requested that Dantas specify the locations of Portuguese garrisons so that Queen Elizabeth could formally forbid her subjects from entering those areas. In contending that the Portuguese only had fortresses in Mina and Axem, the queen relied on Martin Frobisher's report about West Africa, as he had been a prisoner of the Portuguese there for some time.  

Dantas had anticipated these arguments, as the French had also used them several times. Writing on May 25, 1562, he explained that Portuguese *Mare Clausum* rights included not only fortresses, but extended to all West Africa via the tributes and commercial rights that the Portuguese Crown had acquired. He further insinuated the extent of Portuguese power in West Africa with the disclosure that Portugal annually sent around 15,000 men to the region and maintained a permanent fleet there to deter intruders. Dantas added that Portugal occupied the area for missionary purposes, and insisted that no one in Europe dared to contest Portuguese rights. Renowned mathematicians, historians, and cosmographers praised Portugal for its role in civilizing the region and introducing it to Europe. Days later, Dantas wrote to William Cecil offering him a pension on behalf of Portugal if he agreed to become the protector of Portuguese interests in England. He demanded a written answer should Cecil refuse, so that the world could know how unjustly the English treated ambassadors like him. Cecil did not, however, respond to the letter, since by this time both he and Throckmorton maintained that the English Crown should freely patronize English trade in West Africa, and sought to convince Queen Elizabeth I of the same. One of the reasons Dantas could not secure reparations for English seizures was that Cecil and the Privy Council were tasked with

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handling these issues, and Cecil was a staunch supporter of English overseas expansion. Moreover, for Cecil, Throckmorton, and Queen Elizabeth, the prospect of a maritime war with Portugal seemed less worrisome than one with Spain, and continued tension with Portugal appeared preferable to fomenting internal rebellion because of further governmental prohibitions on sailing to West Africa.\textsuperscript{214}

Under such circumstances, fundamental disagreements about the nature of \textit{Mare Clausum} persisted without any clear winner. As Patricia Seed has rightly noted, for Dantas and for Cecil, crucial Portuguese words meant something else when translated into English. While for the Portuguese, possession meant occupying an area by maritime trade rights, for the English possession only meant effective occupation.\textsuperscript{215} This fundamental difference in 1562 was not new: previously, King Francis I's ministers had made this argument against the Portuguese, as had King Charles I of Spain in the run-up to the Treaty of Zaragoza. Given Dantas’s failure to institute a court for arbitrating Anglo-Portuguese maritime clashes, as had been arranged with France in the 1530s,\textsuperscript{216} he addressed his final protest to the Privy Council. In this lengthy document, dated June 19, 1562, Dantas rejected all England's arguments and stated emphatically that he had come to negotiate directly with Queen Elizabeth and not with the Privy Council. This was part of Dantas's new response. When he realized his goals were failing, Dantas united his protest with the Spanish ambassador in England. But, instead of strengthening the Portuguese position, Dantas only weakened it as the queen asserted that her answers to Portugal were not to be confused with those to Spain.\textsuperscript{217} Dantas then wrote that Queen Elizabeth should read his papers and that he was prepared to discuss each point with her. He refuted Cecil's accusation that he had deployed subtle and sibylline arguments, underscored the traditional alliance between Portugal and England and announced that he would return to France. Dantas also wrote another protest directly to Queen Elizabeth on June 25. The very same day, the

\textsuperscript{216} Cruz, \textit{As regências na menoridade}, vol. I, 179.
\textsuperscript{217} Stevenson, \textit{Calendar ... 1562}, 84 and 94–96.
English queen replied formally to King Sebastian, stating that Dantas’s demands had not been met but praising his courtesy.

After returning to Paris, Dantas wrote again to the queen, promising that he would arrange for the production of a better pair of gloves to send her, as she had requested. It is also likely that Dantas’s met other important actors while in England. It is known that he became acquainted with Thomas Smith (1513–77), the famous English writer and Throckmorton’s successor at the English embassy in France between 1564 and 1566. Dantas could hardly guess that Smith would be defeated by him in a quarrel over diplomatic precedence at the Valois court in 1565. Thus, despite some strained relations during the 1562 Mare Clausum embassy to England, Queen Elizabeth I and Dantas admired each other, as the documents clearly demonstrate.

But there was another aspect of the Anglo-Portuguese tensions during Dantas’s embassy to Elizabeth in 1562 that still needs to be addressed: Belchior Vaz de Azevedo, a Portuguese New Christian (of Jewish origin). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Azevedo had long been on the radar of Portuguese and Spanish authorities, as he had served both Francis I and Henry II. When King Henry II named him French ambassador to the sultan of Morocco in 1556, Portuguese and Spanish authorities collaborated to incarcerate him. When King Henry II died, Azevedo entered the service of Antoine de Bourbon, the king of Navarre, who used him in an attempt to restore control of Spanish Navarre. Dantas became aware of Azevedo’s plans through one of his relatives and alerted Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador in France. The first phase of the scheme, Dantas related, was the landing of a French fleet in Morocco, after which they would establish a garrison in the abandoned Portuguese fortress of Seinal and attack Portuguese Ceuta and Tangier. With a French foothold in Morocco, Antoine de Bourbon would then launch a full-scale invasion of southern Spain to force King Philip II to cede Spanish Navarre to him. In the abovementioned letter to King Sebastian, Dantas ridiculed the plot (which he considered childish), but promised that he would place a spy on board Azevedo’s vessel, and avowed that Portuguese like Azevedo deserved to be killed. Nevertheless, Azevedo safely departed and successfully negotiated commercial and maritime privileges for France with the sultan of Morocco.

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219 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1563, doc. 1245.
220 On this issue see Nuno Vila-Santa, “Reporting for a King.”
221 As for Dantas’s references of his plans with Navarre and the suggestion to kill Azevedo see his letter dated October 19, 1559: ANTT, CC I–103–125, ffs. 1–3.
Morocco in 1559. Nor was there any need to kill Azevedo upon his return from Morocco as, shortly after, he fled with his family. The reason for his flight was that Antoine de Bourbon’s family was attempting to convert his family to Protestantism. After learning of this, Azevedo had approached Perrenot de Chantonnay to request assistance in returning to Portugal and information on any new French plans (intelligence which he promised to likewise offer to Spain). When his maneuvers with Spain proved fruitless, Azevedo contacted Nicholas Throckmorton, Queen Elizabeth I’s ambassador in France, which in turn made him the subject of discussions between the English queen and Dantas in 1562.

In a letter dated June 29, 1561, Throckmorton reported to William Cecil that Azevedo had approached him, offering his services to England. He would guide the English to the most profitable and suitable places to trade on the Moroccan coast, as he was familiar with them, having lived in the region for around twenty years. In addition to the commercial opportunities that Azevedo promised, Throckmorton informed Cecil that Azevedo was an experienced nautical expert. A month later, he notified Cecil that he had accepted Azevedo’s offer and that he was sending him to England, alongside eight seamen who were Portuguese, French, Spanish, and English. All were to be presented to the lord mayor of London and to the English lord admiral, as Azevedo had promised to bring with him “the best pilot in the world,” as Throckmorton wrote. Yet the London merchants’ reaction was unenthusiastic: they informed Cecil that the locations to which Azevedo had offered to guide them were already familiar places of trade, known to them since the time of Queen Mary. Nevertheless, the bishop of Aquila’s correspondence to King Philip II shows rumors that Azevedo would sail to West Africa in an English voyage in the summer of 1561, as Cecil retained an interest in Azevedo.

When Dantas came to England in 1562, he eagerly used Azevedo as an example of Portuguese Mare Clausum violations during his arguments with Queen Elizabeth and the Privy Council. Dantas pointed out that Azevedo had traveled to the Moroccan coast under the English flag, in breach of previous English prohibitions. Furthermore, he stated that Azevedo had brought along and sold Jewish books and bibles, scandalously undermining Portuguese

224 Stevenson, Calendar ... 1561–62, doc. 279.
225 Hume, Calendar ... (Simancas), 1538–1567, docs. 139 and 140.
religious orthodoxy and missionary activities in the region. Elizabeth replied that she did not know anything about these allegations and, with some irony, commented that she found it strange that Dantas was worried about Jews proselytizing Moors. Dantas replied that he simply wanted to inform the queen, adding that Azevedo's books had been printed not in England, but in Flanders. It remains unknown whether Dantas played any part in Azevedo's decision to return to Portugal in 1564 with a safe-conduct from the Portuguese king. Given the numerous abovementioned cases in which Dantas's interventions are documented, however, it would not be surprising if this were the case. For Dantas, Azevedo, with his bargaining of nautical knowledge between Spain, France, and England, was yet another menace to Portuguese interests, cast in the same mold as the pilots Bartolomeu Borges, Gaspar Caldeira, Antão Luís or the cosmographer brothers of the Homem family. Dantas's object was always the same: to repatriate them and prevent them from serving France and England.

Meanwhile, Dantas's dealings in England did not go unnoticed to other relevant actors. In a missive directed to King Philip II on June 6, 1562, the bishop of Aquila noted that Dantas "presented his written petition with sound and good arguments, but they have answered him as usual, and even worse, so that he was forced to reply, although unwillingly. I have helped him all I can, but nothing will bring these people to their senses." As relations between Aquila and Queen Elizabeth I were already strained (owing to some suspicions that Aquila was plotting with English Catholics), Aquila admitted that Dantas had tried to assist him with Elizabeth. Nevertheless, the English queen expressed the conviction to Dantas that Aquila only sought her ruin. Still, it is apparent that even though Dantas fell short of his aims, he cultivated a good personal relationship with Queen Elizabeth (an accomplishment that Aquila could not boast of). Indeed, Dantas's diplomatic courtesy was noticed not only in England, but in France and Spain and by the pope. Such polished manners fulfilled a key function in his missions not only in France or England but in all Europe: that is, to embody King Sebastian's, and more broadly, Portuguese, power abroad.

Dantas's mission to England in 1562 did not pass unnoticed to Paul de Foix (1528–82) either, the French ambassador in England between 1562 and


227 Hume, Calendar … (Simancas), 1558–1567, 240 and 243.

228 On this issue see Vila-Santa, "Reporting for a King."
In May 1562, Foix informed Queen Catherine de’ Medici of Dantas's arrival and first meeting with Queen Elizabeth. He stated that Dantas came to stop English voyages to West Africa and to ask for compensation of Portuguese losses at English hands in West Africa. Some days later, he confirmed the contents of Dantas's mission to the queen mother. But it was in June, when Dantas had his discussions with the Privy Council, that Foix reported the most relevant issues. He started by noting that Dantas, like previous Portuguese agents and ambassadors in England, did not take any action without Spain's advice. He also wrote that latterly, Dantas had been publicly displeased with the answers he received. This motivated Foix to promise that he would lay his hands on the formal English replies to Dantas. A week later, Foix acquired these documents and sent them to the queen mother. Foix stated that Queen Elizabeth had decided not to answer Dantas orally, entrusting everything to the Privy Council. Foix's comment strongly suggests that Elizabeth's decision was an attempt not to worsen Anglo-Portuguese relations even more. Still, it is important to note that Foix not only reported the main moments of Dantas's embassy, but also sent one of the Privy Council's answers, as he understood that Dantas's quarrel was similar to the ones he had in France. This was the main reason why Foix sent this intelligence to France and also reported that Dantas was staying with the bishop of Aquila. One of Aquila's missives demonstrates that Dantas had lived there ever since the beginning of his stay at the Tudor court. Aquila extended his help as he had done with Manuel de Araújo in 1561. Once more, Portuguese-Spanish diplomatic collaboration did not go unnoticed.

In his 1562 embassy to England, Dantas adopted the same strategy that he employed in France with Coligny and Michel de L'Hôpital. But if Dantas had enjoyed some success in France, the results were quite the opposite in England (with Cecil). It remains unknown whether Dantas also tried to bribe Lord Clinton. Although there is no explicit evidence, the possibility should not be dismissed, given that Dantas previously suggested that any ambassador to England in 1562 ought to petition him directly. The outcome of Dantas's second embassy to England was to heighten concerns about English maritime expeditions. Precisely for this reason, in December 1562, the bishop of Aquila had to concede to King Philip II that he was unable to forestall the departure of another English fleet to West Africa, despite

230 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations politiques, vol. III, 56
all the protests he made at the behest of the king of Portugal to Queen Elizabeth. Understanding from 1562 onwards that he could not stop English voyages to West Africa, Dantas changed his strategy, resorting to espionage and counter-espionage, as his correspondence for the next years clearly shows. This was a clear consequence of Dantas’s perception that under Queen Elizabeth, London merchants had greater official support and backing in their trading ventures. Dantas may also have known that the profits acquired during the 1561–62 English voyages to West Africa seem, by all standards, to have been the highest achieved during the 1560s; this could help explain his change of tactics.

4.2.2 Spying on the English: Dantas’s Espionage and Counter-Epionage in England (1563–68)

Prior to his departure from England, Dantas was aware of the renewed interest of London merchants in West Africa. He knew that he could rely on the contacts of Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese overseer/consul in Antwerp, to keep him informed of the latest events. Vasconcelos had established his network of informants in England during the 1540s. On September 5, 1562, Vasconcelos informed Portugal that the English voyage to Mina had been successful, and that the English had purchased additional merchandise for the West African trade in Flanders. On September 26, Vasconcelos wrote to Dantas, advising that Portugal should deploy an armed fleet to sink all English ships in the region and without any mercy, as that would be the only way to deter England from entering what he considered Portuguese waters. He expressed the hope that Dantas’s influence would convince Lisbon to seriously face the English challenge. In response to Vasconcelos’s warning, Dantas dispatched Francisco Costa Pontes as his agent to England. Pontes also alerted Dantas in September of the English preparations, reporting that a Jewish traitor (unnamed, but possibly the abovementioned Belchior Vaz de Azevedo) was providing sensitive information to the English and requesting further instructions. Dantas promptly relayed this intelligence to Cardinal Henry. In October, the bishop of Aquila also informed Dantas that Queen Elizabeth had authorized the departure of three ships bound for Mina. Dantas likewise received

231 Hume, Calendar ... (Simancas), 1558–1567, 276.
234 Mendes Leal and Rebello da Silva, Quadro elementar, vol. XV, CXIII.
confirmation that six French ships were joining the English fleet, but heading for trade in Morocco. From Antwerp, Vasconcelos also confirmed all English preparations in October.235

Based on the intelligence he had received, on November 20, 1562, Dantas briefed King Sebastian about the impending departure of the English fleet to West Africa after Christmas. He informed the king that John Hawkins had already set sail, and that French Huguenots were serving on the English ships. On December 13, Dantas wrote the Portuguese king that the English fleet was not sailing south, but instead heading for West Africa, and that Hawkins’s ship was carrying only merchandise. By December 30, Dantas passed along to King Sebastian the names of the two English ships that were scheduled to depart for Mina on January 10, 1563, stating that Portugal still had time to send its fleet there, and that France would not be sending any ships, as previously rumored. By February, Pontes, Dantas’s agent in England, was arrested by English authorities for attending Mass at the house of the Spanish ambassador. Dantas reassured King Sebastian that he was working to secure Pontes’s release, and warned that the English ships had orders to trade before the castle of Mina.236 Dantas’s intelligence proved important in the naval battles that took place in the area that year and resulted in English losses. This pattern continued in subsequent years, as English expeditions to West Africa were marked by violence and plunder due to the presence of Portuguese war fleets.237 For the year of 1563, as has been underscored, Dantas likewise relayed intelligence on Thomas Stukley’s aborted voyage to Florida and on William Rutter’s voyage to West Africa.

In 1564, as reports of English preparations continued to accumulate, Dantas once again took action. On July 2, Diego Guzmán de Silva, the new Spanish ambassador to England, warned Dantas that Queen Elizabeth I was preparing two ships to join two other merchant ships heading for Guinea. On July 16, Dantas forwarded Guzmán de Silva’s letter to King Sebastian. By August 5, Pontes had come directly to Paris to warn Dantas that the English would send eight to ten ships for John Hawkins’s second voyage, with instructions to sail to Guinea and Mina and to establish contact with a friendly African prince. The next day, Dantas communicated to King Sebastian all the details that Pontes had furnished, assuring him that his good spies (“bons espias” in Portuguese) in French ports had confirmed to him that no French ship was to join the English expedition. He also explained

that the English investment in Guinea that year was larger because the Flanders market was closed to English trade,\footnote{This comment by Dantas reveals that he was well-aware that Anglo-Spanish commercial relations were suffering due to piracy attacks in the English Channel after John Hawkins’s return from his first voyage to England in 1563 (Andrews, \textit{The Spanish Caribbean}, 115).} and the English wanted to prevent any Portuguese attack like that of 1563. On September 15, Dantas updated King Sebastian on Hawkins’s fleet, with details sent by Vasconcelos and based on intelligence provided by the Spanish ambassador in England. Dantas did not give the news any credence and even stated, with unmistakable exaggeration, that the Spanish ambassador to England had worse spies in the English ports than he did. Finally, on September 29, Dantas briefed King Sebastian on Hawkins’s departure, denounced his intention to build a fortress, buy slaves, and then sell them in Spanish Santo Domingo.\footnote{On Cardoso’s mission see A. de Magalhães Basto, “A missão de Aires Cardoso a Inglaterra em 1564,” \textit{Occidente} XVII (1942): 355–67.} As before, Dantas’s intelligence on the preparations for John Hawkins’s fleet was mostly accurate.\footnote{Kelsey, \textit{Sir John Hawkins}, 19–20.}

The reports sent by Dantas to Portugal were instrumental in convincing Lisbon to appoint Aires Cardoso as envoy to England in September 1564, with the purpose of lodging another formal protest to Queen Elizabeth I.\footnote{On Cardoso’s mission see A. de Magalhães Basto, “A missão de Aires Cardoso a Inglaterra em 1564,” \textit{Occidente} XVII (1942): 355–67.} Since Dantas’s embassy to England, in addition to the voyage undertaken by John Hawkins in 1562, other voyages by William Rutter and David Carlet in 1563 and 1564 respectively had sailed to West Africa with full support from the queen.\footnote{McBride, “The Politics of Economic Expansion,” 83–85.} Aires Cardoso has already been mentioned in chapter 1, as King John III’s agent in the Canary Islands, where his task was to spy on Spanish voyages to West Africa in the 1540–50s. Thus, Cardoso was far from being untrained in Portuguese espionage when he was appointed to England in 1564. In this role, Cardoso’s orders were very clear. He should stop first in France, where Dantas was to instruct him on how to deal with the English, based on his previous experience. Once in England, Cardoso was to swiftly proceed to the Spanish ambassador’s house, since Guzmán de Silva was responsible for arranging a meeting with Queen Elizabeth. Cardoso was also ordered to dissimulate (“dissimular” in Portuguese) while he was in England, to gather any and all intelligence on old and new English fleet preparations and to try to prevent them from departing.\footnote{Biblioteca Pública Municipal do Porto (BPMP), Ms. 85. The manuscript has no folio numbering. Cardoso’s instruction is in the end.}
evidence of Queen Elizabeth’s personal involvement in naval preparations, he was authorized to confront the queen in person and even to threaten the possibility of open war between Portugal and England.  

In November 1564, Dantas wrote to King Sebastian to inform him that Cardoso had reached his house safely and had already departed. After explaining the details of his 1562 embassy to Cardoso, Dantas had provided him a supplementary lesson on Portuguese espionage in Europe, instructing him on the itinerary to follow in England. Dantas ordered Cardoso to gather intelligence on the English maritime preparations before arriving at the Tudor court, as he would not be able to do so upon his return to Portugal, since by that time the English would publicly know that he was the envoy of Portugal.  

Dantas’s advice to Cardoso was motivated by the maritime tensions between England, Spain, and Portugal. The Spanish ambassador to France predicted in November 1564 that Cardoso would be fiercely attacked when the English discovered that he was lodging another complaint with Spanish support. Given Dantas’s role, by December 1564, King Sebastian refused his requests, due to his poor health, to return to Portugal, as there was no suitable successor.

Cardoso’s protest is recorded, but it was not successful. Cardoso had been allowed to formally forgive Queen Elizabeth I for patronizing all previous English voyages to West Africa, on the condition that she handed over all Portuguese collaborators in such voyages. It is not known if this was authorized personally by King Sebastian, but it seems more likely to have been Dantas’s last-minute handiwork. Seeing that his previous strategies with England had foundered, Dantas might have changed his approach in an attempt to achieve a different outcome. If this was Dantas’s idea, the results were disappointing. Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in England, once again assisted Cardoso in his meetings with the queen. Even before the formal meeting, Guzmán de Silva warned King Philip II that a new English expedition had just departed and that there were no reasons to expect a different answer. When the meeting took place, Guzmán de Silva noted that Queen Elizabeth used the same arguments that she had employed with Dantas two and half years ago: she could see no reason why

245 BA, 49–X–9, fols. 65–65v.
247 BA, 49–X–9, fl. 66.
Englishmen would be prohibited to sail where the Frenchmen had already sailed so many times. The queen also only formally replied to Cardoso when Hawkins was already ready to depart. Later Queen Elizabeth I wrote to King Sebastian stating that Cardoso’s protest had been accepted, when she had simply reiterated the response Dantas received in 1562.

The details of Dantas’s espionage with regard to the 1565 and 1566 English voyages to West Africa have not been preserved. However, as the abovementioned cases of the participation of the Portuguese pilots Gaspar Caldeira and Antão Luís in John Hawkins’s third voyage in 1567 demonstrate, Dantas continued his espionage and counter-espionage activities in England with some success. The loss of several of Dantas’s letters for the years 1566–1568 prevents further tracing of his operations in England. What is known is gleaned from English documents. On December 13, 1566, Dantas wrote to Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester (1532–88), to ask him to pressure Queen Elizabeth to give a formal answer to Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in England, on the issues he had raised. No formal reply is known. Most likely, these questions were connected with Peyrot de Monluc’s attack on Madeira and a possible English involvement that Portuguese authorities were investigating. On December 13, 1566, Dantas also wrote directly to Queen Elizabeth I. In the letter, he stated that the English ships that had been arrested in Lisbon when the news of Monluc’s attack arrived had already been released. However, for some unmentioned reason, possibly related to the contents of the English reply, Dantas became outraged and even offered an injury to Henry Norris (1525–1601), the English ambassador in France between 1566 and 1570.

Dantas’s behavior is even more strange in light of his writing to Guzmán de Silva to ask him to plead with Queen Elizabeth to bar ships and men from Monluc’s expedition from entering England. In this request, Dantas was attempting to prevent the Portuguese pilots Gaspar Caldeira and Antão Luís from being accepted into formal English service. Dantas’s wish was granted. Guzmán de Silva had also discussed Monluc’s attack with the French ambassador in England, who condemned it in such terms that Guzmán de Silva expected France to offer a litany of apologies to Portugal. All of this can be found in Guzmán de Silva’s letter to King Philip...

249 Hume, Calendar … (Simancas), 1558–1567, 394–96.
250 Ronald, The Pirate Queen, 89.
II, dated January 6, 1567.\textsuperscript{253} Thus, Dantas’s actions against Norris may be explained by another piece of intelligence that Guzmán de Silva sent to Antwerp, in October 1566, and that Dantas probably also received: that a new voyage to West Africa was being prepared in the utmost secrecy by the English.\textsuperscript{254} The details of the voyage were also confirmed to Dantas, in February 1567, by Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos. Vasconcelos averred that an unnamed but great Portuguese cosmographer (as stated previously, this was probably André Homem or Diogo Homem) was assisting the English in preparing an expedition to China by sailing westwards.\textsuperscript{255} Dantas may have discovered that this unnamed Portuguese had been recruited by the English in secrecy, as had happened with ambassador Throckmorton’s abovementioned recruitment of the Portuguese Belchior Vaz de Azevedo in France. If this was the case, Dantas may merely have lost his patience with Ambassador Norris. This would hardly be uncharacteristic—as has been mentioned, Dantas readily resorted to violence when defied, even if there was a risk that this behavior could become publicly known. Indeed, this irascibility was documented in Dantas’s dealings with the Portuguese cosmographer André Homem at the Valois court in 1568, and when he ordered an attack on his own spy Manuel de Araújo, also at the French court in 1566.

It is very probable (although this is not documented in his correspondence) that Dantas sought to conceal other Anglo-Portuguese maritime collaborations, as he had with Portuguese pilots in France; for example those of the Portuguese pilot Bartolomeu Baião, who attacked the Cape Verde Islands with the English in 1565.\textsuperscript{256} Incidentally, Baião had also entered the service of John Hawkins and participated in the latter’s triangular voyages between England, West Africa, and the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{257} Indeed, as has been shown in chapter 1, Bartolomeu Baião had begun his trajectory by presenting his nautical proposals to the Spanish court. As they were not likely to be accepted (no formal answer to him has been found), Baião went to England. This was something that might have caught Dantas’s attention as Baião claimed that he had been jailed in Lisbon and received no justice before

\textsuperscript{253} Hume, \textit{Calendar ... (Simancas)}, 1558–1567, 608.
\textsuperscript{254} Hume, \textit{Calendar ... (Simancas)}, 1558–1567, 585.
\textsuperscript{255} ANTT, CC I–108–31. This voyage was likely influenced by a letter sent to Queen Elizabeth I on November 1566. The letter was signed in Naples by an English agent, conveying news of the riches the Portuguese had obtained in the Moluccas and China, although it also mentioned the difficulties of sailing to the region. See \textit{Calendar}, 1890, doc. 1119.
\textsuperscript{256} Andrews, \textit{Trade, Plunder, and Settlement}, 110–11.
coming to England. Baião’s reasons for migration were, thus, a repetition of those of the pilots António Eanes Pinteado and Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira, as underscored previously.

This hypothesis is further supported by the consequences of Aires Cardoso’s mission to England in 1564. One of these was Portuguese maritime retaliation against English vessels in Guinea and Mina, during which one of the Wynter brothers’ ships was seized as revenge for John Lovell’s 1566 attack on Portuguese ships in the Cape Verde Islands. In 1567, this incident prompted Queen Elizabeth I to send ambassador Thomas Wilson to Lisbon. Simultaneously, the Portuguese court made its own complaints about John Hawkins’s assaults on Portuguese ships. As a result, Wilson’s embassy achieved nothing, but it had the effect of forcing Portugal to name a permanent ambassador to England: Manuel Álvares, who served from 1567–68. Furthermore, the episode triggered an intervention by D. Fernando de Carrillo y Mendonza, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal, when Wilson arrived in Lisbon. Although Álvares’s diplomatic misses appear to have been lost, the Simancas archives contain some valuable information on his mission. War was on the brink of being declared in 1569, when

258 Baião’s reply was the answer to the Spanish ambassador in England’s formal complaint. For this reason, the answer was translated from Spanish-Portuguese to English (BL, Add MS. 35831, f8s. 337–339).
262 A passage in Carrillo’s letter dated October 22, 1567, reveals that Carrillo spoke with Wilson. Wilson stated to Cardinal Henry that the English respected the Portuguese rights overseas and that they only went to West Africa to purchase slaves, an answer that angered Cardinal Henry. Carrillo informed Wilson that his words had offended Portugal, and that he should not offend Portugal as it also meant offending Spain. He also advised Wilson to adopt a cautious attitude and conduct himself as a prudent minister, in a clear reference to Wilson’s Protestant faith. Carrillo noted that Wilson took this advice to heart and left Portugal on good terms, but Carrillo still acknowledged that Anglo-Portuguese relations had not improved as there were many complaints from both sides (AGS, Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 384 – This legajo is not numbered, but the document is toward the end). On Wilson’s embassy see also: Susana Oliveira, “Networks of Exchange in Anglo-Portuguese Sixteenth-Century Diplomacy and Thomas Wilson’s Mission to Portugal,” in Exile, Diplomacy and Texts: Exchanges between Iberia and the British Isles, 1500–1767, ed. Ana Sáez-Hidalgo and Berta Cano Echevarría (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 32–54.
263 In a record from August 13, 1568, King Sebastian replied to King Philip II, informing him of Álvares’s departure to the court of Elizabeth, and that, as usual, Portugal had requested Spanish diplomatic support. As King Philip II had inquired about the content of Álvares’s mission, King Sebastian replied that Álvares was to petition the English government regarding the violation of the Portuguese Mare Clausum and that, as King Philip II had similar complaints with regard to England, Portugal hoped to unite diplomatic efforts with Spain. However, Portugal had yet to
King Sebastian, incensed by the lack of a formal diplomatic response from Queen Elizabeth, suspended the alliance with England and seized all English ships and properties in Portugal.\textsuperscript{264} By this time, Dantas was no longer ambassador. However, he had played a vital role in the English decision to withdraw from West Africa in the late 1560s due to the effects of French competition and the presence of the Portuguese war fleet.\textsuperscript{265} Nevertheless, even after Dantas's embassy in France had ended, Portuguese nautical experts continued to provide important nautical and geographical advice to the English. The Portuguese pilot Simão Fernandes, who served in English expeditions to North America during the 1570–80s under the command of figures such as Humphrey Gilbert (1539–83), Richard Grenville (1542–91), and Walter Raleigh (1552–1618), and was considered the most important Portuguese seafarer of the Elizabethan era,\textsuperscript{266} is a noteworthy example, though not the only one.

All available data points to the fact that after his embassy to England in 1562, Dantas operated as a sort of informal Portuguese ambassador to England. Although Dantas did not personally return to England, he had an intelligence network at his disposal that allowed significant intervention in affairs abroad. It must be stressed that this was the first time that the Portuguese diplomatic scenario had operated on such a scale; understandably, perhaps, since no previous Portuguese ambassador to France had had to deal with such a significant threat of English and French overseas expansion. If in the English case (as indeed in the French), this required a degree of collaboration with the Spanish diplomatic network, it is notable that Queen Elizabeth I treated the Portuguese and the Spanish ambassadors at her court differently. While the Spanish were frequently accused of treason

\textsuperscript{264} Mendes Leal and Rebello da Silva, \textit{Quadro elementar}, vol. XV, 1842, CXIX and CXX; Oliveira, “Uma cartografia das mentalidades,” 80–85.
\textsuperscript{265} Andrews, \textit{Trade, Plunder, and Settlement}, 112.
and sometimes expelled, this never happened to Portuguese ambassadors in England in the 1560–70s. Even when Portuguese ambassadors were detained for possible involvement in Catholic plots, or were found to be collaborating with Catholic French and Spanish ambassadors to England, Queen Elizabeth always provided them good living conditions and status at her court. Possibly for Queen Elizabeth I's good treatment to Portuguese ambassadors at her court, Dantas also made his contribution when he favorably impressed Queen Elizabeth I in 1562. Further studies are still needed to understand whether the Queen's relation with Dantas influenced her behavior to later Portuguese ambassadors.

Conclusion

It is now time to assess Dantas's embassies to France and England and to discuss the effect of his missives to the Portuguese attempt to enforce policies of *Mare Clausum* and *Secret Science*. As has been demonstrated, one of the *leitmotifs* of Dantas's embassy, possibly stemming from royal instructions that have not survived, was to prevent English and French expeditions from departing to what Portugal considered its *Mare Clausum*. This policy is well-known. However, what is less broadly acknowledged but is clearly documented by Dantas's correspondence, is how closely *Mare Clausum* policies were tied to a policy of *Secret Science* (that is, a systematic effort to prevent the circulation of Portuguese nautical expertise to France and England). Dantas's espionage and counter-espionage in France and England are largely explained by the use of *Secret Science* as an instrument for *Mare Clausum*. As Baldwin rightly contends, the movement of Portuguese nautical experts to France and England and French and English espionage with regard to Portuguese nautical science became gravely problematic from the 1550s onwards.

In the cases of Michel de Seure's and Jean Nicot's French embassies to Portugal between 1557 and 1561, this phenomenon is well-documented, particularly through Nicot's dispatch of pilots, Portuguese rutters, and cosmographical works to France. With respect to England, the influence of the Iberian connection is generally recognized in accounts of the English overseas expansion. While England benefited from relatively good relations with Portugal and Spain, the same cannot be said of France, which had

267 Oliveira, “Uma cartografia das mentalidades,” 118, 124 and 137.
troubles with Spain and at times better relations with Portugal. Anglo-Hispanic amity permitted England to import nautical knowledge until Queen Mary I’s reign. Moreover, the existence of an alliance between England and Portugal from the late 14th century facilitated contacts with Lisbon and led to the slow growth of a Portuguese community in England that would provide personnel for English maritime expeditions. Yet despite the 1559 peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis and the prospect of an alliance, France’s relations with Spain remained fraught with difficulties. As a result, France was forced to rely on Huguenot personnel to launch its maritime expeditions, and to clandestinely seek out Portuguese nautical and cartographical knowledge. In this light, one can appreciate fully why the enlistment of Portuguese cosmographers André Homem and Bartolomeu Velho, together with André Thevet’s (1516–90) works, were so vital for France during the 1560–80s. However, the French civil wars deprived France of the conditions to mount a full-fledged challenge to the Iberian Mare Clausum. This was particularly true after Coligny’s presumed anti-Iberian maritime and overseas policies. Still, it is hard to deny that Coligny’s leadership of the Protestant brotherhood, especially after his death in 1572, served as pattern for the English (and later, the Dutch) in their maritime programs.

Aware of English and French interest not only in what he considered to be the Portuguese overseas areas, but more generally in Portuguese nautical experts, Dantas tried to prevent experts from entering English or French service. As is evident in the cases of the pilots Gaspar Caldeira, Antão Luís, Francisco Dias Mimoso, and the sons of Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem, Dantas resorted to a variety of strategies, some dubious and dangerous. While he tried to “buy” the favor of elites in the French (Coligny and Michel de L'Hôpital) and English (Cecil and possibly Clinton) courts, he also worked assiduously to represent himself and Portugal in the best possible light, particularly in his dealings with Queen Catherine de’ Medici, King Charles IX, and Queen Elizabeth I. Most of Dantas’s bribery and scheming proved feckless, as had previously already been the case with Portuguese diplomacy in France during the 1520s and 1530s, ultimately raising Spain’s suspicions and precipitating his downfall. However, Dantas was successful in cultivating relationships with Queen Elizabeth I, the Queen

269 Waters, _The Iberian Bases_; Wright, _English Explorers’ Debt_.
Mother Catherine de' Medici, and King Charles IX. Yet throughout his maneuvering, Dantas was too often alone, battling the wave of French and English overseas expansion without sufficient support. His main innovation, although one not without antecedents, was the proposal of a maritime alliance between Spain and Portugal to prevent France and England from achieving major overseas successes. In preferring to side with Spain in maritime, not in political affairs, Dantas reiterated what was by then a historical pattern, with the French overseas menace bringing Portugal closer to Spain. This is the reason why, in Dantas's letters, it can often be noticed that he waited for instructions from Lisbon in some cases, while explicitly disobeying the orders he had received in others.

Dantas's position is also related to the fact, reported in his letters, that France and England collaborated both formally and informally to fight Iberian maritime hegemony at sea and in political arenas such as Morocco. It is hard not to notice that the Anglo-French collaboration Dantas reports took place despite the traditional Anglo-French rivalry, and continued even when tensions arose between the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I and the Catholic Valois. In a sense, this Anglo-French collaboration highlights the difficulties that the English and French faced when they attempted to seriously challenge the Iberian *Mare Clausum*, just as Portuguese-Spanish diplomatic and military cooperation reveals the gravity of the French and English overseas threat. Dantas grasped that Portugal simply could not simultaneously engage in a maritime rivalry with France and England, and that it needed to build a more robust *Secret Science* policy. His insistence on an alliance with Spain can only be understood in this context. Until his dying breath, Dantas never supported a Portuguese-Spanish political alliance, as his defense of the French marriage of King Sebastian corroborates. His correspondence is testament to the attention Portuguese diplomacy paid to France and England, with recourse to Spanish collaboration only as a last resort. Dantas's strategies are mirrored by French diplomats to King Philip II's court, especially Ambassador Raymond de Fourquevaux, by French ambassadors to Portugal, such as Michel de Seure and Jean Nicot, and by Spanish diplomats to Portugal, such as D. Juan de Borja or D. Juan de Silva, as detailed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. For all these figures, the same goals can be observed (to obtain access to maritime knowledge

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272 For further details see Vila-Santa, “Reporting for a King.”
273 Pereira Ferreira, “Da defesa do monopólio,” 159 and 166.
275 Ribera, Diplomatie et espionage, 433–516.
in the form of important nautical treatises, nautical cartography, or the hiring of nautical personnel), as well as similar methods.

Dantas’s position was, thus, that of a man of truly European vision who understood that Portuguese maritime and overseas interests had to be fought primarily in Europe and only secondly at sea. His correspondence also testifies to the maritime nature of Portuguese power and prestige in Europe. Nevertheless, Dantas’s embassies are also proof of how France and England mirrored Portuguese maritime knowledge and experience as a model worth of emulation. This is why both Elizabethan England and Valois France were always keen on hiring Portuguese pilots and cartographers, and Dantas, in his Secret Science policy, had to turn his home into a kind of center of Portuguese talents abroad. The international careers of André Homem and his brother Diogo Homem also show that Portuguese knowledge was highly prized. It is no coincidence that Richard Hakluyt (1553–1613) wrote to Walter Raleigh in the 1580s that André Homem was the prince of cosmographers of his time or that, in 1622, Richard Hawkins (1552–1622) still argued that England had much to learn from the Iberians.

After Dantas, during the late 16th century, the Portuguese Prince D. António’s (1535–95) exile in France and England provided further opportunities for Portuguese nautical knowledge to be disseminated. D. António’s political dealings with the French court and Elizabethan England included significant overseas concessions and the exchange of maritime knowledge. This process involved the other major protagonist that was about to emerge: the Dutch Republic. Although the Dutch benefited mainly from maritime knowledge exchanges with England and France, the importance of the Iberian connection should not be neglected. As this contribution took place mainly after the 1580 Iberian Union, the nature of the exchange cannot be found in diplomatic documents, but in the career of a decisive intermediary: Jan Huygen van Linschoten. The next chapter will detail how this famous Dutch traveler, resorting to non-classical espionage techniques comparable to those that have been described, compiled Iberian maritime knowledge that boosted Dutch overseas expansion in the 1590s.

276 Madeira Santos, João Pereira Dantas.
5. A Spy or a Go-between? Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the *Itinerario* and the Rise of Dutch Overseas Expansion (1583–1611)

**Abstract**
This chapter examines the Dutch-Iberian relations, with a focus on the well-known case of Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the famous Dutch traveler to Portuguese Asia in the 1580s. It discusses the methods used by Van Linschoten to acquire Iberian (Portuguese and Spanish) maritime knowledge, and how his reshaping of the contents for the *Itinerario* publication in 1596 affected not only Dutch overseas expansion, but also the English and French maritime expansion in the early 17th century. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates how, at the transition to the 17th century, Iberian maritime knowledge had become so widespread among its maritime rivals that it became impossible for the Iberian Crowns to successfully implement secrecy policies.

**Keywords:** Dutch Republic, Spain, Iberian Union, Portuguese Asia, traveler, espionage

**Introduction**

Jan Huygen van Linschoten (1563–1611) and his 1596 *Itinerario* was of critical importance in Northern Europe for several years. As Charles McKew Parr has pointed out, the *Itinerario* contained all the knowledge the Dutch and the English had been waiting for, emboldening them to launch their enterprises in Asia. Hitherto hesitant to embark on relatively unfamiliar

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sailing routes, both countries took Van Linschoten’s exaggerated portrait of Portuguese decline as an invitation to mount a direct challenge for dominion in Asia. Parr also regarded Van Linschoten as an unusual figure who, carrying large volumes of intelligence, was able to move between two worlds torn apart by the wars of religion: King Philip II’s Spain and the nascent Dutch Republic. Ernst van den Boogaart also recognized that the publication of the *Itinerario* triggered the beginning of Dutch overseas expansion,² showing that Van Linschoten drew an emphatically moral map of the diversity of Asia.³ The *Itinerario*’s significance is likewise attested by its pattern of distribution: after being swiftly translated into many European languages, roughly 10,000 to 15,000 thousand copies of the book circulated during the 17th century.⁴

Yet, as Arie Pos has noted, Dutch historiography seems to have forgotten the *Itinerario*.⁵ Considered to be one of the most important books about 16th-century Portuguese Asia, and a snapshot of India before the arrival of the North Europeans, the *Itinerario* has also received little attention in Portuguese historiography, despite an excellent 1997 translation and edition by Arie Pos and Rui Manuel Loureiro.⁶ Neither Dutch nor Portuguese historians have fully explained how Van Linschoten, having spent a mere five years in Asia, gained unprecedented access to Portuguese knowledge (nautical rutters, cartography, trade, botany, medicines, weighs, measures) and then brought such precious intelligence back to the Netherlands. Van Linschoten was by no means the first Dutchman in Portugal Asia, but none had managed to collect the material he did. Faced with this puzzling historical and historiographical landscape, the question immediately emerges: why was Van Linschoten the man “fated” to do what his fellow countrymen had not?

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Parr and van den Boogaart, perhaps Van Linschoten’s two main biographers, were succeeded by several scholars. Two other important contributions to tracing Van Linschoten’s biography include an article by Arun Saldanha and the introduction to the aforementioned translation by Arie Pos and Rui Manuel Loureiro. Additionally, a wide range of cultural studies on diverse aspects of the *Itinerario* have been presented by several authors. Many of these studies examined how Van Linschoten portrayed Asia, associating it with the topic of the Portuguese black legend in Asia. However, recent studies failed to problematize the ways that the Dutchman obtained and moved around with secret Portuguese knowledge, embodied in documents such as nautical rutters and cartography. By eliding this matter, scholarship on Van Linschoten tacitly suggests that the feat must have been easy. This, in turn, has led to the idea that Van Linschoten was a spy, with the *Itinerario*’s assertion of Portuguese decline evidenced by lackadaisical Portuguese response to the plunder of such sensitive knowledge by the Dutch.

The aim of this chapter is to probe a pivotal unanswered question: how and where, during his stay in Asia between 1583 and 1588, did Van Linschoten become acquainted with the Portuguese knowledge that he later published in the *Itinerario* and that ended influencing the rise of Dutch overseas expansion? In order to answer this question, I will rely on Iberian sources whenever that is possible. Although the Portuguese and Spanish sources do not mention Van Linschoten directly and the personal notes that he brought back to the Dutch Republic have not yet been located, the chapter will re-examine several aspects of his biography in the context of the broader evolution of the Estado da India during the 1580s. Combining this with a careful re-reading of Van Linschoten’s claims in the *Itinerario*, this chapter will argue that he is better perceived in the framework of Renaissance intra-European knowledge transfers, than through the classical perspective of Van Linschoten as a spy. After debating whether Van Linschoten had become a spy during his stay in Goa or later during his sojourn in the

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7 McKew Parr, *Linschoten; Van den Boogaart, Huygen van Linschoten and idem, Civil and Corrupt Asia.*


9 The expression Estado da India refers to the Portuguese ports network in Asia that functioned as another Asian power, as defined by Luís Filipe Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Lisbon: Difel, 1994), 207–8.
Azores and Lisbon between 1589 and 1592, it will investigate the editorial process of the *Itinerario* preceding its publication. It will also address the revisitation of one of the major features of the *Itinerario*, its black legend of Portuguese decline. All these topics will be connected with Van Linschoten’s non-participation in Dutch expeditions to Asia from 1595 onwards and with Dutch-Portuguese rivalry in Asia.

This chapter will thus propose a new approach to Van Linschoten, bearing in mind that his case is situated in a whole process of knowledge transfer between Portugal and the rest of Europe during the 16th century, as has been argued for the cases discussed in the previous chapters. It will quickly become apparent that although the main scenario for Van Linschoten’s interchange was not in Europe but overseas, the mechanisms for knowledge transfer were very similar to the ones previously identified. In a way, this chapter will also demonstrate that the Dutch-Iberian interchange of maritime knowledge followed the same patterns as the Portuguese-Spanish, the Anglo-Iberian or the Franco-Iberian ones.

5.1 A Dutchman in the Entourage of an Archbishop of Goa:
D. Frei Vicente da Fonseca and King Philip II (1580–1583)

It is difficult to understand the conditions under which Van Linschoten departed for Portuguese Asia in 1583 without mentioning the historical relations between the Low Countries and Portugal. Ever since the conquest of Lisbon from the Muslims in 1147, the first Portuguese King Afonso Henriques (1139–85) had granted privileges to the crusaders from the Low Countries who had helped him capture the city.\(^{10}\) Starting then, and especially from the 13th century onwards, a mercantile community from the Low Countries took root in Portugal, affirming Lisbon’s status as a key commercial port between Northern and Mediterranean Europe. By the 14th century, Portuguese merchants also established themselves in Bruges and in Zeeland with the onset of the salt trade around 1400.\(^{11}\) The 15th century witnessed a tightening of relations when Princess Elizabeth (1397–1471), King John I’s (1385–1433) daughter, married Philip, duke of Burgundy (1419–67). The Burgundian dukes, lords of parts of the Low Countries, quickly started to hire Portuguese

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carpenters and adopted Portuguese nautical and cartographical advances.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, the participation of Flemish settlers in the colonization of some Azorean islands is well-documented in the 15th century.\textsuperscript{13}

These international bonds deepened throughout the 16th century, with marriages serving to cement alliances between the houses of Avis and Austria, lords of the Low Countries, and intensifying commercial traffic at the Portuguese factory of Antwerp. Lisbon also aided in intensifying relations; as a global trade hub during the Renaissance, it supported a growing community of merchants from the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{14} By the middle of the 16th century, the Portuguese had outsourced some of their Atlantic freight cargoes to Dutch ships. This, in turn, enabled the first Dutch merchants to settle in Brazil in 1582.\textsuperscript{15}

The Portuguese overseer/consul at Antwerp acted not only as a commercial, financial, and cultural liaison to the Low Countries, but was also charged with recruiting Flemish-Dutchmen and Germans to serve in Portuguese Asia as artillerymen or harquebusiers. This borderline mercenary practice was a direct result of a shortage of these specialists in Portugal.\textsuperscript{16} John Everaert has documented several Flemings and Dutchmen who served in Asia under the Portuguese during the 16th century.\textsuperscript{17} Dutchmen and Flemings served in the military field in the other Portuguese overseas areas as well.

Turning to the arts, Portuguese patronage of celebrated painters and engravers from the Low Countries is conspicuous throughout the 16th century, with the Portuguese Avis kings providing notable examples. Thus there are the well-known cases of the hiring of António de Holanda (1480–1571) and of his son Francisco de Holanda (1517–85). This “Dutch-Flemish specialty” was

\textsuperscript{15} Houwens Post, “As relações marítimas,” 111–3.
\textsuperscript{16} Gregor M. Metzig, “Guns in Paradise: German and Dutch Artillerymen in the Portuguese Empire (1415–1640),” \textit{Anais de História de Além-Mar XII} (2011): 63 and 68.
so highly regarded that the Portuguese viceroy of India D. Luís de Ataíde (1568–71) did not hesitate to risk his reputation for its sake. He saved Philip of Brias, condemned by the Goa Inquisition, on the condition that the Fleming would draw plans for the fortress of Onor and supervise its construction. 18

Before Van Linschoten’s departure, the acclaimed academic Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) in 1578 published a letter to his countrymen exhorting them to travel. Lipsius contended that travel was the only way to know and study the natural world. 19 His statement may hint at the impact of Iberian scientific texts circulating in translation across the Low Countries during the 16th century. 20 When Van Linschoten set off for Spain in 1579, he was following the spirit of Lipsius’s mandate, as he stated in a letter to his parents in 1584 and in the Itinerario itself. 21 Van Linschoten’s commitment to traveling may also be linked to his family’s move to Enkhuizen in 1572, after the Spanish conquest of Haarlem. In Enkhuizen, a maritime city with direct commercial connections to Portugal, Van Linschoten’s ears were filled with tales of Asia. He also saw his father lending money to shipowners on multiple occasions. 22 In a time when the outcome of a successful Dutch rebellion against King Philip II was uncertain, 23 there was still a chance for Van Linschoten to follow the paths of many Dutchmen before him and serve in the Iberian empires. Therefore, as argued, there is no evidence or any serious reason to consider that by 1579 Van Linschoten was a Dutch spy sent to pilfer Iberian maritime knowledge. 24

Arriving at Seville in 1580, Van Linschoten observed the intense activity of the Casa de la Contratación, but soon decided to join in King Philip II’s invasion of Portugal. This may mean he had already resolved to travel to Asia using Portuguese conduits. Prior to 1583 he learned both Spanish and Portuguese, prerequisites to securing an office in the Portuguese empire. Profiting from his brothers’ connections at King Philip II’s court, he attended the King’s ceremonial arrival in Lisbon. In 1580–81, he entered the employ of a local merchant, while he awaited authorization to head onward to Asia.

18 Nuno Vila-Santa, Entre o Reino e o Império: a carreira político-militar de D. Luís de Ataíde (156–1581) (Lisbon: ICS, 2015), 158.
21 Itinerário, 1997, 57 and 69.
23 Israel, The Dutch Republic, 184–94.
Attentively following Portuguese current events since 1580, Van Linschoten witnessed, at a distance, the war between King Philip II and Dom Antonio (1531–95), the Portuguese pretendant to the Portuguese throne, which affected both the Azores and the broader Portuguese overseas empire. Van Linschoten was certainly aware that King Philip II feared insubordination in Portuguese Asia, where the possibility of open rebellion against Spanish rule and even rumors of D. António’s departure for India were constant in 1580–81. In response to his insecure position, King Philip II named D. Francisco Mascarenhas (1581–84) viceroy of India in early 1581, giving him special powers to legitimize his recognition as King of Portugal in Portuguese Asia. But the king was only informed that the Estado had sworn Philip II in mid-1582. It was at that time, that King Philip II appointed the new archbishop of Goa, who would thus have an important role in solidifying the king’s rule in Asia against D. António.

The relaciones geograficas of the 1570 and 1580s, a way of ruling the Spanish empire, soon influenced the king’s rule in Portugal. By 1583, King Philip intended to apply them in Portugal, and it is possible that they influenced the appointment of D. Frei Vicente da Fonseca. Philip’s choice of Fonseca as archbishop shows that the king aimed to forge his own path in the nomination of bishops and archbishops that applied the decrees from Trent Council, and favoring humble, experienced academics over thirty years old. Fonseca met all these conditions. King Philip II’s choice was justified by Fonseca’s fame. A Dominican royal preacher, Fonseca was held captive after the 1578 battle of Alcazar-Quibir and became known for his conversions of Jews. After escaping imprisonment in disguise, Fonseca became a trusted adviser to Cardinal-King Henry (1578–80). However, as had happened in 1559 with the first archbishop of Goa, Fonseca was reluctant to take an office that required traveling by sea to Goa. Still, King Philip was determined to have his way; as he saw it, Fonseca was the man for the job, destined to help rule a whole new territory. Philip promised Fonseca that

25 Vila-Santa, Entre o Reino e o Império, 288–329.
26 Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia (Lisbon: Régia Officina Typográfica, 1787), decade X, 422–23.
29 Portuondo, Secret Science, 212.
30 José Pedro Paiva, Os bispos de Portugal e do Império 1495–1777 (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 2006), 369–70.
if he agreed to accept the Goa post, he could return to Europe after five years and expect a prompt promotion. Documents on the archbishop’s nomination and Fonseca’s missives have not been found in Portuguese and Spanish archives, but it is very probable that King Philip granted him special powers, as he did for Viceroy Mascarenhas in 1581. There are signs that Fonseca was plied with promises of power. Notable examples include Philip II’s appointment of Fonseca to preach at the burial of the bones of Kings Sebastian and Henry, followed by the king’s public announcement of Fonseca’s appointment as archbishop of Goa, and the general role played by previous archbishops of Goa in the government of Portuguese Asia. The political dimension of Fonseca’s position in India is unmistakable: in 1584, he managed the transition of temporal power from one viceroy to another; and in 1587 he set off from Asia to Portugal to complain about the viceroy.

In 1583, Van Linschoten quickly recognized that Fonseca’s impending departure to Goa would be an ideal opportunity to embark for Asia. Once again exploiting his family connections (one of his brothers had been appointed Welser and Fugger’s overseer on one of the ships in the archbishop’s fleet, and his brother’s patron was friends with a secretary to King Philip II), Van Linschoten pushed to be included on Fonseca’s forty-man entourage. Ultimately, he was made part of Fonseca’s retinue.

Van Linschoten was not the first Dutchman to depart for Asia. His unusual skillset must have piqued Fonseca’s interest; he spoke Portuguese and Spanish, claimed noble roots (having bought the surname “Van Linschoten” before leaving the Low Countries), and evinced both natural curiosity and a talent for note-taking and drawing. It is likely that he initially served as Fonseca’s accountant. After all, Van Linschoten had only lately learned Portuguese and Spanish; appointing a foreigner with only three years’ experience in Portugal as bookkeeper or even secretary of an archbishop of Goa would have been quite unlikely. Given Van Linschoten’s past dealings

32 No data was found in several Portuguese (Torre do Tombo, Portuguese National Library in Lisbon and Ajuda Library) and Spanish archives (Simancas, Archivo de Indias and the Spanish National Library in Madrid), nor in the Vatican Apostolic Archive in several fonds that might contain Fonseca’s possible letters to the pope (*Fondo Califfaloniere*, vol. 31, *Nunziatura di Portugallo* 1, 3 and 4, as well bishops’ indexes). Most of the correspondence from the archbishops of Goa dates from the 1590s onwards, that is, after Fonseca’s death.
34 *Diogo do Couto, 1787*, decade X, 9–11.
with merchants and his father's profession, the role of accountant would have been quite fitting. It is likely that he was promoted to secretary or bookkeeper once he had won Fonseca's confidence.

There should not be any doubt that Van Linschoten must have been a Catholic by the time he entered the archbishop's retinue. It is almost inconceivable that a young Van Linschoten would have been able to trick the Catholic ministers of the king in 1583, when they were perfectly aware of the problem that the Dutch rebels' abjuration of the king posed to Philip's pan-European reputation. It is also unlikely that he was a secret Protestant during his residence in Goa, considering the enfeebled state of the Flemish-Dutch community after two decades of Inquisitorial persecution of alleged Flemish-Dutch and German Protestants. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Van Linschoten could have concealed any Protestant sympathies from his employer, who had powers over the Goa Inquisition and could easily jail Van Linschoten at the slightest suspicion. In fact, his statements reveal that he admired Fonseca, and made a concerted effort to win his confidence.

The first instance in the *Itinerario* is found in Van Linschoten's claims that Fonseca had ordered him to draw a strange fish that had appeared in the river of Goa, to be sent to King Philip II. This episode suggests that Fonseca had been charged with collecting and relaying natural knowledge from India. For this, Fonseca relied on Van Linschoten and his drawing talents. A second example can be found in the case of the four Englishmen who arrived at Hormuz and were sent by the local captain to Goa to be jailed under suspicion of espionage for D. António. Van Linschoten was named, alongside other Flemish-Dutch missionaries, to speak with them and receive their confessions. Later he successfully persuaded the archbishop to ask clemency from Viceroy Mascarenhas, securing their release. Even when three of the Englishmen fled and wary eyes turned on Van Linschoten, he was left untouched. This event confirms the trust he enjoyed with Fonseca as early as 1584. A third example is Van Linschoten's improved employment conditions by the time of Fonseca's departure for Portugal in 1587: his salary had grown and he had been given the keys of the archbishopric's coffers.

In light of the relationship sketched out by these examples, it seems likely that Fonseca tasked Van Linschoten with writing a major work for King Philip II, to help familiarize the monarch with his Asian dominions, a

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37 Everaert, "Soldiers, Diamonds, and Jesuits," 90.
clear need of the king in the early 1580s.\textsuperscript{41} This had already taken place back in 1582, when an anonymous author who was aware of Philip II’s accession to the Portuguese throne and his insufficient knowledge of the Estado, dedicated such a work to him.\textsuperscript{42} It is time to look deeper into Van Linschoten’s years at Goa and figure out how he became acquainted with the knowledge that he later published in the \textit{Itinerario}. As stated, given the lack of direct references to Van Linschoten in Iberian sources, this will be an attempt to identify his likely main informants.

5.2 The \textit{Itinerario}, a Book for the Iberian World? Revisiting Van Linschoten’s Career in India (1583–88)

5.2.1 Collecting Knowledge: The Archbishop’s Trusted Servant and the Cultural Circles of Goa

Although there are many uncertainties surrounding Van Linschoten’s life in Asia, it has already been pointed out that he was probably initially hired as an accountant for the archbishop. In any case, Van Linschoten had secured a prestigious office; the archbishop’s palace, like the Jesuit headquarters in Rome and the later VOC and EIC command centers,\textsuperscript{43} was a place where large volumes of information were compiled. Although it is not possible to document patronage during Fonseca’s office, the case study of one of his successors, D. Frei Aleixo de Meneses (1595–1612), makes clear the patronage powers that any archbishop of Goa enjoyed.\textsuperscript{44} Ever since the arrival of the printing press in Goa (the publishing activities were supervised by the archbishop and involved the indirect participation of Dutch printers in Lisbon),\textsuperscript{45} a library must have existed in the archbishop’s palace. While the precise contents of this library are not known, it is clear that, in the course of executing his duties, initially as accountant and later as secretary

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Livro das cidades, e fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India, e das capitaniaes, e mais cargos que nelas ha, e da importancia deles}, ed. Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1960).
\textsuperscript{43} Steven, “Long-Distance Corporations,” 270.
\textsuperscript{44} Carla Alferes Pinto, “‘Traz à memória a excelência de suas obras e virtudes.’ D. frei Aleixo de Meneses (1559 – 1617), mécenas e patrono,” \textit{Anais de História de Além-Mar XII} (2011), 53–180.
\textsuperscript{45} Everaert, “Soldiers, Diamonds, and Jesuits,” 96.
or bookkeeper, Van Linschoten must have consulted it almost since the
beginning of his stay in Goa. Besides religious texts, Van Linschoten would
undoubtedly have found there the first edition of Garcia de Orta’s (1501–68)
book on the drugs of India, which had been authorized for printing by
Archbishop D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira in 1563.\(^ {46}\) Van Linschoten even seems
to have acquired his own Portuguese edition of Orta’s book during his
stay in Goa, later selling this copy in the Dutch Republic in 1593. This fact
explains why textual similarities between Orta’s text and some chapters
of the \textit{Itinerario} have been identified.\(^ {47}\)

Other books Van Linschoten may have perused in the archbishop’s library
include the \textit{Lusíadas}, the epic poem by Luís de Camões (1524–80), and other
Portuguese chronicles, such as those by João de Barros (1496–1570) and
Fernão Lopes de Castanheda (1500–59).\(^ {48}\) All these texts contained knowl-
dge about Portuguese history in Asia and would have fed the Dutchman’s
innate curiosity, although Van Linschoten seems not to have used entire
passages of them as he did with Orta’s text. In spite of his limited travel
within Asia (spending most of his time in Goa, fifteen days in Mozambique,
fifteen days in Cochin, eight in Onor, and half a day in Cananor),\(^ {49}\) Van
Linschoten’s social position allowed him to gather ample information
through personal contacts.

Van Linschoten could have sourced general facts on Malacca, Indonesia,
China, Japan, and the Moluccas from several individuals: his friend Dirck
Gerritsz Pomp,\(^ {50}\) his Flemish acquaintance Gerrit van Afhuysen (with
whom he was reunited at Santa Helena Island in 1589),\(^ {51}\) or, very likely, the
Portuguese noblemen that he encountered in Goa. It was via conversations
with a Portuguese captain imprisoned in Goa, for instance, that Van Lins-
choten gained information on the Banda islands. A Flemish correspondent
at Coromandel reported data about Bengal to Van Linschoten.\(^ {52}\) Similarly,
Matias de Albuquerque, a captain of Malacca and Hormuz, likely shared his

\(^ {46}\) Teresa Nobre Carvalho, \textit{Os desafios de Garcia de Orta} (Lisbon: A Esfera do Caos, 2015), 144 and 155.
\(^ {52}\) Ernst van den Boogart, 2003, 3.
insights with Van Linschoten when the two met in India.53 D. Paulo de Lima Pereira, another Malacca captain, may also have provided intelligence to the Dutchman. Van Linschoten mentions his departure and later triumphal return to Goa,54 and may well have met with him and discussed Malacca. This would have happened during Van Linschoten’s first days of departure from India, since Lima Pereira was also returning home in 1589 and was shipwrecked in an incident reported in the *Itinerario*.55 Regarding Ceylon, Van Linschoten could have relied for information on a Dutch friend,56 or on Manuel de Sousa Coutinho. Coutinho had served as a captain of Columbus and later became the governor of India who authorized the Dutchman’s departure.57 For Mozambique and Mutapa, Van Linschoten stated that he drew on first-hand experiences from his stay there in 1583, reports from previous captains of Mozambique,58 and accounts given by a black slave.59 Turning to Arabia, Hormuz, and the Middle East, Van Linschoten likely relied on knowledge he extracted from the Englishmen that he helped to release. He also collected information from Bernard Bruchets (the archbishop’s servant who wrote Van Linschoten letters of his return trip to Europe via the Hormuz-Basra-Aleppo-Tripoli land route),60 from Venetian merchants,61 and likely from Captain Matias de Albuquerque.

Van Linschoten met personally with Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas upon his arrival in 1583.62 It is reasonable to assume that he also met Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses (1584–88). Moreover, he became close to Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho (1588–91). Bearing in mind the close relationship between Fonseca and these viceroys, it is also quite likely that Van Linschoten collected general information about trade, botany, medicines, natural history, and animals during conversations with these rulers of the Estado. Van Linschoten also probably made contact with Diogo do Couto (1542–1616), future Portuguese chronicler of Asia, whose stay in Goa overlapped with the Dutchman’s. However, there is no direct documental

58 *Itinerário*, 1997, 82.
61 Haddad, “Um olhar estrangeiro,” 158.
reference to knowledge exchanges between him and Couto, nor between Van Linschoten and the Italian merchant-humanist Filippo Sassetii (1540–88).

Van Linschoten's perspective may have resulted from his conversancy with manuscript texts about the decline of the Estado circulating in Goa. These manuscripts, which have provoked historiographical debates on the Portuguese black legend in Asia, were the Primor, by an anonymous writer (c. 1578), and the Soldado Prático by Diogo do Couto (Van Linschoten would have consulted the first version, of 1564, and not the second, from the 1590s). It may also be assumed that Van Linschoten was familiar with the Desengano dos Perdidos (1573), by Archbishop D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira (?–1576). The same can be said of a 1569 account by Archbishop D. Jorge Temudo addressed to King Sebastian with several proposed reforms for the Estado. Both works would have been in the archbishop's palace. On the other hand, Van Linschoten could not have been more than vaguely aware of the Reformação of Rodrigues da Silveira.

Outside the palace walls, Van Linschoten might have communicated with other crucial sources. Taking into account the close ties between the archbishop and the Jesuit visitor and provincial of Asia Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606), it is possible that he was also one of Van Linschoten's informants, although he is never explicitly mentioned in the Itinerario. Van Linschoten may have met Valignano due to his close relation to Fonseca.

64 Primor e honra da vida soldadesca no Estado da Índia, ed. Laura Monteiro Pereira, Maria Augusta Lima Cruz and Maria do Rosário Laureano Santos (Ericeira: Editora Mar de Letras, 2003).
68 As it was written after his time in Asia between 1597 and 1622. Francisco Rodrigues da Silveira. Reformação da milícia e governo do Estado da Índia Oriental, ed. Luís Filipe Barreto, George Davison Winius and Benjamin N. Teensma (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996), 12.
69 The archbishop preached at the Jesuit college of Goa in 1584 (Documenta Indica (DI), edited by Joseph Wicki, vol. 13 (Rome: Instituto Societa Romanum Iesu, 1975), 520 and 550) and in several letters Valignano points out his good relationship with Fonseca who authorized him to build the Jesuit professed house at Goa and who also collaborated with him regarding the approach to the Christians of Saint Thomas at the Third Provincial Council of India of 1585 (DI, vol. 14, 1979, 107–108, 193, 302 and 687–88).
and their encounter may explain the similarity between the moral map of the *Itinerario* and Valignano’s *Summarium Indicum*. It is also plausible to think that he was acquainted with Valignano’s 1575 report on Estado affairs, and with the letters of Jesuit missions in China and Japan. More facts could have reached Van Linschoten when he witnessed the departure and arrival of the famous Japanese embassy to Europe. Van Linschoten could also have made queries with the Flemish-Dutch Jesuits whose presence he records in Goa. Thus, from his position in Fonseca’s retinue, the Dutchman had access to Portuguese debates and he learned the contours of Goa’s cultural circles.

Passing sequentially through the *Itinerario*’s chapters, it is clear that Van Linschoten’s enthusiastic “discovery” of elephants and their abilities and the mistreatments of them, as well as descriptions of Indian cattle, the rhinoceros, crocodiles, and other maritime animals, were heavily based on direct observations. Van Linschoten mentions his personal observations in his narrative and they are also quite evident in his drawings. For his comments on several commodities and their value, Van Linschoten relied on information picked up in such places as the market of Goa (an illustration of which is included in the *Itinerario*). Van Linschoten likely made use of opinions from Italian, Flemish-Dutch, German, and French merchants and soldiers present in Goa, as he recorded that they lived like brothers due to Portuguese prejudices against foreigners. Most of the *Itinerario*’s description of the goods exchanged on the maritime Asian market seem to be rooted in personal experience, supplemented by reports from merchants. These may have included the Italian merchant and humanist Filippo Sassetti, whom he possibly met during his 1583 voyage to India, as has been seen. Van Linschoten also collected several scientific specimens and had a pronounced interest in depicting plants like the arvore triste and the pineapple. He additionally availed of oral Asian testimonies.

The *Itinerario*’s treatment of precious stones is an exception, as it was based entirely upon information from Van Linschoten’s jeweler friend Frans Connigh (who likely wrote the first draft of these chapters). The major contribution Van Linschoten makes is commercial insight; he gives a rundown of the economic advantages of various trades, specifies which

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regions yield the best products, breaks down classes of goods according to their value, and explains where and how one ought to buy and sell for maximum profit.\textsuperscript{76} All this data is summarized in the chapter on the weights, measures, and coins of India.\textsuperscript{77}

Van Linschoten’s merchant-cum-scientific collector mentality, characteristic of the Dutch Golden Age,\textsuperscript{78} may also have been a reason for his inclusion in the entourage of the archbishop. Such an extensive trade report, carefully complemented with scientific observations, would have been invaluable to both the archbishop and King Philip II. Some aspects of the report seem tailor-made for a Portuguese ruler (among them, the maps of Mozambique and Goa). The presentation and dedication of this work to Philip II could have been accomplished through cardinal-archduke Albert of Austria (1559–1621), viceroy of Portugal between 1583 and 1593, whose coat of arms Van Linschoten placed on the bird’s-eye view of Goa.

It should by now be apparent that the intended audience for the \textit{Itinerario} may have been King Philip II, with Archbishop Fonseca acting as intermediary. Was Van Linschoten planning to write a book structured like those of Duarte Barbosa and Tomé Pires from the 1510s, to be regarded as an updated compendium of knowledge about Asia? If this was his intention, where did Van Linschoten consult such books? By Van Linschoten’s time in Goa, only Barbosa’s book and a small part of Pires’s had been published by the Italian geographer Giovanni Baptista Ramussio (1485–1557), who compiled and printed several travel accounts in the 1550s. But Van Linschoten probably only got his hands on Ramussio’s works once he returned homeland. The same was probably true of the 1578 treatise by Cristóvão da Costa (1515–94) on Indian drugs.\textsuperscript{79} Could Van Linschoten have read these authors in Goa? And more perplexingly, how and where did he have access to secret cosmographical sources such as nautical rutters and cartography?

5.2.2 Copying Intelligence: Van Linschoten and Portuguese Cosmographical Knowledge

The compilation of Portuguese nautical rutters published in the \textit{Reys-gheschrift} section of the \textit{Itinerario} had successfully been kept out of the hands

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 203–71.
\textsuperscript{78} Cook, \textit{Matters of Exchange}.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 32.
of foreigners since almost the beginning of the Portuguese discoveries, and scholars disagree on how Van Linschoten came to copying it. Parr argues that he got to know them during his stay in Angra, where he found the Portuguese eager to hand over such intelligence, traumatized as they were by the Spanish conquest of Terceira Island in 1582.\textsuperscript{80} Van den Boogaart is not sure if Van Linschoten copied them in Goa or Angra,\textsuperscript{81} while Tan suggests that the pilot Vicente Rodrigues, whom Van Linschoten met in India, gave the Dutchman Portuguese rutters.\textsuperscript{82} But Tan’s hypothesis may lose credibility as it implicates the famous pilot, author of two relevant India Run’s rutters, in an act of treason, punishable by death under Portuguese laws. Pos states that Van Linschoten may have copied rutters while still in Goa. In the case of the nautical rutters from the Far East (i.e., the Malacca-Macau, and Macau-Nagasaki voyages), we are on firmer footing. There is little doubt that Van Linschoten acquired them from his friend Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, who traveled to Japan in 1585 in the service of Francisco Pais, captain of Macau and of the vessel Santa Cruz. In fact, the information published in some of these rutters seems to have come directly from the logbook of the Santa Cruz.\textsuperscript{83}

This still does not explain how Van Linschoten accessed the others rutters published in the Reys-gheschrift, particularly those concerning intra-Asian voyages and the general routes of India Run ships. Although Pomp could have compiled them during his long Asian career and later delivered them to Van Linschoten, I contend that Van Linschoten consulted these rutters in the viceroy’s palace in Goa. Nautical rutters were written and updated at Lisbon’s Armazéns da Índia, where prior to each voyage they were copied and distributed to pilots and captains, alongside nautical charts and instruments.\textsuperscript{84} Exactly the same happened in Goa, where there was a “ribeira” (or shipyard) at which Portuguese governors and viceroys regularly convened to coordinate the departures of fleets. It is certainly conceivable that nautical rutters for the India Run and intra-Asian routes (i.e., Goa-Cochin; Goa-Ceylon; Goa-Coromandel coast; Goa-Mozambique) were held in the viceroy’s palace for storage, copying, and issuing to pilots. The question is whether Van Linschoten could have gotten hold of such copies and under which conditions.

\textsuperscript{80} McKew Parr, Linschoten, 165.
\textsuperscript{81} Van den Boogaart, Huygen van Linschoten, 7.
\textsuperscript{83} Pos, “Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,” 68–72.
It is thus, relevant to consider the degree of Van Linschoten’s access to the palace. That the Dutchman had gained ongoing admission is confirmed by several passages in the *Itinerario*. The first is his description of the palace looking like an abandoned house when Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas left Goa to meet the newly arrived Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses in 1584. The second is his reference to how the same happened when Viceroy Meneses died in 1588 and Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho succeeded him. Van Linschoten states that this triggered a flurry of furnishing and redecorating, something that he alleges happened every time there was a change of ruler. That Van Linschoten had first-hand knowledge of the palace is further evidenced by his description of the gallery of paintings of the Portuguese annual fleets to India and portraits of the Portuguese viceroys and governors. His ability to come and go in the palace must have been a consequence of the high social status he enjoyed in the entourage of the archbishop, which also granted him access to high-ranking officials, and won him special viceregal dispensation to temporarily leave Goa. This brief departure was, incidentally, to join a company of Portuguese noblemen who had gone to nearby Salsete and Bardez to watch the Hindu *sati*. The sojourn enabled Van Linschoten to make drawings of mosques and Hindu temples, and also got him mixed up in a near-skirmish between the noblemen and Brahmins, with the Dutchman acting as a peacekeeper.

Like his predecessors during the 1570s, Archbishop Fonseca was charged with provisionally governing Goa on two occasions. The first was between December 1583 and April 1584, when Viceroy Mascarenhas visited the Northern Province. The second took place during the transfer of power between Viceroys Mascarenhas and Meneses in April 1585, when Fonseca jointly ruled with the chancellor and the captain of Goa. This factor becomes crucial, as Van Linschoten copied the Spanish rutters published in the *Reys-gheschrift* from Francisco Gali’s expeditions (the routes Acapulco-Manila, Manila-Macau and Macau-Acapulco) using a copy sent from Macau to Viceroy Meneses. He could only have accessed it in the viceroy’s palace.

Van Linschoten might have copied these rutters under the archbishop’s direction, with the purpose of better informing King Philip II about nautical

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88 Diogo do Couto, 1787, Decade X, 436 and 460.
matters in Portuguese Asia. He may have also drawn on the *Codex Casanatense*, produced in the 1550s; he would have access to this from 1583, when Fonseca first ruled in the absence of Viceroy Mascarenhas. Many of the drawings and corresponding textual accounts published in the *Itinerario* could have been modeled after this Codex. The fact that Van Linschoten produced charts of Mozambique and Goa, as well as other drawings very probably at the request of Fonseca, make viceregal authorization to consult Portuguese cartography less incredible than it might otherwise have seemed. Such would be the case for Van Linschoten’s likely consultation of a 1570s famous atlas, authored by the Portuguese cartographer Fernão Vaz Dourado (1520–80), that compiled several charts of Asia. Some of the maps that were later published in the *Itinerario* concerning the geographical area of Indonesia, China, and Philippines show some similarities with Dourado’s previous maps for this region. In addition, Van Linschoten could have studied the orders originally written at Lisbon’s Casa da Índia while at the palace. These would have included several “regimentos” (orders to rulers and captains), political and religious decrees, and merchant laws.

Mixed in among such documents, Van Linschoten could not have failed to come across the general India Run rutters. And, I reiterate, there is reason to believe he had studied them at Fonseca’s orders, with the archbishop acting in the service of King Philip II. Although Portuguese nautical rutters were well-known to Portuguese seafarers, they may have only circulated in manuscript form among mariners; no published compendium had been issued until that moment. As has been demonstrated in the first chapter, like his predecessors since the beginning of the 16th century, King Philip II also employed Portuguese experts at Seville’s Casa de la Contratación and the Spanish court in order to profit from Portuguese nautical knowledge.

91 Van den Boogaart, *Huysgen van Linschoten*, 7, 167 and 175.
93 Cortesão, *Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses*, vol. II, 27–28 and 288–89. The author is uncertain whether or not Van Linschoten obtained information for his atlas from Dourado’s or or by bribing the Portuguese cartographer Bartolomeu de Lasso during his stay in Lisbon in 1592. However, it should be noted that it was the Houtman brothers, not Van Linschoten, who bribed Lasso. Based on the evidence presented, it is likely that Van Linschoten obtained access to Dourado’s atlas while it was in the palace of the viceroy of India, as the atlas had been originally produced by Dourado and later presented with a dedication to D. Luís de Ataíde, viceroy of India (1568–71; 1578–81).
Meanwhile, it stands to reason that the monarch, obsessed as he was with accumulating and cataloguing scientific knowledge, would wish his library at the Escorial Palace to boast an updated compilation of the chief Portuguese rutters of Asia. This hypothesis is even more probable after Juan de Herrera’s (1530–97) renewed scientific projects and the foundation of the Royal Academy of Mathematics in 1583, as this meant the beginning of open and formal Portuguese-Spanish scientific cooperation, as was noted in the first chapter.

Although the potential pragmatic motivations of Van Linschoten’s research and writing have been stressed, it is relevant not to understate the Dutchman’s sincere interest in the topics he treated in the *Itinerario*. As a man hailing from a maritime town on the North Sea, Van Linschoten took copious notes during his voyage to India in 1583, writing rather in the manner of a formally trained seaman and consistently noting latitudes and debating navigational options. Comparing the chapter on this with the one in which he describes the perilous return voyage to Europe in 1589, there is an undeniable improvement in Van Linschoten’s nautical knowledge of the India Run route. In his remarks he carefully discussed shallows, tides, the impact of meteorological conditions, navigation outside the channel of Mozambique, and perceived faults in the decisions made by the Portuguese pilots. This fact demonstrates that between 1583 and 1589, Van Linschoten did much more than gawk at shipwrecks. He actively gathered information from Portuguese pilots such as Gaspar Reimão Ferreira, whom he met on his 1589 trip back to Portugal. Moreover, this suggests that, having returned to Enkhuizen and spoken with the former pilot Lucas Sagenaer (1534–1606) and cartographer Petrus Plancius (1552–1622), Van Linschoten was perfectly able to make changes to the Portuguese nautical rutters that he had compiled, as was already argued. Van Linschoten’s portrait of an Arab pilot and his references to Chinese pilots raise questions of whether he sought or acquired expertise on these two navigational cultures while voyaging in the Indian Ocean. Even if he did not, these visual and textual

96 *Portuondo, Secret Science*, 83–86.
allusions display a cognizance of the still-important role Islamic and Chinese knowledge played in 16th-century Portuguese seafaring.

The deep knowledge of Portuguese political, social, economic, financial, and religious system in Asia that Van Linschoten exhibits across the *Itinerario* documents the privileged access he enjoyed in both the archbishop’s and viceroy’s palaces in Goa. Van Linschoten’s expansiveness on these topics is also a testament to his information network, which was cultivated in a similar manner to that of any Portuguese chronicler based in India and setting about gathering data.\(^{101}\) Van Linschoten’s “Portuguese-eye-view” presentation of Asia in the *Itinerario* could readily serve the administrative needs of the Estado in the 1580s.\(^{102}\) Following the Renaissance tradition inherited from Classical authors, Van Linschoten described Asia from West to East, precisely as Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Tomé Pires, and Duarte Barbosa had done in the beginning of the 16th century. Van Linschoten may even have read these last two authors’ works at the viceroy’s palace.

This becomes clear through an analysis of how Van Linschoten details so many historical, geographical, and ethnographical events based solely on five years of residence in Asia. Good examples can be found in his accurate descriptions of the fortresses of Mozambique and Goa, which are peppered with curious details (like the Dutchman’s allegation that Goan military security fell upon the shoulders of a single boy, with a clapper to warn the whole island of threats). Another case is his geographical description and drawings of Santa Helena and Ascension islands. The same can be said of his thorough historical and ethnographical discussion of Hindu brahmins and his comments on the duplicitous merchants of Gujarat, the inhabitants of nearby Goa and Cochin, and the remarkable forbearance of the Arabs.\(^ {103}\) The same applies to his description of the monsoon seasons and navigational systems in India, as well as his exhaustive accounts of Portuguese vessels, Lisbon-bound and richly loaded, in Cananor and Cochin.\(^ {104}\)

Still, this same degree of factuality and specificity can be found in reports on places that Van Linschoten did not visit: his description of the Indu Valley and of Diu; remarks on the Portuguese renegades in Chatigan; his reference to the 1568 war between Pegu and Siam; and his narration of the Portuguese destruction of the famous Buddha teeth in Ceylon in 1560.\(^ {105}\) While Van

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101 A clear example of this would be the comparison with Gaspar Correia, who wrote his *Legends of India*, or later the more studied case of Diogo do Couto for his *Decades*.  
Linschoten is largely ignorant of the religious principles of Hinduism and Buddhism, he evinces a typical European and Christian sense of superiority when he touches on Islam (an antipathy particularly evident in the drawings of the *Itinerario*). This attitude towards Islam in Van Linschoten's case might also be connected with his own career serving the Portuguese, who had had that same vision almost since their arrival in the Indian Ocean.

However, following his participation in the Third Provincial Council of India in 1585, Van Linschoten felt compelled to describe the Saint Thomas Christians. He did so with the same blend of disdain and grudging respect seen in his treatment of Brahmins and the *Naires* of Malabar (whom he perceived to be the closest India had to European nobility). The same spirit pervades his portrayal of the Jewish community at Cochin de Cima. Despite being a servant of the archbishop, among whose main goals was the “conversion” of Jews and surveillance of New Christians, Van Linschoten felt some empathy towards this group. Van Linschoten admitted that, when visiting a Jewish house, he held in his hands a Hebrew version of the Bible. 106 The clear exception to this European superior pattern comes in his description of Japan and China. Impressed by Mendonza's work on China, which he read upon return to the Dutch Republic, Van Linschoten regretted that he did not have 300 ducats to travel with Pomp to China and Japan, in 1584. 107 This statement shows that he was not only rueful at missing commercial opportunities, but disappointed to have lost a chance to see if Chinese civilization matched his expectations.

Although, as has been argued, the *Itinerario* was likely planned as a major cosmographical work for Iberian audiences, it ended up being published in the Dutch Republic. Therefore, it is relevant to make sense of why and how, after the archbishop’s death, Van Linschoten was authorized to leave Portuguese Asia.

5.2.3 A Damned Fate and Broken Heart: Van Linschoten and the Reasons behind his Departure from India

In the 1584 letter to his parents, Van Linschoten mulls an imminent return trip home by land. 108 But sometime after penning the missive, he must have realized how much he had left to learn, and he stayed in Goa four more years. The archbishop's growing trust in him stoked Van Linschoten's ambitions.

He may have dreamed of being fully integrated into Goa’s upper cultural echelons. In later comments on his decision to leave India, he remarks that the choice was a tough one. He states that he had even considered settling there permanently, and notes that he expected a promotion if the archbishop had returned.

Van Linschoten’s ultimate decision to leave India came after news of his father’s, his brother’s, and the archbishop’s death, leaving the Dutchman bereaved and unemployed. Van den Boogaart points out that Van Linschoten may have already amply enriched himself at this point, which could have been a contributing factor to his departure. Still, even bearing in mind the conflict between the archbishop and Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, it remains to be explained how Van Linschoten was cleared to leave India carrying stacks of sensitive information. Even those who have stressed that Van Linschoten received news from Europe on the evolution of the Dutch rebellion, and thus might have feared for his life without the protection of the archbishop, do not explain how he was able to leave India. The news in question was that of the duke of Parma’s victories in the South, the fall of Antwerp, and the arrival of the earl of Leicester, all events happening between 1583–1586.

Recent clashes between Fonseca and Meneses were a major impetus for Van Linschoten’s departure from India. Therefore, it is important to analyze them, using new Iberian sources, because if they had not happened, Fonseca would not have departed from India so soon and Van Linschoten might not have felt forced to leave Portuguese Asia. Van Linschoten and, later on, the Portuguese chronicler Diogo do Couto, agree that the discord between the viceroy and archbishop emerged out of jurisdictional disputes. Another source posits that the conflict originated with Fonseca’s order to imprison some of the viceroy’s soldiers after they had attacked some of his own servants. Meneses had countered that Fonseca lacked the secular authority to do so and ordered their release. The top judicial officer of India was pressured to take a stand, but despite threats of excommunication from Fonseca, he supported the viceroy’s allegation.

109 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 100.
111 Van den Boogaart, Huygen van Linschoten, 7.
112 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 109–11.
happened because King Philip II had appointed Meneses as viceroy for a period longer than the usual three years. This is implied by the king’s 1587 denial of Meneses’s request for a successor. Terms longer than three years were very unusual in Portuguese Asia and can only be explained (in Meneses’s case) by the king’s high expectations of him.

Humiliated in the aftermath of the incident with the viceroy’s soldiers, the archbishop left India. Both Van Linschoten and Couto state that Fonseca intended to go to Portugal and Rome with written testimonies to denounce what he considered the religious and secular immorality of India. No one could persuade the archbishop otherwise. He temporarily entrusted important management tasks to Van Linschoten, leaving him the keys to the coffer and in charge of collecting taxes on the authority of the pope for the release of captives from Morocco. Van Linschoten was well-aware of the scandal of the whole situation; it was the first time an archbishop left for Portugal in the midst of a public conflict with a viceroy. While all previous archbishops of Goa died in office, Fonseca had abandoned his post before finishing the five years’ service he had promised King Philip II. Thus, Van Linschoten’s statement that Fonseca had been poisoned before arriving in Lisbon, to the great delight of his rivals, cannot be ignored.

The relationship between Fonseca and Meneses had not always been acrimonious, and in earlier letters to Portugal it is impossible to detect any bitterness. But in a letter to King Philip II dated December 6, 1587, Viceroy Meneses spoke of problems with Fonseca, claiming that the archbishop incessantly demanded additional funds for the archbishopric. When these requests were denied by Meneses, Fonseca allegedly tried to force the appointment of financial officers. Meneses blocked this scheme. It was at this point, Meneses reports, that Fonseca embarked for Portugal in the company of a rich captain, leaving his house in charge of Nuno Fernandes Sequeira, and setting a terrible example. To end this crisis, Meneses asked for a reinforcement of his powers.

118 The archbishop merely petitioned for whatever necessary church building materials the viceroy of Portugal was unable to provide. Letters from Cardinal Albert of Austria to Philip II, 1.XI/6.XII.1586 – AGS, Secretarias Provinciales Portugal (SPP), book 1550, fls. 596v. and 701.
The battle between the secular and ecclesiastical spheres in the Estado had reached its apex. Parr argues that Viceroy Meneses died soon after hearing news from a Hormuz courier that Fonseca had landed in Lisbon and discredited him. But this is contradicted by other reports. Valignano, for instance, mentioned Fonseca’s departure (but not his motives) and urged his Jesuit colleagues to welcome Fonseca, should he arrive in Rome. Moreover, Viceroy Meneses had been on good terms with the Dominicans, the order to which Fonseca belonged.

Van Linschoten was formally discharged from all duties in Fonseca’s household by September 1588 at the latest, when word of the archbishop’s death reached India. André Fernandes claimed, in a letter to King Philip II, dated November 20, 1588, that he had been overseeing the archbishop’s household since Fonseca’s ill-fated departure, although Viceroy Meneses had called him several times to assist at the court of Goa. Faced with jurisdictional ambiguity and a backlog of royal orders to India from throughout 1587–88, Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho summoned the previous bishop of Cochim, D. Mateus, to assume the archbishopric of Goa. King Philip II commanded cooperation between the governor and the new archbishop, as is confirmed by a missive penned on November 25, 1588 from D. Mateus to King Philip II. With no official role and the loss of a powerful patron, Van Linschoten’s position had become precarious.

In September 1588, around the same time he learned of deaths in his family and of his employer, Van Linschoten also caught wind of reports that an Iberian fleet was being prepared for an offensive against England. The implications were worrisome. The invasion could affect the Dutch rebellion, which by that time was openly supported by Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603). This could bring about added scrutiny and harsher treatment for Dutchmen in Portuguese Asia. On the eve of a new archbishop taking over the Inquisition of Goa (which, as Van Linschoten records, had previously forced many Dutchmen to flee to the Bijapur sultanate), Van Linschoten’s accumulated research now exposed him to great danger. Without Fonseca, he was just a foreigner with a dossier of sensitive information, and he needed to find a way out. By then, the quarrel between Fonseca and Meneses no longer was at issue as both were dead.

In the end, Van Linschoten’s authorization to leave India was granted to him by Governor Coutinho, with whom he enjoyed a close relationship. Van Linschoten witnessed the governor’s succession ceremony and reports that Coutinho signed all the legal documents needed for his departure. Van Linschoten might have secured this permission in exchange for promises to help the governor in loading of the vessel Santa Cruz. Governor Coutinho wrote to King Philip II on December 18, 1588 concerning the loading of this ship, which was hired due to a cargo surplus. The governor stressed he had no one he could trust on this. Thus, an offer of assistance from Van Linschoten, who had previous experience with this kind of issue, might have been a godsend.

The Santa Cruz belonged to Francisco Pais, the same man who employed Dirck Gerritsz Pomp on his voyage to Japan in 1585. Pomp was also returning to Lisbon at the end of 1588. Van Linschoten could easily have asked for his help securing passage on the ship. Van Linschoten likewise used his Flemish-Dutch contacts in India (representatives of the Welsers and Fuggers in Cochin) to secure appointment as pepper overseer of the Santa Cruz. With all these pieces in place, Van Linschoten’s final step was probably to assure Governor Coutinho that the departure was temporary as he wrote in the Itinerario that he always gave the impression that he was only leaving India temporarily. Thus, wielding Coutinho’s trust, the fact that Portuguese law did not forbid the appointment of Flemish-Dutch overseers for ships, and given his connections with the well-reputed Pomp, Van Linschoten won formal approval for his departure. This does not, however, explain how he was able to make off with so much information, especially in light of the non-surreptitious avenues by which he conducted his research. It was no secret that the Dutchman had gathered sensitive data at the archbishop’s orders; why did they let him abscond with it?

Van Linschoten could have told Coutinho that he was returning to Lisbon to present Cardinal Albert of Austria, viceroy of Portugal, with some or all of the information he had been collecting. He could have pointed at the bird’s eye view of Goa, emblazoned with Albert’s coat of arms, and explained that he was hoping for a reward. If these were his arguments, Governor Coutinho would be hard-pressed to block his departure. Although Coutinho was effectively granting safe conduct to the man fated to plunder

126 Itinerário, 1997, 300.
127 AGS, SSP, Libro 1551, fls. 381v. and 385v.
128 Pos, “Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,” 73.
the Portuguese, he could not know this at the end of 1588. In order to embark with his chest and keep all his belongings safe during the maritime voyage, although he could not mention it in the *Itinerario*, Van Linschoten had to bribe the dockers. He also needed to keep close to his friend Pomp, who could provide him with both military and social protection.

During his journey back to the Azores, Van Linschoten was intermittently employed by the Portuguese to draw coastal profiles such as those of Santa Helena and Ascension Islands. As a subtle social operator with ties to the former archbishop, Van Linschoten might have managed to initiate candid discussions of nautical knowledge with Portuguese pilots and seamen on this voyage. His remarks about the trip suggest as much when they go into detailed technical observations and touch on the mistakes precipitating the wrecking of the *São Tomé*. Does his unending quest for nautical knowledge indicate that, by the time of the return trip, Van Linschoten was working for the Dutch as a spy? The answer to this question cannot be given without considering the events he witnessed in the Azores between 1589 and 1591.

5.3 The Azorean Stay and Return Home (1589–92): Loyal Subject of King Philip II or Spy for the Dutch Republic?

Sailing to Europe in 1589, Van Linschoten recorded his trip more accurately than on his 1583 voyage to India. His 1589 notes disclose persistent unease and a feeling that his life was in the hands of God. He feared he would perish on the coast of Natal and during the passage around the Cape of Good Hope. He also faced terror when his vessel exchanged cannon fire with an English ship and had to delay anchoring at the bay of Angra, since the port authorities suspected they were English rather than Portuguese. Van Linschoten was beginning to see how Europe had changed in his absence.

He had managed to keep abreast of some news while in India, as he reported in the *Itinerario*. He had kept up correspondence with contacts in Holland through the Italian merchants who frequented Goa, by land routes and by India Run ships, and was informed of the death of William of Orange (1533–1584) and the marriage of King Philip II’s daughter to the

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duke of Savoy. While in India, Van Linschoten also received letters from the illustrious physician Bernardus Paludanus (1550–1633), whom he would meet in person only in 1592. In his missives, Paludanus urged Van Linschoten to collect and bring home scientific specimens, something he continued to do on his 1589 voyage.\textsuperscript{135} However, there is no extant letter to Van Linschoten from the leaders of the Dutch Republic attempting to enlist him in espionage. By the time of his departure from India, Van Linschoten knew that his notes and work could profit his homeland; maybe it was there that he could build the career he had strived for in India. But this could hardly be hoped for if the Iberian fleet defeated the English, leaving the young Dutch Republic isolated and imperiled.

After landing in Angra in 1589, Van Linschoten was notified that the Iberian fleet had been defeated, and that Queen Elizabeth I had sent Francis Drake (1540–96) with D. António to besiege Lisbon and try once more to unseat Philip II. At his older friend Afhuysen’s request, Van Linschoten agreed to stay in Angra to help recover the lost cargo of a wrecked Malacca ship. He also needed time to negotiate the charter of a ship to carry the cargo from the \textit{Santa Cruz} to Lisbon. Although Drake’s assault on Lisbon failed, trepidation about a potential English conquest of the Azores swept across Angra. Yet in 1589, during his stopover in Angra, Van Linschoten watched a ship with Pomp on board depart for Lisbon. He later noted that they were lucky to arrive in Lisbon just a day before Drake plundered Cascais.\textsuperscript{136}

Firm connections between the Flemish isles (as he called the Azores) and the Dutch Republic helped Van Linschoten to keep up to date on the evolving situation in Europe and the Low Countries (despite open war between Philip II and the Dutch Republic).\textsuperscript{137} As a former archbishop’s servant and current royal overseer, Van Linschoten readily gained the ear of the governor of Terceira.\textsuperscript{138} Although King Philip had donated the island to D. Cristóvão de Moura, one of the architects of his accession to the Portuguese throne, its governor was the Spanish-born Juan de Urbina (who had ruled Angra since the 1582 defeat of D. António by the marquis of Santa Cruz).

In light of Van Linschoten’s curriculum vitae, Urbina may have also been led to believe that the Dutchman wished to present his collection of writings, drawings, and maps to the viceroy of Portugal. Indeed, Urbina treated Van Linschoten as a full-fledged citizen of the island. In a period marked by

\textsuperscript{135} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 196.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 336.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 37.
\textsuperscript{138} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 161–63.
European wars of religion, Urbina's warm reception of Van Linschoten was exceptional. He welcomed the Dutchman in spite of frequent accusations of heresy with regard to foreigners on the basis of nationality. While the English naval threat lingered and war raged between the Spanish and the Dutch, Urbina allowed Van Linschoten to explore the island on horseback twice, a privilege not even conferred on the native Portuguese of Terceira. Furthermore, Urbina requested that the Dutchman map Angra and produce drawings of Terceira Island, possibly to inform King Philip II on the on-going works on the fortresses of Angra. Van Linschoten refused to map the whole island but agreed to give a depiction of Angra.139 However, no reference is made directly to the Dutchman in Urbina's letters, preserved at Simancas and covering the dates of Van Linschoten's stay at Angra.140

The resultant map of Angra was produced in just two years, and is exceedingly detailed; I agree with Humberto Oliveira that Van Linschoten could only have created it if he had been trained in cartography. Oliveira hypothesizes that Urbina provided Van Linschoten with a team of people to assist him in the depiction of Angra. Such a team could have included the Portuguese cartographer Luís Teixeira (?–1604), who was also in Angra at the time.141 In its turn, this fact may explain why Luís Teixeira's maps later circulated so widely in the Low Countries, were sold at high prices, and influenced some works from the Edam cartographical school.142 The fact that the Angra map was immediately sent to Philip II was seen by Urbina as proof of Van Linschoten's loyalty to the Spanish king, but Van Linschoten recorded that he kept a copy for himself (which later appeared in the Itinerario).143

139 Itinerario..., 1997, 341 and 344.
140 AGS, Marina y Guerra Felipe II, Legajo 250, fls. 159, 185 and 186, Legajo 251, fl. 171, Legajo 253, fls. 211–13, Legajo 254, fls. 131–33, Legajo 260, fl. 120, Legajo 285, fl. 385, Legajo 287, fls. 313–19, Legajo 288, fls. 297 and 301–4, Legajo 292, fls. 79–86, Legajo 293, fl. 49, Legajo 294, fl. 164, Legajo 295, fl. 169, Legajo 296, fl. 401, Legajo 297, fl. 166, Legajo 317, fls. 2 and 173, Legajo 324, fls. 220 and 234, Legajo 328, fl. 183 and 254. All these letters from Urbina are dated between July 1589 and December 1591. None of them directly mentions Van Linschoten (even considering possible hispanized form of his name). It is surprising to note that even though Urbina wrote about depictions and fortifications being built in Angra in those days, he never mentioned any Dutchman working on them (in the letters exchanged between King Philip II and Urbina in September 1589 and also in September 1590 – Legajo 251, fl. 177 and Legajo 260, fl. 120 and Legajo 272, fl. 79). The main topic of his missives are the English naval raids in the Azorean Sea and the defensive measures that the governor adopted.
142 The same was to happen with maps by João Teixeira, Luís Teixeira’s son. See Guerreiro, “A Cartografia portuguesa,” 262.
143 Itinerário, 1997, 341 and 344.
Extending Oliveira's argument, it is time to consider authorship issues for the map of Goa as well. Although Van Linschoten would have had more time to draw this map, he may have merely directed its composition, following the archbishops' orders. Van Linschoten may have solicited assistance from his contacts in Goa such as the captive English painter he had helped to release. Van den Boogaart has shown that many drawings in the *Itinerario* underwent multiple alterations, and argues that it is difficult to discern how skilled a draftsman Van Linschoten really was. The maps of Angra and Goa were not simple aerial views or coastal profiles. The creation of both maps required training and preparation, and cartographic know-how was something in which Van Linschoten freely declared himself to be deficient.

Turning back to Van Linschoten's activities in Terceira, it must be stressed that while the Dutchman was gaining Urbina's trust, he was also probing English prisoners in Angra for information, and serving as an English-Spanish interpreter. Leading up his departure in late 1591, Van Linschoten witnessed several naval battles between the English and the Spanish, and likely continued to exchange and debate nautical knowledge with the English, Spanish, and Portuguese seamen he encountered. He also wrote; it is probable that much of the *Itinerario* was composed in Angra. Still, it is unclear what Van Linschoten thought of the things he saw in the Azores. Perhaps he finally came to the realization that the Iberian empire was not, after all, the invincible force that Northern Europe had judged it to be for decades. Two episodes in the *Itinerario* suggest scepticism of Iberian invulnerability emerging during Van Linschoten's Azorean stay. First, Van Linschoten recorded that in 1590, King Philip II had been forced to send warnings to the fleets from America and Asia not to come to Europe: the waters were controlled by the English, putting Iberian vessels at risk. Second, he reported that even during a storm, all of the 140 vessels stationed at Angra sailed to Lisbon to avoid capture by the English, resulting in a loss of ships exceeding that of the 1588 Invincible Armada.

There is a certain strategic plausibility to the notion that, hedging his bets, Van Linschoten was working in secrecy for the Dutch Republic while stationed in Angra; recent events, after all, favored the odds of the young Republic. But Van Linschoten could never have confessed to such duplicity in

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the *Itinerario* even if it were the case. In so doing, he would have denigrated previous technical espionage missions of the Dutch in Lisbon, such as that of the Houtman brothers, sent in 1592 by Petrus Plancius to acquire Portuguese nautical rutters of the India Run.¹⁴⁹ In the absence of positive evidence, it is more reasonable to stick with the mundane but realistic conjecture that Van Linschoten wished to use the knowledge that he had compiled to elevate himself in society. This could be achieved in the service of either the king of Spain or the Dutch Republic.

While in the Azores or during his Lisbon sojourn in 1592, Van Linschoten must have connected with the Flemish-Dutch merchant community and absorbed news of the Dutch Republic’s plans to stage a world-wide maritime war against Spain. After landing in Lisbon on January 2, 1592, Van Linschoten spent seven months in Portugal taking care of some curiously unspecified affairs.¹⁵⁰ I contend that it was in these crucial months that Van Linschoten seriously grappled with the question who he would serve in the future: would he present his compiled data to the viceroy of Portugal, Cardinal Albert of Austria? Or would he dissemble, as he did when he left India in 1589, and convince Iberian authorities of his ongoing service while he negotiated passage on a vessel bound for Texel in 1592?

Although it is hard to draw firm conclusions owing to the lack of Iberian references to Van Linschoten, it is quite conceivable that the same Dutch merchants who turned informant for the Houtman brothers in 1592,¹⁵¹ could have pressed Van Linschoten to publish his work homeland. Considering both the final version of the *Itinerario* and the editorial process it underwent between 1592 and 1596, the hypothesis that Van Linschoten might have planned to present his writings to the viceroy of Portugal until 1591 cannot be abandoned. As late as 1596, Van Linschoten was to be found actively tending his ties with Iberian elites, and sending his map of Angra to D.

¹⁵¹ Günter Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica Neerlandica* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Canaleto, 2003), 229. The Dutch scholar Erik Odegard is preparing an edition of a manuscript, kept at the Maritime Museum in Amsterdam, which is believed to have been the result of a spy mission undertaken by the Houtman brothers in Lisbon in 1592. In the article that Odegard will publish on this topic, he posits that Petrus Plancius dispatched a “man” to gather intelligence on the East India and Moluccas trade. According to Odegard’s argument, the information compiled in Lisbon and present in the manuscript was also crucial for the planning of Cornelis de Houtman’s voyage in 1595. However, it is unclear whether or not Van Linschoten was contacted by the “man” sent by Petrus Plancius during their time in Lisbon. The author expresses gratitude to Odegard for allowing access to the article. For further details see: Erik Odegard, “To Go There and Back Again: Preparations for the First Dutch Voyage to Asia, 1592–1595,” to be published soon.
Cristóvão de Moura, the lord of Terceira Island. Ultimately, the scales were tipped by the fact that, as Van Linschoten eventually recognized himself, he could reap greater benefits by offering his work to the Republic. Van Linschoten may have understood that it would be harder to extract a reward from King Philip II at a moment when the king was far away in Castile, without patronage at court, something that he may have lacked when he sailed for Texel.

5.4 The *Itinerario*: The Publication of a Dutch “Hero” (1592–96)?

5.4.1 Reshaping the *Itinerario*, a Work of Many Hands: Van Linschoten, the Scientific and Political Elites of the Dutch Republic

Arriving at Enkhuizen in December 1592, Van Linschoten was soon the target of enormous attention. Pomp had talked him up in his absence, and had arranged for Van Linschoten’s 1584 letter to his parents to be printed alongside the interview he had given to Lucas Wagenaer about China and Japan (published in Wagenaer’s 1592 *Treasure of Navigation*). A former pilot and refugee from Antwerp, Wagenaer had partnered with printer Cornelis Claesz (1546–1609) and Petrus Plancius, former disciple of the geographer Gerardus Mercator (1512–94) and future hydrographer of VOC, since his 1588 arrival in Enkhuizen. Wagenaer presented Van Linschoten to Claesz. This trio, together with Paludanus, was especially interested in meeting Van Linschoten and poring over the materials he had collected during his career in Asia. Moreover, they had all suffered because of orders of King Philip II, and had a personal stake in the way publishing Van Linschoten’s materials might kickstart Dutch overseas voyages.

This was particularly true of Plancius, who, aside from his duties as a Protestant minister, directed a school of sailors and preached Dutch overseas expansion until his death. It was he who had sent the Houtman brothers to acquire Portuguese nautical rutters in Lisbon, apparently without trying to profit from Van Linschoten’s presence there in 1592. Ironically, it was

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Van Linschoten, not the Houtman brothers, who procured the runters.\textsuperscript{157} Waghenaer and especially the diplomat Franciscus Maelson (1538–1601), advisor to Prince Maurice of Nassau (1567–1625), were also supporters of Dutch expansion in Asia.\textsuperscript{158} The third element of this group, and probable the most decisive, was Cornelis Claesz. Formerly a typographer in Antwerp, Claesz fled when Parma’s forces retook the city in 1585. Settling in Amsterdam, he worked closely with Waghenaer and Plancius to publish any geographical and nautical knowledge that could help the United Provinces to launch overseas enterprises. Claesz is considered the true father of the Dutch plan to dominate the European book market in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. Not only was he a relentless salesman, but he also advocated for the translation of books into French, English, German, and Latin.\textsuperscript{159} His mercantile activities had a political goal: Claesz wanted to weaponize books to support the Dutch Republic in its struggle against King Philip II. It is no wonder that many of the books Claesz published and sponsored made a contribution to the Spanish black legend.

This pro-expansion Dutch milieu was one factor, but other events similarly directly affected Van Linschoten and his \textit{Itinerario}. The highest leader of the United Provinces, Prince Maurice of Nassau, summoned Van Linschoten after he arrived in 1592.\textsuperscript{160} The meeting took place on the heels of important military victories for Prince Maurice, achieved while King Philip II was occupied with France.\textsuperscript{161} Like Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), Prince Maurice hoped to export the war with Philip to the seas, thereby easing military pressure on the borders of the Republic and enabling the establishment of firm terrestrial boundaries between the two powers. As has been detailed in the previous chapter, in doing so, Prince Maurice was following the most recent and successful Protestant examples of this strategy: Admiral Gaspard de Coligny (1519–72) in France and Queen Elizabeth I in England.

\textsuperscript{157} Cornelis Koeman, “Jan Huygen Van Linschoten,” \textit{Revista Da Universidade de Coimbra} XXXII (1985): 39. Erik Odegard has documented that the Maritime Museum manuscript contains additional nautical information on Portuguese East Indies routes. He also highlights the differences between the information provided in the manuscript and that published by Van Linschoten in the \textit{Itinerario}. Thus, the author argues that Van Linschoten was not the sole source used in the preparation of Cornelis de Houtman’s voyage, as evidenced by the contents of the manuscript. For more details see Erik Odegard, “To Go There and Back Again.”

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 17.


\textsuperscript{160} Saldanha, “The Itineraries of Geography,” 160.

\textsuperscript{161} Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, 241–53.
In 1594, Philip declared an embargo on Dutch navigation to Iberian ports,\(^\text{162}\) forcing the Dutch Republic to forge a plan to reach Asian markets by their own means to avoid endangering their economy of war. The very same year, and by no means coincidentally, the States General and Cornelis Claesz signed a contract for the future publication of the *Itinerario*.\(^\text{163}\) Van Linschoten’s book could no longer be packaged as a mere travel narrative. It had to instead read like a work of Ramussio,\(^\text{164}\) and serve as a guiding cosmography for the upcoming voyage of Cornelis de Houtman, who aimed to undertake, in 1595, the first Dutch expedition to Asia by the Cape route.

Lacking a strong scholastic background, and sensing that the inchoate *Itinerario* needed major reshaping, Van Linschoten asked Claesz to enlist Paludanus’s help.\(^\text{165}\) A renowned and traveled academic, educated in the Erasmian philosophy, Paludanus was delighted to share Van Linschoten’s burden and to learn from all his scientific notes on the *naturalia* of Asia. The support of an academic like Paludanus, who had once refused to lecture at Leiden University, was a prized endorsement for Van Linschoten, who had only lately pivoted towards a career in the Dutch Republic. The changes that emerged from the Van Linschoten-Paludanus collaboration are telling. First of all, the botanical and trading chapters of the *Itinerario* were reworked to fit the commercial objectives of Houtman’s planned expedition. Paludanus’s several annotations were based on the access that the botanist Carolus Clusius (1526–1606) had given him to Garcia de Orta’s book, while Van Linschoten’s text body was more centered on his personal experience.\(^\text{166}\)

They also collaborated on the *Beschryvinghe*, the section of the *Itinerario* containing geographical and ethnographical information on Africa and the Americas. As stipulated by a contract with the States General, the *Beschryvinghe* was to be published as a second volume since Van Linschoten would translate Father José de Acosta’s (1540–1600) work on America. Due probably to miscommunication between Claesz and Van Linschoten, this plan was aborted.\(^\text{167}\) Consequently, Van Linschoten and Paludanus set about preparing a version of the *Beschryvinghe* to be published in the *Itinerario*. They relied on a map of Africa and America that was in Paludanus’s possession,\(^\text{168}\) as well as major Spanish works Claesz loaned them (such as texts by Acosta,

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162 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 341.
166 Pos, “Sources and Organisation,” 49 and 54.
Pedro de Medina, Pietro Martyr, Rodrigo Zumorano, Oviedo, Las Casas) and other sources (Filippo Pigafetta and Jean de Léry). 169 For the nautical rutters of the Manila-Mexico-Spain route, 170 the duo drew on data from the Spanish pilot Francisco Gali and the Portuguese pilot Nuno da Silva, who had been captured by Drake to guide part of his 1579 circumnavigation voyage. 171 Another influential work that directly influenced this Dutch milieu was the art of navigation published by Michel Coignet in Antwerp, in 1580, in Dutch, which itself contained important Iberian contributions from Pedro de Medina, Martín Cortés, and Pedro Nunes. 172 Van Linschoten and Paludanus influenced the first generation of Dutch explorers in America. 173

For the Reys-gheschrift, printed in advance of the Itinerario so that it would be available to Cornélis de Houtman in 1595, Plancius contributed his maps of Asia and America. The maps were originally bought (in Lisbon) by the Houtman brothers from the Portuguese cartographer Bartolomeu de Lasso in 1592 and were later adapted and published by Plancius. 174 When Van Linschoten was away on his 1594 and 1595 journeys to the north, he entrusted Claesz with continuing the still-unfinished Reys-gheschrift. 175 His faithful editor added a list of the coordinates of ports, a regiment of the compass between Lisbon and Goa, and a set of questions and answers for sailors. 176 Some of the Portuguese and Spanish nautical rutters that Van Linschoten used in Reys-gheschrift and also some of the major changes that were introduced by Van Linschoten and his collaborators in the writing of Reys-gheschrift have been identified. When analyzing the editorial overhaul of the Reys-gheschrift, it becomes clear that Van Linschoten also added his personal comments on several nautical and geographical issues concerning sailing routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Once more, this aspect casts new light on Van Linschoten's rising scientific status within the Dutch Republic during the 1590s. 177 Most decisively it also shows how updated

170 Loureiro, “Inquérito sobre um navegador enigmático.”
172 Schmidt, A carta de navegar, 224–25.
173 Schmidt, Innocence Abroad, 162.
174 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 204.
175 Schilder, Monumenta Cartographica, 111 and 205.
177 For more details see my article Nuno Vila-Santa, “Jan Huygen van Linschoten and the Reys-gheschrift.”
Portuguese nautical information was transformed into a coherent body of knowledge for Dutch purposes, in a similar vein to what has been observed previously for Spanish, English, and French instances.

The Extract, another subsection of the Itinerario, included information on Iberian royal revenues. Van Linschoten may have copied the Portuguese Crown's revenues at the viceroy's palace of Goa. The data concerning Spanish overseas crown revenues were acquired by way of Franciscus Maelson (also the mayor of Enkhuizen), whose daughter Reiniu became Van Linschoten's wife in 1595. This wedding was part of a scheme, masterminded by Claesz and Waghenaer, to impel Van Linschoten to abjure Catholicism, temper his admiration for the Spanish, and convert to Calvinism. Maelson also asked Theodorus Velius (1572–1630), Petrus Hoogerbeets (1542–99), and Cornelis Taemsz (1567–1600) to write sonnets for the final version of the Itinerario. The idea behind this may have been to aggrandize Van Linschoten's achievements. Using literary tropes employed in Camões's Lusíadas, Van Linschoten was cast as a Dutch Magellan.

Impatient to make a profit from the Itinerario, Claesz hired engravers to complete a portrait of Van Linschoten and perfect all the drawings and maps to be incorporated in the book. Some of these engravings were sold as isolated sheets and could command a high price. During this process, Claesz took advantage of Van Linschoten's Spanish and Portuguese fluency and tasked him with translating Acosta's work. It should be noted that Claesz sold several editions of the Itinerario, possibly changing the text as he saw fit without consulting Van Linschoten, a common practice among editors of the time.

A final effect of the editing process, the importance of which cannot be overstated, concerns the Itinerario's political subtext. Possibly at the urging of Claesz and Plancius, Van Linschoten's magnum opus plays up any and all hints of Portuguese and the Spanish decline. What were Van Linschoten's intentions at the time of the book's publication? To provoke direct war against the Portuguese by depicting an empire in tatters? Or merely to

178 Van den Boogaart, Huygen van Linschoten, 19.
179 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 185.
183 Der Weduwen and Pettigree, The Bookshop of the World, 94.
184 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 205.
185 McKew Parr, Linschoten, 278.
warn of the dangers of miscegenation that the Portuguese practiced in Asia?\textsuperscript{187} Is Van den Boogaart correct when he points out that the \textit{Itinerario} should not be interpreted literally?\textsuperscript{188} Insofar as the \textit{Itinerario} disparages Portuguese Asia, it is relevant to determine whether this is deliberate and, if so, to elucidate Van Linschoten’s motives.

In repackaging the \textit{Itinerario} for a Dutch audience, Van Linschoten knew he had to desist from praising King Philip II.\textsuperscript{189} A book teeming with accolades for the Iberian monarch would have never passed muster with his new patrons; Prince Maurice, Oldenbarnevelt, and Claesz were all embroiled in a life-or-death battle against Philip. Aware of this, Van Linschoten formally dedicated his book to Oldenbarnevelt and Prince Maurice. He stated that many had insisted that he publish his notes on Asia, and although he had considered them of little significance, he had at last acquiesced.\textsuperscript{190}

Because the final version of the \textit{Itinerario} resulted from an intensive collaborative effort, it is almost impossible to know who did what, or how the concept for the book changed over time. But one thing is nearly certain: the final version of the \textit{Itinerario} was as much a work of Paludanus and Claesz as it was of Van Linschoten. If it is true that for the \textit{Itinerario}, Van Linschoten capitalized on Pomp’s knowledge because he did not take notes in Asia,\textsuperscript{191} it is also probable that Van Linschoten erased notes or chapters about Portugal and Spain that he deemed inconsequential from the final version in 1596. References to Portuguese authors and sources may have similarly been removed, either because they lacked validity in the eyes of the Dutch audience, or to avoid compromising Iberian informants.

Still, a careful reading of the \textit{Itinerario} reveals that Van Linschoten retained some admiration for the Spanish and may have seen the Portuguese decline as a form of justice.\textsuperscript{192} But if Van Linschoten was so anti-Portuguese, why did he not participate in the expedition of Cornelis de Houtman in 1595 and why did he advise, in the \textit{Itinerario}, to sail to Java and settle where the Portuguese were weaker in Asia, instead of navigating directly to India?\textsuperscript{193}

Whether Van Linschoten’s depiction of Portuguese decline was voluntary

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Haddad, “Um olhar estrangeiro,” 151 and 160–63.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} Van den Boogaart, \textit{Huygen van Linschoten}, 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{190} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 63–65.
  \item \textsuperscript{191} Pos, “Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,” 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Kamps, “Jan Huygen,” 179.
  \item \textsuperscript{193} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 34–35.
\end{itemize}
or imposed on him can be inferred by assessing several key moments in the *Itinerario* and looking more closely at its author’s later career.

5.4.2 Rereading the *Itinerario*: Van Linschoten, an Admirer of Portugal and Spain?

Although numerous studies cast Van Linschoten as a strongly anti-Portuguese figure,\(^{194}\) the *Itinerario* itself contains several episodes that challenge or even reverse this assumption. This might come as a surprise bearing in mind the editorial overhaul the *Itinerario* went through to ready it for publication in 1596.\(^{195}\) Also noteworthy is the fact that in 1599, the De Bry brothers gave Van Linschoten financial support for a Latin edition of the *Itinerario*.\(^{196}\) They republished the book in three volumes within a major project to publish travel and geographical accounts, adding more drawings and adapting the text.\(^{197}\) Since the Latin *Itinerario* was to be sold to and read by Catholics, Van Linschoten removed his critical remarks on the Jesuits.\(^{198}\) The pragmatism of the editor was matched by Van Linschoten’s desire to expand his readership, and willingness to alter his book to this end. Reading between the lines, the *Itinerario* presents a balance of well-worn criticisms alongside insinuations of Portuguese potency. Indeed, Van Linschoten could hardly have regarded the Portuguese with unmitigated contempt given his ease in adapting to the Goan milieu\(^ {199}\) (to say nothing of his thoughts of settling in India permanently). Moreover, it has been argued that Van Linschoten’s career in the Iberian world was driven more by his curiosity and careerism than by his “patriotism.”\(^ {200}\)

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194 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 113; Giuseppe Mazzocchi, “Una Imagen Holandesa de Goa: La “Navigatio” de Jan Huyghen van Linschoten,” *Criticon* no. 87–89 (2003): 505; Ana L. Méndez–Oliver, 2016, 341. A more recent study even argues that Van Linschoten’s anti-Portuguese views were based on his stay in Goa, during which he became a spy for the Dutch Republic. However, the author does not provide any documentary evidence for this hypothesis (William Blanke Elgin, “The Itinerary of Jan Huygen van Linschoten: Knowledge, Commerce, and the Creation of the Dutch and English Trade Empires” (MA thesis, Oxford University, 2021), 16–25). Only Saldanha does not follow the opinion that Van Linschoten was anti-Portuguese (Saldanha, “The Itineraries of Geography,” 163 and 173).

195 See illustration 5.


Van Linschoten’s admiration of the Portuguese can be documented with revealing examples. When describing his voyage to Asia in 1583, he wrote about the competition between ship captains as to who would arrive first in India, and he told about how mariners staged plays on board which invariably led to brawls. In the resulting confusion on one occasion, the ship’s captain ended up on the floor, trampled by the crew. Under the harsh conditions of India Run voyages, Van Linschoten knew personally how difficult it could be to stave off chaos and mutiny. His laudatory remarks on the archbishop’s behavior, who had gone around personally to retrieve all the swords and put an end to escalating havoc in the case cited above, are a testament to the courage the Dutchman recognized in his employer.201 And despite his later criticism of “palanquins” and the viceroy’s opulent palace, Van Linschoten initially had no qualms about the sumptuous arrival ceremonies of the archbishops of Goa.202

Describing Goa, Van Linschoten also noted the general atmosphere of confessional freedom outside the city, which must have been refreshing for a man hailing from lands torn apart by religious wars. It was also this circumstance that allowed him to travel to nearby lands of Goa to witness and draw the life of the Hindus. Following such visits, Van Linschoten realized that Hindu medical knowledge outshone that of Europeans, making them more desirable as physicians in Goa than their Western counterparts. This detail makes his compliments to the viceroy and other rich Portuguese noblemen who periodically volunteered at the Goa hospital all the more meaningful. Van Linschoten further expressed his regard for the Portuguese when acknowledging their ability to impose their authority. He lauded the determination of the non-European inhabitants of Goa in defending the lands rented to them by the Portuguese, and commended the patience and good manners of Arab crews employed on Portuguese ships.203 These passages must not be overlooked, since Van Linschoten says the opposite on several occasions. Still, the most obvious statements of Portuguese potency relate to Van Linschoten’s portrayal of Portuguese rulers.

In the case of Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas, he starts by noting the death of the viceroy’s nephew in an expedition to punish the Malabar pirates, who had wrought considerable havoc. Later, however, the same viceroy sent an expedition that decisively routed the pirates. Van Linschoten also acknowledges that several peace treatises were signed during Mascarenhas’s

201 Itinerário, 1997, 77.
tenure. He draws special attention to the custom house of Cochin, one of the major responsibilities given to the viceroy by King Philip II; Van Linschoten says it was so well-managed that nothing was loaded onto a Cochin-Lisbon vessel without being properly registered at penalty of total confiscation. In discussing Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, Van Linschoten paints a picture of a weak ruler who chronically came to the battlefield unlucky and underequipped. Still, he does not brush aside major victories at Malacca and Ceylon, achieved notwithstanding a shortage of backup troops. His generalized scorn for Meneses has a straightforward explanation: the previously discussed conflict between the viceroy and the archbishop that forced Fonseca’s return to Portugal and influenced Van Linschoten’s decision to return to Europe. In contrast, Van Linschoten presents Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho as a successful military leader, who had risen to remarkable heights despite his low birth. 204

Van Linschoten also praises the courage of a viceroy he did not meet: D. Luís de Ataíde, third earl of Atouguia (1578–81). He recounts an episode in which Ataíde decided that diplomatic gifts should be collected by the Estado rather than given directly to the Jesuits. In punishment, Ataíde was accused of heresy by the Jesuits (who, incidentally, Van Linschoten accuses of lust for power). Van Linschoten also commends King Philip II’s choice of Matias de Albuquerque (1591–97) as viceroy of Portuguese Asia, although the Dutchman only encountered him before his appointment. He applauds the valor Albuquerque evinced by successfully sailing to Asia alone when, in 1591, his fleet scattered in the Atlantic and the timing of the voyage augured ruin. 205 In all these cases, Van Linschoten discloses his enduring respect for the Portuguese.

It is possible that Van Linschoten’s original chapter on his stay in Asia had contained additional relevant events that did not survive the editing process. After all, in 1596, when the Dutch had already sent their first expedition to Asia, it would be difficult for Van Linschoten to dwell too long on his personal knowledge that Mascarenhas, Meneses, Coutinho, and even Albuquerque were still feared and respected rulers across maritime Asia. This is especially true of Albuquerque, the presiding Portuguese viceroy when Houtman sailed to Java. Acquainted by his personal experiences with Albuquerque, Van Linschoten may have counselled Cornelis de Houtman not to sail directly to India, fearing that this first Dutch expedition to Asia awaited sure defeat in any standoff with Albuquerque’s forces. 206 I agree

205 Itinerário, 1997, 162 and 352.
206 On Albuquerque’s career: Nuno Vila-Santa, “Matias de Alburquerque.”
with Van den Boogaart: far from evoking a Portuguese Asia in shambles, the *Itinerario* does the exact opposite.\(^{207}\) But to state this frankly would have cost the *Itinerario* a sizeable segment of its hoped-for audience, putting the fame Van Linschoten hoped to win in the Dutch Republic and across Europe in jeopardy. However, this does not mean that Van Linschoten envisaged future Dutch-Portuguese confrontation as a completely victorious to the Dutch, as shall be discussed. Before touching on this topic, it is important to evaluate the anti-Portuguese sentiments that do exist in the *Itinerario*.

Van Linschoten’s chief criticism of the Portuguese is found in his description of Goan society. Since the beginning, he condemned what he dubbed generalized “corruption” in Portuguese India. According to Van Linschoten, everyone in Goa, from viceroy to soldier, sought only to enrich and ennoble themselves, and they pursued these ends at the cost of good governance. Even the king had his share of the blame, with his habit of conceding captaincies, voyages, and government posts for three years as mere favors. Van Linschoten emphasized the adverse effects this had on the lives of soldiers, who were stuck in India and reliant on liaisons with women to secure food and housing, especially when there were no wars to be fought and no good military leaders.\(^{208}\) On the other hand, Van Linschoten also pointed out the dangers manifested by the total absence of social barriers in Goa’s society. The *Itinerario*’s remark that Goan mestizos physically resemble Indians,\(^{209}\) is usually seen as Van Linschoten’s most overt warning to the Dutch against miscegenation.\(^{210}\)

Van Linschoten’s obsessive indictment of the behavior of European women in India is also well-known. He accused women of murdering around forty men per year, resorting to poison and treachery to get rid of unwanted husbands (a fate that befell his unfortunate friend Frans Connigh).\(^{211}\) This critique is usually linked to Van Linschoten’s dismay at Goan society’s racial fluidity, and his support for a white supremacy policy.\(^{212}\) As Van Linschoten noted, the Portuguese already tended to look down on non-Portuguese, and in consequence, many foreigners (and even some Portuguese renegades)

\(^{207}\) Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 160.  
were forced to flee Goa and serve Indian rulers, to whom they confided the secrets of European artillery. Conversely, Van Linschoten mocked the chivalric value system that played out on Goa’s streets, in which the slightest of perceived insults could trigger a deadly duel.\footnote{Itinerário, 1997, 152 and 297.}

In all these instances, Van Linschoten is far from impartial. Nor is he uninformed; during his years in India, he became acquainted with contemporary literature on the decline of Portuguese Asia (written in the wake of the political and military crisis of 1565–75, the Avis dynastic crisis, and the accession to the Portuguese throne of King Philip II), and many of his reprovals seem to be lifted from the pages of earlier Portuguese critiques, especially from the first version of the \textit{Soldado Prático} (1564) by Diogo do Couto.\footnote{Diogo do Couto, O Primeiro Soldado Prático, edited by António Coimbra Martins (Lisbon: CNCDP, 2001).} When he denounces Goan society, Van Linschoten vacillates between voicing Portuguese opinions and speaking as a Dutchman. Nonetheless, scholars often exaggerate Van Linschoten’s portrait of India without taking into account the impact that the \textit{Devotio Moderna} movement had in the Low Countries during the 15\textsuperscript{th} century,\footnote{Cook, Matters of Exchange, 85.} and how it evolved into “experimental” humanism in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Israel, The Dutch Republic, 44, 47 and 53.} It is exactly this “experimental” humanism that Van Linschoten exhibits throughout the entire \textit{Itinerario}, a book that is, at its most basic level, a curious merchant’s earnest effort to describe the natural world as he found it.\footnote{Bill, “A European View of Life,” 41.} This is why Van Linschoten is also, paradoxically, often labeled an “impartial” observer of the Portuguese, when his book, like that of François Pyrard de Lavale (1578–1623) and the memoirs of Jacques de Coutre (1572–1640), was a contribution to the Portuguese black legend in Asia.\footnote{Célia Cristina da Silva Tavares, “Aspectos da vida em Goa segundo os viajantes Linschoten, Pyrard e Della Valle,” In D’Aquém, d’Além e d’Ultramar: homenagem a António Dias Farinha, ed. Francisco Contente Domingues, José da Silva Horta, and Paulo David Vicente, vol. II (Lisbon: Centro de História da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 2015), 1142.} But it cannot be forgotten that Van Linschoten, like any author, had his own personal views and agenda. Indeed, it is very likely that some of Van Linschoten’s disparaging comments arose from simple culture shock. Coming from a more urbanized, Protestant, and mercantile-capitalist society (the Low Countries), Van Linschoten must have struggled to internalize the logic of a more aristocratic, Catholic, and monarchical society (Portugal).
This explains how Van Linschoten could believe that the Goan Hindus and the “casados” (the Portuguese settled in India) were at once crucial to the military viability of the Estado, and simultaneously a cause of Portuguese decay. This contradiction is not solely based on his misunderstanding of Goa’s multicultural society,\(^{219}\) but is related to the fact that Van Linschoten might have harboured personal resentment towards the Portuguese. If Van Linschoten wanted to remain permanently in India, he knew he had to get married (like his friend Connigh), therefore becoming slightly “more Portuguese.” But for unknown reasons Van Linschoten demurred; perhaps he thought it would be impossible while he served the archbishop, or his Dutch morals recoiled from the laxer sexual mores of the Portuguese in India,\(^ {220}\) or he simply could not commit to becoming “completely” Portuguese. Again, the *Itinerario* is proof of a kind of identity crisis Van Linschoten confronted during his travels. This inner turmoil was not erased, and is documented in the 1596 edition when he divulges his hesitations and regrets about leaving India.

None of this is to suggest that Van Linschoten could not or did not make valid judgements on the Portuguese. One of the *Itinerario’s* strongest categories of evidence for Portuguese decline relates to Van Linschoten’s experiences at sea on the India Run. Van Linschoten’s descriptions of the shipwrecks of the *Santiago*, in 1585, and of the *São Tomé*, in 1589, were staggering assaults on Portugal’s reputation as an invincible naval power after almost a century of sailing the India Run. Van Linschoten’s treatment of the *Santiago* wreck is an unflinching picture of a pilot’s hubris: utterly assured of his own competence, the pilot failed to steer clear of the infamous shallows of Judia; Van Linschoten also references a ship that perished near Cochin under ludicrous circumstances (a chicken escaped, causing people to chase it to starboard en masse, triggering a deadly weight imbalance on the already overloaded vessel). The Dutchman gives a general etiology of the Portuguese shipwrecks of the 1580s: they were caused, he avers, by overweight cargoes; bad pilots, officials, and crews; and the absence of proper inspections before the start of voyages.\(^ {221}\)

His description of life on board during the 1589 voyage also documents the confusion and disorder on Portuguese ships during dangerous moments.\(^ {222}\) This image strongly contradicted widespread Portuguese propaganda about

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\(^{219}\) Mazzocchi, “Una Imagen Holandesa de Goa,” 499.

\(^{220}\) Pos, “A Stranger’s Testimony,” 119–21.


its maritime prowess. Although this sort of shipwreck reportage was already accessible in certain maritime circles in France, England, and even the Low Countries, it became available to a new and wider audience when published in the *Itinerario*. Considering also that Van Linschoten described the naval battles in the Azores and the fact that the Portuguese (and to a lesser extent, the Spanish) faced meaningful challenges from the English, the invitation to breach the Iberian *Mare Clausum* was obvious. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) later threw down the same gauntlet in his *The Free Sea*. But Van Linschoten’s message had a greater impact on the Portuguese maritime empire than the largely terrestrial Spanish empire; Portugal had sought to build a seaborne empire, and the *Itinerario* was a nail in the coffin of the realm’s maritime hegemony. Although Portuguese dominance had been contested since almost the beginning of the 16th century, as has also been underscored in all previous chapters, the most recent serious blow, in the eyes of the broader European audience, had occurred with the end of the Avis dynasty in 1580.

Van Linschoten takes the Spanish perspective on this question, surveying Portugal’s 1580 defeat with contempt. No words of compassion are to be found in his comments on the shipwrecks of the India Run. But on the topic of Anglo-Spanish engagements in the Azores, the tables are turned. The same Van Linschoten who had ridiculed Portuguese customary courtesy in India praises Spanish notions of decorum, singling out their polite treatment of the Englishman Richard Grenvelle (1542–91), who had been captured after a quintessentially chivalric naval battle. However, this does not necessarily mean that when the Dutch started their enterprise in Asia, Van Linschoten regarded the Portuguese as a trivial threat. Thus, it is important to revaluate the Dutchman’s last years before we attempt to formulate conclusions.

### 5.5 Van Linschoten’s Final Years and the Dutch Enterprise in Asia (1594–1611): Approval or Disapproval?

In 1594, at the peak of his career, Van Linschoten embarked on a voyage on the ship *Mercurius*. The aim of the fleet Van Linschoten had joined was to find a northern route to China along the Scandinavian and Russian coasts.
in order to avoid engaging in the Cape route against the Portuguese.\footnote{226 McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 214–18.} This northern route was believed to be shorter than the Cape route. The voyage was defended and sponsored by Franciscus Maelson, and endorsed by Petrus Plancius. Having been appointed clerk by Prince Maurice,\footnote{227 McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 216.} Van Linschoten once more proved his nautical know-how by keeping a logbook, producing 36 drawings of places the fleet passed, writing nautical rutters, and collecting specimens for Paludanus.\footnote{228 McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 217–18, 223–24 and 231.} The expedition ended in failure because the Dutch were unable to determine their location. On the verge of a punishing Russian winter, they turned back before their vessels could be trapped in the ice. Their only consolation was the founding of a fortress at Waygats Island.

The expedition formed part of the Republic’s response to King Philip II’s decision of the same year to bar Dutch navigation from Iberian ports. Van Linschoten saw a northern route as the best chance at tapping into lucrative Chinese markets, while Petrus Plancius argued for a trans-Artic approach.\footnote{229 Saldanha, “The Itineraries of Geography,” 159.} Although the failure of the expedition had immediate consequences, a friend from Hoorn could still dedicate a poem to Van Linschoten in 1594, comparing his enterprise to those of Vasco da Gama and Francis Drake.\footnote{230 Van den Boogaart, \textit{Huygen van Linschoten}, 19.} Several merchants, motivated by the information Van Linschoten brought back from Asia, decided to finance Cornelis de Houtman’s voyage to Asia by the Cape route. Strikingly, Van Linschoten was \textit{not} given a formal appointment to participate in the Cape route expedition, even though he and Dirck Gerritsz Pomp were the only Dutchmen at that time with the requisite nautical knowledge. Why?

Van Linschoten’s involvement in the 1594 northern expedition strongly suggests that he did not want to take part in Houtman’s expedition. There are several potential reasons: trauma from previous experiences on the Portuguese India Run;\footnote{231 McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 163.} a sense of having reached a status above hands-on involvement; and, finally, an unspoken conviction that it would be foolhardy to directly challenge the Portuguese on the Cape route. Having written orders for Cornelis de Houtman, Petrus Plancius tried, without success, to exclude Van Linschoten from the debate on the route to be followed. However, it was Van Linschoten, and not Plancius, who had managed to deliver the most detailed Iberian nautical rutters to the Republic, and who now had...
the backing of the States General. In his orders to Houtman, Plancius specified that he should not provoke outright war with the Portuguese, and should sail directly from the Cape of Good Hope to Bantam, on Java. It was Van Linschoten who proposed the idea of sailing to Java, knowing that the Portuguese lacked a fortress in the area, and of the potential of the Bantam market.

In 1576, King Sebastian had sent a fleet of ships under Captain Matias de Albuquerque to sail directly from Lisbon to Malacca by a route west of Madagascar. This was the route preferred by the Portuguese throughout the 1580s. Van Linschoten might have learned of its existence from a number of informants: the pilot Gaspar Reimão Ferreira, whom he had met on the 1589 voyage; his friend Afhuysen; or Captains D. Paulo de Lima Pereira and Matias de Albuquerque. Starting with Cornelis de Houtman, this would also be the main route the Dutch would take for the next years, causing the original Portuguese route to fall into disuse. Still, Van Linschoten and Plancius disagreed about the coordinates of Bantam, and engaged in political rivalry. On one matter, however, they concurred: it was unthinkable to wage head-on war with the Portuguese. Oldenbarnevelt and Prince Maurice, who received Van Linschoten personally at The Hague on his arrival from the North in 1594, may have agreed. The merchants who sponsored the Houtman expedition surely would not want to risk their investment in Asia by confronting the Portuguese. Such a decision is not that different from what has been noted in chapter 2 concerning the English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s.

Also, in 1595, the Dutch Republic resolved once more to explore the possibility of a northern route to China. Special orders were written in case the fleet reached China, and Van Linschoten was commissioned by the States General to produce a nautical chart for the voyage. Van Linschoten participated in this expedition as well, and was appointed supervisor of

235 Pos, “A Stranger’s Testimony,” 129. Part of this nautical route had been previously suggested. For details see: Madeira Santos, *O carácter experimental*.
238 Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica*, 201.
the whole fleet.\textsuperscript{239} The route to be followed was again via Scandinavia and northern Russia (to the disgust of Plancius, who still insisted on an Arctic route). This second expedition proved another failure. On the verge of death several times, Van Linschoten learned from locals how far the Dutch were from finding the southeast passage to China. Returning to the Republic, he was summoned by Prince Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt to account for his lack of results. He was unable to convince the merchants and leaders of the Republic to finance another attempt the following year, even after reminding them of his hitherto impressive track record and noting that the Portuguese had also endured failures on the path to their maritime achievements.\textsuperscript{240} This time, the Dutch explorer was bested by Plancius, who persuaded a detractor of Van Linschoten, Willem Barentsz (1550–97), to sail through the Arctic, resulting in Barentsz’s death. Van Linschoten, on the other hand, decided not to explore new places.

In 1597, Van Linschoten was named treasurer of Enkhuizen,\textsuperscript{241} and in 1598 he published the Dutch translation of Acosta’s work,\textsuperscript{242} and was publicly praised by Waghenaeer for his expeditions in the North.\textsuperscript{243} Meanwhile, he engaged in a polemic against Gerrit de Veer (1570–98), who had published an account of Barentsz’s expedition that Van Linschoten considered inaccurate. Van Linschoten also tried, without great success, to publish an academic edition of his journeys of 1594 and 1595. But the version Van Linschoten managed to print in 1601 did not capture the Dutch imagination, as it lacked a tragic hero like Barentsz.\textsuperscript{244} With Houtman’s return in 1597 and the publication of his travel journals,\textsuperscript{245} the Cape route began to appear viable, and the northern option a dead end. The \textit{Itinerario} was now fighting obsolescence, since more detailed information arrived with the return of each Dutch expedition from Asia.

Claesz and Linschoten issued a new Dutch version of the \textit{Itinerario} in 1604, republishing the \textit{Icones} edition alongside a revised text.\textsuperscript{246} In 1606, Van Linschoten was appointed hospital administrator of Enkhuizen and was consulted about a plan to create a West Indies Company for the Atlantic. The idea was struck down when the Dutch Republic got tied up

\textsuperscript{239} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 241–42.
\textsuperscript{240} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 263–67.
\textsuperscript{241} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 270.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Itinerário}, 1997, 22.
\textsuperscript{243} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 273.
\textsuperscript{244} Der Weduwen and Pettegree, \textit{The Bookshop of the World}, 96.
\textsuperscript{245} Cook, \textit{Matters of Exchange}, 128.
\textsuperscript{246} Van den Boogaart, \textit{Civil and Corrupt Asia}. 
in negotiations with Spain over the Twelve Years’ Truce (signed in 1609). Also in 1609, Claesz died and Van Linschoten published King Philip III’s (1598–1621) letter to his favorite, the duke of Lerma, about the Moorish revolt in Spain.\textsuperscript{247} When the States General issued a license the same year allowing Van Linschoten to reprint the \textit{Itinerario} for a decade to come, he bought all relevant publishing rights and unsold copies of his book from Claesz’s widow, hoping to put together future editions.\textsuperscript{248} However, he died just a year later, in February 1611.\textsuperscript{249} His position had slid somewhat at the time of his death. The States General refused to grant him a pension for his services to the Republic, ruling that he had enough income from his books. When Van Linschoten died, he was popularly regarded as a proponent of exploring the northern route. Plancius, his sometime scientific adversary, had even summoned him to the States General to testify in support of the Arctic route, but he died before he could make an appearance.\textsuperscript{250}

Like Paludanus, Van Linschoten only invested in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), in 1606,\textsuperscript{251} although his \textit{Itinerario} was primarily a book for anyone wishing to be a merchant, sailor, or explorer of the world, all that Van Linschoten had been during his life. In contrast to his friend Pomp, who died in 1606 after sailing across the Magellan Strait,\textsuperscript{252} Van Linschoten had elected not to intervene in the political and military trajectory of the Dutch expansion in Asia. This decision demands explanation. Even in the wake of the second failed voyage to the North in 1595, Van Linschoten still had an audience at the VOC. An important contributor to the foundation of Dutch Batavia, Van Linschoten probably refused to get involved for very simple reasons: he was now a married man with a daughter, and he did not need or want to leave his family behind and risk his life again. He likely suspected until his death that dislodging the Portuguese from Asia would be gruelling, if it was possible at all. Bearing in mind that Van Linschoten proposed kicking off the Dutch enterprise in Java because it was a Portuguese weak spot, the question remains: was Van Linschoten sympathetic to the Portuguese and averse to open war, as his insistence, until the day he died, on finding a northern route to China and not sailing to Asia anymore suggests? Or did he merely know from his years in Asia, despite what he wrote in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{247} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 276–79.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Schilder, \textit{Monumenta Cartographica}, 203.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Der Weduwen and Pettegree, \textit{The Bookshop of the World}, 96.
\item \textsuperscript{250} McKew Parr, \textit{Linschoten}, 277 and 279–81.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Van den Boogaart, \textit{Huygen van Linschoten}, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Pos, “Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,” 65–66.
\end{itemize}
Itinerario, that the Portuguese could still put up a fight? An initial reply can be reached by looking into the first Dutch-Portuguese wars in Asia.

During his lifetime, Van Linschoten witnessed the outcomes of the early Dutch expeditions to Asia. In the beginning, mariners were under strict orders not to engage militarily with the Portuguese, but this changed after the establishment of the VOC in 1602. Not everyone at VOC agreed with militarization to face the Portuguese in Asia, especially due to the costs entailed and the financial difficulties VOC went through in its infant years. While the VOC was able to expel the Portuguese from Tidore and Amboina in 1605, it was nonetheless thwarted in Malacca in 1606, and Mozambique in 1607. Even though Van Linschoten had provided a detailed military description of the Mozambique stronghold in the Itinerario, the Dutch were overpowered. Studies on the VOC’s privateering against the India Run show that until the 1609 truce, Portuguese losses to the Dutch were not exorbitant.

The Portuguese tried out a number of responses to the VOC’s militarization: orders were issued from Lisbon that all India Run ships had to sail together without separating; the calendar for the departure of fleets was altered; a direct Lisbon-Goa route, circumventing Santa Helena and thus, ostensibly, avoiding heavily armed VOC vessels, was attempted; 16th-century plans to turn Mozambique into a Portuguese depot linking inland Africa and the Atlantic were reconsidered; and, in 1613, the Portuguese cosmographer João Baptista Lavanha (1550–1624) dispatched a spy to discover the route the Dutch followed between Madagascar and Java. All these attempts faced opposition in India.

Meanwhile, the Dutch-Iberian nautical interchange did not stop, mainly in Asia. During Cornelis de Houtman’s inaugural Dutch expedition to Asia, the Dutch were given decisive access to Portuguese cartography, when the Portuguese defector Pedro de Ataíde handed over a package of Portuguese charts of Asia. Because of his perceived treason, Ataíde ended up killed by the Portuguese. His death is reminiscent of the similar attempts by

257 Schilder, Monumenta Cartographica, 267.
the Portuguese ambassador João Pereira Dantas, reported in chapter 4. However, as had happened before with the French and the English, they did not impede the Dutch use of this knowledge. The Portuguese were also quick to realize that they could appropriate Dutch nautical knowledge for their own profit, almost the same way they had done with the Spanish in the Moluccas as detailed in chapter 1. In his Art of Navigation, published in 1596, the Portuguese Father Francisco da Costa included a translation of Adriaen Veen’s nautical works, almost in the same way the Dutch cartographer Jodocus Hondius (1563–1612) had acquired the English cosmographer Edward Wright’s (1561–1615) famous scientific tables some years earlier.

Hondius brought Wright’s tables to the Dutch Republic and even published them.258 Like the previous Anglo-Portuguese maritime interchange detailed in chapter 2, the Anglo-Dutch one was also full of technical consequences for both sides. Aside from Hondius, the Dutch were able to hire the English nautical expert, pilot, and author of English works on seamanship John Davis (1550–1605), to pilot the second Dutch expedition to Asia by Jacob van Neck (1564–1638). When Davis returned from the voyage to the Dutch Republic, agitation on the other side of the English Channel prompted Richard Hakluyt (1552–1616) to negotiate Davis’s return to English service to stop the seepage of English nautical knowledge to the Dutch Republic. Still, at the same time, Hakluyt also appropriated Van Linschoten’s Itinerario and used it for his re-edition of the Principal Navigations.259 This even included Van Linschoten’s report of Francis Drake’s circumnavigation that Hakluyt wanted to print because he had been previously forbidden to publishing any report due to Queen Elizabeth I’s secrecy policy regarding Drake’s voyage.260 The English edition of the Itinerario published just two years after the original Dutch edition (in 1598) played a critical role in the English designs for Asia in the following years. The same applies to the first and subsequent translations of the Itinerario and even of the Reys-gheschrift alone into French.261 These facts points to the importance of the Anglo-Dutch interchange unfolding simultaneously and fully comparably with what has been stressed in chapter 2 concerning the importance of Anglo-Portuguese nautical interchange in the first English systematic expeditions to West Africa: two allies slowly becoming maritime competitors and appropriating

the other’s nautical knowledge. The Anglo-Dutch interchange remained intense throughout the 17th century with very similar stories such as those of Hondius or Davis, proving how for the English and the Dutch, too, it was impossible to control maritime knowledge circulation.

Thus, returning to the Dutch-Portuguese wars in Asia, the main military engagements in Asia up to Van Linschoten’s death prove that the Portuguese and Dutch were deadlocked. The Portuguese were incapable of casting the VOC out of Asia, but the Dutch were also unable to land major blows on the Portuguese. The VOC’s mission would not be easy, despite the Company’s own wealth and funding from the Republic, which outstripped the meager resources of the Portuguese. All these factors, combined with the fact that Van Linschoten opted out of military actions in Asia and died promoting the failed northern route, imply that he was not keen on massive war against the Portuguese.

In 1595, Van Linschoten knew better than anyone else that the Portuguese would not stand quietly and accept the arrival of the Dutch. In a sense, these events also contributed to the declining influence of the Itinerario and help to contextualize Van Linschoten’s later career in Enkhuizen. Although Van Linschoten’s data on Mutapa could still win approbation from the Dutch governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the 1660s, the Itinerario was old news even before Van Linschoten’s demise. Nonetheless, for the English, who had less updated information about Asia, Van Linschoten’s text could have provided valuable insights. For this reason, in 1619, the VOC formally forbade its re-publication for fear that English rivals in Asia would persist in using it against the Dutch. Still, Van Linschoten’s warnings on the dangers of miscegenation continued to be taken seriously. In 1610, the VOC board were confronted with a corrupting portrait of Dutch Asia by Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629), that seemed to mirror the very situation Van Linschoten had repudiated in Portuguese Goa. They decided to send white European women to Asia and discontinue missions in the area. Arriving in 1592 to a hero’s welcome, bearing invaluable data for the emergent Republic and its dream of shattering the Iberian Mare Clausum, Van Linschoten died in 1611 better-known outside the Dutch Republic than within its borders.

To conclude this re-examination of Van Linschoten’s career, it is time to return to the earliest questions about the circumstances around the

262 Van den Boogaart, Huygen van Linschoten, 21.
264 Cook, Matters of Exchange, 183.
Dutchman’s acquisition and abscondment with precious data, and attempt to weigh the ultimate legacy of the *Itinerario*. How can we make sense of this state of affairs without recourse to convenient, but unsubstantiated, claims that Van Linschoten was a spy?

**Conclusion**

The fundamental reason that Van Linschoten could harvest and make off with Portuguese intelligence is neatly expressed by the subtitle of a book by Russell-Wood, who tracked the ways the Portuguese Empire truly functioned as a world on the move, circulating people, ideas, and goods.266 Van Linschoten’s well-documented capacity to adapt to new environments becomes very clear in the course of his whole career. It played as decisive a role in the Iberian world as the archbishop, who recognized Van Linschoten’s drawing and organizing talents, and of Urbina, the Spanish governor of Terceira, who took an interest in them. But this adaptability and flexibility was also made clear when, back in the Dutch Republic, Van Linschoten accepted to reshape his materials for the Dutch publication, in order to win pan-European fame. Still, the *Itinerario* could have easily been published as either a travel narrative or a major cosmographical work within the Iberian world, were it not for the archbishop’s death and its repercussions. It is hard to deny that, for Van Linschoten, making a living in Portuguese Asia was a tempting option. Otherwise, what could he have meant by his mention in the *Itinerario* that many of his hopes were hanging on the archbishop’s return?

I argue Van Linschoten’s goal was to become a celebrated writer/chronicler for the Portuguese, and that this explicit aim was the main reason he secured access to secret knowledge. The post of chronicler of Portuguese India was vacant by Van Linschoten’s time in Goa, and the *Decades* of João de Barros was without a clear successor (only later, in 1595, would chronicler Diogo do Couto be thus instated). As has been demonstrated, the *Itinerario* was totally reshaped for a Dutch audience. In the process, the would-be Iberian cosmography was effectively transformed into a masterpiece of Dutch propaganda that stoked the black legend of the Spanish and Portuguese. The *Itinerario* was duly forbidden in Portugal and Spain,267 as it took the same negative perspective on the Estado that had seen other contemporary


Portuguese debates banned from being published. But a careful calibration of its political commentary would have been all that was needed for the *Itinerario* to perfectly meet the standards required of a publication in Portugal or Spain, especially if someone as prestigious as the archbishop of Goa or the viceroy of Portugal had signed on as sponsor.

On the other hand, by the end of 16th century, both Portugal and Spain were increasingly unable to control sensitive cosmographical knowledge being published about their empires. For the Portuguese-Spanish case, several instances have been identified in the first chapter. The same goes for Anglo-Portuguese and French-Portuguese relations in chapters 2, 3, and 4. As for the Low Countries, a similar process took place, although the critical episodes occurred mainly from the 1580s onwards, with Van Linschoten's example being one of great significance. As Richard Unger has long ago demonstrated, the Low Countries had been importers of Portuguese nautical knowledge from as early as the 15th century, enabling them to cultivate leading thinkers such as Gerard Mercator and then Petrus Plancius. It is noteworthy that Michel Coignet (1549–1623) also used Iberian authors, in a manner fully comparable with those documented in chapters 2, 3, and 4, to Tudor England and Valois France. Furthermore, it is relevant to bear in mind that the cutting-edge works of the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes (1502–78) and D. João de Castro (1500–48) were likewise read throughout Europe, and obviously reached the Dutch Republic in the 1590s.

Thus, ever since the beginning of the 16th century, Europe was more than merely curious about the Portuguese discoveries, as was documented mainly for Italy and Germany. Rather, rulers across the continent sought to understand how Portugal had managed to set up the first truly scientific European institution, and then placed it in the service of imperial administration (starting with the Casa da Guiné, later renowned the Casa da Índia). This is why the celebrated naturalist Carolus Clusius visited not just Spain, but also ventured into Portugal, where he became familiar with

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268 Vila-Santa, “O Primeiro Soldado Prático.”
Garcia de Orta's work. This transfer of maritime knowledge from the Iberian Peninsula to Northern Europe was also accelerated by the exile of D. António, the claimant to the Portuguese throne, at the French and English courts, and his supporters' contacts with the English and the Dutch. Although it is widely acknowledged that Richard Hakluyt employed D. António's supporters in his school of seamanship in England, much less is known of his supporters' connection with the Dutch in the 1580s. It is important to further investigate whether any of D. António's supporters who ventured into the Dutch Republic participated in exchanges of nautical information during this time. Furthermore, it is clear that the Dutch-Portuguese interchange continued, particularly evidenced by the marriage of D. António's heir, D. Manuel de Portugal (1568–1638), with Emily of Orange (1569–1629), daughter of William of Orange, in 1597.

On the Spanish side, although the Consejo de Indias tried to protect secret cosmographical knowledge from Dutch, French, and English rivals, its policy was foundering by the 1580s. A classic example is the publication, in Rome, of Juan González de Mendoza's (1545–1618) book on China, a complete bypass of the Consejo de Indias's control. With every Spanish ship captured by the English, Spanish cartography and rutters changed hands. Knowledge escaped at such a rate that when the Consejo de Indias denied the Spanish Captain Juan Escalante de Mendoza's (1526–96) request for permission to publish his maps and rutters, he rebutted that foreigners already had all of Spain's nautical knowledge. Even after the Consejo de Indias's decision, Mendonza's maps and rutters circulated in manuscript form in such a volume that King Philip II was forced to forbid their distribution in 1593. Abraham Ortelius (1527–98) also seemed to have had little difficulty securing Iberian maps of overseas areas, receiving a map of China and Japan by the Portuguese cartographer Luís Jorge Barbuda in 1584, and, in 1592, another by the Portuguese cartographer Luís Teixeira.

Seen in this light, Van Linschoten's success in gathering nautical data in Goa between 1583 and 1588 should not come as a surprise. His situation is not much different from the efforts of Petrus Plancius to seize the Dutch longitude prize, all the while basing his theories on the cosmographical works of Spanish royal cosmographer Alonso de Santa Cruz (1505–67) and Portuguese authors such as Francisco Faleiro and João de Lisboa.

274 McKew Parr, Linschoten, XXV.
276 Karel Davids, “Dutch and Spanish Global Networks of Knowledge in the Early Modern Period: Structure, Changes and Limitations,” In Centres and Cycles of Accumulation in and around the
another critical example demonstrating how the Dutch-Iberian interchange continued in spite of the open war between both sides. It is in this context of technical and scientific espionage that the impact of the publication of the *Itinerario* should be discussed. While Van Linschoten’s opus is frequently treated as a collection of completely new knowledge, there are many reasons to dispute this characterization. Were not Asian goods and their values already known across Europe within merchant communities? Had not rumors of the decline of the Estado circulated ever since the death of King Sebastian? Furthermore, nautical knowledge had been swapped daily in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Italian ports and global cities since the start of the 16th century. And finally, Portuguese and Spanish discovery accounts and even chronicles had indubitably reached pockets of readers across the continent by the 1580s.

With the exception of Portuguese nautical rutters, which no one before Van Linschoten seems to have been able to acquire to the same extent because the Portuguese Crown at an early stage issued strict orders for them to be destroyed if any Portuguese vessel was captured by the enemy, few aspects of the *Itinerario* were completely new. What was novel was the way the book merged several bodies of knowledge about Asia (nautical, cartographical, ethnographical, political, mercantile, social) and repackaged them into a manual for anyone bent on defying Iberian maritime hegemony. It contained data essential for the development of political strategies, and offered a pragmatic resource for any merchant, sailor, or explorer interested in entering the “Iberian” waters and markets. This was the selling point of the *Itinerario*, and the reason it saw a flurry of translations into English (1598), Latin (1599), German (1600), and French (1610) and several re-editions. This fact again invites reflection on the importance of intra-European knowledge transfers about Asia with critical repercussions.

As has been highlighted, the Dutch contribution to the emergence of modern science in Europe was directly influenced by the formation of the VOC and of a “Republic of Merchants.” The Dutch cultivation of universities and cabinets of curiosities, and their untiring efforts to update information coming from Asia, are inextricably related with the Dutch Republic’s particular sociocultural environment. Contrary to Spain and Portugal,

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where scientific development was dominated by the royal sphere, the Dutch Republic was able to mix public and private spheres of influence in its pursuit of natural knowledge.\textsuperscript{280} In this sense, Van Linschoten was at the vanguard of a new kind of professional identity: the 17\textsuperscript{th}-century VOC merchant-scientist.\textsuperscript{281} In his own way, Van Linschoten made a major contribution to the trajectory of scientific development in the Dutch Republic. But he was only able to do so because of his “apprenticeship” in Portuguese Asia and experience in transforming his knowledge in the Dutch Republic.

During Van Linschoten’s career, the trading of confidential information between Iberian and Dutch ambiances was a constant event. Furthermore, there is not enough evidence that he was acting as a spy in Portuguese Asia. For this reason, it may not be accurate to admit that Van Linschoten was ever a spy, and certainly not one comparable to the type of nautical espionage that has been documented in all previous chapters. On the contrary, reassessment of Van Linschoten’s Iberian career and of several statements in the \textit{Itinerario} reveals that he was not as anti-Portuguese or even anti-Iberian as is usually assumed. Moreover, there is reason to think that this might have influenced his decision not to depart again for Asia, and might even explain his later career in Enkhuizen. Therefore, it is more fitting to approach Van Linschoten as a cross-cultural broker,\textsuperscript{282} in a pivotal period for the history of maritime knowledge transmission, between the Iberian world and the Low Countries. Van Linschoten’s whole tale is directly related with a previous history of transfer of Iberian knowledge to northern Europe. The fact that Van Linschoten is frequently quoted as a major success case should not overshadow this major process, which was fundamental in the rise of the English and Dutch overseas expansion. This is why R. C. D. Baldwin correctly posited the importance of Asia as the place where the knowledge interchange between the Portuguese and the Dutch took place, with profound consequences.\textsuperscript{283} It is in this framework of understanding that Jan Huygen van Linschoten should be approached. After all, Van Linschoten’s case stands against a backdrop of knowledge transmission within Europe about Asia that was happening since the beginning of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century and that was being accelerated in the transition to the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, when the Dutch, the English, and the French were in better shape to challenge Iberian claims to the \textit{Mare Clausum}.

\textsuperscript{280} Davids, “Dutch and Spanish Global Networks,” 5 and 11–12.
\textsuperscript{281} Cook, \textit{Matters of Exchange}.
\textsuperscript{283} Baldwin, “The Development and Interchange,” vol. I, 349.
It is now time to propose final conclusions on the mechanisms of Iberian nautical and maritime knowledge circulation in Europe during the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries and to discuss if there is good reason to think that there were successful Portuguese secrecy policies regarding nautical knowledge being transmitted to maritime rivals.
Conclusion: Five Connected Histories of Knowledge? Portugal, Spain, France, England, the Dutch Republic, and Secrecy Policies

Abstract
This chapter discusses the reasons for the overwhelming intensity and extension of Iberian maritime knowledge circulation among its maritime rivals (England, France, and the Dutch Republic) as early as the 16th century, in a process that intensified throughout the 17th century. It discusses why there is no reason to seriously consider the existence of a successful Iberian secrecy policy regarding maritime knowledge, and why those policies failed in most cases. Finally, it also argues that the dissemination of Iberian maritime knowledge contributed to the rise of early modern science.

Keywords: secrecy policies, maritime knowledge circulation, globalization of nautical knowledge, science

“I have at times seen him somewhat impatient at the delay, but this is a condition natural to those of this nation.”
(Letter from the duke of Sesa to King Philip III of Spain, 1602). ¹

With these words, the duke of Sesa, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, informed King Philip III of Spain (1598–1621) of the behavior of the Portuguese sailor Pedro Fernandes Queirós (1565–1614). The comment was in reference to Queirós's previous proposal to the pope and to the duke of Sesa regarding

an expedition to explore and colonize Terra Australis. Queirós ultimately completed the expedition under the Spanish flag and made important geographical discoveries in 1606. Queirós's story is little different from episodes detailed throughout the chapters of this book. The news of his discoveries made a profound impact across Europe. In October 1615, the Dutch commander Jacob Le Maire (1585–1616), sailing the Atlantic under harsh conditions, was able to calm onboard tensions with the announcement that the Dutch fleet would head for a new continent that the Portuguese Queirós (who died some months earlier) had recently charted. By the 18th century, the British navigator James Cook (1728–79) was also inspired to sail to Australia by the simple reading of Queirós's report of his voyages. Sesa's passage on Queirós's impatience as being natural to Portuguese sailors, and Le Maire's and Cook's references to Queirós, eloquently evoke what David Waters has described as the Portuguese contribution to the emergence of modern science in Europe.

Sesa was correct in observing Queirós's eagerness to make geographical discoveries, as it was a trait and widespread image typical of Portuguese seafarers' behaviors dating back to the 15th century. In addition to designing new nautical instruments and composing a manual of navigation at Sesa's request, Queirós also made a sound argument to King Philip III to secure support for his voyage. In his memorial to the king, Queirós remarked that he was proposing his journey after having sailed the oceans of the globe for twenty years and traversed some 20,000 leagues, a feat that neither Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), Vasco da Gama (1469–1524), or Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521) could claim when they set sail on their famed maritime voyages. Queirós's “Portuguese” pride and keen awareness of the pivotal role his nautical knowledge could play in Spanish designs in the Pacific Ocean during the early 17th century resemble several other documented histories in this book. It was precisely pride and a sense of technological superiority (based on Iberian maritime knowledge), evident in Queirós's words and action, that could be traced in Portuguese sailors who defected to Spain (such as Ferdinand Magellan), France (João Afonso), or England (António Eanes Pinteado). Although in all these cases there was also an element of typical Renaissance self-fashioning, these Portuguese characters

2 Kelly, “Pedro Fernandes de Queirós.”
4 Kelly, “Pedro Fernandes de Queirós,” 301–2 and 311–12.
connected their activities with the competencies tied to their nationality. This sense of superiority likewise directly influenced Portuguese overseas rivalries with Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic, as described throughout the chapters of this book, even leading to important *Mare Clausum* disputes, accusations, and “unofficial” wars between the Portuguese and their maritime rivals. Still, this did not preclude the acceptance of such experts in foreign service. Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic readily recognized the value of Portuguese maritime knowledge, whether it be in the form of great sailors, pilots, cartographers, cosmographers, or important nautical rutters or nautical treatises.

Thus, as has been demonstrated, Portuguese nautical expertise circulated widely across Europe during the 16th century. In the first chapter, it was argued that the first phase of Portuguese nautical knowledge circulation had already begun during the 15th century between Portugal and Spain. As Portugal was the first European realm to launch a systematic overseas expansion and Spain the second, it was somehow natural that the Iberian powers became the first global competitors with regard to maritime knowledge in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. However, the Portuguese-Spanish nautical interchange affected France, England, and later the Dutch Republic as well—the intra-Iberian circulation of expertise was not long confined to the Iberian Peninsula. If, for England, it was only from the 1550s onwards that a systematic overseas expansionist process can be detected, this does not mean that, as argued in chapter 2, there were no key instances of Anglo-Iberian nautical knowledge interchange before that. Some of these episodes even took place in the 1490s and early 1500s, albeit with a deceleration at the beginning of King Henry VIII’s (1509–1547) reign. Nonetheless, the true roots of the Anglo-Iberian nautical and maritime knowledge interchange that is analyzed in chapter 4, lie in the late 15th century, when the pattern of the circulation of Iberian nautical experts and knowledge to England is unmistakeable.

For France, the process of overseas expansion began earlier, but the Valois monarchs did not consistently implement a systematic policy. As France aimed to emulate Iberian overseas expansion and challenge the Iberian *Mare Clausum*, it sought to acquire Iberian nautical knowledge. However, during King Francis I’s (1515–47) reign this did not involve a coherent overseas program; such a program is more rightly situated during King Henry II’s (1547–59) reign. The most serious French overseas contests against Portugal and Spain, *France Antarctique* in Brazil and the efforts in Florida in the 1550s and 1560s, took place during, or as a consequence of, King Henry II’s policies, as contended in chapters 3 and 4. A full process of
maritime knowledge transfer between Portugal and France was consequently identified in chapter 3, particularly with regard to Jean Nicot’s embassy in Portugal between 1559 and 1561. As detailed in chapters 2 and 4, the Portuguese Crown’s concerns with respect to the sensitivity of the nautical knowledge entering France and England from the 1550s onwards, motivated serious maritime espionage and counter-espionage endeavors via Portuguese diplomacy in both France and England.

The chronological coincidence between Queen Elizabeth I’s (1558–1603) overseas policies, themselves a continuation and intensification of processes already underway under Queen Mary I’s (1553–58) reign, and Admiral Gaspard de Coligny’s (1519–72) maritime leadership in France, meant that Portugal had to fortify its Secret Science policy, as described in chapter 4. However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful, as had previously been the case with Spain and would later be the case with the Dutch Republic in the 1580–90s. The nautical knowledge exchange between the Dutch and the Iberians during this time was unique in that it was a result of the 1580 Iberian Union, rather than solely a Portuguese or Spanish endeavor. This phenomenon was documented in chapter 5, with Jan Huygen van Linschoten’s career in the Iberian world and the impact of the publication of the *Itinerario*, not simply in Dutch overseas expansion, but also in England and France at the beginning of the 17th century. Despite varying historical contexts, there are several commonalities that must be considered when evaluating the attempted secrecy policies in these connected histories of maritime knowledge transfer during the 16th century.

A first shared feature is the inescapable failure of the Portuguese (and sometimes Spanish) secrecy policies when it came to the transfer of nautical knowledge to maritime rivals. Despite the persistent misconception that Portugal successfully enforced its secrecy policy with regard to its nautical experts in the 16th century, early evidence suggests otherwise. It is important here to recall what Guido di Tomasso Detti, a Florentine merchant residing in Lisbon, wrote concerning Vasco da Gama’s inaugural voyage of the India Run between 1497 and 1499. Reporting on Gama’s return to Lisbon in 1499, Detti stressed that King Manuel I (1495–1521) had ordered the confiscation, on penalty of death, of nautical charts and rutters, so that no one could discover the secrets of the routes and become rivals of the Portuguese. Commenting on the Portuguese king’s order, Detti wrote “I believe the king may do this, but everything will become known all the same.” This prediction proved true, as notable accounts and reports of the

first Portuguese voyages to Asia still exist in Italy today.\(^7\) Bearing in mind the intense knowledge circulation that Renaissance Italy fostered with all corners of Europe, it is worth remembering Italy’s role when evaluating the circulation of Portuguese nautical knowledge. The same logic can be applied to Germany at the beginning of the 16th century, as Banha de Andrade’s classic study, and more recent scholarship, demonstrate.\(^8\) Thus, by the first years of the 16th century, King Manuel I’s secrecy policies were already flagging, even if the king approved a law in 1504 prohibiting cartographic depictions of the coast south of Congo.\(^9\) Circulation of Portuguese nautical knowledge only accelerated throughout the different contexts of the 16th century, as was documented in all chapters, with similar instances for Spain, England, France, and the Dutch Republic.

Regardless of the Portuguese Crown’s attempts to enforce secrecy policies (which did exist, *de jure*, at certain times), it was impossible to fully control the circulation of nautical experts and knowledge. Notable examples include the migration of Portuguese sailors such as Ferdinand Magellan to Spain, João Afonso to France, and António Eanes Pintado to England. However, these are just the best-known cases. Many others also occurred, albeit with less spectacular consequences. This raises an important question: if Portugal and Spain were aware of the value of their “national” experts’ nautical expertise, and of how eagerly that expertise was sought by other maritime players such as France, England, and the Dutch Republic, why did they not make more of an effort to prevent this movement? In most cases, pilots, sailors, cartographers, and cosmographers were able to cross formal political boundaries without facing great difficulties. This can be observed in the movement of Columbus between Portugal and Spain, or of Sebastian Cabot (1474–1557) between England and Spain. Intelligence was crucial if a monarch were to halt such migrations, and this is why the attempts of ambassadors and spies to repatriate nautical expertise, best exemplified by Dantas in chapter 4, were critical.


But in the case of Portugal during the 16th century, efforts to repatriate pilots, sailors, cartographers, and cosmographers were often unsuccessful. One of the major reasons for this was that there was a market for competencies readily sought by all maritime players. Any nautical expert was liable to be purchased independently of their home countries’ “national” interests. If Portuguese repatriation efforts often came to nothing, this is primarily due to the fact that by the time attempts were made, it was too late—defecting experts had already been offered better conditions abroad. This was documented in chapter 1 with Ferdinand Magellan, who, despite being approached by Portuguese agents three times while in Spain, nonetheless refused to return to Portugal. The same occurred in France with João Afonso, who was also approached three times, as detailed in chapter 3, and with António Eanes Pinteado, leading to the Portuguese agent’s imprisonment, as discussed in chapter 2. All these cases, as well as the others documented in chapter 4 in connection to ambassador Dantas, easily prove that, during the whole of the 16th century, Portugal never solved the issue at the heart of the problem: providing all Portuguese sailors, pilots, cartographers, and cosmographers with conditions that were attractive enough to retain them in Portuguese service. Indeed, the emigration of Magellan, Afonso, and Pinteado, and of their many lesser known colleagues, were all motivated by quarrels with the Portuguese kings that could easily have been resolved in their earliest phases. Rather than appease their servants at the first signs of trouble, however, the Portuguese kings acted late, in most cases when experts were already abroad and had been offered attractive arrangements. Even when Portugal offered these experts better rewards than they had been offered abroad, they did not seriously consider returning to their homeland because of the perception of being a “traitor” to the Portuguese Crown. The fear of being killed when returning motivated figures such as Pinteado to remain in English service, as stated in chapter 2. Quite likely the same was true for other nautical experts throughout the book, as the Portuguese Crown’s reputation for fierce attempts at secrecy was well-known across Europe in the 16th century. This factor decisively explains why successful repatriations were so rare (as chapter 4 demonstrates) and also elucidates why Portugal had to build up a full and increasingly intense network of spies in Spain, France and England throughout the 16th century. It also explains why the Portuguese Crown lacked a coherent secrecy policy, as the myriad negotiations with previous nautical experts suggest a pattern of adaptability rather than a monolithic approach.

The Portuguese intelligence machine, particularly as documented in chapters 2 and 4, was still surprisingly powerful and often accurate. The mere
existence of such an apparatus reveals that the Portuguese Crown was more than vaguely aware of foreign technical espionage on Portuguese maritime knowledge. It also demonstrates that the Portuguese government knew that controlling maritime knowledge circulation was almost impossible. This is the chief reason why the Portuguese Crown so often collaborated with the Spanish diplomatic and espionage network. But even utilizing intelligence from the Spanish, who obviously had more resources, Portugal still experienced failures. Thus, the Portuguese Crown did not hesitate to consider killing former servants whose nautical knowledge was deemed too dangerous to be shared with maritime rivals, as exemplified by the cases of Ferdinand Magellan in Spain and Portuguese cosmographer André Homem in France and England (discussed in chapters 2 and 4). The growing complexity of Portuguese maritime espionage in Spain, France, and England during the 16th century demonstrates the Portuguese Crown’s recognition of both the difficulty of maintaining secrecy, and the interest of other maritime players in obtaining Portuguese nautical intelligence. Indeed, as early as the 15th century, Portuguese laws reflect such concerns. The same complexity explains the discretion and dissimulation employed by Spanish and French ambassadors in Portugal, as discussed in chapters 1 and 3, when acquiring Portuguese maritime knowledge to transmit to their homelands. As stated, this was another consequence of the Portuguese reputation of fierce attempts at secrecy that was no secret in 16th century Europe.

While it is undeniable that Portugal sought to control the transfer of its nautical experts to its maritime rivals on several occasions, due to attempts to enforce secrecy policies and the sensitivity of Portuguese nautical, cartographical, and geographical knowledge in the hands of Spanish, French, English, or Dutch stakeholders, it is important to reiterate that these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. The intention of these secrecy policies and their actual outcome should not be conflated, as has frequently occurred in past scholarship. I argue that, despite the Portuguese Crown’s well-planned attempts at secrecy vis-à-vis their maritime rivals, it was simply impossible to prevent leaks, particularly as several of the exchanges took place via informal channels and in manuscript form. Moreover, no Portuguese king had the ability to control the movements and knowledge of their nautical experts, as all chapters in this analysis demonstrate.

All of this connects with the words of Sesa quoted at the start of this conclusion: a good Portuguese navigator or pilot would always find employment abroad because of his home country’s renown for cultivating nautical skill in the 16th century. In the 1530s, D. Pedro de Mascarenhas, a Portuguese ambassador to Emperor Charles V (1516–56), wrote to King
John III (1521–57) from Antwerp with an unambiguous admonition: the Portuguese Crown needed to develop a policy for handling the sham nautical experts from Portugal that were appearing in Europe. This was a problem that Mascarenhas had encountered, having earlier been confronted with a Portuguese “pilot” who had been deceiving the French by claiming to possess all of the nautical knowledge inherent in being Portuguese. Despite the ambassador’s efforts, Mascarenhas stated that he was unable to prevent the foreign hiring of such individuals, as the reputation of Portugal abroad was that all pilots born in the country automatically possessed nautical skill. The story of Ambassador Mascarenhas is quite similar to that of the Portuguese pilots Antão Luis and Gaspar Caldeira (as detailed in chapter 4), who also attempted to “sell” their fake nautical expertise in Spain, France, and England, but were finally executed in Lisbon in 1568. Nevertheless, there is no indication that King John III ever followed this advice. On the contrary, the same Portuguese king exploited the “Portuguese pilot” archetype to deploy Lagarto (a false nautical expert and, in reality, a spy) to infiltrate King Francis I’s chamber, discuss the king’s plans for Canada and mislead him with incorrect cartographical knowledge. The continual hiring of Portuguese pilots by France and England, to say nothing of Spain, which was almost an established accepted reality for Portugal from the 1550s onwards, proves how this archetype prevailed.

This is precisely what has been documented in all chapters of this book: when the time came for Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic to launch their overseas expansion, Portuguese nautical knowledge was more than simply welcome: it was fully desired and needed. The continual hiring of Portuguese pilots by France, England, and Spain in the 16th century highlights the prevalent image of Portugal as a source of valuable nautical knowledge. This is further evidenced by the frequent hiring of Portuguese pilots by these maritime players even in disguise to avoid diplomatic conflicts with Portugal, as discussed in chapters 1, 3, and 4.

The problem of controlling the circulation of “national” nautical experts was not unique to Portugal. Other maritime powers, such as Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic, also faced similar challenges. Examples such as Sebastian Cabot’s move to England, Jean Rotz’s and Jean Ribault’s careers between France and England, and the English pilot John Davis in England and the Dutch Republic illustrate how this struggle was identical for all maritime rivals. Ironically, open maritime rivals were affected by processes of acquisition and betrayal of nautical experts. This in itself was another consequence

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of the fact that maritime milieus in Europe, already in the 16th century, were international by nature with several “nationalities” living alongside each other and sharing knowledge in several global port cities of Europe. Although the Portuguese kings were the first to face this challenge, their deep awareness of, and concerns with regard to, the consequences of nautical knowledge circulation were very similar to those of later monarchs such as Charles I and Philip II in Spain, Francis I, Henry II, and Admiral Coligny in France, queens such as Mary I and Elizabeth I in England, and Prince Maurice of Nassau in the Dutch Republic. In these processes of maritime knowledge circulation, formal maritime rivals were powerless to control the circulation of knowledge, whether it favored or threatened their interests. If this book has primarily examined this reality for Portuguese maritime knowledge circulation, the same could be applied to other European maritime players such as Spain, France, England, and the Dutch Republic in their own chronologies. Despite the power and influence of historical figures relayed in this book (such as Kings Philip II, Henry II, Admiral Coligny, Queen Elizabeth I, and Prince Maurice of Nassau), none were able to effectively control the circulation of maritime knowledge. Any attempts at secrecy, regardless of the context or motivation, were ultimately doomed to failure, a theme that has been consistently documented in the book.

However, at the beginning of the 16th century, as Portugal was the realm that had already accumulated a century of nautical expertise and the other maritime players were starting to set out on their overseas attempts, the problem of the movement of Portuguese nautical experts to Spain, France, and England became much more acute for Portugal than the equivalent was for the other powers. This fact was inextricably connected to the global scale of 16th-century Iberian navigations, as some of the authors mentioned in the introduction have stressed. As Iberian sailors made voyages in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, a routine exercise during this century, oceans became a global avenue for communication and exchange between different geographical spaces. When early French, English, and Dutch overseas projects took shape, they not only sought to emulate Iberian precedents, but drew benefit from this nautical interchange that was unfolding in Europe (chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4), overseas (chapter 5), and at sea (chapters 1 and 5).

The globalization process sparked by the first trans-oceanic voyages in the 16th century, which reached maturity during the 17th century, meant that the Global Ocean became synonymous with Global Knowledge. To master oceanic navigation, as the French, the English, and the Dutch quickly understood, required absorbing the Iberians’ accumulated experience and
the knowledge they had amassed in the form of nautical rutters, nautical cartography, important cosmographical and nautical treatises, and, if possible, Iberian nautical experts. Once these conditions were met, and once commercial or political support for the journey was forthcoming (for example for the English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s or the first Dutch voyages to Asia in the 1590s), success was within reach. Thus, nautical knowledge transfers became critical in the processes of maritime knowledge circulation but also in early attempts to the emulate overseas voyages. It is precisely at this point that the contribution of the circulation of Portuguese nautical experts throughout Europe and its impact on early modern European science needs to be considered.

Now that the circulation of Iberian maritime knowledge has been conclusively demonstrated, the impact of these transmissions of Portuguese nautical expertise to the recipient maritime players can be assessed. In cases such as those of Ferdinand Magellan, João Afonso, António Eanes Pinteado, and Jan Huygen van Linschoten, clear examples were provided of how Portuguese knowledge affected the maritime players in question. Without Magellan, Spain would not have organized what became the first circumnavigation of the world. Without João Afonso, the establishment of the Dieppe cartographical school in France would have been delayed at best. Because of Pinteado’s contributions, England was able to launch successful voyages to West Africa in the 1550s. Likewise, Jan Huygen van Linschoten jumpstarted Dutch overseas expansion. In each of these four examples (as with the others detailed in this book), the pivotal role of Portuguese nautical knowledge is unmistakable. This itself is another consequence of the process of globalization, triggered precisely by Iberian overseas navigations across the globe. This should also be factored into historiographical considerations concerning global maritime histories in the early modern period, the history of scientific knowledge interchanges between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe, and the rise of early modern science.

In conclusion, the long-term effects of Portuguese nautical knowledge circulation on European overseas expansion are evident, particularly in the 16th century when Portugal reached the pinnacle of its maritime power. When Portugal lost its maritime hegemony to northern European powers in the 17th century, the impact of Portuguese nautical knowledge remained significant in French, English, and Dutch overseas enterprises. Portuguese nautical rutters and cartography continued to be eagerly sought across Europe. Théodore de Godefroy (1580–1649), one of King Louis XIII’s (1610–43) archivists and historians, possessed nautical materials pertaining to the Portuguese and the Spanish, including a French translation of Vicente
Rodrigues's nautical rutter;¹¹ Melchisédech Thevenot, King Louis XIV’s (1643–1715) librarian, was filled with Portuguese nautical knowledge;¹² in England, Robert Cotton (1571–1631) had a full collection of the main 16th-century Portuguese nautical rutters; and in the Dutch Republic, Gerard John Voosius (1577–1649), even at the end of 17th century, after a century of nautical and scientific development, openly praised Fernando Oliveira’s nautical works and expertise.¹³ Other telling instances of Portuguese nautical knowledge being employed, quoted, and lauded have been identified for the 17th and the 18th century.¹⁴ Again, like so many other instances in this book, this is not a coincidence. Despite the defeat of its attempts at enforcing a Mare Clausum, Portugal’s nautical knowledge remained valid and advanced for several geographical regions of the world.

If it is true that Portugal’s geographical location in the extreme west of Europe was not the best to facilitate knowledge interchanges, unlike for instance France’s, Germany’s or Italy’s central geographical position in Europe, it should be kept in mind that this did not prevent Portuguese nautical knowledge circulation in Europe. This circulation took the form not only of the movement of Portuguese nautical experts but also of the mailbags of those classical protagonists of the history of knowledge who, for any reason, like Van Linschoten, became interested in Portuguese nautical knowledge: travelers, spies, merchants, ambassadors, and seamen. Thus, the final conclusion that needs to be underlined once more is that Portuguese nautical knowledge was circulating within Europe with such intensity and in overwhelming numbers that it is simply impossible to consider that these processes did not have a direct influence on Spanish, French, English, and Dutch overseas expansion. There was no official systematic policy on the part of the Portuguese Crown that could prevent this type of circulation, and even in the periods when this policy can most easily be documented, Portuguese maritime knowledge circulation remained uncontrolled. As has been highlighted in several studies on the history of knowledge, this was an

¹¹ Bibliothèque de L’Institut de France (BLF), Godefroy 68, fl. 98–127.
¹³ Voosius’s reference to Fernando de Oliveira is found in the forthcoming critical edition of Oliveira’s Ars Nautica, which will be published as the third volume of Oliveira’s collected works. The edition will be produced by Henrique Leitão and José Carlos Lopes de Miranda and will be published by Gulbenkian in 2024.
¹⁴ On this topic see: José Manuel Malhão Pereira, Os roteiros e a expansão marítima europeia (offprint from Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, 2017).
inescapable result of the fact that knowledge is by its nature uncontrollable. With each piece of Portuguese maritime knowledge that moved to Europe in the 16th century, the seeds for the emergence of new maritime powers were sowed. In a way, these nautical knowledge exchanges also contributed to the rise and dissemination of scientific practices, especially on nautical matters, which in turn contributed to the emergence of modern science in Europe. Here, as all the instances presented show, the Portuguese example in terms of the mechanisms of maritime knowledge circulation and transmission reflects a reality that still needs to be researched more: not simply in the form of more studies on Portuguese exchanges with Europe, but also on other relevant maritime knowledge exchanges, such as the Anglo-French or the Anglo-Dutch.

Portuguese nautical knowledge circulated and deeply affected other maritime players, prompting them to emulate the Iberian model for overseas expansion. But to write this history (of which this book is merely the beginning), both maritime history and history of knowledge approaches must be brought into play. Only then can the interrelations between Portuguese (and more broadly, Iberian) maritime knowledge and its contributions to early modern science be brought into focus.

15 Secord, "Knowledge in Transit"; Burke, Social History of Knowledge.
Illustrations

Illustration 1 – Francisco Faleiro’s nautical treatise published in 1535 in Seville. Francisco Faleiro, Tratado del Esphera y del arte del marear, en Seuilla: en la imprenta de Juan cromberger, 1535.
Illustration 3 – Opening page of the manuscript version of André Pires’s seamanship book that Jean Nicot brought to France after his embassy in Portugal. The frontpage indicates that the manuscript belonged to Nicot’s personal library.

BnF, *Portugais* 40: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10032271c/f2.item.r=Portugais%2040
Illustration 4 – Frontispiece of Gabriel Pereira’s missive to Ambassador João Pereira Dantas, dated August 1567, on his attempts to persuade the “traitors” Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira to abandon John Hawkins’s preparations for his third voyage. Corpo Cronológico, Parte I, n.º 108, n.º 74 PT/TT/CC/1/108/74 https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/details?id=3781770 “Imagem cedida pelo ANTT”
Illustration 5 – First Dutch edition of Jan Huygen van Linschoten’s *Itinerario*, printed in 1596.
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Following recent historiographical appeals on the need to study knowledge exchanges between European maritime rivals and their impact on overseas expansionist processes, this book makes this study for the Portuguese overseas empire between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. As the first European maritime power to systematically launch long-distance voyages, Portugal became a model worth emulation when Spain, France, England and the Dutch Republic started their own overseas enterprises. In different chapters that each adopt a case study relation (Portugal-Spain, Portugal-England, Portugal-France and Portugal-Dutch Republic), this book documents how Portuguese maritime knowledge was outsourced by its maritime rivals. The impact that Portuguese nautical knowledge had is evaluated, resorting particularly to a wide range of diplomatic and espionage documents. Finally, the book discusses the alleged Iberian secrecy policies regarding maritime knowledge, explaining why there is no serious reason to consider their success.

Nuno Vila-Santa is a post-doctoral fellow from the RUTTER project founded by the European Research Council. His main works deal with the history of the Portuguese overseas empire in Asia and with Portuguese connections to Europe in the sixteenth century.